Judgment : 1. Two judgments in O.S. Nos.78 and 79 of 1991 rendered by the learned First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry on 12. 1992 disposing of the suits on the question of jurisdiction after trial, have been canvassed with regard to their correctness, legality and propriety in these two appeals by and on behalf of the plaintiff. 2. The plaintiff in both cases is the appellant, which is a limited company having its Head Office at Mayiladuthurai in Thanjavur District with several branches in the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The defendant in both the suits are subscribers to the respective chits referred to in the plaints and the bye-law relating to the suit chit was registered under the provisions of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act. The first defendant in O.S. No.78 of 1991 appears to be the successful bidder in the auction held on 16. 1988 for the sum specified in the plaint and the defendants 2 and 3 stood as sureties for the repayment of future subscriptions regularly and the defendants executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.2, 52, 390 agreeing to repay the same jointly and severally and security bond were also executed by other defendants. As such, in O.S. No.79 of 1991 the first defendant, by name, Mani was the successful bidder in the auction held on 112. 1986 and the second defendant by name, Dhanalatchumy stood as surety and both the defendants executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff corporation for a sum of Rs. 1, 94, 000 and the second defendant also executed a security bond. Since the first defendant in both the cases became defaulter in the payment of future subscription inspite of legal notice issued, the plaintiff had to file suits for the recovery of the balance amount claimed in the plaints. 3. The suits were resited by the defendants by contending inter alia among other grounds that the entire transaction had taken place at Mayiladuthurai and the suits were filed by the Managing Director and not by the Foreman of the company and so, the suits were not maintainable and the quantum of amount claimed in the suits as per the statement of accounts was also denied since the plaintiff had failed to give credit to the real payments made by and on behalf of the defendants. It was also contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim future subscriptions under Section 33(5) of the Act, since the defendants had already given property as security. With regard to the rate of interest also, the suits were resisted. 4. Upon the above pleadings and after hearing both the sides, the trial Court, since the pleadings taken in both the suits by and on behalf of the respective parties are identical in nature, settled the following common issues in both the suits: 1. Whether the suit filed by the Managing Director is not maintainable? 2. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit in view of Section 64 of Chit Funds Act, 1982 and only an arbitration would lie before the Registrar of Arbitration? 3. Whether the defendants made number of payments which were not given credit to by the plaintiff? 4. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the suit amount? 5. To what relief the parties are entitled to? 5. The case records show that the trial in both the suits was taken up and consequently, the plaintiff examined one Nagarajan as P.W.1 through whom plaintiff’s side documents were marked. On the other hand, the defendant Mani was examined as D.W.1 and no document was marked on the side of the defendants. 6. Though five issues were settled for trial and evidence was recorded on that basis by and on behalf of the respective parties, the second issue in both the suits regarding the jurisdiction of the trial Court in view of Section 64 of Chit Funds Act, 1982 alone was taken into consideration by the learned trial Judge and the rest of the issues were left by the learned trial Judge unanswered and finally he returned the plaints in both the suits for representation of the same before the proper forum, since he found that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the suits, Aggrieved at these judgments, these two appeals were preferred by and on behalf of by the plaintiff. 7. 7. As the plaintiff in both the suits is one and the same and the relief claimed in both the suits is identical on the facts and the question involved in both the cases is common and similar in nature, with the consent of the Bar for the respective parties, I have heard both the cases and proposed to dispose of the same by delivering this common judgment. 