Judgment :- THANIKKACHALAM, J. At the instance of the Department, the Tribunal referred the following question for the opinion of this Court, under S. 27(1) of the WT Act, 1957 : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is correct in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to exemption under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the WT Act, 1957 ?" * 2. The assessee Dr. G. Nallakrishnan invested a sum or Rs. 79, 680 in a firm called M/s. Asia Engineering Company engaged in building activity on a large scale. Its activities comprised of construction of several large buildings of complex designs, involving large amounts of reinforced concrete works, fabrication of steel for windows, door frames etc. In the asst. yr. 1975-76 and the valuation date being 31st Dec., 1974, the assessee claimed that these activities undertaken by the firm constituted manufacturing activities. Therefore, the assessee claimed that the investment of Rs. 79, 680 made in the said firm should be exempt from the levy of wealth-tax under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the WT Act, 1957, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'. The WTO disallowed the claim for the reason that in his opinion that the carrying on of construction activities by the said firm did not mean that the firm was an industrial undertaking. On appeal, the AAC confirmed the disallowance made by holding that for the purpose of claiming exemption under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, the firm should be engaged in the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or in the construction of ships or in the manufacture or processing of goods or in mining. In the opinion of the AAC none of the activities undertaken by the said firm could be said to be activities contemplated under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, and, therefore, the building activities could not be considered as manufacturing activity could not be considered as manufacturing activity nor processing of goods so a to entitle it to the exemption contemplated under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act. 3. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal and while repeating the arguments advanced before the authorities below, relied on the decision of the Orissa High Court in CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja & Co. 1980 (121) ITR 212 (Ori). 3. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal and while repeating the arguments advanced before the authorities below, relied on the decision of the Orissa High Court in CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja & Co. 1980 (121) ITR 212 (Ori). The Departmental Representative submitted that if the firm's activity involved fabrication work, it could be regarded as an industrial undertaking, but since neither the WTO nor the AAC has gone into this question, no decision could be pronounced, assuming that fact and by applying the decision of the Orissa High Court. The Tribunal, therefore, thought that it was necessary to look into this matter and examine the nature of the activities actually carried on by the firm to ascertain whether it included fabrication activities and to enable the Department to do so, the assessment was set aside, directing the WTO in the following manner : "If there are activities involving fabrication and those activities referred in the case reported in 1980 (121) ITR 212 (Ori), the said M/s. Asia Engineering Company could be said to be an industrial undertaking and the value of the assessee's interest could be exempt under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act" * . 4. Before us, the learned standing counsel appearing for the Department submitted that the Tribunal was not correct in remitting back this issue to the WTO for the purpose of ascertaining whether the assessee was doing any fabrication work so as to enable the assessee to claim the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act. According to the learned standing counsel the Tribunal gave the aforesaid direction on the basis of the decision of the Orissa High Court reported in 1980 (121) ITR 212 1993 AIR(SC) 2529, 1994 (S1) SCC 280, 1993 (5) JT 346 , 1993 (3) SCALE 726 , 1993 (204) ITR 412, 1993 (91) STC 450, 1993 (3) Scale 726 , 1993 (114) CTR 420, 1993 (70) TAXMANN 312, 1993 (2) TLR 1117, 114 CTR(SC) 420, 1993 AIR(SCW) 3317, 1993 TaxLR 1117 (SC). Therefore, according to the learned standing counsel, the Tribunal was not correct in remitting back this issue on the basis of the decision rendered by the Orissa High Court in 1980 (121) ITR 212 (Ori) (supra). Therefore, according to the learned standing counsel, the Tribunal was not correct in remitting back this issue on the basis of the decision rendered by the Orissa High Court in 1980 (121) ITR 212 (Ori) (supra). The learned standing counsel further submitted that when the business of the assessee was construction of building all the intermediary activities in that process could be the integral part of the main business., viz., construction of buildings. In such a case, according to the learned standing counsel, the assessee is not entitled to ask for benefit under Ss. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, with regard to intermediary activities, like fabrication work, making doors and windows and indulging in reinforced concrete work. Further, the learned standing counsel pointed out that the assessee before the Authorities below and before the Tribunal, contended that their main activities are only construction work and not any fabrication work or making windows and doors etc. Therefore, it was submitted that in as much as in the construction work, all the intermediary works are integral part of the same, the assessee is not entitled to ask for benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, on those intermediary activities, which cannot be considered as independent activities. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the assessee submitted that even though the assessee is engaged in the construction of buildings in a large scale, the assessee is also doing fabrication work, making doors and windows and doing reinforced concrete works. Even if the assessee is not entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act on the investment made, with regard to the construction of buildings, the assessee is entitled to ask for the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, with regard to its activities in doing fabrication work, making windows, doors etc. since those activities are being done independently and the Department was not correct in saying that the above activities are the integral part of the main activity of the assessee, viz., construction of buildings. Under such circumstances, in order to find out whether the assessee is engaged in the manufacturing and production of articles like fabricating steels, making doors and windows and making reinforced concrete construction, the Tribunal directed the AO to ascertain the fact whether the assessee was doing the abovesaid works independently. Under such circumstances, in order to find out whether the assessee is engaged in the manufacturing and production of articles like fabricating steels, making doors and windows and making reinforced concrete construction, the Tribunal directed the AO to ascertain the fact whether the assessee was doing the abovesaid works independently. According to the learned counsel even if the intermediary works are done and articles are produced and the same went into the construction work, that does not disentitle the assessee from asking for the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act with regard to the manufacturing of those articles. Thus the learned counsel appearing for the assessee supported the order passed by the Tribunal. 6. We have heard the rival submissions made by the parties. The assessee is a partner in a firm called M/s. Asia Engineering Company, which is carrying on business as contractors of buildings, bridges, factories and other construction activities. The assessee claimed exemption under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act in respect of the capital invested in M/s. Asia Engineering Company. Sec. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act reads as under :5(1) subject to the provisions of sub-s. (1A) wealth-tax shall not be payable by the assessee in respect of the following assets, and such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee (xxxii) the value, as determined in the prescribed manner, of the interest of the assessee in the assets (not being any land or building or any rights in any land or building or asset referred to in any other clause of this sub-section) forming part of an industrial undertaking belonging to a firm or an association of persons of which the assessee is a partner or, as the case may be, as member". Explanation to S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act reads as under : " For the purposes of this clause and cl. (xxxii), the term 'industrial undertaking' means an undertaking engaged in the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or in the construction of ships or in the manufacture or processing of goods or in mining ". 7. (xxxii), the term 'industrial undertaking' means an undertaking engaged in the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or in the construction of ships or in the manufacture or processing of goods or in mining ". 7. The point for consideration is whether the assessee is entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act with regard to the intermediary activities in which the company is engaged in manufacturing steel fabrication work, making doors and windows and also making reinferred concrete works, since, according to the assessee these activities are being done independently and not as an integral part of the main business of construction. Even otherwise, according to the assessee if the intermediary products are made or manufactured and went into the construction work, then also the assessee is entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act on the investment made with regard to intermediary activities. 8. The Tribunal remitted back this issue in order to find out whether the assessee was doing any intermediary works as claimed by it independently so as to enable it to claim benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act. The Tribunal's order is based upon the decision of the Orissa High Court rendered in CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja & Co. (supra), wherein the Orissa High Court held that the term "Industrial undertaking" in S. 80HH of the IT Act, 1961, has no statutory definition. Law is fairly settled that in the absence of a statutory definition, it could be open to look from the meaning by reference to definitions in sister-legislation and, failing that, to adopt the meaning in common parlance. The concept of industrial undertaking need not necessarily be confined to manufacture and production of articles. Even in the absence of either of them in the strict sense there could be an industrial undertaking. The business of a contractor, who has undertaken the construction of an irrigation project would be an industrial undertaking for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 9. This decision was taken on appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while considering this issue in CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja & Co. The business of a contractor, who has undertaken the construction of an irrigation project would be an industrial undertaking for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 9. This decision was taken on appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while considering this issue in CIT vs. N.C. Budharaja & Co. (supra), reversing the decision of the Orissa High Court, held that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit, provided under S. 80HH , because the activity of construction of a dam could not be characterised as manufacture or production of an article or articles within the meaning of S. 80HH(2)(i) of the Act, while rendering its decision in the abovesaid case, the Supreme Court observed as under :" * It may be that the respondent is himself manufacturing some of the articles like gates, windows and doors which go into the construction of a dam but that makes little difference to the principle. The petitioner is not claiming the deduction provided by S. 80HH on the value of the said manufactured articles but on the total value of the dam as such. In such a situation, it is immaterial whether the manufactured articles which go into the construction of a dam are manufactured by him or purchased by him from another person. We need