TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) CLASSIFICATION and consequent placement of private horticulture nurseries in Tariff Schedule L. T. 3 of the Karnataka electricity Board Tariff, 1990 is what has been called in question in this writ petition. The classification and grouping of such nurseries with commercial establishments like Nursing Homes, hotels, Bars, Kalyana Mantaps, Clubs etc. , is invidious, artificial and impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, is the burden of the challenge mounted by the petitioner, who claims to be more akin to those grouped together and placed under Tariff Schedule L. T. 4-A applicable to agricultural pumpsets and pumpsets used for forest nurseries, plantations, and gardens etc. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is engaged in horticultural activities like growing of plants and flowers, preservation of pollen, germination, breeding and production of seeds in scientific conditions, raising and improving the quality of hybrid seeds, rearing of ornamental and flower yielding plants, etc. It owns farm Glasshouses and a vegetable Farm where it undertakes growing of plants and flowers in controlled humidity and temperature. Several pumpsets used for lifting water required for the seed testing laboratory and for irrigation have been installed by it. According to the petitioner, the activities undertaken by it, are horticulture activities of Agro horticulture programmes. A certificate issued in its favour by Professor and head of the Department of horticulture, University of agricultural Sciences, Bangalore ha9 been produced by it in this connection to support this claim. ( 3 ) THE respondent-Board has in exercise of the powers vested in it under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, framed and promulgated a Tariff made effective from the 6th september, 1990 according to which private horticulture nurseries have been classified and placed under Tariff Schedule l. T. 3 generally applicable to commercial establishments like nursing. Homes, Banks, Clubs, Restaurants, Studies Guest houses etc. , Tariff Bills issued by the Board under Tariff schedule L. T. 3 have been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition besides assailing the classification of private horticulture nurseries and their placement under the said Schedule L. T. 3. Homes, Banks, Clubs, Restaurants, Studies Guest houses etc. , Tariff Bills issued by the Board under Tariff schedule L. T. 3 have been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition besides assailing the classification of private horticulture nurseries and their placement under the said Schedule L. T. 3. It is contended that exclusion of private horticulture nurseries from Tariff Schedule L. T. 4-A and their inclusion in Tariff L. T. 3 is offensive to Article 14 of the constitution of India not only because the petitioner's activities do not partake the character of commercial activities carried on by establishments grouped together in the said schedule but also because the classification made and the inclusion of horticulture nurseries in the said schedule is in bad faith. ( 4 ) IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent the challenge to the classification has been refuted and the allegations of malice and bad faith stoutly denied. It is contended that Tariff fixation is a legislative function and that it is neither the function nor the forte of the Court to critically examine or refix the same. The revision in the Tariff, it is stated was made on the basis of recommendations of a Committee constituted by the Board with one of its former Chairman, as the chairman of the Committee besides five other members representing various interests including Industry, Commerce, agriculture, domestic, users and specialists in Rural development. It is urged that constitution of Tariff Committee even though not a statutory requirement was all the same deemed appropriate with a view to dispassionately evolve a tariff structure that would be fair to all sections besides helping the Board to reduce its losses. The Committee it is pointed out, invited suggestions from the members of the public and after deliberating upon the same, recommended an upward revision. A decision to revise the Tariff consistently with the recommendations of the Committee was taken and the matter forwarded to the Government for its approval. On receipt of the approval, the revised Tariff was made effective from 6th september, 1990. The classification made is according to the board perfectly justified and permissible under the Constitution, calling for no interference from this Court. On receipt of the approval, the revised Tariff was made effective from 6th september, 1990. The classification made is according to the board perfectly justified and permissible under the Constitution, calling for no interference from this Court. ( 5 ) THE classification in question placing private horticul turenur series under Tariff Schedule L. T. 3 was questioned in M/s. M. Devappa and Sons v Karnataka Electricity Board and another. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in p. M. Ashwathanarayana Setty and Others v State of Karnataka and Others and in State of Gujarat and Another v Ambica Mills limited, Ahmedabad, Babu, J. , repelled the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that the classification in question was offensive to Article 14. It was observed that the question whether maintenance of nurseries is in the sphere of horticulture or a part of agriculture as also the question whether horticulture could stand as a separate class were matters which have to be examined by the respondent-Board while framing the tariff. It was further held that the question as to whether there has been any sub-classification was immaterial so long as the classification actually made was consistent with Article 14 of the constitution. The view taken by the learned Judge was upheld even by the Division Bench in W. A. No. 12742 of 1991. ( 6 ) IN the ordinary course and as a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction I am bound by the view taken by my noble and learned Brother Babu, J. , in the above case. Mr. Hegde, appearing for the petitioner however made a valiant bid to show that the view taken by this Court in Devappa's case, supra, was not in tune with the law declared by the Supreme Court. The argument advanced by Mr. Hegde, was primarily aimed at showing that the activities in which the petitioner is engaged are no different from