8. I have looked into the impugned judgments rendered by the learned trial Judge in both the suits. Among the issues, issue No.2 has been preferred by the learned trial Judge, as it relates to the question of jurisdiction, I may straight away observe that the mode of disposal of the suits adopted by the learned trial Judge is not correct for the very reasoning that the parties were allowed to adduce their evidence on all issues settled for trial and the finding was given with regard to the issue relating to question of jurisdiction only and the plaints were returned for representation before the proper forum without any adequate finding therefor. Recording of evidence afresh and again may amount to stultification of the earlier one and the evidence of parties may vary due to long passage of time. When a question of jurisdiction is raised, it is the necessary duty of the trial Court to direct for a trial first upon the question of jurisdiction alone and render judgment on that question so as to avoid conflict of decisions and stultification of the evidence recorded already. The case records in the instant case do not show that the oral and documentary evidence on behalf of the respective parties are confined only to the issue of jurisdiction. A fair trial giving full opportunity and a full-fledged trial has not been conducted by the learned trial Judge as contemplated by the settled law in the courts. On this ground alone, I am totally unable to endorse my view with the impugned judgments rendered by the learned trial Judge by preferring the issue which relates to the question of jurisdiction alone at a later stage. 9. Coming to the observations on the issue of jurisdiction, learned trial Judge has given his findings as extracted hereunder:- “This issue was taken at first for discussion since it involves the question of jurisdiction of this Court to try this suit. 9. Coming to the observations on the issue of jurisdiction, learned trial Judge has given his findings as extracted hereunder:- “This issue was taken at first for discussion since it involves the question of jurisdiction of this Court to try this suit. The contention of the defendants is that the Chit was started on 16. 1987 and according to Section 64 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 the matter has to be referred for arbitration to the Registrar of Arbitration and no suit lies before the Civil Court. It is an admitted fact that the Chit Funds Act, 1982 (Act No.40 of 1982) came into force as per the notification published in the Extra Ordinary Gazette of India dated 210. 86, on the first day of November, 1986. As per Section 85 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982, nothing in the said Act shall apply in respect of any chit started before commencement of this Act. As per the admitted evidence of P.W.1 the suit chit was commenced on 16. 1987. Therefore, it clearly goes to show that this chit was started and commenced after the coming into force and commencement of Chit Funds Act, 1982. The learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that though the suit chit was started and commenced after 11. 86, the bye-law of the suit chit was registered prior to it and drew the attention of the court to Ex.A-14 and A-15. But, actually the certificate of commencement of chit business was issued only after 96. Even as per section 4 of Chit Funds Act, 1982, no chit can be commenced or conducted without obtaining previous sanction of the State Government and unless the chit is registered in that State within whose jurisdiction the chit is to be commenced or conducted. But, sanction also seems to have been obtained from the State Government when the suit chit commenced after 86. Thereafter section 64(3) of the Chit Fund Act, 1982 will be attracted and therefore, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain the suit since it relates to dispute referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 64 of Chit Fund Act, 1982. Therefore, as per the provisions of Section 64(1) of Chit Fund Act, 1982, any dispute of this nature shall be referred to the Registrar for Arbitration. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit. Therefore, as per the provisions of Section 64(1) of Chit Fund Act, 1982, any dispute of this nature shall be referred to the Registrar for Arbitration. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit. Hence, this issue is answered in the affirmative. On issues 1, 3 and 4:- Since this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit, these issues are left unanswered and undiscussed. On issue No.5: Since this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit, the plaintiff and documents filed by the plaintiff are ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for representation of the same before the proper forum.” 10. I have heard Mr.Chandramouli, learned senior counsel for and on behalf of the appellant who would contend very strenuously and stubbornly that while passing the impugned judgments, learned trial Judge had deliberately failed to look into the nuggets of law viz., the implied meaning provided in the enactment which gives every jurisdictional power to the trial Court to try the suit and dispose of the same in accordance with law that chosing the issue of jurisdiction alone and giving a finding on it by not appreciating the oral and documentary evidence recorded already in its proper perspective and thereby rendering the impugned judgments are highly erroneous and incorrect and that the very approach adopted by the learned trial Judge cannot be sustained and therefore, he strenuously pleaded for setting aside the impugned judgments under these appeals. Controverting the same, Mr.Sathiachandran, learned counsel for the respondents justified the impugned judgments. 11. Before proceeding further, I would like to advert to Section 64 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 which is a Central Act, came into force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry on 1. Controverting the same, Mr.Sathiachandran, learned counsel for the respondents justified the impugned judgments. 