not express any opinion on the question what would be the position if the respondent had claimed the benefit of S. 80HH on the value of the articles manufactured or produced by him which articles have gone into/consumed in the construction of the dam ". Relying upon this observation, now the learned counsel appearing for the assessee submitted that inasmuch as the Supreme Court has not expressed any opinion with regard to the claim for benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, for the intermediary activities in manufacturing articles which went into the construction work, the assessee should be given benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act with regard to the manufacturing work done for the production of steel fabricating, making doors and windows and doing reinforced concrete work. The learned counsel for the assessee relied upon the decision in National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. vs. CWT 1969 (74) ITR 465 (Del), wherein the Delhi High Court, while considering the provisions of S. 45(d) of the WT Act, 1957, held as under :" .... The learned counsel for the assessee relied upon the decision in National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. vs. CWT 1969 (74) ITR 465 (Del), wherein the Delhi High Court, while considering the provisions of S. 45(d) of the WT Act, 1957, held as under :" .... that the assessee was engaged in the manufacture, production or processing of goods or articles within the Explanation to S. 45(d) and was therefore qualified for the exemption. From a business point of view it could not be said that the assessee was not engaged in manufacturing or processing of goods. Though it was true in one sense that it might be termed a feeding activity, the proportion that the assessee's manufacturing activity assumed made it one of the assessee's principal activities. Sec. 45(d) does not require that the undertaking should be engaged in the manufacture of goods for being sent to market or be solely engaged in the manufacture. An undertaking engaged in the manufacture of goods for its own use may, therefore, equally qualify for the exemption. The word 'engage' may have a variety of meanings depending on the context and setting in which it is used. Ordinarily the expression connotes doing of more than one act or one transaction. Continuity of action is implicit in the meaning of the word. It has also been used in the sense of being busy or conducting or devoting attention or effect or employing oneself. The words 'engaged in the manufacture, production', etc., should normally, therefore, mean continuously occupied in the manufacture as a principal business as distinguished from an occasional participation or single act or casual employment or a mere supervision without physical participation. The extent of activity would be a relevant factor and if such activity is at an extended scale it may be suggestive of being 'engaged' in manufacturing activity". 10. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Patna High Court in CWT vs. Kishorilal Agarwal 1993 (203) ITR 975 , 1993 (115) CTR 445 (Pat), wherein the Patna High Court, while considering the provisions of S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the WT Act, held as under : Therefore, the construction of buildings, roads, drains, etc., being immovable properties is on the face of it not embraced by the expression 'manufacture or processing of goods'. As such, the business activities of the firm cannot be said to be those of an industrial undertaking with in the meaning of the statutory definition. The manufacturing of bricks for execution of the works contract is wholly inconsequential for determination of the issue involved because it is merely an ancillary or incidental activity. The same view has been taken by the Gujarat High Court in a recent case in Smt. Shantaben Chinubhai vs. CWT 1992 (196) ITR 44, 1992 (103) CTR 185 (Guj) by placing reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Minocha Brothers (P) Ltd. 1986 (160) ITR 134, 1986 (52) CTR 346, 1986 (26) TAXMAN 648, 1986 (2) TLR 88, 1986 (52) CTR(Del) 346 (Del). The Delhi High Court itself has distinguished its earlier judgment in the case of National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. vs. CWT 1969 (74) TR 465 (Del), while considering a question identical to the one at hand". According to the learned counsel appearing for the assessee benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act was denied in the abovesaid case, since the value of the bricks manufactured formed negligible part of the total turnover of the firm of the assessee. So also Smt. Shantaben Chinubhai v. CWT (supra), the Gujarat High Court, while considering the provisions of S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act held : '....that the activity in which the firms were engaged was the construction of buildings and merely because they, in the course of construction of buildings, prepared or manufactured cement concrete, they could not be said to be engaged in the activity of manufacture or processing of goods. Preparation of manufacture of cement concrete is only ancillary or incidental to their business of construction of buildings. In the instant case, the firms in which the assessee was a partner did not have or own any undertaking which was engaged in the manufacture or processing of goods. Making or preparation of cement concrete or other such articles was not an activity in which the firms in which the assessee was a partner were engaged, but such activity was an integral part of the activity of construction of buildings in which the firms were engaged. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to exemption under cl. Making or preparation of cement concrete or other such articles was not an activity in which the firms in which the assessee was a partner were engaged, but such activity was an integral part of the activity of construction of buildings in which the firms were engaged. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to exemption under cl. (xxxii) of S. 5(1) of the Act in respect of his share in the two partnership firms'." According to the learned counsel appearing for the assessee, the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act was denied in the abovesaid case, because the Court found that preparation or manufacture of cement concrete is only ancillary or incidental to the business of construction building. 