Judgment : N. ARUMUGHAM. J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered by the Second Additional Special Judge, Madras Division, in C. C. No. 42 of 1992 dated 7- 10-1993 against the accused appellant, finding him guilty for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and whereupon, sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year with the fine of Rs. 1, 000/-in default of payment of which, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months. ( 2 ) THE gravamen of the charge against the accused/appellant by the prosecution is extracted as follows: The accused who is the appellant was the grade I Executive Officer of Arulmighu Venkatesa Perumal Thirukkoil, being maintained and organised by a mutt popularly known as Biragi Madam, situated in Madras town, which owns the property and premises bearing Mumber 18, Veerappan Street at Sowcarpet, Madras. During the year 1991, P. W. 2 Thiru Sekar alongwith his brother and father was the occupant of a portion of the said premises as tenant and he was doing plastic business in a portion of the same. The said building consisted of six portions out of which, it has been stated that two portions were in the occupation of his deceased father till his life time and another portion was standing in the name of his brother Arunachalam for tenancy and that since his father died in the year 1983, one portion of his father was transferred to his brothers name and another was transferred to the name of this witness in the year 1990. Therefore, P. W. 2 was deemed to be tenant of one portion and also another portion in the name of his father and after his fathers death, the portion occupied by his father was divided into two and both were sublet to one laundry and one sweet stall and the quantum of the rent for all the three portions was Rs. 1,860/-and the said quantum of rent was being paid by P. W. 2 himself. On 25-2-1991, a notice was issued to all the tenants in the said premises demanding the payment of the rent with 100 percent enhancement and the copy served to P. W. 2 is Ex. P. 2 and Ex. 1,860/-and the said quantum of rent was being paid by P. W. 2 himself. On 25-2-1991, a notice was issued to all the tenants in the said premises demanding the payment of the rent with 100 percent enhancement and the copy served to P. W. 2 is Ex. P. 2 and Ex. P. 3 is another copy served in the name of his father and for which, the tenants association decided to pay the rent with the enhancement by 10 per cent alone and accordingly, each tenant has given the reply individually and Ex. P. 4 and Ex. P. 5 are the replies sent by P. W. 2 for himself and on behalf of his deceased father respectively. Subsequently, the President of the tenants association was stated, to have talked over with the temple authorities and arrived at a consensus to increase the rent by 33-1/3 per cent for those who were tenants for more than three years and for those who were for lesser period at 25 per cent. P. W. 2 has claimed further that he was sent for by the appellant on 6-9- 1991 at about 3 p. m. on that day and when he met the appellant, he was informed that the enhancement of the rent by 33-1/3 per cent was not adequate and that however he was insisted to-pay the enhanced rent with 50 per cent increase for the portion in his occupation and for which P. W. 2 has declined, that the accused enhanced the rent for the shop in the name of P. W. 2 by 25 per cent and for the shop in the name of his father by 33-1/3 per cent and for which, the accused/appellant demanded a sum of Rs. 6,000/-as bribe. P. W. 2 had responded not to pay the said amount of Rs. 6,000/-, which was not amenable for him. Therefore, it was the case of P. W. 2 that the appellant had called for Govindan, the Clerk P. W. 4 and directed him to quantify the arrears for two months for himself and his father and that accordingly. P. W. 4 quantified the arrears for himself and on behalf of his father at Rs. 6,680/- in all under Ex. P. 6 series. The demand thus made by the appellant/accused according to P. W. 2 is the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 6,680/- plus Rs. P. W. 4 quantified the arrears for himself and on behalf of his father at Rs. 6,680/- in all under Ex. P. 6 series. The demand thus made by the appellant/accused according to P. W. 2 is the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 6,680/- plus Rs. 6,000/-as bribe to be paid on or before 19-9-1991 for having fixed the enhancement of rent by 25 per cent for P. W. 2 himself and the enhancement of rent for the portion in the name of his father by 33-1/3 per cent and acknowledging the said consensus, the accused/appellant had obtained two consent letters from P. W. 2, which have been marked as Ex. P. 7 and Ex. P. 8 and that P. W. 4 was present at that time. Twelve days after, on 18-9-1991 at about 4 p. m. P. W. 2 claims to have met the accused and expressed his inability to pay Rs. 6,000/-as bribe and for which, the accused/appellant had asked him to come with Rs. 4,000/-as bribe and with the arrears of rent quantified on the previous occasion to be paid on or before the next day before 4 p. m. , failing which, threatened to impose rentals with 50 per cent increase. ( 3 ) THE above threat probably made P. W. 2 to decide not to pay the bribe and consequently, on the next day, at about 1. 10 p. m. he gave a written complaint Ex. P. 9 to P. W. 9, which is the original First Information Report in this case. On his lodging the complaint, P. W. 9 brought P. W. 3 by name Radhakrishnan and another Rajagopalan and as per his instructions, P. W. 2 handed over the amounts Rs. 4,000/- and Rs. 6,680/- which he had brought each separately. The amount of Rs. 4,000/- consisted of seven leaves of 500 rupees denominations and five leaves of 100 rupees denominations. P. W. 9 noted down the numbers in all the currencies and asked P. W. 3 and Rajagopalan to count the amount of Rs. 4,000/-and then to dip their fingers in the sodium carbonate solution kept in two separate glass tumblers. There was no change in the colour of the solution. Phenolpthalein powder was smeared on the currency notes and the witnesses were again asked to count them and they dipped their fingers in the solution in the glass tumblers. 4,000/-and then to dip their fingers in the sodium carbonate solution kept in two separate glass tumblers. There was no change in the colour of the solution. Phenolpthalein powder was smeared on the currency notes and the witnesses were again asked to count them and they dipped their fingers in the solution in the glass tumblers. The solution turned pink in colour. The phenolpthalein test was explained to them. The bribe amount was directed to be kept in his shirt pocket and to be given to the accused, on his demand. P. W. 2 was asked to keep the amount relating to arrears of rent in his pant pocket. After adequate instructions to the witnesses, a mahazar detailing the whole episode Ex. P. 10 was prepared, attested by P. W. 2, P. W. 3 and another witness. At about 4. 20 p. m. on 19-91991 they had been to the place of the accused in the temple. When they reached the office of the accused at about 4. 45 p. m. he was not there but however P. W. 4 was present. At that time P. W. 4 is said to have stated that the accused was not available and P. W. 2 could hand over the money to him and go away. It was at this time, the telephone rang and P. W. 4 responded and from the talk P. W. 2 learnt that it was the accused who had instructed P. W. 4 and when he was given the receiver of the telephone and informed the accused that he had come there with money, it was claimed that the accused had some other Job and therefore, he had asked P. W. 2 to come to Senkazhuneer Amman Temple. After having intimated the other witnesses, P. W. 2 alongwith P. W. 3 had been to the Senkazhuneer Amman Temple followed by the other witnesses including P. W. 9. When P. W. 2 reached the temple at about 5. 45 p. m. on that day, the accused was in his room alongwith one Subramaniam Thakkar of the said temple. After having introduced P. W. 3 to the accused as his uncle, P. W. 2 claims that he paid a sum of Rs. When P. W. 2 reached the temple at about 5. 45 p. m. on that day, the accused was in his room alongwith one Subramaniam Thakkar of the said temple. After having introduced P. W. 3 to the accused as his uncle, P. W. 2 claims that he paid a sum of Rs. 6,680/-and the accused after having counted and verified the same asked him as to where was the other money he had demanded and that immediately he gave the sum of Rs. 4,000/- kept in his shirt pocket separately. Having received the same by the right hand, the accused/appellant counted and verified the amount and tied with a rubber band and kept them in his rexine bag M. O. 2. Then P. W. 2 has stated that he made a demand to the accused to reduce that amount and for which the accused replied that his demand itself was very low. Then the accused had instructed P. W. 2 to inform the temple of his having paid the rent and to get the receipt and that accordingly, he gave instruction to P. W. 4 over telephone for issue of receipt thereon. After this when P. W. 2 came out and signaled as instructed. P. W. 9 followed by his staff entered into the office room of the accused and to him P. W. 2 and P. W. 3 identified the accused. As. instructed by P. W. 9. P. W. 2 went outside and waited till 8 p. m. on that day. It was at this time, P. W. 2 handed over Ex. p. 6 series and then on the next day, he went to the Vigilance and Anticorruption Office, where he was examined and from the Court he got the amount of arrears of rent and paid the rental as per the receipt given by them. M. O. 1 series are the seven five hundred rupee denomination currencies and 5 hundred-rupee denomination currencies. ( 4 ) P. W. 3 Radhakrishnan, who was working as Executive Officer in the office of the Director of Tamil Nadu Agriculture, on 19-9-1991 at about 2 p. m. was asked by his superior to go to the office of P. W. 9. When he went there at 2. 45 p. m. he saw one Mr. ( 4 ) P. W. 3 Radhakrishnan, who was working as Executive Officer in the office of the Director of Tamil Nadu Agriculture, on 19-9-1991 at about 2 p. m. was asked by his superior to go to the office of P. W. 9. When he went there at 2. 45 p. m. he saw one Mr. Rajagopalan an Officer in the Adi Dravida Welfare Department, who had come there on similar request from P. W. 9. P. W. 9 introduced P. W. 2 to P. W. 3 and the other witness and briefed them of the written complaint by P. W. 2 and asked them to read it, P. W. 3 and the other witness inquired P. W. 2 about the complaint and then followed the instructions of P. W. 9. In other respects, P. W. 3 corroborated the evidence given by P. W. 2. This witness has also corroborated P. W. 2 by saying that after the accused had kept the sum of Rs. 4,000/-in his rexine bag. P. W. 2 demanded the accused to reduce the same, for which the accused refused by saying that his demand was very low. He would further claim that on the arrival of P. W. 9 with his staff the accused was questioned and he answered and that two glass tumblers with sodium carbonate mixture was brought and the accused was asked to dip his fingers and the solution turned pink in colour and that the said solutions were put in two bottles and labels were pasted indicating the solution relating to the right hand and the left hand, attested by P. W. 3, another witness Rajagopalan with P. W. 9, followed by the recovery of M. O. 1 series, verification of the number of the currency notes with the numbers noted down by P. W. 9 already alongwith a further sum of Rs. 136/-which was returned to the accused and that the accused was arrested at about 7. 45 p. m. He would claim further that a mahazar Ex. p. ii was prepared by P. W. 9 for the whole episode happened there attested by witnesses and a copy of the same was served on the accused and then all of them had been to the house of the accused where a search was conducted and from his house, he would claim that a sum of Rs. p. ii was prepared by P. W. 9 for the whole episode happened there attested by witnesses and a copy of the same was served on the accused and then all of them had been to the house of the accused where a search was conducted and from his house, he would claim that a sum of Rs. 18,560/-plus some bank records were seized under the search list Ex. P. 12 which was also attested by him M. O. 2 is the rexine bag kept by the accused. M. O. 3 and M. O. 4 are the sodium carbonate solutions in which the respective hands of the accused were dipped. ( 5 ) P. W. 5 by name Kandasamy is one of the tenants in the premises belonging to the temple in question and he has spoken to the factum of the proposed enhancement of rents by the temple authorities in question for all the tenaments by 100 per cent and then the decision taken by all the tenants to pay the rents with only 25 per cent increase and that he in the capacity of the President of the association negotiated with the accused and an agreement was reached to the enhancement of the rent by 33-1/3 per cent and also once in five years. ( 6 ) P. W. 7 working as Grade I Assistant in the Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory, has spoken to the factum of the receipt of M. O. 3, M. O. 4 bottles for chemical examination with a requisition Ex. P. 17 and that on analysis. The solution was found to contain Sodium Carbonate and Phenolpthalein and his report is Ex. P. 18. ( 7 ) P. W. 8, the Head Clerk Of the Court has spoken to the factum of the receipt of M. O. 1 to M. O. 4 On 20-9-1991 and the requisition Ex. P. 19 from the Dy. S. P. to send M. Os. 3 and 4 for Chemical Analysis and his sending the same with the covering letter and the receipt of the Chemical Analysis Report Ex. P. 18. ( 8 ) P. W. 9, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, during the relevant time in question received the complaint Ex. P. 9 from P. W. 2 and registered the same in his office Crime No. 9 of 1991 under Ex. P. 18. ( 8 ) P. W. 9, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, during the relevant time in question received the complaint Ex. P. 9 from P. W. 2 and registered the same in his office Crime No. 9 of 1991 under Ex. P. 20 and the copy of which has been given to P. W. 2. After preliminary enquiry, he sent intimation to the higher authorities regarding the registration of the case. He sent for two officials, one from the Office of the Director of Agriculture and another from the Office of the Director of Adhi-Dravida Welfare Department by means of requisition letters and accordingly both P. W. 3 and another witness arrived and in their presence he had demonstrated the whole trap which he was going to implement and has spoken to the factum of what he has done till he was incharge of the investigation in this case. In fact, this officer has stated everything substantiating and corroborating everything stated by P. W. 2andp. W. 3. P. W. lowho took up further investigation having verified the investigation done by P. W. 9 upon the orders passed by his superior officers, he examined P. Ws. 2, 3, 6 and 9 as well as the accused on 20-9-199 1 and after examining P. W. 5 and P. W. 4 and, on the receipt of Chemical Examiners Report, obtained the sanction to prosecute the accused from the competent authorities under Ex. P. 1 and on completion of investigation laid the final report against the accused before the Court on 27-4-1992 for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Among the 10 witnesses examined by the prosecution, P. Ws. 4 and 6 were treated as hostile as they had not supported the prosecution case. ( 9 ) WHEN the appellant/accused was examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in evidence, the accused has denied the allegation of having received a sum of Rs. 4,000/- as bribe from P. W. 2 on 19-9-1991 but however, has claimed that he had-received the said amount of Rs 4,000/-from P. W. 2 as rental advance from him and that out of enmity P. W. 2 has falsely implicated him by giving a false complaint. 4,000/- as bribe from P. W. 2 on 19-9-1991 but however, has claimed that he had-received the said amount of Rs 4,000/-from P. W. 2 as rental advance from him and that out of enmity P. W. 2 has falsely implicated him by giving a false complaint. However, he has not chosen to examine any witnesses on his behalf to substantiate his defence. ( 10 ) THE trial Court after having recorded the oral evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 10, documentary evidence marked as Ex. p. i to Ex. p. 21 on behalf of the prosecution, 12 documents produced by the accused on his behalf with the four material objects relied on by the prosecution and having considered the pros and cons and the legal gamut of the whole case on hand has held that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused and accordingly, found the accused guilty for the charges framed and tried against him and consequently convicted and sentenced him as referred to supra, by passing the impugned judgment. Aggrieved, the appellant has come forward with this appeal canvassing the correctness and legality of the finding of the learned trial Judge. ( 11 ) I have heard Mr. V. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the appellant who dwelt his attack more strenuously upon the impugned judgment by taking me through the oral evidence in its entirety adduced and relied on by the prosecution to identify the guilt of the accused. While doing so, it is noticed that the learned counsel took enormous pain in analysing every aspect of the oral claim made by P. Ws. 2 and 3 on the one hand with that of the oral claim of P. Ws. 4 and 6 on the other hand. To build up his contention, it was his endeavor to refer to the existing backdrop of the whole case in which the relationship or nexus existed between the accused and P. W. 2. In short, to summaries briefly, the learned counsel had not rendered any of his argument or contention assailing the claim of P. W. 3 as well as P. W. 1 or P. W. 5, P. W. 9 and P. W. 10 nor the evidence of P. Ws. 7 and 8. At the most, the main throng of attack made by the Bar for the appellant is that the oral claim of P. Ws. 7 and 8. At the most, the main throng of attack made by the Bar for the appellant is that the oral claim of P. Ws. 2 and 3 is in direct conflict with the performance done by P. W. 4 and P. W. 6 before the trial Court, which if considered in its legal perspective, no reliance can be safely placed to accept or hold that P. W. 2 and P. W. 3 are believable persons, rendered their performance truly with an unblemished character and in short to say, the evidence of P. W. 2 is wholly unbelievable and cannot at all be accepted for not only want of adequate corroboration and substantiation but also his claim, particularly, betrays the whole of the prosecution and that therefore, the prosecution must fail, which the learned trial Judge has miserably failed to take note of. The prejudice thus caused to the accused is on account of the whole misconception of evidence of P. W. 2 in the context of the non-support of the prosecution case by P. W. 4 and P. W. 6. The doubt, however, graver and very serious in nature, in the evidence of P. W. 2 on the one hand against the evidence of P. W. 4, and P. W. 4 goes to the very root of the prosecution case. Therefore, if the above circumstance, which is the only legal factor, if considered properly, it is obvious, learned counsel contended, that the rest of the prosecution case seems to be highly superfluous and upon the basis of which, rendering a conviction is totally unsustainable either on facts and law. ( 12 ) PER contra, Mr. A. N. Rajan, learned Government Advocate, placed most of his reliance upon the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 as fully corroborated by P. W. 9 and the other circumstances brought out before the Court by the prosecution in full support. The various other findings given by the learned trial Judge was made reliance of by the learned Government Advocate with a view to justify the impugned Judgment of conviction and sentence rendered against the appellant. According to him, the guilt of the accused has been fully established by the prosecution by the 10 witnesses and the documents relied on by them. Therefore, he justifies the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence as fully supported by law. According to him, the guilt of the accused has been fully established by the prosecution by the 10 witnesses and the documents relied on by them. Therefore, he justifies the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence as fully supported by law. ( 13 ) IN the context of the above rival position, the only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the impugned judgment of conviction rendered by the trial Court in this case is vitiated with any incorrect or erroneous approach inherented with any illegality or impropriety and whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant/accused beyond the realm of doubt. ( 14 ) THE very fact that P. W. 2 by name Sekar is the tenant in a portion of the premises bearing Door No. 18, which belongs to Arulmighu Venkatesa Perumal Thirukkoil situated in Sowcarpet, Madras, alongwith his brother by name Arunachalam and his father in portions till 1990 and that with regard to the one portion standing in the name of his father he was directly inducted to in the temple records as a tenant and another was entered in the name of his brother and the third portion of the said premises was allotted to continue in the name of his deceased father, which was sub-let to two tenants by P. W 2 and that under Ex. P. 2, Ex. P. 3 the accused had given notice of demand to all the tenants including P. W. 2, his father and his brother to pay not only the arrears but also to pay the enhanced rent by 100 per cent and for which all the tenants had consulted among themselves and decided to pay the enhanced rent with 10 per cent increase as evident from Ex. P. 4 and Ex. P. 5 and that consequently, P. W. 5 being the President of the temple tenants association took effort in conciliating the matter with the accused and others and was able to arrive at a consensus for the payment of the enhanced rent with 33-1/3 percent increase and that consequently, P. W. 2 was sent for by the accused and the actual quantum of arrears to be paid by him was quantified at the enhanced rate, for which. P. W. 2 has agreed by giving consent letters to accused Ex. P. 7 and Ex. P. W. 2 has agreed by giving consent letters to accused Ex. P. 7 and Ex. P. 8, followed by the quantification figure given by P. W. 4 at the behest of the accused in two small chits under Ex. P. 6 series and that accordingly a total amount of Rs. 6,680/-was quantified to be paid by P. W. 2 in all towards the arrears of rent due then are all the admitted facts remaining undisputed and there was no controversy whatsoever over the same among the parties herein. ( 15 ) SIMILARLY, the payment of the arrears of rent of Rs. 6,680/- by P. W. 2 to the accused on the evening of 19-9-1991 at his office situated in Senkazhuneer Vinayakar-Koloor Amman Temple in the presence of P. W. 3 the trap witness and the thackkar of the said temple P. W. 6 by name Subramaniam and that a further sum of Rs. 4,000/-under M. O. 1 series was also paid by P. W. 2 and that the accused had received the said amounts and kept the same in his jip fitted rexine bag M. O. 2 and that consequently P. W. 9 and his staff entered into the said room and questioned the accused and recovered the said amounts, conducted the phenolpthalien test with all the implements for the whole trap set up by him with the mahazars prepared and attested by P. W. 3 and other witnesses with the samples therein, are not much in dispute except the fact and the specific defence that the appellant/accused had not received the said amount as bribe. The accused also seems to have feigned any knowledge about the recovery of the material objects and sending the same for Chemical Examination and the report of the Chemical Examiner received in this regard, which proved positive, according to the prosecution case. So also, he has feigned any knowledge about Ex. P. 1, the sanction accorded to the prosecution to launch the prosecution against the accused as per the oral evidence of P. W. 1. ( 16 ) THE trial Court after having canalised and examined every part of the legal evidence adduced and relied on by the prosecution has believed and accepted the evidence of P. Ws. 2. P. 1, the sanction accorded to the prosecution to launch the prosecution against the accused as per the oral evidence of P. W. 1. ( 16 ) THE trial Court after having canalised and examined every part of the legal evidence adduced and relied on by the prosecution has believed and accepted the evidence of P. Ws. 2. 3 and 9 even though the independent witnesses P. W. 4 and P. W. 6 have not supported the prosecution and consequently found the accused guilty for the charges framed and tried against him. The evidence of P. W. 5, the President of the tenants association seems to have been not considered by the trial Court in the proper perspective and context. It is under these circumstances, the Bar for the appellant canvassed much about the credibility and acceptability of the evidence of P. W. 2 and P. W. 3 as wholly unbelievable and unacceptable, in the context of almost all the admitted facts above referred, namely, that the accused/appellant had admitted the possession of M. O. 1 series on the relevant day and time and from whose custody it was recovered by the Police, before proceeding further and that as such, it was only an advance rental he had received from P. W. 2 and not as a bribe money and that at the behest of P. W. 2, the whole case for the relevant charges against him has been foisted and schemed out by the Police. In support of his theory, he has produced 12 documents on his behalf, which were marked as Ex. D. 1 to Ex. D. 12, amongst which, Ex. D. 6 to Ex. D. 12 are the receipts for having received the advance from various tenants in the occupation of the premises belonging to the said temple in question during the year 1990- 91. There was no contra evidence made available by the prosecution nor any acceptable observation or finding made by the learned trial Judge to suspect the genuineness and veracity of these defence documents. In fact it is noted that these documents Ex. D. 6 to Ex. D. 12 were marked through P. W. 4, the staff and Clerk of the Arulmighu Venkatesa Perumal Thirukkoil, who is the proper person to speak about the relevancy, genuineness and correctness of the same. In a more similar way, Ex. D. 1 to Ex. In fact it is noted that these documents Ex. D. 6 to Ex. D. 12 were marked through P. W. 4, the staff and Clerk of the Arulmighu Venkatesa Perumal Thirukkoil, who is the proper person to speak about the relevancy, genuineness and correctness of the same. In a more similar way, Ex. D. 1 to Ex. D. 5 would reveal clinchingly that the tenants in the actual occupation of the premises in the building of the temple were in the habit of paying the rentals belatedly and that it was only then the temple authorities enhanced the rent by issuing notices and letters and thus they used to receive the rental arrears from the tenants also. ( 17 ) IF the evidence of the prosecution particularly through P. W. 2 that there was a demand for paying the enhanced rent with 100 per cent increase made by the temple authorities through the accused, for which the tenants had consented to pay the rent with 10 per cent increase and that if the prosecution case through P. W. 5 had peaceful solution of paying the increased rent with 33-1/3 per cent increase and that if P. W. 2 had agreed to pay the rental inclusive of all arrears of rent by giving the letter in writing under Ex. p. 7 and Ex. P; 8 to be paid on or before 18-9-1991, that is after the lapse of 12 days, then the doubt arises with regard to the lodging of the complaint by P. W. 2 on 19-9-1991 about the illegal demand made by the accused. This doubt about the probability of claim of P. W. 2 arises for the reason that the accused, according to him had demanded a bribe of Rs. 6,000/- that apart from the arrears of rental of Rs. 6,680/-even on 6-9- 1991 itself and that the response for such a demand by P. W. 2 was one of refusal. Be that as it may for a period of 12 days, he evinced no interest in taking action against the accused. On the other hand, he has claimed that he met the accused on 18-9-199 1 and expressed his inability to pay Rs. 6,000/-by way of bribe. Be that as it may for a period of 12 days, he evinced no interest in taking action against the accused. On the other hand, he has claimed that he met the accused on 18-9-199 1 and expressed his inability to pay Rs. 6,000/-by way of bribe. Therefore, it is noticed that for the second time only when he meet the accused, he has expressed his inability to pay the same and that whereupon the quantum of bribe was reduced into Rs. 4,000/- by the accused himself, for which. P. W. 2 seems to have agreed to comply with the said demand on or before the next day as demanded. There is absolutely no explanation put forth or placed by the prosecution before the Court as to what had transpired for a period of 12 days between the accused and P. W. 2. If P. W. 2 had been insisted to pay Rs. 6,000/- by way of bribe on 6-9-1991 itself by the accused and P. W. 2 had expressed his inability to pay the said amount on that day itself then. I find no reason for P. W. 2 to wait for more than 12 days without taking any action or informing anybody until he met the accused again of 18-9-1991 to repeat his same intention. This lacuna and vaccum found in the prosecution case remains totally unexplained and the prosecution has failed to adduce acceptable legal evidence to explain the lacuna and serious gap made available in this case. ( 18 ) IT was the specific and categoric claim of P. Ws. 2 and 3 that two sets of amounts, one by way of rental arrears to the extent of Rs. 6,680/ - kept in a separate bundle and another, the bribe amount of Rs. 4,000/-M. O. 1 series kept in the shirt pocket, were paid to the accused in the presence of P. W. 3 and P. W. 6, who is none other than the fit person for the temple of Senkazhuneer Vinayagar-Koloor Amman, a third party to the alleged entire transaction. It was also the specific case of the prosecution that the arrears of rental all amounting to Rs. It was also the specific case of the prosecution that the arrears of rental all amounting to Rs. 6,680/- kept in a separate bundle and paid by P. W. 2 to the accused was received by him counted verified and kept in his rexine bag M. O. 2 and that at the same stretch on demand, the bribe, money, M. O. 1 series had been paid by P. W. 2, which was also counted by the accused, verified and kept in his rexine bag by being separately with rubber band. If that being so, to offer the foolproof before the Court of Law, it must have been the endeavour of P. W. 9, the Investigating Officer in implementing the trap while nabbing the culprit who received the bribe to set up the phenolpthalein test for the two sets of money said to have been received by the accused and the conduct of pyenolpthalein test over M. O. 1 series alone is highly doubtful and cannot at all be accepted. It may be that the receipt of the rental arrears to the extent of Rs. 6,680/-had been admitted by the accused, so also, he admits that the alleged bribe money was in his custody and from whom it was recovered by P. W. 9. The non-performing of phenolpthalein test over the other part of the money creates every grave doubt, which the Investigating Officer ought to have performed. There is absolutely no evidence or material to show that he has taken any effort to conduct phenolpthalein test over that part of the money received by the accused. This non-performance on the part of the investigating agency, in my considered view, creates a serious doubt in the backdrop of the admitted case among the parties herein. ( 19 ) ONE more significant and vital aspect, which has been omitted to be taken note of by the learned trial Judge is the normal conduct of an ordinary prudent man. This non-performance on the part of the investigating agency, in my considered view, creates a serious doubt in the backdrop of the admitted case among the parties herein. ( 19 ) ONE more significant and vital aspect, which has been omitted to be taken note of by the learned trial Judge is the normal conduct of an ordinary prudent man. P. W. 2 is supposed to be a tenant under the temple authority always at the loggerhead of paying the rent to not only the portion in his occupation but also to the portions in the occupation of his brother and the deceased father and that too, at the enhanced rate of 33-1/3 per cent increase as spoken not only by himself alone but also claimed by P. W. 5, though the alleged demand of bribe was made to him before 12 days, it is noticed that he not only kept quiet for such a long period but also brought the amount to P. W. 9 alongwith the prepared complaint Ex. p. 9 with him to be lodged, but finding that the accused was not available in the place where he was expected to be went to a different place at his request, seems to have cleared not only the arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 6,680/ - but also the bribe amount of Rs. 4,000/-as demanded by the accused, significantly in the presence of a third person by name Subramaniam, examined as P. W. 6, who is none other than the fit person of the temple and totally unconnected with the bribe transactions. The concept of demanding the bribe to reduce the quantum of enhanced rent from 33-1/3 per cent to 25 per cent by the accused to P. W. 2 and the illegal consideration, for doing so, fixed originally at Rs. 6,000/-and subsequently after 12 days reduced to Rs. 4,000/- and P. W. 2 accepted to pay the same was exclusively a transaction expected to have taken place between P. W. 2 the decoy witness and the accused and while such being so, no other person is expected to have the knowledge of the same. 6,000/-and subsequently after 12 days reduced to Rs. 4,000/- and P. W. 2 accepted to pay the same was exclusively a transaction expected to have taken place between P. W. 2 the decoy witness and the accused and while such being so, no other person is expected to have the knowledge of the same. If this is so, while prosecution has not claimed anything more about the said transaction for P. W. 4 or P. W. 6, it is highly strange and astonishing for P. W 2 to claim that he has paid the bribe amount of M. O. 1 series to the accused in front of a third person, who is totally a stranger namely, P. W. 6, the fit person of the temple, who was all along sitting alongwith the accused. The alleged payment of Rs. 4,000/- as bribe as claimed by P. W. 2 in the presence of P. W. 6, a third person totally unconnected with the transaction goes to show that it was not at all a bribe money paid secretly to the accused. This aspect of the case on hand has been totally overlooked and missed for any consideration by the learned trial Judge while delivering the impugned judgment. ( 20 ) ANOTHER important but most disturbing feature that has emerged out from the adduced evidence of the instant case is that immediately when P. W. 2 has paid the bribe money M. O. 1 series to the accused and he received the same, counted, verified and kept in his rexine bag M. O. 2, it was the claim of P. W. 2 that he asked the accused to reduce the quantum of bribe money and for which, the accused had replied that the demand already made was very low. This demand and refusal seems to have been prostrated in the presence of P. W. 6. If the demand of the bribe at Rs. 6,000/-was made on 6-9-1991 itself by the accused and P. W. 2 had expressed his inability to pay the same on that day itself and that subsequently, the said amount has been reduced into Rs. 4,000/- and paid on 19-9-199 1 to the accused in the presence of a third person as a bribe money fixed and quantified already, I am at every difficulty to accept the prosecution case. 4,000/- and paid on 19-9-199 1 to the accused in the presence of a third person as a bribe money fixed and quantified already, I am at every difficulty to accept the prosecution case. Where was the need or occasion for P. W. 2 to enter into a barter to reduce the quantum of bribe money in the presence of a third person? This is totally against the normal conduct of a prudent man who is genuinely transacting with another. The reasoning given by the learned trial Judge that because M. O. 1 series was treated as the bribe money, P. W. 2 has made a repeated demand to reduce the said quantum after it was paid. If the giver of a bribe and receiver had entered into an understanding to pay the bribe money secretly deemed to be exclusively within their knowledge by applying the same logic as propagated by the learned trial Judge, it is also possible to presume after having quantified the bribe money even on 6-9-199 1 and followed on 19-9-1991, there exists no need or occasion to enter into a barter for reducing the bribe money, namely, M. O. 1 series in this case. This aspect of the admitted prosecution case again demonstrates a serious doubt about the attitude and conduct of P. W. 2. P. W. 2is a decoy witness set up by the investigating agency to nab the accused after having completed the trap for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. As I have already observed, the reasonings given above and the circumstances referred to therein are inherent in the oral claim of P. W. 2, which has been totally and clearly overlooked by the learned trial Judge and by doing so, it seems the learned trial Judge has proceeded on the basis of superfluous outlook of his oral claim. For all the said reasonings, I am of the considered view that the claim of P. W. 2 that he paid M. O. 1 series to the accused as bribe cannot at all be believed and thus the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that what was paid by P. W. 2 under M. O. 1 series is the bribe money. Then, the question remains, what does it represent? Then, the question remains, what does it represent? The theory propounded by the accused with regard to the same is that it is only a rental advance received by him from P. W. 2 in the presence of P. W. 6. In support of this contention, he has relied upon the entire substratum of tile prosecution case till the payment of the arrears of rent quantified and relied on. The 12 documents produced by the accused through P. W. 4 render all support and substantiation to his theory. It was the prosecution case that the moment the amount was paid, the temple was informed over telephone by the accused to give the receipt for the said amount. Immediately pursuant to the trap, P. W. 9 alongwith his staff went and seized the same by conduct of phenolpthalein test and arrested the accused. It is under these circumstances, if the amount M. O. 1 series had been received by the accused as advance rentals, then he is expected to give the receipts for the same only subsequently after arriving to the office and it is highly impossible to predict that it was a bribe money for all the reasonings given above. It is not as if the temple authorities or the accused had not received any amount by way of advance rentals as observed by the learned trial Judge. Ex. D. 6 to Ex. D. 12 go to show that the habit of receiving the advance rentals from the tenants was in vogue and that therefore, under the established circumstances above referred, I am inclined to hold that there was overwhelming evidence made available by and on behalf of the accused to show that what was received by him under M. O. 1 series was not the bribe money at all but only rental advance for which proper receipts have to be issued by the temple authorities. ( 21 ) REGARDING the lodging of complaint Ex. ( 21 ) REGARDING the lodging of complaint Ex. P. 9, follow up actions during the part of investigation made by P. W. 9, setting the trap, conducting the phenolpthalein test, various recoveries under the cover of mahazars attested by witnesses, examination of witnesses and completing the investigation inclusive of subjecting the material objects for chemical examination, there is no need or occasion for me to observe anything for the very reasoning that it has no impact in view of my specific observations and findings with regard to the credibility of the evidence of P. W. 2, who is the star witness. Once the evidence of P. W. 2 is suspected and rejected, then the whole case of the prosecution must go as it goes to the very root of the prosecution case. May be it is stated that P. W. 3 has rendered all corroboration and substantiation to the claim of P. W. 2. Be that as it may, it is noted that the evidence of P. W. 3 is nothing but a corroboration to the claim of P. W. 2 to the limited extent of giving the money M. O. 1 series to the investigating officer P. W. 9 at his office and during the time of completing the trap in the place of occurrence. But the very fact, whether M. O. 1 series is the bribe money or the advance rental money is since exclusively within the knowledge of P. W. 2 and the accused, the evidence of substantiation or corroboration rendered by P. W. 3 has no significance in this case. ( 22 ) P. W. 1 is the official witness who speaks about Ex. P. 1, the sanction accorded to prosecute the accused for the offences by the authorities concerned. Since it was not disputed or agitated on the question of sanction, I do not propose to say anything in this regard. ( 23 ) P. W. 2 is the decoy witness and has rendered a star performance in the whole of the prosecution case and P. W. 3 is the trap witness. Since it was not disputed or agitated on the question of sanction, I do not propose to say anything in this regard. ( 23 ) P. W. 2 is the decoy witness and has rendered a star performance in the whole of the prosecution case and P. W. 3 is the trap witness. With regard to the scope and legal purview and ingredients to be followed by the Courts of Law with regard to the performance of a decoy or a trap witness, the Supreme Court had the occasion to set up the ratio in M. D. Samshuddin v. State of Kerala, in the following words: The word accomplice is not defined in the Evidence Act. However, it is accepted that the word is used in its ordinary sense, which means and signifies a guilty partner or associate in a crime. Illustration (b) to Section 114, in a way cautions the Court to bear in mind the presumption that an accomplice is not worthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Section 13 of the Act, however, declares that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The relation between Section 133, which is a rule of law and Illustration (b) to Section 114, which is a rule of prudence has been the subject of comment in a large number of decisions. However, it has emerged that a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal though an accomplice may be unworthy of credit for several reasons. Reading Section 133, and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act together the Courts have held that while it is not illegal to act up on the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice the rule of prudence so universally followed has to amount to rule of law that it is unsafe to act on the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material aspects so as to implicate the accused. The reasons for requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice are that an accomplice is likely to swear falsely in order to shift the guilt from himself and that he is an immoral person being a participator in the crime who may not have any regard to any sanction of the oath and in the case of an approver, on his own admission, he is a criminal who gives evidence under a promise of pardon and supports the prosecution with the hope of getting his own freedom. Now confining to the case of bribery it is generally accepted that the person offering a bribe to a public officer is in the nature of an accomplice in the offence of accepting illegal 1997 Page 11 of 16 gratification but the nature of corroboration required in such a case should not be subjected to the same rigorous tests which are generally applied to a case of an approver. Though bribe givers are generally treated to be in the nature of accomplices but among them here are various types and gradation. In cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act the complainant is the person who gives the bribe in a technical and legal sense because in every trap case where ever the complaint is filed there must be a person who has to give money to the accused which in fact is the bribe money which is demanded and without such a giving the trap cannot succeed. When there is such a demand by the public servant from a person who is unwilling and if to do public good approaches the authorities and lodges complaint then in order that the trap succeeds he has to give the money. There could be another type of bribe giver who is always willing to give money in order to get his work done and having got the work done he may send a complaint. Here he, is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime committed and thus is an accomplice. Thus there are grades and grades of accomplices and therefore, a distinction could as well be drawn between cases where a person offers a bribe to achieve his own purpose and where one is forced to offer bribe under a threat of loss or harm that is to say under coercion. Thus there are grades and grades of accomplices and therefore, a distinction could as well be drawn between cases where a person offers a bribe to achieve his own purpose and where one is forced to offer bribe under a threat of loss or harm that is to say under coercion. A person who falls in this category and who becomes a party for laying a trap stands on a different footing because he is only a victim of threat or coercion to which he was subjected to. Where such witnesses fall under the category of accomplices by reason of their being bribe givers, in the first instance the Court has to consider the degree of complicity and then look for corroboration if necessary as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case may vary having regard to the facts and circumstances. It is well settled that the corroborating-evidence can be even by way of circumstantial evidence. No general rule can be laid down with respect to quantum of evidence corroborating the testimony of a trap witness, which again would depend upon its own facts and circumstances like the nature of the crime, the character of trap witness etc. and other general requirements necessary to sustain the conviction in that case. The court should weigh the evidence and then see whether corroboration is necessary. Therefore as a rule of law it cannot be laid down that the evidence of every complainant in a bribery case should be corroborated in all material particulars and otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether corroboration is necessary and if so to what extent and what should be its nature depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a case of bribe, the person who pays the bribe and those who act as intermediaries are the only persons who can ordinarily be expected to give evidence about the bribe and it is not possible to get absolutely independent evidence about the payment of bribe. However, it is cautioned that the evidence of a bribe giver has to be scrutinised very carefully and it is for the court to consider and appreciate the evidence in a proper manner and decide the question whether a conviction can be based upon or not in those given circumstances. However, it is cautioned that the evidence of a bribe giver has to be scrutinised very carefully and it is for the court to consider and appreciate the evidence in a proper manner and decide the question whether a conviction can be based upon or not in those given circumstances. ( 24 ) PURSUANT to the legal ratio held by the Court in the above case law, it has now become that the standard or the nature of a trap witness, who becomes a party to a transaction, becomes the victim of threat or coercion and assumes the character of an accomplice by reason of his being the bribe giver. It is for the duty of the court to consider the degree and complicity and then look for the corroboration if necessary as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration may vary according to the facts of each case and that corroboration can even by proving the circumstances and that as such no general rule can be laid down with respect to the quantum of evidence required corroborating the testimony of trap witness, which again would depend upon its own facts and circumstances. All the more, it could be said that the court should weigh the evidence and then see the standard of corroboration, which is required. As a matter of rule of law it cannot be laid down that the evidence of every complainant in a bribery case should be corroborate in all material particulars and otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether corroboration is necessary and if so to what extent, and what should be its nature, all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is a caution declared by the Apex Court that the evidence of a bribe giver has to be scrutinised very carefully and that it is the duty of the court to consider and appreciate the evidence in a proper manner as rendered above. In the light of the above legal ratio, if the evidence of P. W. 2 is weighed and scrutinised, for the three reasonings and circumstances pointed out by me earlier, the substantiation or corroboration required in this case for the evidence of P. W. 2 is more and enormous for the very reasoning that the claim of P. W. 2 bristles with every surmounting suspicious circumstances. The preponderance of improbabilities is all the more inherent in his claim and the probabilities and naturalness are totally lacking in his claim. His testimony before the trial Court that he has paid M. O. 1 series as the bribe money appears to me very dubious in nature and character and superfluous, remains solitary and without an iota of support corroboration or substantiation. The delay in setting the law in motion by lodging Ex. p. 9 after a lapse of 12 days from 6-9-1991 would belie the prosecution case in toto and this aspect is only a death knell to the whole claim of P. W. 2. Therefore, on this count also, I have no hesitation to suspect and disbelieve the claim of P. W. 2 in its entirety. All the more, he does not seem to be a mere stranger. He was all along a tenant in the occupation of a portion of the rental premises paying rent to the accused and committing default, subletting the two portions of his father and thereby collecting the rent from them also without any permission. He is doing business in the portion in his occupation. It is noticed that he has sent a reply notice already, however, the gravity of disputes is seem to have been narrowed down by the intervention of P. W. 5. Even so, it is also noticed, for the part of his arrears, there is no dispute and with regard to M. O. 1 series alone, a complaint under Ex. P. 9 was thought over to be lodged after a lapse of 12 days, which, in my well considered view, is clearly a scheme emerged out in the mind of P. W. 2. ( 25 ) IT is noticed that the learned trial Judge has the occasion to consider that part of the evidence given by P. W. 2 and P. W. 3 that immediately after the payment of M. O. 1 series to the accused, a demand was made to reduce the same, which was not accepted by the accused and that would reveal the payment of M. O. 1 series as bribe money and that because it was bribe money, P. W. 2 thought fit of making the demand to reduce the same. This reasoning of the learned trial Judge can be accepted under no logic nor under the perception of any law for the very same logic if applied, why cannot it be otherwise? If it was a bribe money quantified already, where was the occasion or need for the bribe giver to make a demand for reduction of a bribe money and that too, in front of a stranger, a third party. Having considered the same there are two views possible, as pointed out above, one is conflicting with the other, which resulted in creating a grave doubt about the veracity of the claim of P. W. 2 and the benefit of such serious doubt should be ascribed to the benefit of the accused as per the settled law. With regard to the said aspect, the reliance and observation made by the learned trial Judge cannot be sustained for the mere reasoning as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that that part of the evidence alleged to have been spoken by P. W. 2 and P. W. 3 though remains static and important, no questions were put to the accused on that score as provided under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For the very reasoning that that part of the evidence clearly amounts to an incriminating portion of evidence made available by the prosecution. I have perused the questioning and the explanation given by the accused, held by the learned trial Judge under Section 313 Cr. P. C. It is apparent that no such questions were put to the accused in that regard and no explanation were obtained from the accused despite the fact that the accused had specifically pleaded that he received M. O. 1 series only as an advance rental and observe that no opportunity was afforded to the appellant/accused to explain those circumstance, and by which, the accused is put to serious prejudice and as such for the said reasoning also, the conviction rendered against him could not be sustained. In so far as the defence theory projected by the accused is concerned, pursuant to subclauses (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the amended Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 20 of the Act, once the accused admits the possession of the bribe money, the presumption to be drawn is that the tainted money is the bribe money having regard to the facts of the instant case and the legal evidence made available on behalf of the respective parties. I feel totally satisfied in accepting the case of the defence that from the tenor of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the defence documents, it has been clearly established that what was received by the accused on the evening of 19-9-199 1 under M. O. 1 series was not the bribe money but only as an advance rental and that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the guilt of the accused for the offence of bribery as charged and tried. There is a big and volume of doubt however with every seriousness and the benefit of which should be ascribed in favour of the appellant accused by setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered against him by the trial Judge. It is thus having considered every gamut of the case adduced evidence and the projected contentions on behalf of both parties. I am fully constrained to hold that the various other observations and findings given by the learned trial Judge are not based on the correct perception of law and the whole observation seems to be on account of the total misconception of the adduced evidence and that therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts and that as a result the accused is entitled to be acquitted of all the charges. ( 26 ) IN the result, for all the foregoing reasonings and findings, the appeal succeeds and stands allowed. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered by the learned Second Additional Special Judge, Madras Division, in C. C. No. 42 of 1992 dated 7 -10-1993 is set aside and the appellant! accused is acquitted. Bail bond if any executed by him shall stand cancelled. Fine amount, if any paid by him is ordered to be refunded immediately. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered by the learned Second Additional Special Judge, Madras Division, in C. C. No. 42 of 1992 dated 7 -10-1993 is set aside and the appellant! accused is acquitted. Bail bond if any executed by him shall stand cancelled. Fine amount, if any paid by him is ordered to be refunded immediately. M. O. 1 series is directed to be paid to Arulmighu Venkatesa Perusal Thirukkoil, towards the rentals payable by P. W. 2. Appeal allowed. Judgment of conviction set aside. 1997 (3) Crimes 193 Article WOMAN AND CRUELTY (M. B. Sardar, Advocate, Bhuj, Kachchh) The inhuman atrocity and barbaric torture of woman physically and mentally is not the norm or boon of the present day society but the same has existed and practised since ages memorial and infliction of cruelty on woman in one form or other was prevalent even in our mythological and historical truths. Driving away of the pregnant sacred Sita by Lord Rama can in no sense be said to be less cruel. Putting Draupadi on the gambling stake by brave Pandvas is equally cruel. The cruelty on woman by male dominated society has never abated nor it can be extinct by clamping any sort of laws in the present age. Albeit, the present day lady is far more secure and superior to her past sisters who in the present age, at least can raise their voices, express their views and put forth their well deserved demands. No doubt the incidence of torture of the woman in the society has a rising trend as per records but the incidents in the past were not any way less. We can easily find salient reasons for the increasing trends. Firstly, the incidents in the past were suppressed and came to light in very meager cases and secondly as the population is increasing the proportionate crime increase naturally is the order of the day. Can there be two opinions that the present day woman stands on more firmer and secure grounds then her ancestral sisters. Socially and from the angle of economic security and the shield of protection through the laws, and active as well as startlingly sparked vibrant social organizations have-been the fulfillment of the desideratum and eventual assets of the modern woman. Can there be two opinions that the present day woman stands on more firmer and secure grounds then her ancestral sisters. Socially and from the angle of economic security and the shield of protection through the laws, and active as well as startlingly sparked vibrant social organizations have-been the fulfillment of the desideratum and eventual assets of the modern woman. The status and stature of woman is achieving new heights and reservation of one-third seats in highest Forum of elected body is on the cards and would soon be the reality and part of the constitutional right. The awareness of their rights amongst the women is kindling within their thinking and present day woman is not merely chattel and housemaid of the past. But despite all this can the present woman be said to have achieved her right place and dominance in the society? Can she move with deserved freedom in the society? Is she being respected in the society as she should be? Is she that much secure which she should be? Is she not yet at a receiving end in the society? Has she been permitted to achieve she very well deserves? No! Far from it I Lot many decades would be required to put the woman on par with her male counterpart and the male dominance over her cannot be wiped out or put to an end. Laws cannot be panacea or the solution of the inequality of woman vis-a-vis man. We have to sensitize the male part of humanity to give the woman her deserving rights, to respect her and her rights and male should be taught to be that magnanimous so as to perform his duties towards. This sense of urgency led the framers of the Constitution to pass and enact Article 51a and add Chapter IVA in the Constitution and incorporate the following clause through the 42nd Amendment in the year 1976 S. 11 (w. e. f. 3- 1-1977) which sounds as under in relevance to our discussion: 51a: Fundamental Duties: It shall be the duty of every citizen of India (e to promote harmony-and promote spirit of brotherhood amongst all people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional and sectional diversities; To Remove Practices Derogatory to the Dignity of Women. The above introduction of the Chapter IV A in the Constitution, among others necessitated to protect the women from derogatory practices against her. The above introduction of the Chapter IV A in the Constitution, among others necessitated to protect the women from derogatory practices against her. All this became especially inevitable and a dire necessity for the simple reason that when the women leaves her parental home to her matrimonial abode she has to all of a sudden to adjust to an altogether new environment, new way of life and new people who are not wholly conversant with her way of life, new place, new society and new customs which may not be prevalent in her parental home. The sudden change to unknown environment makes her life all the more curious and she becomes a conspicuous object of ridicule many a times. And all has to be changed by her. She has to adjust and accommodate every one in her matrimonial life and give every one due and every one expects something or the other from her. None is ready and willing to adjust or accommodate her to her way of living the life. Skirmishes are very natural. In-laws and husband and other relatives in order to establish their superiority stultify her and subjugate her to very great extent and many a times tolerance and patience give way to hatred and the vicissitudes become polluted with acrimony and relations get strained and unbearable. And that is how her cycle of life takes shape for the worst to come. And that is the beginning of crude cruelties of various kinds. Under these very obvious and excessively predominant circumstances the derogation of women could neither be stopped or curtailed and the victimization of the women becomes more and more prevalent and the above quoted amendment of the Constitution is only a piece of decoration in the Constitution without implementation and remains ineffective. The germane situation was getting from bad to worse, and then the legislature introduced penal provisions to prevent cruelties to women in 1983 as per Criminal Amendment Act, 1983, 5. 2 Chapter XX-A had been enacted and Section 498A was introduced in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This section made cruelty to a woman by her husband or relatives of her husband a criminal offence liable to punishment. 2 Chapter XX-A had been enacted and Section 498A was introduced in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. This section made cruelty to a woman by her husband or relatives of her husband a criminal offence liable to punishment. For the purposes of this section the Cruelty was defined and explained to mean as under:explanation- For the purposes of this section, cruelty means a. any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grievous injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; orb. harassment of the woman where such harassment of the woman is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. The same amendment also amended the Cr. P. Code, and Evidence Act and added S. 198-A in. Cr, P. Code, and S. 113-A in the Evidence Act which limited the scope of operation of S. 498-A I. P. C. and an artificial presumption of law was introduced for offences committed within a period 7 years respectively. As the unabated menace of dowry was getting uncontrollable by passage of time and doom of dowry deaths could not be effectively minimised to minimal proportion the legislature amended the Dowry Prohibition Act in 1985 and again in 1986 amending the definition dowry and also introducing a new penal Section 304-B in the Indian Penal Code was deemed to be a further remedy. S. 304-B I. P. C. runs as under:304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in connection with any demand of dowry, such death shall be called dowry death, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, dowry shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ). Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, dowry shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Similar artificial presumption by way of introducing S. 113-B in the Evidence Act, 1872, had been introduced in respect of dowry death. It may be mentioned that unlike S. 498-A I. P. C. the operation of this section had been made operatable within a narrow compass of dowry death and the meaning of the word dowry was confined and circumscribed to the meaning as defined in 5. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as amended till date. The definition of dowry has a very vital ingredient which, has to exist to make a death a dowry death and the dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with marriage of the parties but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. The bold words underlined in italics are the most vital to bring the case of dowry death under Section 304-B I. P. C. Albeit, that would not be a necessity for application Sec. 498-A I. P. C. [explanation clause (b)] as the property or valuable security has not been referred to be connected with dowry and the demand of any property or valuable security simpliciter would not fall within the definition of dowry u/s 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 there would be no scope for any application of Sec. 304-B I. P. C. The above propositions, finds approval from the following reported case: 1991 Cr. L. J. 639 (Para 6)THE complaint petition does not disclose that the complainant had given any property or valuable security or that he had agreed to give such things to the accused petitioner No. 1, either at or before or after the marriage between Usha Shaw and petitioner No. 1 or to his parents or other relations. L. J. 639 (Para 6)THE complaint petition does not disclose that the complainant had given any property or valuable security or that he had agreed to give such things to the accused petitioner No. 1, either at or before or after the marriage between Usha Shaw and petitioner No. 1 or to his parents or other relations. Although in common parlance we very often use the term dowry demand in the cases where the husband or his relations demand valuable security from the parents and other relations of the wife after the marriage, yet in my opinion this Will not amount to demand for dowry under the Act in view of the definition of dowry contained in S. 2 of the Act. Demand for dowry under the Act in the legal sense will mean the demand for dowry only when it refers to property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at or before or after the marriage. The alleged offence as made out in the complaint petition may attract the penal provisions as contained in S. 498-A of the Penal Code. The Parliament in its wisdom appended the explanation as to what cruelty means and has constructed sub- clause (b) of S. 498-A in the following words harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to met any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. In my opinion, if the cases of this nature are to be brought within the ambit of 5. 4 of the Act, then the word dowry u/s 2 of the Act shall have to be redefined in the light of sub-clause (b) u/s 498-A of the Penal Code. The term extortion demand popularized by the media may also find a place in the definition of dowry. The above discussion clearly shows that for the offence u/s 304-B the word dowry has a reference to the definition as given in the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 as per 5. 2. The Section 498-A I. P. C. does not use the word dowry in clause (b) of the Explanation and only demand of property or valuable security has been mentioned. Similar view has been taken in 1996 Cr. L. ]. 1528. 2. The Section 498-A I. P. C. does not use the word dowry in clause (b) of the Explanation and only demand of property or valuable security has been mentioned. Similar view has been taken in 1996 Cr. L. ]. 1528. In the light of the above position of the law coupled with the Rules pertaining to the maintenance of lists of presents to the bride and bridegroom framed in 1985 if changed slightly would be beneficial and in the interest of both the parties. The suggested amendments in the Rules are to the following effect:a. That the rules at present require the list of presents to be prepared at the time of marriage should also be prepared as and when the presents or any article or valuable security is given either, before or at the time of marriage and also at any time after, marriage and the same should also be signed by both the parties alongwith the signatures of the concerned persons. b. That if any article or valuable security is agreed to be given that also should be mentioned in the said list and duly signed. c. That if any demand of dowry is made the same should be immediately intimated to the Dowry Prohibition Officer or the police or recognised local Social Organisations. This would firstly put a check on the giver and taker of the dowry and also subsequent cooked up stories would be prevented to a great extent, This is especially necessary for the simple reason that after the woman dies either by way of suicide or homicide or by way of accident the stories are woven about the dowry and many a times parents are compelled to file false and fictitious complaints in order to show that their daughter and their family was not at fault and they along with their daughter were the victims of the illegal demands of the members of the matrimonial side. There are cases, in abundance, wherein the cases of pure and simple accidents and/or suicides for reasons other than the reasons concerned with cruelty to woman or demand of dowry or property subsequent to the marriage have been converted into the dowry deaths or cruelty to the woman. d. That the failure of informing the police or the Dowry Prohibition Officer or Social Organisations about the demand should be made penal. d. That the failure of informing the police or the Dowry Prohibition Officer or Social Organisations about the demand should be made penal. The parents of the woman should not be permitted to sit idle till the woman meets her death one way or other. If the complaints of cruelty and dowry demand are timely made so many untimely and unnecessary deaths or other cruel acts may be prevented. e. That there are many States in which no Dowry Prohibition Officers have been appointed by the Governments and such States deserve to be directed and instructed to appoint district-wise such officers. f. That the Social Organisations dealing with such matters under the Act deserve to be recognised and a district-wise list deserves to be made. And they should also be given certain powers to prevent offences and also to summon the parties and make efforts for reconciliation between the estranged parties. Let the sacrosanct and sacramental institution of marriage be not spurned into scurrilous sacrilege.