D. K. SETH, J. Mr. Shashi Nindan, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised very interesting questions in the present case, namely : - (1) Whether a suit for possession claimed in terms of the condition of delivery of possession contained in mortgage deed without seeking relief of foreclosure comes within the purview of Order XXXIV requiring passing for preliminary decree and then drawing up a final decree and whether such decree can be held inexecutable before final decree is passed in an objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) after the decree is satisfied by delivery of possession. (2) Whether such a decree can be negatived by reasons of Sections 4 and 5 of the U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977 and the possession already delivered could be restored to the judge ment debtor. 2. The brief facts relating to the present case are summarised as follows : 3. Pursuant to a mortgage dated 3-9-1975 for a period of five years containing a clause for delivery of possession a suit was filed in 1981. The said suit was decreed ex parte on 18-1-1992. Application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the decree was rejected. There was no appeal against the ex pane decree. The Proceeding under Order IX, Rule 13 has also reached its finality. Execution Case No. 45 of 1984 was levied by the decree- holder which stood fully satisfied by delivery of possession of the property pursuant to the decree on 21-8-1984. An objection under Section 47 was filed on"21-ll-1985 challenging the executability of the said decree. Admittedly the decree for costs was still unsatisfied. The learned trial court by an order dated 4-5-1987 allowed the said objection and direct restoration and posses sion of the property. The said order dated 4-5-1987 passed by the learned Munsif, Kasia, district Deoria in Execution Case No. 45 of 1984 arising out of suit No. 1143 of 1981 was challenged by means of Civil Revision No. 79 of 1987 before the learned District Judge, Deoria. The said order dated 4-5-1987 passed by the learned Munsif, Kasia, district Deoria in Execution Case No. 45 of 1984 arising out of suit No. 1143 of 1981 was challenged by means of Civil Revision No. 79 of 1987 before the learned District Judge, Deoria. By an order dated 18-7-1987 the learned Additional District Judge, Second Court, Deoria, to whom the said case was assigned, had dismissed the Civil Revision No. 79 of 1987 and affirmed the order passed by the learned Munsif and directed delivery of the property back to the judgment-debtor within a period of 30 days. Out of these orders the present writ petition arises. 4. On the prayer of Mr. Shahshi Nandan leave is granted to amend the cause title so as to convert the petition into one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly this petition is being treated as an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. A plain reading of the plaint (Annexure 1) as translated at the Bar by Mr. Shahshi Nandan reveals that it contains a prayer that in case a decree for possession is not possible, in that event, the principal and the interest payable may be decreed. The said prayer has been couched as prayer No. 3. The first prayer was a decree for possession while the second prayer as for a decree for a sum of Rs. 3600 being the occupation charges payable by the defendant. The plaint in paragraph 2 has given the particulars of the mortgage as is required in the pleading for a suit for foreclosure which is provided in Form No. 45 Appendix A to the Code. They also claimed an alternative decree for principal and interest in case the first two reliefs are found not available. The description of the property is also included in the plaint as is requried in the pleading of a suit for foreclosure. 6. The right to foreclose a mortgage is provided under Section 67 of the Trans fer of Property Act which runs as follows : "67. The description of the property is also included in the plaint as is requried in the pleading of a suit for foreclosure. 6. The right to foreclose a mortgage is provided under Section 67 of the Trans fer of Property Act which runs as follows : "67. Right to foreclosure or sale.-In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the mortgagee has, at any time after the mortgage-money has become due to him, and before a decree has been made for the redemption of the mortgaged property, or the mortgage-money has been paid or deposited as hereinafter provided, a right to obtain from the Court a decree that the mortgagor shall be absolutely debarred of his right to redeem the property, or a decree that the property be sold. A suit to obtain a decree that a mortgagor shall be absolutely debarred of his right to redeem to the mortgaged property is called a suit for foreclosure. Nothing in this Section shall be deemed- (a) to authorise any mortgagee, other than a mortgagee by conditional sale or a mortgagee under an anomalous mortgage by the terms of which he is entitled to foreclose, to institute a suit for foreclosure, or a usufructuary mortgagee as such or a mortgagee by conditional sale as such to institute a suit for sale; or (b) to authorize a mortgagor who holds the mortgagees rights as his trustee or legal representative, and who may sue for a sale of the property, to institute a suit for foreclosure; or (c) to authorize the mortgagee of a railway, canal, or other work in the maintenance of which the public are interested, to institute a suit for foreclosure or sale ; or (d) to authorize a person interested in part only of the mortgage-money to institute a suit relating only to corresponding part of. the mortgaged property, unless the mortgagees have, with the consent of the mortgagor, served their interests under the mortgage. " 7. The suit for foreclosure is governed by the provisions contained in Order XXXIV which in Rule 2 provides for a pleading in the decree in the manner as provided therein. the mortgaged property, unless the mortgagees have, with the consent of the mortgagor, served their interests under the mortgage. " 7. The suit for foreclosure is governed by the provisions contained in Order XXXIV which in Rule 2 provides for a pleading in the decree in the manner as provided therein. "2 Preliminary decree in foreclosure suit.