D. K. SETH, J. The petitioners case, inter alia, was that one Sri Raj Narain, respondent No. 3, was initially appointed on 2-7-1963 as Conductor on temporary basis in U. P. Government Roadways. By Notification No. 2869/xxx-2-422-T-68 dated 31st May, 1972 published in the extra ordinary Gazette dated 1st June, 1972, U. P. State Road Transport Cor poration (hereinafter referred to as UPSRTC) was constituted with effect from 1st June, 1972 under Section 3 of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. The erstwhile employees of U. P. State Roadways Organisation (hereinafter referred to as UPSRO) continued to serve in the Corporation. The status of the said employees were determined to be on deputation in the service of the Corporation, by means of notification dated 5-7-1972 amend ing the earlier Government order dated 7-6-1972 with regard to the status of the employees. A charge-sheet dated 7-2-1975 was issued to the respon dent No. 3 for carrying passengers without ticket on different dates. The respondent No. 3 was placed under suspension by order dated 17-9-1975. A dispute was raised against the said order suspension and the same was referred to the III Industrial Tribunal, U. P. at Kanpur and the same was registered as Adjudication Case No. 271 of 1975. In the order of reference in the said Adjudication case, the controversy was referred to as dismissal. After the said discrepency was pointed out the word dismissal in the order of reference dated 12-11-1976 was substituted by the word suspension. In the additional written statement the Corporation took a stand that the respondent No. 3 was a Government servant, and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 the said stand was admitted by the Union (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) In the departmental inquiry the charges having been proved by an order dated 3-11-1976 the respondent No. 3 was dismissed. On 6-5-1977 the respondent No. 3filed an application under Section 6-F of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (here inafter referred to as the U. P. Act) challenging the order of dismissal passed during the pendency of Adjudication case and the same was register ed as Misc. Case No. 1 of 1977. On 6-5-1977 the respondent No. 3filed an application under Section 6-F of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (here inafter referred to as the U. P. Act) challenging the order of dismissal passed during the pendency of Adjudication case and the same was register ed as Misc. Case No. 1 of 1977. In the written statement filed by the petitioner it was alleged that the petitioner being Government servant on deputation with the Corporation, the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdic tion to adjudicate upon the same. Without adjudicating the question of jurisdiction the learned Tribunal proceeded to decide as to whether dogmatic inquiry was fair and proper. A writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Peti tion No. 7901 of 1978 was dismissed by this Court on 27-9-1988. filed by the petitioner, challenging the same on the ground that no interference was called for at interlocutory stage. Thereafter the said adjudication case No. 271 of 1976 and Misc. Case No. 1 of 1977 were heard together By award dated 28-10-198, published on 23-11-1979 passed in Misc. Case No 1 of 1977 the learned Tribunal had set aside the order of dismissal and directed re-instatement of respondent No. 3 with back wages (Annexure-4 to the petition ). In the meantime by award dated 26-10- 1979, published on 23-11-1979, the Adjudication Case No. 271 of 1975 was allowed by setting aside the order of suspension with full wages (Annexure-5 to the writ peti tion i. The said two awards were challenged in Writ Petition No. 2504 (C)/ 1980. By order dated 18-12-1985 passed in the said writ petition the said two awards were quashed and the matter was remanded to the Industrial Tribunal for decision on merits (Annuxure-6 to the petition ). After such remand, by award dated 21-1-1987, published on 28-5-1987 the Tribunal had set aside the order of suspension as well as the order of dismissal on the ground that the Corporation had no jurisdiction to initiate domestic inquiry against the employee concerned. It is against this order the present writ petition has been moved. 2. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate Full bench decision in the case of Ram Krishna Yadav v. U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980, decided on 24-12-1980. It is against this order the present writ petition has been moved. 2. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate Full bench decision in the case of Ram Krishna Yadav v. U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980, decided on 24-12-1980. He further contended that the Tribunal did not appreciate the decision in the case of J. P. Gupta v. State of U. P. 1980 ALR 81, as well as the decision in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5315 of 1978, which was based in the judgment in the case of J. P. Gupta (supra ). The Tribunal also failed to appreciate the ratio decidendi in the order of remand passed in Writ Petition No. 2504 (C)/19and0 which was based on the decision in the case of J. P. Gupta (supra ). Sri Sharma further relied on the case of Surendrapal Singh v. State of U. P. , 1988 (56) FLR 463. He also relied on the case of Surajpal Singh v. Labour Court, Allahabad ,vwand (57) FLR 194. He also relied on the case of Bhopal Singh v. Managing Director, V. P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1986 (12) ALR 556 : 1986 UPLBEC 634 and, in the case of Nagendra Prakash Sharma v. The Regional Manager, VPSRTC, 1988 UPLBEC 155 in support of his contentions. According to him, there was no relation of employee arid employer between the respondent No. 3 and the Corporation, giving rise to any industrial dispute, which can be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal unless, according to him, the relation subsists, there cannot be any industrial dispute. 