11. Before proceeding further, I would like to advert to Section 64 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 which is a Central Act, came into force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry on 1. 11.1986, which runs like this:- “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the management of a chit business shall be referred by any of the parties to the dispute, to the Registrar for arbitration of each party thereto is one or the other of the following, namely:- .(a) a foreman, a prized subscriber or a non-prized subscriber, including a defaulting subscriber, past subscriber or a person claiming through a subscriber, or a deceased subscriber to a chit; .(b) a surety of a subscriber, past subscriber, or a deceased subscriber.” Sub-clause(3) of the above section runs like this:- “No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain suit or other proceedings in respect of any dispute referred to in sub- section (1)”. The sub-clauses (1) and (3) to Section 64 of the Act were obviously taken as a pivotal by the learned trial Judge for the purpose of answering issue No.2 in the suits on the basis of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties. The legal position relating to sub-clauses (1) and (3) clearly postulates the fact that any dispute between a foreman and a subscriber particularly referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Section 64(1) of the Act, must necessarily be referred to the Registrar for arbitration and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been totally taken away from settling the dispute existed among themselves. It is also noticed that the provisions of Section 64 of the Central Act came into force to the Union Territory of Pondicherry on 11. 1986. The two suits filed by the plaintiff relate to the dispute existing between the Foreman of the plaintiff-corporation and the subscribers of the respective chits. Learned trial Judge has observed that the transactions took place after the Act come into operation. Learned trial Judge has also observed that P.W.1 during the course of his oral evidence admitted that the chit commenced on 112. 1986. Perhaps, this answer was taken advantage by the learned trial Judge for rendering the impugned judgment. 12. The matter does not end with this. Learned trial Judge has also observed that P.W.1 during the course of his oral evidence admitted that the chit commenced on 112. 1986. Perhaps, this answer was taken advantage by the learned trial Judge for rendering the impugned judgment. 12. The matter does not end with this. Mr.Chandramouli, learned senior counsel contended that the said observation and finding given by the learned trial Judge is not correct for the simple reasoning that the learned trial Judge had failed to see that the chit transaction existing between the respective parties herein was commenced by the plaintiff by registering the same as early as 1985, by virtue of Section 3 of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act, as it was prevalent then as evidenced from Exs.A-14 to 17. Exs.A-14 and 15 reveal that though the certificate given by the Registrar of Chits, Karaikkal is dated 112. 1986, the operative portion of the same is relevant to be noted which is as follows:- “I hereby certify that the Mayavaram Financial Chit Corporation Limited, Mayiladuthurai is entitled to commence the business of conducting the chit, the bye-laws of which have been registered in my office as No.57/85 dated 8. 85 M.C.2000/213/2, 00, 000/ renewed on 9. 86 and 186. Given under my hand and seal this day of fifteenth December, 1985”. “I hereby certify that the Mayavaram Financial Chit Corporation Limited, Mayiladuthurai is entitled to commence the business of conducting the chit, the bye-laws of which have been registered in my office as No.213/86 dt.10. 86 MC.3000/A 13, 00, 000. Given under my hand and seal this 17th day of June, 1987”. Though these two documents in Form-3 were signed by the Registrar of Chits, Karaikkal on 112. 1986 and 16. 1987 both the certificates relate to the registration of the bye-laws No.57/85 on 8. 1985 and bye-laws No.213/86 dated, 10. 1986 which are earlier to 11. 1986. This would mean that before the Central Act came into force on 11. 1986, the chit transactions very much involved in the suits were registered and commenced by duly registering the same before the authorities concerned. Ofcourse, it is true that the chit agreement entered into between the plaintiff-corporation and the defendants, as seen from Ex.A-16 is a later one. Other documents which are later dated, show the working of the chit transactions between the parties herein. Ofcourse, it is true that the chit agreement entered into between the plaintiff-corporation and the defendants, as seen from Ex.A-16 is a later one. Other documents which are later dated, show the working of the chit transactions between the parties herein. It is, at this juncture, Mr.Chandramouli, learned senior counsel drew my attention that though the oral and documentary evidence pertains to the chit transactions of various dates after 11. 