- (I) In a Suit for foreclosure, if the plaintiff succeeds, the Court shall pass a preliminary decree- (a) ordering that an account be taken of what was due to the plaintiff at the date of such decree for- (i) principal and interest on the mortgage, (ii) the costs of suit, if any, awarded to him, and (iii) other costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by him up to that date in respect of his mortgage-security, together with interest thereon; or (b) declaring the amount so due at that date; and (c) directing- (1) that, if the defendant pays into Court the amount so found or declared due on or before such date as the Court may fix within six months from the date on which the court confirms and countersigns the account taken under clause (a), or from the date on which such amount is declared in Court under clause- (b), as the case may be, and thereafter pays such amount as may be adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges and expenses as provided in Rule 10, together with subsequent interest on such sums respectively as provided in Rule 11, the plaintiff shall deliver up to the defendant, or to such person as the defendant appoints, all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, and shall, if so required, re-transfer the property to the defendant at his cost free from the mortgage and from all incumbrances created by the plaintiff or any person claiming under him, or, where the plaintiff claims by derived title, by those under whom he claims, and shall also, if necessary, put the defendant in possession of the property; and (ii) that, if payment of the amount found or declared due under or by the preliminary decree is not made on or before the date so fixed, or the defendant fails to pay, within such time as the Court may fix, the amount adjudged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges, expenses and interest, the plaintiff shall be entitled to apply for a final decree debarring the defendant from all right to redeem the property. (2) The Court may, on good cause shown and upon terms to be fixed by the Court, from time to time, at any time before a final decree is passed, extend the time fixed for the payment of the amount found or declared due under sub-rule (1) or of the amount ad judged due in respect of subsequent costs, charges, expenses and interest. (3) Where, in a suit for foreclosure, subsequent mortgagees or persons deriving title from, or subrogated to the rights of, any such mortgagees are joined as parties, the prelimi nary decree shall provide for the adjudication of the respective rights and liabilities of the parties to the suit in the manner and form set forth in Form No. 9 or Form No. 10, as the case may be, of Appendix-D with such variation as the circumstances of the case may require. " 8. A final decree in a suit for foreclosure is passed in terms of Rule 3 of Order XXXIV which runs as follows : "3. Final decree in foreclosure suit.- (1) Where, before a final decree debarring the defendant from all right to redeem the mortgaged property has been passed, the defendant makes payment into Court of all amounts due from him under sub-rule (1) of Rule 2, the Court shall, on application made by the defendant in this behalf, pass a final decree- (a) ordering the plaintiff to deliver up the documents referred to in the preliminary decree. and, if necessary.- (b) ordering him to re-transfer at the cost of the defendant the mortgaged property as directed in the said decree, and also, if necessary- (c) ordering him to put the defendant in possession of the property. (2) Where payment in accordance with sub-rule (1) has not been made, the Court shall, on application made by the plaintiff in this behalf, pass a final decree declaring thai the defendant and all persons claiming through or under him are debarred from all right to redeem the mortgaged property and also, if necessary, ordering the defendant to put the plaintiff in possession of the property. (3) On the passing of a final decree under sub-rule (2), all liabilities to which the defendant is subject in respect of the mortgage or on account of the suit shall be deemed to have been discharged. " 9. Appendix A to the Code of Civil Procedure provides forms of pleadings. (3) On the passing of a final decree under sub-rule (2), all liabilities to which the defendant is subject in respect of the mortgage or on account of the suit shall be deemed to have been discharged. " 9. Appendix A to the Code of Civil Procedure provides forms of pleadings. Form No. 45 provides the form in a suit form foreclosure or sale in the following manner: No. 45 Foreclosure or sale (a) (date); (b) (names