(1) KALINATH Munda, the sole appellant stands convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. (2) THE sole point urged by Mr. Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that the appellant was a boy of fourteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offence and therefore was a child, as defined under Section 2(d) of the Bihar Children Act. 1982. His submission is that the appellant could not have been tried along with his other co-accused in view of the provisions of the Act. The offence was committed by the appellant in the year 1972. Certain ordinances of the year 1979 which culminated in the enactment of the aforementioned Act, were pressed into service to raise the plea that on the date of the commission of the offence the appellant had not attained the age of sixteen years and that he could only be tried in a Childrens Court, envisaged to be set up under Section 5 of the Act. We find that this contention was raised only at the appellate stage before the High Court and not before the Court of Session. The High Court repelled the contention on the ground that the Childrens Court had factually not been constituted under the Act and therefore the provisions of the Act could not have been followed in the case of the appellant. It also took the view that his regular trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure was thus in order. (3) NOTHING was brought to the notice of the High Court that there was a Childrens Court established in the area where the offence was committed or tried. Years have gone by and nothing has been pointed out even to us as to whether any Childrens Court stood constituted for the purposes of the Act when the appellant was put to trial. One of the preconditions for invoking the Childrens Court is the determination of the age of the offender as to whether he would be a child within the meaning of the Act or not. One of the preconditions for invoking the Childrens Court is the determination of the age of the offender as to whether he would be a child within the meaning of the Act or not. It has barely been pointed out that in the judgment of the Court of Session the appellant has been described as twenty-two years of age and on that basis, he would be fourteen years of age on the date of the commission of the offence. That description would not per se entitle the appellant to the protection of the Act. Something more is needed. In the absence of any material to support the case of the appellant, we have no option but to reject the contention. Besides the occurrence took place in the year 1972 and twenty-two years have gone by. Had there been any positive evidence, we would have been apprised of it and now at this stage to undertake an inquiry of this kind shall be next to impossible. On this score, there is no merit in this appeal. Besides no other point has been urged. We therefore reject the appeal. (4) BEFORE parting with the judgment however, we leave it open to the appellant to approach the State Government for commutation of his life sentence as the offence was committed in the year 1972 when Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not on the statute-book. We have no doubt in our mind that if there is material to suggest that the appellant was comparatively of younger age at the time when the offence was committed, the Government may exercise powers under Chapter XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure and grant appropriate relief to the appellant. The order of the dismissal of his appeal however shall not stands in his way.