Research › Browse › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1996 DIGILAW 61 (MP)

Commissioner Of Wealth Tax v. Meghji Girdharilal.

1996-01-12

A.R.TIWARI

body1996
ORDER A. R. TIWARI, J. : These connected five reference applications, presented by the CWT, Bhopal under s. 27(3) of the WT Act, 1957, raise a common question of law as extracted below : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that s. 5(1)(viii) of the WT Act, 1957 would be applicable to the assessees case for the asst. yr. 1966-67 to 1970-71 ?" 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the value of certain gold ornament/silver ornaments weighing 20.200 kgs. was included by the WTO in computation of wealth of the assessee. The assessee filed an appeal before the CWT(A). The appellate authority held that the gold ornament/silver ornaments weighing 20.200 kgs. belonged to three ladies, namely, Dirsubai, Laxmibai and Chandrabai and as such they were entitled for personal or household use within the meaning of s. 5(1)(viii) of the WT Act, 1957. He, therefore, deleted this property from the wealth of the assessee. Against this appellate order, WTO filed appeals for asst. yrs. 1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1970-71, registered respectively as WTA Nos. 60/Ind/87, 61/Ind/87, 62/Ind/87, 63/Ind/87 and 64/Ind/87. The Tribunal dismissed all these appeals by common order dt. 24th Aug., 1988. Thereafter the applicant filed applications under s. 27(1) of the WT Act, 1957 and sought statement of the case and reference of the proposed question. The reference applications, registered as RA Nos. 76 to 80/Indore/1988 arising out of the orders passed in appeals, WTA Nos. 60 to 64/Indore/1987 for asst. yrs. 1966-67 to 1970-71, were dismissed on 16th Nov., 1989 holding that the orders of the Tribunal are based on the decision of this Court and as such no referable question arose. Aggrieved by the order of rejection and main order of the Tribunal, the applicant has filed these five reference applications for five separate assessment years, as noted above, under s. 27(3) of the WT Act, 1957. 3. At that stage, the special leave petition, filed by the Department, against the decision of this Court, linchpin of the orders of the Tribunal, was pending in the apex Court. 4. We have heard Shri D. D. Vyas, learned counsel for the applicant/Department and Shri S. C. Goyal, learned counsel for the non-applicant/assessee in all these cases. 5. 3. At that stage, the special leave petition, filed by the Department, against the decision of this Court, linchpin of the orders of the Tribunal, was pending in the apex Court. 4. We have heard Shri D. D. Vyas, learned counsel for the applicant/Department and Shri S. C. Goyal, learned counsel for the non-applicant/assessee in all these cases. 5. Shri Vyas submitted that the decision of this Court has since been overruled by the apex Court by decision rendered in CWT vs. Smt. Binapani Chakravarty (1995) 214 ITR 721 (SC) and as such the question as proposed is a question of law and is required to be referred by the Tribunal. According to Shri Vyas the Tribunal was not justified in holding that s. 5(1)(viii) of the WT Act, 1957 would be applicable to the assessees case for the asst. yrs. 1966-67 to 1970-71. 6. Shri Goyal, on the other hand, submitted that even when it is held, on following the decision of Smt. Binapani (supra), that s. 5(1)(viii) of the Act is not attracted to the case of the assessee for the assessment years in question and exemption is unavailable to it, then also there is no necessity of statement of the case and reference of the proposed question to this Court for opinion because Department has already added the property in question to the wealth of the person other than the assessee and hence nothing turns for or against the parties in any case. He thus contended that further pursuit of the cases by the Department is an exercise in futility because of non-liability of addition of property to the account of the assessee, independent of s. 5(1)(viii) of the Act. 7. Faced with this branch of the argument, Shri Vyas contended that the aforesaid aspect is not considered by the Tribunal. At that stage, the Department had sought reference because of pendency of special leave petition against the decision of this Court on which the orders of the Tribunal had rested and, on rejection of the prayer, it filed these applications to keep the issue alive. At that stage, the Department had sought reference because of pendency of special leave petition against the decision of this Court on which the orders of the Tribunal had rested and, on rejection of the prayer, it filed these applications to keep the issue alive. Now that the base and basis of the orders are vanished due to reversal of the decision of this Court by the apex Court, direction deserves to be made to the Tribunal to consider the utility or futility of the aforesaid point, as noted in para 6 above, and state the case and refer the question for all these assessment years, if it is felt and found by the Tribunal that opinion of this Court is still necessary to do complete justice between the parties. 8. The aforesaid plea of qualified direction is not oppugned by Shri Goyal. 9. This Court is not required to touch the point not placed before the Tribunal and is not to opine where silence is gold. The object behind reference is to seek opinion so that legal question receives the answer and parties to the lis obtain justice in conformity with the answer. Justice is the eventual destination of the litigation. Lord Mansfield in Rex vs. Wikes elegantly exhorted that "Fiat justitia et ruant coeli". (Let justice be done, though the heavens fall). 10. Luculently there ought not to be a contest on academic basis alone yielding no result in the cases on hand. We, therefore, issue direction but with liberty to the Tribunal to examine the point and purpose in the light of submissions urged before us. 11. This Court, as held in S. P. Gramophone Co. vs. CIT AIR 1986 SC 1152 , is empowered to reframe question and focus attention on real issue. 12. In view of the decision of the apex Court, overruling the decision, fulcrum of the orders of the Tribunal, of this Court, we find it fit to allow these reference applications in terms indicated below : (a) The Tribunal shall hear both the sides on the point, raised on behalf of the assessee and chronicled in para 6 above and shall decide whether or not reference is still necessary and opinion is essential in the interests of justice. (b) The Tribunal, on reaching the conclusion in the affirmative, shall state the cases and refer the above stated common question of law concerning the assessee and the asst. yrs. 1966-67 to 1970-71. (c) To keep the parties immune from any possible injury, the aggrieved party shall have freedom to resort to s. 27(3) of the Act, if sufficient grounds permitted that course. 13. The Tribunal shall comply with this conditional direction of reference if found necessary, within six months from the receipt of the copy of this order. 14. Our direction, qualified one and born of the prayer of both the sides as noted above, aims at promoting the cause of justice and perishing occasion, if any, of probable injury to both the sides. It is trite position that law and justice are not distant neighbours. 15. All these reference applications are thus allowed as above with no order as to costs. Counsel fee is, however, fixed at Rs. 750 in each case for each side, if certified. 16. Transmit a copy of this order to the Tribunal immediately. 17. Retain this order in Misc. Civil Case No. 86 of 1990 and place its copy each in the connected Misc. Civil Cases for ready reference.