of mortgagor and mortgagee); (c) (sum secured); (d) (rate of interest); (e) (property subject to mortgage); (f) (amount now due); (g) (if the plaintiffs title is derivative, state shortly the transfers or devolution under which he claims ). (If the plaintiff is mortgagee in possession, add) 3. The plaintiff took possession of the mortgaged property on the. . . . . . . . . . day of. . . . . . . . . . . and is ready to account as mortgagee in possession from that time. (As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No. 1) 6. The plaintiff claims- (1) Paymenmt, or in default (sale or) foreclosure (and possession); (Where order XXXIV, Rule 6, applies ). (2) In case the proceeds of the sale are found to be insufficient to pay the amount due to the plaintiff, then that liberty be reserved to the plaintiff to apply for (an order for the balance ). " 10. Appendix-D provides the forms of decree. Forms Nos. 3 and 3-A provide the form of preliminary decree for foreclosure while Form No. 4 prescribes the form for final decree for foreclosure. 11. Drawing my attention to the said forms and comparing the same with the plaint and the decree passed, Mr. Shashi Nandan contends that the present suit was not a suit for foreclosure and, as such, Order XXXIV, Rules 2 and 3 does not apply. The decree passed is the one and the only decree and there was no scope for a preliminary and final decree as contemplated in Rules 2 and 3 respectively. There fore, there was no scope, according to him, for objecting the executability of the decree before the final decree is drawn and no objection under Section 41 would be entertained after the decree is fully satisfied by delivering possession. There fore, there was no scope, according to him, for objecting the executability of the decree before the final decree is drawn and no objection under Section 41 would be entertained after the decree is fully satisfied by delivering possession. He further contends that the suit does not contain any prayer absolutely debarring the mortgagor of his right to redeem the mortgaged property. Therefore, the right to redeem the mortgage is still open to the judgment-debtor. 12. Para 2 of the plaint gives the particulars of the mortgage as is required in Form 45 Appendix-A. At the bottom of the plaint, the amount of principal and interest have also been indicated. The prayer as contained in Form No. 45 of Appen dix-A provides in the following manner : "payment, or in default (sale or) foreclosure (and possession ). " Now there are, therefore, three parts of the prayer-one is for the payment and default then sale or possession. A party may not choose for sale but possession implies that it is to be obtained only after foreclosure. I must appreciate the artistic manner in which the plaint has been drafted. By reason of such artistic drafting, the plaintiff had avoided a preliminary decree and obtained a final decree one for all and got the same executed and virtually obtained a decree of foreclosure with outgoing through the process of Order XXXIV. A suit for foreclosure is initiated after the amount payable becomes due. Admittedly in the present case, the mortgage was for a period of five years and entered into in 1975 and, therefore, the money became due on the mortgaged in 1980 and the suit was instituted in 1981. Therefore, it cannot be said that the possession was asked for before the money became due. It was also not said to be a usufructuary mortgage in which the interest would be realised from the property, possession whereof is to be delivered. Even then the remedy of the mortgagee if possession is not delivered, he could assess the benefit and claim the same in a suit for foreclosure as money due, 13. In the present case, the suit was filed alter the money became due though there was very crafty alteration of the form of pleading as contained in Form No. 45 Appendix-A. But the ingredients required therein are very much present in the plaint. In the present case, the suit was filed alter the money became due though there was very crafty alteration of the form of pleading as contained in Form No. 45 Appendix-A. But the ingredients required therein are very much present in the plaint. The right giving rise to the claim of relief admittedly flows from a mortgage. The prayer for payment which should have been the first prayer was inserted at the bottom while the fast prayer has been sported at the top. The inclusion of prayer b, on the other hand, serves the purpose of possession and Specifies the right that might be claimed to receive the usufructs. The claim for principal and interest shows the claim for payment. Though in so many words no relief was inserted with the expres sion "foreclosure" but in pith and substance the said plaint reflects the pleading of a suit for foreclosure. It appears that the plaint was drafted artistically to avoid the implication of Order XXXIv 14. It is alleged by the learned counsel for the respondent that from the ex pane decree, it does not appear that the mortgage deed was ever produced. Neither the plaint discloses that the mortgage-deed is being filed alongwith the plaint. But the said submission is wholly irrelevant for our present purpose. At the same time such an argument would be counter-productive so far as the respondents are concerned. Inasmuch as if such a stand is taken, in that event, he cannot claim that there should be a preliminary decree and a final decree, in case there is no mortgage. That