3. Sri B. N. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respon dent No. 3, on the other contends that the order of dismissal, cannot be sustained because the same was passed during the pendency of the dispute. Iitasmuc has in such circumstances the dispute attracts the mischief of Sec tion 6-F of the U. P. Act. He contends that if there is no relationship in that event the Corporation was incompetent to pass the order of suspension and that of termination. If the order of suspension or termination remains, the same indicates existence of relationship of employer and employee. He contends that if there is no relationship in that event the Corporation was incompetent to pass the order of suspension and that of termination. If the order of suspension or termination remains, the same indicates existence of relationship of employer and employee. According to him the organisation of U. P. State Road Transport Corpora tion is an industry, therefore, the respondent No. 3 is a workman under U. P. State Road Transport Corporation. As such there exist industrial dispute, which has been rightly adjudicated upon by the Industrial Tribunal. Sri Singh relies upon the decision in the case of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1217 and contends that in the said case the relationship of the employees taken over by the Road Trans port Corporation pursuant to the notification under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, were treated to be the employees of the Corporation and, as such, on the ratio of the said decision the respondent No. 3 herein is also an employee of the Corporation. He also relies on the decision in the case of Surendrapal Singh (supra) and the decision in the case of U. P. State Rood Transport Corporation, Central Work-shop, Kanpur v. Ram Dayal, 1992 AWC 1327, He also relied on the decision in the case of D. R. Gurushanthappa v, Abdul Khuddus Anwar, AIR 1969 SC 744 , in order to substantiate his contention that the workman was an employee of the Corporation. He also refers to the decision in the case of Elgin Mill Company Limited v. Labour Court (II) U. P. Kanpur, 1992 AWG 1161, and contends that because of passage of time this court should not interfere with the award in view of the ratio decidendi in the said case. The further relies on the decision in the case of G. V. M. Reddy v. Depot Manager, 4. P. S. R. T. C. 1993 LLR 252. According to him there was relationship of employee and employer between the respondent No. 3 and the Corporation. Therefore, the award cannot be challenged. Alternatively, if there was no relationship then the order of suspension and dismissal cannot be sustained since the Corporation is incompetent to pass such orders. 4. In order to appreciate the situation it is necessary to refer to the following facts. Therefore, the award cannot be challenged. Alternatively, if there was no relationship then the order of suspension and dismissal cannot be sustained since the Corporation is incompetent to pass such orders. 4. In order to appreciate the situation it is necessary to refer to the following facts. By or under the Government order No. 000/20-30-2- 16q-N-72 dated 7th June, 1972 as amended by Government order No 3414/30-2-170-N-72 dated 5th July, 1972 the services of the employees of UPSRO were placed on deputation with UPSRTC after its creation with effect from M-1972. The said Government order provides that all permanent arid temporary officers and employees, who were in service with the Government Roadways prior to the constitution of State Road Transport Corporation, shall be deemed to be on deputation in service of the Corporation. He further spates that since UPSRTC has not framed Service rules under Section 45 at the Road Transport Corporation Act for its subordinate employees regarding condition of service. Therefore, the government order drafted 7th June, 1973 except para 1 (Ka) was deemed to be cancelled. It was further provided that the conditions of service of the officers and employees shall not be inferior to those which were available to them prior to absorption in U. P. Government Roadways and the period of work, prior to the same shall be included by the Corporation for the purposes of seniority. , promotion, Pay fixation, leave and financial benefits, which shall be the same as were available in the Government service. Therefore, the status of the respondent No. 3 continued to be that of the Government servant under the Government of U. P. on deputation to the Corporation and his condition of service shall be governed by the Government Service Rules. 