agricultural activities which were more favourably placed in the matter of rate applicable to them under tariff Schedule L. T. 4. It was contended that out of a variety of activities that could be called agricultural activities in a wider sense, only horticulture activities had been singled out for a hostile treatment impermissible under Article 14 of the constitution. It was contended that out of a variety of activities that could be called agricultural activities in a wider sense, only horticulture activities had been singled out for a hostile treatment impermissible under Article 14 of the constitution. Alternatively it was urged that even if horticulture activities could be classified differently from other agricultural activities yet, the same could not be placed along side or grouped together with the commercial activities like Hotels, Clubs, cinemas etc. , which had absolutely no similarity or affinity with the activity undertaken by the petitioner. ( 7 ) BEFORE dealing with the merits of the submissions made by Mr. Hegde, it is necessary to preface any discussion on the subject relating to classification made by the Legislature or a legislative body like the Board in matters involving fiscal measures. While it is true that classifications made for the purposes of fiscal legislations or the like are not totally immune from a challenge on the ground of discrimination opposed to article 14, yet the Courts have conceded in favour of the legislature or bodies discharging any legislative functions dealing with classifications for fiscal purposes the widest latitude. That is so because of the inherently complex and difficult task of bringing about classifications which may be in all situations, free from any criticism. "the Court must be aware of its own remoteness and incapacity to inform itself fully about the peculiarities of a situation. In utilities tax and economic regulation cases there are good reasons for judicial self restraint if not, official difference to legislative judgment" said the supreme Court in Ambica Mill's case, supra. "merely because a tax falls more heavily on some in the same category is not by itself a ground to render the law invalid. It is only when within the range of its selection the law operates unequally and cannot be justified on the basis of a valid classification that there would be a violation of Article 14" declared the Supreme Court in income Tax Officer, Shillong and Another v N. Takin Roy rymbai. The legal position was succinctly summed up by venkatachalia J. , as his lordship then was in P. M. Ashwathanarayana Setty's case, supra, speaking for the Court he observed:"the problem is indeed, a complex one nor free from its own peculiar difficulties. The legal position was succinctly summed up by venkatachalia J. , as his lordship then was in P. M. Ashwathanarayana Setty's case, supra, speaking for the Court he observed:"the problem is indeed, a complex one nor free from its own peculiar difficulties. Though other legislative measures dealing with economic regulation are not outside article 14, it is well-recognised that the State enjoys the widest latitude where measures of economic regulation are concerned. These measures for fiscal and economic regulation involve an evaluation of diverse and quite often conflicting economic criteria and adjustment and balancing of various conflicting social and economic values and interests. It is for the State to decide what economic and social policy it should pursue and what discriminations advance those special and economic policies. In view of the inherent complexity of those fiscal adjustments, Courts give a large discretion to the legislature in the matter of its preferences of economic and social policies and effectuate the chosen system in all possible and reasonable ways. If two or more methods of adjustments of an economic measure are available, the legislative preference in favour of one of them cannot be questioned on the ground of lack of legislative wisdom or that the method adopted is not the best or that there were better ways of adjusting the competing interests claims. The legislature possesses the greatest freedom in such areas. The analogy of principles of the burden of tax may not also be inapposite in dealing with the validity of the distribution of the burden of a 'fee' as well". Let us now turn to the case at hand. Shorn of rhetoric and legal embroidery the case of the petitioner is that horticultural activities undertaken by it which it prefers to call Agro horticultural activities are in no way different from the agricultural activities and would fall within the embrace of the later in its wider meaning. Stated differently the argument advanced is that if horticulture is a part of agriculture, it is impermissible to sub classify the activities for purposes of charging the power Tariff, and any such subclassification made would fall foul of the constitutional pledge of equality. The contention urged must fail for two distinct reasons. Stated differently the argument advanced is that if horticulture is a part of agriculture, it is impermissible to sub classify the activities for purposes of charging the power Tariff, and any such subclassification made would fall foul of the constitutional pledge of equality. The contention urged must fail for two distinct reasons. Firstly because, the question whether the term agriculture would include horticulture also would in a great measure depend upon the provisions of the Act or the regulation where the same have been used. In the absence of any definition of the term 'agriculture' or 'agriculture pumps' as the same appears in the Tariff Schedule L. T. 4-A the expression will have to be understood in a narrow sense, so as not to include horticultural activities carried on by private nursery owners. This is so because the Tariff Regulations make a distinction between agriculture pumps and those used by the Horticultural nurseries. It follows that the Rule making authority did not use the word agriculture or agriculture pumps in the wider sense so as to include all activities like horticulture, forestry, dairying, husbandary etc. The classification of agriculture pumps under one head, and horticulture under the other manifests the legislative intent of drawing a distinction between the two. In any such situations it cannot be said that one would necessarily include the other; for if that were so in the wisdom of the legislative body framing the regulation; they would not have been placed in two categories. ( 8 ) SECONDLY because, even if the expression agriculture may be interpreted liberally so as to include horticulture the same would not mean that the legislature or a legislative body like the respondent-Board in the instant case would be precluded from classifying them differently for purposes of power tariff. It cannot be denied that in a narrow sense the two activities are distinctly different. While agriculture signifies any activity which is related to cultivation of the field horticulture relates to the art and science of gardening. See Smt. Kasturi (dead) by l. Rs. v Gaon Sabha. A discernible dissimilarity thus exists between the two types of activities which would provide a sound basis for a valid classification for it is settled that so long as an intelligible differentia exists, between things and articles grouped together and others kept out of the group the same would be legally permissible. v Gaon Sabha. A discernible dissimilarity thus exists between the two types of activities which would provide a sound basis for a valid classification for it is settled that so long as an intelligible differentia exists, between things and articles grouped together and others kept out of the group the same would be legally permissible. ( 9 ) COMING then to the question of a nexus between the classification and the object sought to be achieved it is apparent that there is a clear nexus between the two. The Board has in making a classification, imposed a lower charge upon agriculture pumpsets and forest nurseries, while subjecting private horticultural nurseries to a relatively higher Tariff. The object behind the classification obviously is that horticultural nurseries which are run by private managements like the petitioner being in the nature of commercial enterprises need not be compared with and given the benefits being extended to agriculture pumpsets and forest nurseries. The later have been given encouragement and protection which the former does not in the wisdom of legislative body deserve. So long as the classification is not unconstitutional by the standards which are now well-recognised, the wisdom behind the making of the same is beyond the purview of judicial scrutiny. As to whether horticulture should be dealt with by the same yard stick as agriculture is a matter for the State or its policy makers to decide. In the event of the State deciding to deal with them differently this Court would be concerned only with finding out whether the classification made for any such differential treatment is based on a rational differentia. If the answer be in the affirmative and a reasonable nexus be established between the classification and the object sought to be achieved the Court would decline to interfere. ( 10 ) RELIANCE was placed by Mr. Hegde upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala Hotel and Restaurant Association and others v State of Kerala and Others, and in particular the following observations made in the same:"a catena of decisions was cited at the bar on the point relating to valid classification and the test to be applied when hostile discrimination is alleged. It is not necessary to refer to all those decisions which state the settled principles not in dispute even before us. It is not necessary to refer to all those decisions which state the settled principles not in dispute even before us. The difficulty really is in the application of settled principles to the facts of each case. It is settled that classification founded on intelligible differentia is permitted provided the classification made has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In other words, those, grouped together must possess a common characteristic justifying their inclusion in the group, but distinguishing them from those excluded; and performance of this exercise must bear a rational nexus with the reason for the exercise". It was argued that not only should therebe a dissimilarity between items placed in two groups, but there should be some similarity between those that are placed in one group. Seen thus, the placement of private horticulture nurseries under one head along with other commercial establishments was according to the learned Counsel, legally impermissible and discriminatory as there was no similarity what so ever between the consumers that were placed in the group under L. T. 3 and the horticultural nurseries as such. There is no substance in this submission either. It is true that treating unequals as equals is also one form of discrimination, but then the question is whether the grouping of horticultural nurseries, with commercial establishments like Hotels, Clubs, Kalyana Mantaps, Nursing Homes is tantamount to any such invidious classification. It is apparent that each one of the establishments brought under L. T. 3 is a commercial establishment. So also are private horticulture nurseries like the one being run and managed by the petitioner. It cannot be disputed that the nurseries established and run by the petitioner are a pure and simple commercial venture the dominant object behind which is exploitation of the advanced scientific techniques in the field of horticulture development with an eye on making profit, by running the entire establishment on a commercial scale. It is thus different from an agriculturist using electrical energy for irrigating his field from which he ekes out a living for himself and his family. There is no qualitative difference between horticulture nurseries and other commercial establishment with which the same is grouped for purposes of the tariff. The decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Hegde, does not lay down a proposition different from the one recognised in the judgments referred to earlier. There is no qualitative difference between horticulture nurseries and other commercial establishment with which the same is grouped for purposes of the tariff. The decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Hegde, does not lay down a proposition different from the one recognised in the judgments referred to earlier. As a matter of fact their Lordships have clearly ruled that so long as there is a discernible dissimilarity between those grouped together and othersleft out of the group, the classification cannot be held to be bad. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances I see no reasons to take a view different from the one taken by Babu, J. in M. Devappa's case, supra and would dismiss this writ petition with costs assessed at rs. 2,000/ -. --- *** --- .