may be a good ground for challenging the original decree. But no appeal having been filed, the decree having reached the finality, the same cannot be challenged in execution, proceedings. It is an established principle of law that the executing court cannot go behind the decree. Such a stand by the learned counsel for the respondents denying the mortgage-deed would also be counter-productive for the other ground, namely, the benefit of the provision contained in the U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977. Inasmuch as in order to claim the relief under the said Act, there must be an existence of debt. The mortgage is a debt. If there is no mortgage, then there is no debt and then the matter could not be brought within the purview of the said Act. Inasmuch as in order to claim the relief under the said Act, there must be an existence of debt. The mortgage is a debt. If there is no mortgage, then there is no debt and then the matter could not be brought within the purview of the said Act. Be that as it may, it is the plaint which would determine the nature of the suit. The plaintiff having claimed the benefit out of mortgage which he had pleaded in the plaint, the plaintiff is estopped from resiling from the said plaint and the decree having reached finality, the defendant also can not question the same. Though the decree has been couched not in the form contained in Form No. 3,3-A and 4 of Appendix D but is a decree for possession in a suit for mortgage. Though the said decree could not be said to be according to Rules 2 and 3 of Order XXXIV, yet the same cannot be gone into at this stage for the purpose of setting aside the said decree. 15. Since the suit is a suit for foreclosure, as I have held already, the decree as it stands is for possession without being subject to any condition which presupposes that the said decree, if executed, would amount to the last stage of a suit for foreclosure, namely, possession. 16. Admittedly the same has been passed without a preliminary decree. There fore, it can very well be said that the said decree cannot be executable unless there is a preliminary decree and the executability of the said decree can very well be chal lenged. It is the court which is responsible for passing such a decree over-looking the situation. Now even if the possession is delivered, still then the cost and other parts are yet to be executed even if the petitioner does not seek to execute that part of the decree but still then it cannot be said that the decree has been fully satisfied. That apart, in the present case, no preliminary decree having been passed, the decree that has been passed can at best be taken to be the preliminary decree subject to final decree. Unless the provision of Rule 2 is complied with, no final decree can be passed. It can be passed only when the conditions contemplated in Rule 3 is satisfied. Unless the provision of Rule 2 is complied with, no final decree can be passed. It can be passed only when the conditions contemplated in Rule 3 is satisfied. No such position having been there, the execution of the decree for possession is a nullity and void ab initio in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, it can not be said that the decree has been fully executed and/or satisfied. In case the decree of possession is nullity and void under the law, in that event, there is no execution in the eye of law and, as such, even if possession is delivered, it is a nullity and void ab initio, Section 47 is still maintainable since in such event the execution case can be said to be still pending. 17. Under Section 47, all questions relating to the disputes with regard to the executability of the decree are to be decided in the same suit and the same can not be decided in any other suit. By way of defence, in a suit for foreclosure, the defendant would have sought for redemption after the preliminary decree and if he has not availed the same, he is precluded from filing a suit for redemption on an altogether different cause of action. Therefore, on the principle of constructive res judicata, it would not be open for the defendant to get any relief by way of redemption of mortgage. In the present case, since such a defence though open to him was not availed of and the foreclosure had taken away his right of redemption absolutely. Therefore, Mr. Shahshi Nandans contention that the redemtpion is still available to the defendant judgment-debtor is a mis-nomer. 18. Sections 4 and 5 of the U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977 provides as follows : "4. Therefore, Mr. Shahshi Nandans contention that the redemtpion is still available to the defendant judgment-debtor is a mis-nomer. 18. Sections 4 and 5 of the U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977 provides as follows : "4. Discharge of debts.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any contract, decree or other instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act- (a) every debt, together with any interest, payable on the date of commencement of this Act, by a debtor whose annual household income does not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees, shall with effect from the date of such commencement, be deemed to be wholly discharged; (b) every debt payable on the date of such commencement by a debtor whose annual house-hold income exceeds two thousand and four hundred rupees shall be wholly dis charged, if the debtor -. (i) has paid, in the discharge of his debt, a sum exceeding or equivalent to double the amount of principal in respect of the debt, at any time before such commencement, and such discharge shall be effective from the date of such commencement; (ii) pays after the date of such commencement, a sum, which together with any sum already paid in the discharge of such debt, is equivalent to or exceeds double the amount of principal in respect of the debt, or the amount actually due whichever is less, and such discharge shall be effective from the date of such payment. Explanation.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle any debtor to the refund of any part of a debt already repaid by him or recovered from him before the commencement of this Act. 5. Explanation.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle any debtor to the refund of any part of a debt already repaid by him or recovered from him before the commencement of this Act. 5. Consequence of discharge of debt.-Where any debt payable by a debtor has been discharged under Section 4, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any contract, decree or other instrument, the following consequences shall, with effect from the date of such discharge, ensure, namely- (a) no such debt shall be recoverable from a debtor, or from or against any of his movable or immovable property, nor shall any such property be liable to be attached and sold or proceeded against in any manner in the execution of any decree or order relating to such debt; (b) no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding against such debtor for the recovery of any debt including interest, if any: Provided that- (i) where a suit or proceeding is instituted jointly against such debtor and any other person, nothing in this clause shall apply to the maintainability of the suit or proceeding insofar as it relates to such other person ; (ii) where a suit is instituted against a debtor jointly in respect of a debtor advanced before as well as after the commencement of this Act, nothing in this clause shall apply to the maintainability of the suit in respect of the debt advanced after such commencement. (c) all suits and proceedings, including appeals, revisions, attachment or execution proceedings, pending on the date of commencement of this Act, for the recovery of any such debt against such debtor shall abate: Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the sale of- (i) any movable property, held and concluded before such commencement; or (ii) any immovable property, confirmed, before such commencement: Provided further that the proviso to clause (b) shall mutatis mutandis apply to a suit or proceeding referred to in this clause as it applies to a suit or proceeding referred to in this clause as it applies to a suit or proceeding specified in that clause : (d) every debtor undergoing detention in a civil prison in execution of any decree passed in respect of any such debt shall released forthwith; (e) every movable property pledged by a debtor shall stand released in his favour and the creditor shall, be bound to return the same to the debtor. (f) every mortgage of immovable property executed by a debtor shall stand redeemed and the mortgaged property shall be released in favour of the debtor. " 19. Mr. Shashi Nandan contends that the judgment-debtor has not proved that he is a small farmer or landless labourer or a marginal farmer. Therefore, the respondent cannot avail of the benefit of the said Act. According to him, the provisions of the said Act can be applied only when a proceeding had been taken under the said Act for determination of debt and not otherwise. He refers to Sec tions 6 and 6-A of the said Act and contends that unless the procedure laid down therein are gone through, the provisions of the said Act can not be applied for the purpose of rendering the decree inexecutable. According to him, unless there is a determination as provided in Chapter IV, the judgment debtor is not entitled to claim any benefit. He refers to Section 17 which provides the machinery, manner or mode for determination of the debt. According to him, unless the said proceedings are taken within a period of two years from the commencement of the said Act, such relief is no more available to the defendant. 20. The contention of Mr. Shashi Nandan appears to be misconceived in view of the finding by both the courts below. According to him, unless the said proceedings are taken within a period of two years from the commencement of the said Act, such relief is no more available to the defendant. 20. The contention of Mr. Shashi Nandan appears to be misconceived in view of the finding by both the courts below. It has been found by the trial court that from the materials on record, the trial court has come to a finding that the judgment-debt-or was a landless agricultural labourer as defined in Section 2 (8) of the said Act. The revisional court has affirmed the said conclusion of the learned trial Court on the basis of the materials available on record. Both the courts have also found that the petitioner has not been able to prove that the judgment-debtor was not an agricul tural labourer, then again Section 28 of the said Act prescribes: "28. Burden of proof.