5. In exercise of the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, U. P. Roadways Organisation (Abolition of Posts and Absorption of the Employees) Rules, 1982 was framed by the Government- The said rule came into force on 28th April, 1982 by or under notification No. 2051/xxx-2-170-N-72 of even date published in the Official Gazette. The said rules were given overriding effect by means of Rule 3 (2) of the said Rules and by Rule 3 (1) the same were made applicable to all employees of the UPSR6 working on deputation with UPSRTC. The said rules were given overriding effect by means of Rule 3 (2) of the said Rules and by Rule 3 (1) the same were made applicable to all employees of the UPSR6 working on deputation with UPSRTC. The employees referred to in Rule 3 (i) was defined in Rule 2 (ii) #3 Government servant employed in UPSRO and working on deputation -with -the Corporation. Under Rule 4 (1) the employees were required to intimate their wish if they do not want to be absorbed in UPSR FC. In default by reason of Rule 4 (2) the employees would be deemed to have opted for absorption and stood absorbed in the service of the Corporation with effect from expiry of three months from 28th April, 1982, namely, on 28th July, 1982, by reason of Rule 4 (3 ). The consequences of absorption were provided in Rules 7 and 8. By virtue of Rule 5 (1) the relevant post held by the concerned employee, under the State Government stood aboli shed, upon such absorption with affect from 28th July, 1982. in respect of the employees who did not opt to be absorbed, their services stood terminated and dispensed with under Rule 5 (ii) on the expiry of the period of notice provided in Rule 6. 6. A combined reading of the notification dated 5th July, 1972, by which the employees of UPSRO were treated to be on deputation as Government servant in the service of UPSRTC continued to be so in the service of Corporation until 28th July, 1982, by reason of the provisions contained in the said 1982 Rules. The status of the respondent No. 3 was governed by the said notification dated 5th July, 1972, since his services stood terminated in 1975. Therefore, he could not come within the purview of Rule 4 (2) read with Rule 4 (3) of the said Rules for being treated as absorbed in the service of the Corporation. Until termination of his service, the respondent No. 3 continued to remain a Government servant on deputation in the services of the Corporation. Therefore, there was no relationship of employee and employer between the respondent No. 3 and the Corporation. 7. Now the question is that if there was no relationship of employee and employer then now the order of suspension or that of dismissal, passed by the officer of the Corporation could be sustained. Therefore, there was no relationship of employee and employer between the respondent No. 3 and the Corporation. 7. Now the question is that if there was no relationship of employee and employer then now the order of suspension or that of dismissal, passed by the officer of the Corporation could be sustained. The question was decided by the Full Bench in the case of Ram Krishna Yadav v, V. P. State Road Transport Corporation, decided on 24th December 1980, in Writ Petition No. 150 of 1980. The said Full Bench had taken a view that those officers of erstwhile UPSRO, who were themselves on deputation with the Corporation were competent to take action against those employees of the erstwhile UPSRO who were on deputation with the Corporation. 8. In the present case, admittedly the order of suspension was passed by Sri S. C. Dwivedi and the order of dismissal was passed by Sri K. C. Manral, both of whom were Government servant, working in U. P. S. R. O. OB deputation with the Corporation. Therefore, in. view of ratio decided in the case of Ram Krishna Yadav (supra) it can safely be said for the purposes of passing order of suspension and the order of dismissal the said two officers of erstwhile UPSRO on deputation, were competent to pass the said orders. 9. In the case of J. P. Gupta (supra) it was held that the employees of U. P, Government Roadways continued to be in service of the State Government although they were on deputation with the Corporation. There had been no privity of contract of service between the petitioner and the Corporation. As such the relationship of master and servant did not exist between them. Therefore, the petitioner did not fall within the cate gory of workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, So far as the decision that there was no relationship of employee and employer between the employees of U. P. S- R O. and the U. P. S. R. T. C. , have been upheld in the case of Surendrapal Singh (supra) viz. but that the ratio decided that there is no relationship of employee and employer between the employees of U. P. S. R. O. even after deputation with the Corporation, was rightly held and the said aspect did not require any reference. but that the ratio decided that there is no relationship of employee and employer between the employees of U. P. S. R. O. even after deputation with the Corporation, was rightly held and the said aspect did not require any reference. However, because the employees continued to be a Government servant, therefore, they were amenable to U. P. Public Services Tribunal, this view was held to be incorrect. On the other hand it was held that there is relationship of employee and employer between the employees of U. P. S. R O. and the State Government. But that does not mean that these employees were Government servant and not workman. On the other hand it was held that even Government servant may be workman within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, when the Government runs an industry. The Division Bench in the said case approved the single Judge decision in the case of U. P State Road Transport Corporation v. State of U. P. , 1981 AWC 481 where U. P. S. R. O. was held an industry. 