1986, since the transactions and bye-laws were registered with the authorities concerned by virtue of Section 3 of the old Pondicherry Chit Funds Act, the date of registration of chit transaction must be taken as the date of commencement of the chit transaction which was very much involved in both the suits and that therefore, by virtue of the registration of chit, the plaintiff is entitled to carry on the business of chit transactions by following the procedural norms most specifically provided therefore and the compliance of subsequent procedure may not at all be taken note of as the date of the commencement of the chit transactions is earlier. 13. To appreciate the above contention, it has become relevant for me to advert to Section 3 of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act which has now been repealed by the Central Chit Funds Act, 1982 and which runs as follows:- “Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no person shall start or conduct any chit unless he has registered with the Registrar the proposed by-laws of the chit. 2. For the purpose of registration, there shall be filed with the Registrar the bye-laws of the chit in duplicate signed by the foreman and attested by at least two witnesses. 3. The Registrar, on being satisfied that the by-laws are not contrary to this Act or to the rules made thereunder, shall issue to the foreman a certificate of registration and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence that the bye-laws of the chit therein men- tioned are duly registered.” A combined reading of these three sub-clauses of Section 3 of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act would clearly reveal that no person is entitled to start or conduct any such business unless he has registered the bye-laws of the chit and the details of the same with the Registrar. Sub-clause(2) could provide with the things which are necessarily to be done by the foreman of a chit company for the purpose of registering the bye-laws. It is, thus made clear that the ingredients provided in sub-clause (1) are not only mandatory, but also the basic things to acquire right to start chit business and subclause (2) provides necessary things to be complied with for effecting registration. The cumulative effect of these sub-clauses would go to show that on complying with the said ingredients, a person is entitled to start chit business at any point of time that would mean that for the commencement of chit transaction, he has to follow certain modes provided under sub-sections (6) to (8) of the Act. Therefore, Section 3 of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act gives ample guidance to identify the date of commencement of the chit transaction as to when necessary things were done for starting the chit business and for getting it registered pursuant to Section 3 of the Chit Funds Act. 14. It has also become relevant to note Section 4 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 which is in existence and runs as follows:- “No chit shall be commenced or conducted without obtaining the previous sanction of the State Government within whose jurisdiction the chit is to be commenced or conducted or of such officer as may be empowered by the Government in this behalf, and unless the chit is registered in that State in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Provided that a sanction obtained under this sub-section shall lapse if the chit is not registered within twelve months from the date of such sanction or within such further period or periods not exceeding six months in the aggregate as the State Government may, on application made to it in this behalf allow.” Section 6 of the Act runs as under: - “Every chit agreement shall be in duplicate and shall be signed by each of the subscribers or by any person authorised by him in writing and the foreman and attested by at least two witnesses and it shall contain the following particulars, namely:- (a) to (q) xxxxx Section 7 of the Act deals with the mode of filing such agreement with the Registrar of Chits concerned. Likewise, Section 9 of the Act deals with the commencement of chit which runs as follows:- “Every foreman shall, after all the tickets specified in the chit agreement are fully subscribed, file a declaration to that effect with Registrar. .(2) As soon as may be after a declaration is filed under sub- section (1), the Registrar shall, after satisfying himself that all the requirements relating to sanction, registration of chit and other matters have been duly complied with, grant a certificate of commencement of the foreman. .(3) No foreman shall commence any auction or the draw of any chit or appropriate any chit amount unless a certificate of commence- ment referred to in sub-section (2) is obtained by him”. The above provisions would go to show that they are new provisions, but, however, they provide almost the provisions of the State Act which would obviously mean that though the chit transaction with the bye-laws was duly registered, unless the number of subscribers are found to be fully complied with and necessary declaration form are submitted to the authorities concerned, the transaction is not deemed to commence. In the instant case, by virtue of Exs.A-14 and A-15, since the chit transactions were registered with the Registrar, Chits, Karaikkal before the commencement of the present Central Act, the date of registration of the chit transactions is deemed to be taken as the date of the commencement of the chit transactions. Therefore, after having considered the same, I find that there is every force in the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for and on behalf of the appellant. 15. Therefore, after having considered the same, I find that there is every force in the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for and on behalf of the appellant. 15. One another legal aspect which requires consideration in this case is the scope of the chit transaction pending on the date of the commencement of the provisions of the present Central Act as found in Section 85 of the Present Act which runs like this:- “Act not to apply to certain chits:- Nothing in this Act shall apply in respect of- .(a) any chit started before the commencement of this Act; or .(b) any chit the amount of which, or where two or more chits were started or conducted simultaneously by the same foreman, the aggregate amount of which does not exceed one hundred rupees.” The above section of law, particularly, clause(a) of Section 85 does not in any way, in my considered view, include or warrant the suit chit transactions, but, however, it clearly provides an exception to the provisions of the present Act. The provisions of the precent Central Act came into force on 11. 1986. The suit chit transactions already commenced and were registered as early as 1985-86. Therefore, in the facts of the instant case, the suit chit transactions are clearly in the teeth of sub-clause (a) to Section 85 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982. 16. Mr.Bathiachandran, learned counsel for the respondents while justifying the impugned judgments under these appeals, brought to my notice the scope of repeal of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act by the present Central Act. While doing so, referring to Section 90 of the present Act, learned counsel would contend that the provisions of the present Act have given a cover to the entire chit transactions under the appeals for the very reasoning that the certificate of commencement of the chit transactions and the actual payment by the defendants have taken place after the provisions of the Central Act came into force and that therefore, the impugned judgments rendered by the Court below could well be justified. While considering the said contention with the observations made by me in the above paragraphs of the judgment, in the context of the fact of the instant case, I am at every difficulty to sustain the same for the following reasonings. While considering the said contention with the observations made by me in the above paragraphs of the judgment, in the context of the fact of the instant case, I am at every difficulty to sustain the same for the following reasonings. Section 90 of the Central Act which is now made applicable to the Union Territory of Pondicherry runs like this:- “Repeal and saving:- (1) The Andhra Pradesh Chit Funds Act, 1971, the Kerala Chitties Act, 1975, the Maharashtra Chit Funds Act, 1974, the Tamil Nadu Chit Funds Act, 1961, as in force in the State of Tamil Nadu and in the Union Territories of Chandigarh and Delhi, the Uttar Pradesh Chit Funds, 1975, the Goa, Daman and Diu Chit Funds Act, 1973 and the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act, 1966 are hereby repealed and the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply to such repeal as if eac h Act so repealed were a Central Act. 2. Notwithstanding such repeal, the Acts mentioned in Sub-section (1) shall continue to apply to chits in operation on the commence-ment of this Act, in the same manner as they applied to such chits before such commencement”. The above section of law would clinch the fact that the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act, 1966 has been totally repealed by the provisions of the present Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply to such repeal as if each Act so repealed were a Central Act. 17. The above section of law would clinch the fact that the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act, 1966 has been totally repealed by the provisions of the present Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply to such repeal as if each Act so repealed were a Central Act. 17. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 runs like this:- “Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- .(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or .(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or .(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or .(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or .(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfei-ture or punishment as aforesaid: and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted or continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfei-ture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed”. 18. A mere reading and minimum understanding of the above Section of law, particularly sub-clauses (a) and (b) would clearly provide that the moment the statute is repealed, no matter whether it is temporary or permanent is in operation, unless or until the repealed Act seems to have given an implied or expressed, or different or repugnant meaning to the present substituted Act, the effect of the repeal would be the same as provided in the subsequent Act. It is unnecessary to have further elaboration in this matter for the reasoning that the Section 85 of the Central Act provides that nothing in the present Act shall apply in respect of chit transactions pending before the commencement of the Act viz., the provisions of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act, Exs.A-14 and 15 dealing with the scope of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act are to be taken to mean in its proper perspective in the context of Section 90 of the present Central Act. 19. 19. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh , A.I.R.1955 S.C. 84 has observed as follows: - “But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The Court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that S.6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case to repeal even if there i s simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course, the consequences laid down in S.6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application when a statute, which is of a temporary nature automatically expires by efflux of time”. The Supreme Court in another case in State of Orissa v. M.A.Tulloch & Co. , A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 1284 held the legal ratio as follows:- “The effect of a Central Act under its exclusive legislative power which covers the field of an earlier State Act which was competent and valid when enacted is not open to doubt. The Parliamentary enactment supersedes the State law and thus it virtually effects a repeal; the effect in law of a repeal, if it is not subject to a saving as is found in S.6 of the General Clauses Act, is also not a matter of controversy. The repealed Act is to be considered, except as to past and closed transactions, as if i t had never existed. The repealed Act is to be considered, except as to past and closed transactions, as if i t had never existed. The principle on which the saving clause in S.6 of the General Clauses Act is based is that every later enactment which supersedes an earlier one or puts an end to an earlier state of the law is presumed to intend the continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment unless there were sufficient indications-express or implied- in the later enactment designed to completely obliterate the earlier state of the law. The entire theory underlying implie d repeals is that there is no need for the later enactment to state in express terms that an earliest enactment has been repealed by using any particular set of words or form of drafting but that if the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is manifested by the enactment of provisions as to effect such supersession, then there is in law a repeal notwithstanding the absence of the word, ‘repeal’ in the later statute. As the legislative intend to supersede the earlier law is the basis upon which the doctrine of implied repeal is founded there can be no incongruity in attributing to the later legislation the same intent which S.6 presumes where the word, ‘repeal’ in expressly used. As the liability to pay the fee which was the subject of the notices of the demand made on 8. 1960 under the Orissa Act 27 of 1952 had accrued prior to June 1, 1958 where the Central Act 67 of 1957 came into force there notices were valid and the amounts due there-under could be recovered notwithstanding the disappearance of the Orissa Act 27 of 1952 by virtue of the superior legislation of Act 67 of 1957 by the Union Parliament”. 20. In the light of the aforesaid reasonings and observations given to the facts of the instant case, and having considered the impugned judgments as well as the adduced legal evidence, I am constrained to hold that the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge in answering the issue on the question of jurisdiction it not correct and also erroneous and that therefore, the impugned judgments in both the cases are liable to be set aside. It is also noticed at this stage, that the entire claim made by the plaintiff in both the suits is the defaulted prize amount to be repaid by the defendants viz., the successful bidder and the guarantors, and under the bye-laws, each of them are liable to pay the suit claim. But, the unfortunate thing that happened in these cases is that the learned trial Judge has not given any finding regarding this, nor even he touched the said plea. It is, thus the claim of the chit was made in the year 1991 and for the obvious reason, the adjudication of the same is being delayed consuming long passage of time. It is, therefore, under the circumstances, keeping in view of the defence theory being projected to by and on behalf of the respondents, the interest of justice would impel me, while setting aside the decrees and judgments in both the suits, to remit the whole matter in both the appeals for fresh trial before the learned trial Judge who has got jurisdiction to try the suits on all other issues, and to dispose of the suits O.S.78 and 79 of 1991 after giving opportunity to both the parties, in accordance with law, within eight weeks from the date of the receipt of the case records. 21. In the result, both the appeals succeed and the same are allowed. The judgments and decrees rendered by the learned First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry in O.S. Nos. 78 and 79 of 1991 dated 12. 1992 are set aside, but the entire matter is remitted for trial afresh on all issues and for disposal in accordance with law as directed above. There will be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.