11. Therefore, according to the learned counsel appearing for the assessee, in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in 1993 AIR(SC) 2529, 1994 (S1) SCC 280, 1993 (5) JT 346 , 1993 (3) SCALE 726 , 1993 (204) ITR 412, 1993 (91) STC 450, 1993 (3) Scale 726 , 1993 (114) CTR 420, 1993 (70) TAXMANN 312, 1993 (2) TLR 1117, 114 CTR(SC) 420, 1993 AIR(SCW) 3317, 1993 TaxLR 1117 (SC) cited supra, if the assessee claims benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act with regard to the intermediary activities, which are independent and not integral part of the main business of building construction, the assessee is entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, with regard to those intermediary activities, even if the products went into the construction work of the building. The learned counsel further pointed out that in the abovesaid decisions cited supra, the Courts came to the conclusion that the intermediary activities are ancillary or incidental to the main business of building construction. Therefore, it was held that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act with regard to the goods manufactured by the intermediary activities. 12. Therefore, it was held that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act with regard to the goods manufactured by the intermediary activities. 12. The learned standing counsel for the Department apart from relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in 1993 AIR(SC) 2529, 1994 (S1) SCC 280, 1993 (5) JT 346 , 1993 (3) SCALE 726 , 1993 (204) ITR 412, 1993 (91) STC 450, 1993 (3) Scale 726 , 1993 (114) CTR 420, 1993 (70) TAXMANN 312, 1993 (2) TLR 1117, 114 CTR(SC) 420, 1993 AIR(SCW) 3317, 1993 TaxLR 1117 (SC) cited supra, also relied upon the decisions in 1992 (196) ITR 44, 1992 (103) CTR 185 (Guj) cited supra, 1993 (203) ITR 975 , 1993 (115) CTR 445 (Pat) cited supra, CWT vs. Urmila Gupta 1992 (105) CTR(Cal) 223 and CWT vs. Smt. Asha Mittal 1994 (209) ITR 368, 1994 (116) CTR 106, 1994 (2) TLR 1028 (Raj) in order to support his contention that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, when the assessee is engaged in the intermediary activities, like the manufacture and production of steel fabricating, making doors and windows and doing reinforced concrete work, since those activities are integral part of the main activity of building construction. In 1992 (105) CTR(Cal) 223 cited supra, the Calcutta High Court, while considering the provisions of S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, held that the assessee as a partner of the firm engaged in construction of multi-storeyed buildings, is not entitled to exemption under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act in respect of the value of her interest in the firm. Similarly in 1994 (209) ITR 368, 1994 (116) CTR 106, 1994 (2) TLR 1028 (Raj) cited supra, the Rajasthan High Court, while considering the provisions of S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, held, that a firm engaged in the construction of dams does not constitute 'industrial undertaking'. Therefore, the interest of the assessee, a partner in a firm, in the assets of the firm, forming part of its industrial undertaking and which firm is engaged in the construction of dams, does not qualify for exemption under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act. 13. Therefore, the interest of the assessee, a partner in a firm, in the assets of the firm, forming part of its industrial undertaking and which firm is engaged in the construction of dams, does not qualify for exemption under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act. 13. A plain reading of the decisions cited supra would go to show that where an assessee is having an interest in a firm which is engaged in the construction of buildings, manufacture or production of intermediary articles for the purpose of its construction work, the question of allowing benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, depends upon the facts of each case. If the intermediary articles are produced or manufactured as an integral part of the main business of construction, then the assessee is not entitled to the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act, for its activity in manufacturing or producing intermediary articles. But if the intermediary articles are manufactured or produced not as an integral part of the main business of construction building, but independently, the assessee can ask for the benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act on these intermediary activities. This principle we have culled out from the observation of the Supreme Court made in 1993 1993 AIR(SC) 2529, 1994 (S1) SCC 280, 1993 (5) JT 346 , 1993 (3) SCALE 726 , 1993 (204) ITR 412, 1993 (91) STC 450, 1993 (3) Scale 726 , 1993 (114) CTR 420, 1993 (70) TAXMANN 312, 1993 (2) TLR 1117, 114 CTR(SC) 420, 1993 AIR(SCW) 3317, 1993 TaxLR 1117 (SC) cited supra and the decision of the Delhi High Court in 1969 (74) ITR 465 (Del) cited supra. In as much as the claim of benefit under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act is depending upon the facts, the Tribunal thought fit to remit back this issue to the assessing authority in order to find out whether the assessee is engaged in intermediary activities independently, not as an integral part of its main business, viz., building construction. Inasmuch as such a direction is in accordance with the decisions cited supra, we consider that there is no infirmity in giving such direction by the Tribunal. Accordingly, we hold that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in remitting back this issue. Inasmuch as such a direction is in accordance with the decisions cited supra, we consider that there is no infirmity in giving such direction by the Tribunal. Accordingly, we hold that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in remitting back this issue. Inasmuch as the question framed and referred by the Tribunal does not reflect the true issue arising in this case, we would like to reframe the question as under; "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is correct in law in remitting back the issue, to consider the claim of exemption under S. 5(1)(xxxii) of the WT Act, 1957, after ascertaining the facts arising in this case". In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.