10. In fact, the question as to whether employees of U. P. S. R. O. were working or Government servant was not alluded in the casa of J. p Gupta, (supra ). Their Lordship in the case of J. P. Gupta (supra) had proceeded only on the basis of relationship of master and servant between the employees and the Government and, therefore they ware Government servant. There was no doubt that they were Government servant, but Government servant may also be workman, if organisation in which they are serving, is an industry. The view that the Government servant are not the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, is no longer a good law in view of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Deshraj v State of Punjab, MR. :988 SC 1182. The case of Surendrapal Singh (supra) proceeded on the assertion, by the petitioner that the claim was against the State Government only. Such a stand was taken in view of notification dated 5-7-1972 and the decision in the case of J. P. Gupta (Supra ). Similar view was taken in the case of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation Central Workshop v. Ram Dayal, to the effect that Government servant still can be a workman. Such a stand was taken in view of notification dated 5-7-1972 and the decision in the case of J. P. Gupta (Supra ). Similar view was taken in the case of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation Central Workshop v. Ram Dayal, to the effect that Government servant still can be a workman. In the said case of Ram Dayal (supra) it was found that the workman was deemed to be in service even after promulgation of 1982 Rules and, therefore, he was an employee of the Corporation. On facts, the present case, with regard to the said finding is different. Inasmuch as here the petitioner services stood terminated m 1976, long before 1982 Rule came into force, 11. The decision in the case of Bhopal Singh (supra) decided on 10-12-1986, was concerned with the authorisation of the Regional Manager made under 1981 Regulations. In the said case it was held that the minutes of resolution dated 16-2-1974, under the law then in force the Assistant Regional Manager, did not acquire any right to be the appoint ing authority. It is true that power in this behalf was of the Corporation and due to authorisation given the Assistant Regional Manager, acquired competency in this respect. In the case of Bhopal Singh (supra) it was held that the Assistant Regional Manager was not competent because of the changes brought about by the Amending Act, 1982 whereby all the existing Regulations or Orders on the subject stood superseded on the promulgation of 1981 Regulations. Therefore, in terms of expressed term of supersession the then existing regulations and orders on the subject stood superseded and thus the resolution dated 16-2-1974 of the Corporation passed in exercise of statutory power under Section 12 of the Act, stood also superseded. Thus it appears that until Regulation 1981 was promulgated or until 1982 Amendment was brought into being the resolution dated 16-2-1974 taken in exercise of Section 12 of the Act by the Corporation held the field and, therefore, the said officers were competent to take disciplinary action Thus we find no contradiction between the decision of Full bench in the case of Ram Krishna Yadav (supra) and that of Bhopal Singh (supra ). In the case of Ram Krishna Yadav (supra) Full Bench had held that the officers, who were Government servant in U. P. S. R. O, on deputation with U. P S. R. T. C. were competent to take disciplinary action against the employees, who were Government servant under with U. P. S. R. T. C. 12. The U. P. State Road Transport Corporation was constituted in exercise of the powers under Section 3 of Road Transport Corporation Act by the notification, referred to above. Section 19 read with Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, empowers the Corporation to frame its regulation for providing condition of service etc, for its employees. Regulations were framed only in 1981, which was declared invalid in the case of Bhopal Singh (supra ). But the same stood cured by the promulgation of 1987 Ordinance replaced by 1987 Act revalidating 1981 Regulations with effect from 19-6-1981. But the services of respondent No. 3 having stood dismissed prior to 1981. Regulations the same can no more of challenge even on the ratio in the case of Bhopal Singh (supra ). 13. In the facts and circumstances of the case the ratio in the case of Narendra Prakash Sharma (supra) does not help us much in deciding the present issue, in the facts and circumstances of the case, since we are not concerned with the validity or otherwise of 1981 Regulation. 14. The decision in the case of D. R. Gurushanthappa (supra) cited by Mr. Singh is clearly distinguishable, on the facts of the present case. Inasmuch as in the said case an employee of Mysore Iron and Steel Works Ltd. , which was started by the Government of Mysore and was being managed by the Government as its own concern, and continued to be the employee of the said Organisation after the said concern was taken over by Mysore Iron and Steel Works Limited, a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, though the entire share was held by the Govern ment and few of its officers were treated to be the employee of the company with effect from the date on which it was taken over by the said company by reason of the agreement entered into between the Government and the said Company. In the said case when undertaking was taken over by the company, the employees working in the Undertaking were also taken over and they were no more governed with effect from the date of taking over by the Civil Service Regulations and their condition of service were deter mined by the Standing Order of the Company, which were certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946, in which such emplo yees were defined as "lent officers", referring to the persons who continued to be in Government service but whose services were lent to the company. But in the present case the facts are completely different. Here by virtue of notification dated 5-7-1972 the employees were treated to be on deputa tion entitled to all service benefits to the Government servant and were absorbed only in 1982 pursuant to the Absorption Rules and continued to be on deputation without being governed by any Regulations of the Cor poration until 1981. Therefore, the said case is distinguishable and does not help to substantiate the contentions of Mr. Singh. Though Mr. Singh has placed much reliance on the said decision. 