-In any suit of proceeding, the burden of proving that the debtor or small farmer is not entitled to the protection of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, lie on the creditor. " Therefore, whether the judgment-debtor is debtor or a small farmer or not, the burden is on the petitioner and both the courts below have come to a concurrent finding of fact that the petitioner has not been able to prove the same, Therefore, the said finding assumes the character of concurrent finding of fact which by no stretch of imagination can be said to be perverse. Now the debtor has been defined in Section 2 (6) to mean "a landless agricultural labourer, a marginal farmer, a rural artion or an urban worker who owes a debt, but does not include a small farmer, "small farmer" has been defined in Section 2 (11 ). However, we are not concerned with the same. 21. The contention of Mr. Shashi Nandan about the determination of debt as contemplated in Section 17 is wholly misconceived in view of the fact that Chapter IV deals with scaling down of debts of small farmers. It does not deal with landless agricultural labourer. The determination of debt in Section 17 is in respect of debt of a small farmer who is excluded from the definition of debtor. 22. It does not deal with landless agricultural labourer. The determination of debt in Section 17 is in respect of debt of a small farmer who is excluded from the definition of debtor. 22. Both the courts below have held that the judgment-debtor is a landless agricultural labourer and, as such, is a debtor. Therefore, Chapter IV is not ap plicable in the case. "relief to debtors" has been dealt with in Chapter II wherein Section 4 provides for discharge of debts as contemplated therein. Section 4 does not contemplate any proceeding to be undertaken. With the commencement of the said Act, every debt as mentioned in Section 4 stands discharged. Now dues under the mortgage is admittedly a debt. Therefore, the same stood discharged with the com mencement of the said Act which came into being on 21st February 1977. As soon such debt is discharged, the consequences contained in Section 5 are to follow. Both Sections 4 and 5 are qualified by non-obstante clause giving overwhelming applica tion despite existence of any other law. By reason of Section 5 that discharged a debt under Section 4, the debt payable by the judgment-debtor under the decree had become irrecoverable from or against the immovable property which shall not be liable to be attached, sold or proceeded against in relation to any decree relating to such debts. Admittedly the suit was instituted in 1981 when the present decree was not there. But clause (b) of Section 5 prescribes that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit against such debtor for the recovery of the debt including interest. The remedy of the petitioner was under Section 6 of the said Act. Therefore, the present suit could not have been entertained by the Civil Court and, therefore, the decree passed thereof is wholly without jurisdiction and cannot be executed. Therefore, the executability of such decree can very well be challenged. In case it is found that such a decree which is void ab initio, the same is a nullity and non-est. In other words, there is no decree in the eyes of law which can at all be executed but the same has been executed with the aid of the Court. Therefore, it is for the Court who has to rectify the mistake and undo the injustice. The Court has every power to undo any injustice without being restricted by any procedural technicality. Therefore, it is for the Court who has to rectify the mistake and undo the injustice. The Court has every power to undo any injustice without being restricted by any procedural technicality. The procedures are hand-maid of justice which cannot have tentacles to restrain a Court from removing injustice and rectifying its own mistake when the same is brought to its notice and thereby affirm or uphold a non-est decree and allow the decree holder to reap the benefits of such decree in such a situation when the same was obtained by an intel ligent manoeuvre and that too ex-pane. Admittedly the judgment-debtor Belongs to the weaker section of the Society for whom protection has been extended. Such protection cannot be allowed to be frustrated simply on technicalities. In order to render justice for the ends of justice, the judiciary is not supposed to loiter in the labyrinth of technicalities without leading for the ends of it. 23. The relief of creditor as contemplated under Section 6 is available to him while those in Section 6-A are available to the judgment-debtor. Therefore, the decree, as such, is not executable as has been held by both the learned Courts below. Despite the erudite arguments made by Mr. Shashi Nandan, I have been unable to persuade myself to agree with his contention in view of the reasons given above. 24. In the result, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner shall restore possession of the property to the judgment-debtor within a period of 30 days from date. There will be no order as to costs. 25. If under the law, the petitioner is entitled to any relief under Section 6, he is at liberty to avail of the same. At the same time, the judgment-debtor may avail of the relief under Section 6-A of the U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977 and in such case because of the petitioners possession of the property since November 1984 till the date adjustment should be made from the amount due on account of such occupa tion for the said period while deciding the question by the authority under the said Act if occasion so arises. Petition dismissed. .