15. The decision in the case of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation ( Supra) cited by MT. Singh also does not help him. Inasmuch as in the said c e the services of the workman was terminated before the Corporation *as incorporated and the said termination having been set aside, after the employees of the erstwhile Bihar Government Roadways were taken over by the Corporation. Therefore, it was held that he was continuing in the service and were governed by the Standing Orders regulating the services of the employees of the Corporation. In the said case the Cor poration took a stand that it had taken over as from 1st May, 1959 such of the employees of the Rajya Transport Authority into its service who were on the rolls of the said Authority on the date it came into existence. Therefore, it was held that since the termination of the workman was set aside, therefore, he would be deemed to be on the rolls of the said Autho rity as on 1st May 1959. In the present case the situation is altogether different. Therefore, it was held that since the termination of the workman was set aside, therefore, he would be deemed to be on the rolls of the said Autho rity as on 1st May 1959. In the present case the situation is altogether different. By reason of Notification dated 5th July, 1972 the employees were on deputation and the Corporation had not taken over the services of such employees until 1982 Rules were framed. Therefore, the ratio decided in the said case is distinguishable, on the facts of the present case and does not render any help to the contentions of Mr. Singh. 16. The decision in the case of Swajpal Singh (supra) cited by Mr. Singh also does not help him. The decision in the case of Surendrapal Singh were cited by Mr. Singh, also does not help him. Inasmuch as in the said case the decision in the case of Surendrapal Singh (supra) were cited with the approval for the purposes of holding that the employees under the State Government in the Roadways department in workman since such an Undertaking was held to be an industry, in the case of Surendrapal Singh (supra ). The said case also does not held that there was any relationship of employee and employer between the workman and the Corporation. 17. The decision in the case of Elgin Milts Company Ltd. , (supra) also does not help Mr. Singh, inasmuch as the ratio decided therein is not of any help so far as the present case is concerned. In the said case the relationship of master and servant was not in dispute. On such back-ground when reference was technically incompetent, this court refused to interfere on the ground of passage of time since the question was held to be purely technical. Whereas in the present case the question is one of jurisdic tion, namely, as to whether the Tribunal can adjudicate the dispute. 18. Mr. Singh placed much reliance in the case of G. V. M. Reddy (supra ). But the said case also did not help him. Whereas in the present case the question is one of jurisdic tion, namely, as to whether the Tribunal can adjudicate the dispute. 18. Mr. Singh placed much reliance in the case of G. V. M. Reddy (supra ). But the said case also did not help him. Inasmuch as the transport wing of Tarramala Tirupathi Devesthana (T. T. D.) was taken by Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as A. P. S. R. T.) pursuant to the agreement dated 8th August, 1975 and the petitioner there was suspended by the Depot Manager, A. P. S. R. T. C. at Tirumala on 4th July, 1988. In the said case a question was raised that the said Agreement was biporfite agreement between T. T. D. and A. P. S. R. T. C. , in which the petitioner was not a party. Therefore, his services cannot be transferred to A. P. S. R. T. C. In the said case it was held : "that the relationship of employer and employee is contractual, it is not open to the employer to transfer the services of his employee to another employer without the consent of that employee. Relying on the decision in the case of Pyarachand Kesharimal Porwal Bidi Factory v. Omkar Laxman Thenga, 1970 (I) LLJ 492 . But in case of transfer of undertakings the workmen therein can be taken over by the transferee undertaking. In such a case Section 25-FF of the Industrial. Disputes Act is attracted. It is not necessary to obtain the consent of the workmen in order to transfer such undertaking. The rights of the employees of such undertaking are as envisages under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. In such a case Section 25-FF of the Industrial. Disputes Act is attracted. It is not necessary to obtain the consent of the workmen in order to transfer such undertaking. The rights of the employees of such undertaking are as envisages under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. If the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman, after such transfer, are not in any way less favourable to the workman than these applicable to him immediately before the transfer, and if the service of workman had not been interrupted by the said transfer and if the new em ployer is under the terms of such transfer or otherwise legally liable to pay to the workman in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his service was continuous and hits not been interrupted by the transfer, then the workman of the undertaking who was taken over by the new employer by transfer of such undertaking is not entitled to compensa tion as contemplated under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. But if the workman of such transferred undertaking is not taken by the new employer, or if the workman of such undertaking was not willing to join service under the new employer, or when such workmen in undertakings were taken by the new employer without satisfying all the three conditions referred to in the proviso to Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, then the workmen of such undertaking ate entitled to the notice pay and compensation as envisaged under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The ownership of management of the undertaking may be transferr ed either by agreement or by operation of law. If it is by agreement between the employer and the new employer the consent of the workmen coming within the purview of Industrial Disputes Act of such Undertaking need not be obtained. The workmen of such undertaking are entitled to only the notice and compensation as provided under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, if they do not come within the ambit of proviso to Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. If the workmen of such transferred undertaking are continued in service by the new employer such workmen have no right to urge that they continued to be the workmen of the transferor-employer. If the workmen of such transferred undertaking are continued in service by the new employer such workmen have no right to urge that they continued to be the workmen of the transferor-employer. If such workmen feels that his conditions of service under the new employer are less favourably than these applicable to such workman immediately before the transfer, then his right is only to claim the notice pay and compensation under Section 25-FF of the Indus trial Disputes Act and he cannot urge that he continued to be the workman of the transferor employer even after the undertaking was transferred to the new employer under whom he worked from the date of transfer. " But in the present case service of the employee was not transferred to U. P. S. R. T. C. , the services continued with the Government but they were on deputation with the Corporation. Therefore, of facts also the said case is distinguishable and does not help Mr. Singh. 19. The industrial disputes as defined in the U. P. Act is a dispute between the employer and the workman. Unless there is any relationship of employer and the workman it cannot be said that there exist a dispute between the parties. Even if it is said that the respondent No. 3 was a workman but then the relationship of workman and the employer is between respondent No. 3 and the State Government. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, though industrial dispute can be maintained and be adjudicated upon between respondent No. 3 and the State Government but by no stretch of imagination, in view of the position in law, as discussed above, it cannot be said that there exist industrial dis pute between respondent No. 3 and U. P. S. R. T. C. Therefore the Industrial Tribunal was wholly incompetent to adjudicate the same. 20. For all these reasons the award impugned, therefore, cannot be sustained and, as such, is hereby quashed. 21. However, this order will not prevent the respondent No. 3 from espousing his cause against the State Government on the same reference adding the State Government as principal party i. e. employer. Such liberty is being given in view of the fact that the Industrial Tribunal has power to consider incidental matters which are required to be gone into foe bringing an end to the dispute. Such liberty is being given in view of the fact that the Industrial Tribunal has power to consider incidental matters which are required to be gone into foe bringing an end to the dispute. The Tribunal should exhaust the whole field covered by the order of reference vide. Birla Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills v. Their Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 1158 . Power to consider incidental matters includes power to add parties vide Hochtief Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1964 SC 1746 . Such step is necessary to further or advance the ends of justice. In the present case, the above liberty is given also in view of long lapse of time in between, in order to shorten the process and avoid technicalities. In case the respondent No, 3 makes an application for addition or amendment introducing the State Government while main taining U, P. S. R. T. C. as co-respondent in the said adjudication case before the learned Tribunal, in that event the learned Tribunal shall allow the same within a period of three months from the date and proceed with the adjudication cases on the basis of the materials on record as well as f hose which might be brought on record by the parties, in accordance with law after giving adequate opportunity to the State Government and U. P. S. R. T. C. and dispose of the same, as early as possible, preferably within a period of one year from the date of such amendment or addition of the State Government, as principal party to the proceeding. Since the State Government is a party in the present proceeding, the State Govern ment may make adequate notice of the above direction. 22. In the result the writ petition succeed and is disposed of, as indicated above. 23. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .