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1996 DIGILAW 623 (KAR)

K. R. JAMBUKESHWAR v. SECRETARY, REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,CHITRADURGA

1996-10-25

H.N.TILHARI

body1996
H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition, the petitioner has sought the writ of certiorari to quash temporary permit bearing No. 91 of 1996-97 granted on the route Thirumapura to Chitradurga and back-1 round trip and Chitradurga to Hosadurga-2 round trips. Petitioner has prayed that such other reliefs as this Court deems fit may be granted. ( 2 ) PETITIONER claims himself to be the existing stage carriage permit operator under permit No. 10 (A)/83-84 on the route chitradurga to Hosadurga and back. Petitioner's case in the nutshell is that the opposite party respondent 1 has granted temporary permit in breach of the provisions of Section 87 of m. V. Act, 1988. Petitioner has stated that in the application under Section 87 no purpose has been indicated nor any ground has been indicated for grant of temporary permit which may be said to be covered by the provisions of Section 87 of Motor vehicles Act, 1988. Only interest of travelling public and continuation of T. P. No. 317 of 1995-96 is mentioned. As such the application for temporary permit was liable to be rejected. Petitioner has annexed the copy of the temporary permit as annexure-'c' to the writ petition in which permit is for the period from 5-7-1996 to 31-10-1996. Petitioner's case is that by the grant of this temporary permit in favour of 2nd respondent the petitioner is prejudiced by the time assigned to the service of 2nd respondent as he is an existing stage carriage permit operator on the route from Chitradurga-Hosadurga a distance of about 33. 6 kms. Notice has been issued to the respondents and thereafter the case was posted on 7-10-1996 and Hon'ble Justice r. V. Raveendran directed LA. to be listed on 24-10-1996. LA. had been made for early hearing. This was listed before me on 24-10-1996. Appearance had been put by Sri N. S. Rajanna, learned Advocate of this Court on behalf of 2nd respondent who was allowed to file his power by 25-10-1996. Sri N. S. Rajanna filed his power today and pointed out that due to mishap having been taken place at Chitradurga, the near relatives, kith and kin of 2nd respondent had been subjected to some sufferings so his client had informed that he could not come. The permit in this case is to expire by 31-10-1996. So learned Counsel for the petitioner insisted on early hearing. The permit in this case is to expire by 31-10-1996. So learned Counsel for the petitioner insisted on early hearing. ( 3 ) I have heard learned Counsels for the parties but no counter affidavit has been filed in the above said case. ( 4 ) SRI Krishna Swamy, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the temporary permit has been granted is a clear breach and violation of the basic principles of law. Learned counsel submitted that power to grant temporary permit is specifically provided in Section 87 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' of 1988. He further submitted that the purpose which is indicated in the application is in the interest of public and nothing more. No specific reason has been mentioned as how the public interest is involved giving rise to temporary need. But the Regional Transport Authority without applying its mind to necessary provisions and ingredients of law has been pleased to grant temporary permit in favour of the petitioner. The first time permit was granted from 15-3-1996 to 30-6-1996 copy of which is annexed at annexure-'b' and thereafter the temporary permit had been granted in favour of the petitioner from 5-7-1996 to 31-10-1996. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel invited my attention to Annexure-'d' i. e. , an endorsement issued by the office of Regional Transport authority to the petitioner in pursuance of application dated 26-7-1996. Learned Counsel submitted that only interest of travelling public is mentioned and nothing else is mentioned to indicate whether any of the circumstances or category of ground mentioned under Section 87 did exist and as such the temporary permit granted is illegal and without jurisdiction. The contentions made by the petitioner's Counsel has been hotly contested by Sri N. S. Rajanna. Sri N. S. Rajanna submitted that the petitioner no-doubt had been granted regular permit for this route on 20-6-1996 but the time-table has not been fixed and for time-table to be fixed it might have taken some more time. Therefore the temporary permit was granted in the public interest. To this contention of the respondent's Counsel, objection was taken by the petitioner's Counsel that no such fact had been alleged by filing any counter affidavit so far and this should not be taken note of. Therefore the temporary permit was granted in the public interest. To this contention of the respondent's Counsel, objection was taken by the petitioner's Counsel that no such fact had been alleged by filing any counter affidavit so far and this should not be taken note of. Sri N. S. Rajanna secondly contended that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition because really he is not suffering any substantial injury and it is not a monopoly route and therefore the petitioner's petition should be dismissed on this ground. He further submitted that liberalisation had been adopted in the matter of grant of permit. I have applied my mind to the contention's of the learned Counsel for the parties. ( 6 ) THE power to grant temporary permit is no-doubt there and it has been provided and circumscribed of under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act by Section 87. It has been vested in the regional Transport Authority as well as the State Transport authority. Section 87 further clarifies that procedure under section 80 need not be applied and does not control the grant of temporary permits. The section provides that temporary permits may be granted by Regional or State Transport Authorities for a limited period which shall not exceed four months period and thereunder the owner of the vehicle may be allowed to make use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle for this temporary period and temporarily for the following purposes which indicate as the conditions or circumstances in which permits may be granted to make use of the motor vehicle as transport vehicle for limited period of 4 months temporarily, viz. , (1) Conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to prayers or religious gatherings; (2) For the purpose of seasonal business; (3) To meet particular temporary need; and (4) Pending decision of application for renewal of a permit. The section further authorises the Authority concerned to impose such conditions to the permit as it may think fit. In the matter of imposing conditions guidelines may be furnished by other provisions of the Act such as one contained in Section 84 or those contained in Section 72 (2) and the like. But sofaras the procedural provisions contained in Section 80 as sub-section (2) of Section 80 or the proviso thereto are concerned may apply as section itself without following the procedure prescribed under section 80. But sofaras the procedural provisions contained in Section 80 as sub-section (2) of Section 80 or the proviso thereto are concerned may apply as section itself without following the procedure prescribed under section 80. No doubt the public interest and the liberty could prejudice for the grant of permission may control the grant of permanent permit or if any for a moment it may be said the temporary permits with this liberalisation of grant of permits or the policy of liberalisation is not meant to give a go by to the provisions of law or to the conditions attached under this section which conditions are required to be fulfilled before the granting of permit even in the present moment in the matter of grant of temporary permit. May be that the expressions used in Section 87 be interpreted in a reasonable manner keeping in view the public interest and therefore circumstances which can be brought within the four corners of either of the 4 clauses may furnish a ground for grant of temporary permit. For illustration if the carriages are required for taking the marriage party from one place to the other place then conveyance of passengers on the special occasions can be interpreted as including special occasion of taking the marriage party and bringing back such as to cover far off distance. So temporary need has to be considered. A particular- temporary need may come out or may bring out a special situation such as a periodical requirement when there is over burden of tourists or passengers on certain specified occasion to visit that place. For illustration we may say that during spring period of Kumb or Ardakumb where there is generally overburdened flow of pilgrims to Ganges either at Hardwar or at allahabad or be a seasonal period when there is overflow of tourists to enjoy the beauty of nature during particular period at such places where there are natural falls during the rainy season or after rains. This may provide some temporary permit. It may also provide temporary permit when there may be cases where the consideration for grant of regular permit but on account of some situation the grant of regular permit or the permanent permit has been granted but giving its enforcement may take some time to fill in the gap of the tourists for issuance of temporary permits which may be so utilised. The expression to meet a particular temporary need as used in clause (c) of Section 80 has been the subject-matter of consideration before their lordships of Supreme Court in the case of the Madhya Pradesh state Road Transport Corporation, Bairagarh, Bhopal (M. P.) v b. P. Upadhyaya, Regional Transport Authority, Raipurand Oth- ers. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court under Section 62 (c) of M. V. Act, 1939 observed as under: "it appears from the Order of the Regional Transport authority that after regular permit granted to the 3rd respondent was cancelled there was shortage of necessary number of transport vehicles on the route and the Regional transport Authority thought it fit to provide vehicles for this temporary need until regular operations were introduced and regular permits were granted after following the procedure prescribed under Section 57 of the act. Section 62 (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act states that the regional Transport Authority may grant a temporary permit to him on a particular temporary need and we see no reason why this clause should be given any special or restricted meaning. There is no antithesis between the particular temporary need and a permanent need and it is manifest that two kinds of need may co-exist in a particular route. If therefore Regional Transport Authority considers that in the circumstances of the case there was a particular need, and granted a temporary permit to the appellant, the action of Regional Transport Authority cannot be challenged as legally invalid. Reference may be made, in this connection, to Section 62 (d) which contemplates that temporary permits may be granted to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit. This sub-section, therefore, contemplates that there may exist a temporary need for transport facilities on a particular route even in case of permanent need for such facilities, we are accordingly of opinion that the Regional Transport authority was right as a matter of law in granting temporary permit to the appellant under Section 62 (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, in the circumstances of this case and the view expressed by the High Court is not correct". Their Lordships further observed that: "this section means that at any one time the Regional transport Authority is not permitted to issue to any person a temporary permit for a period exceeding 4 months, but where the temporary need persists, where, for example, the formalities under Section 57 are not completed within 4 months it would in our opinion be permissible to regional Transport Authority to grant a second temporary permit in order to meet the temporary need. We should also make it clear that the Regional Transport Authority cannot abuse its power and go on granting temporary permits in quick succession and not, speedy action in completing the procedure under Section 57 of the Motor vehicles Act. Where upon the facts of any particular case it is apparent that the Regional Transport Authority is so abusing its power, this action is liable to be corrected by granting a writ, but where no such abuse of power is alleged or shown, the mere fact that he has granted a temporary permit for a second time and the total duration of two permits is more then 4 months would not invalidate the second permit". ( 7 ) A reading of this decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reveals that a temporary permit can be granted for 4 months at one instance and not more but if temporary need exists even after the expiry of 4 months period then second temporary permit may be granted for a further period of 4 months and that will not invalidate the second permit. But the transport Authority grants successively temporary permits without applying its mind to the question of explanation i. e. , existence of those circumstances which may show or establish an extension of temporary need and from very facts of the cases appears that if there is abuse of the principles of law, then the powers of this Court under Section 226 are wide open to set right, no doubt the temporary permit cannot be granted if any of those circumstances or category of those circumstances as specified in clauses (a) to (d) or of sub-sections (1) to (6) or contained in sub-section (2) (i) and (ii) are not shown or established or proved to exist. But if any of the circumstances mentioned in Section 87 or any of the circumstances of the category mentioned in Section 87 is shown to exist then in the public interest no doubt the temporary permit can be granted by the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport authority as the case may be. In the present case as per the order and the application for grant of temporary permit the purpose of temporary permit has been indicated as interest of travelling public and continuation of T. P. No. 317 of 1995-96 t. P. No. 317 of 1995-96 copy of which is at Annexure-'b' the purpose is again shown as interest of travelling public nothing beyond that has been indicated. A perusal of Annexure-'c' also does not show anything more than interest of travelling public in place of B. P. No. . . . continuation of T. P. is mentioned. Learned counsel for the respondents no doubt submitted that he had applied for a permanent permit and that has been granted in his favour on 20-6-1996 but as time-table has not been fixed temporary permit has been granted. If the formalities in the matter of grant of permit i. e. , fixation of time table had not been completed then it cannot be said that regular permit had been issued because fixing the time table is also part of the condition of the permit. In a time-table there may be conditions which are indicated in Section 72 and Section 84. Such conditions may be imposed and if in fixation of the time-table delay of time has taken place and that the person i. e. respondent, i. e. , applicant for permit found eligible for the permit, it could be said to be a case temporary need particularly temporary need pending the fixation of the time-table for permanent carriage permit. No doubt the temporary permit can be granted but so-far-as the facts of the present case are concerned petitioner's Counsel is correct, that there is nothing on record in this regard. In the application also no such thing is mentioned. So the grant of temporary permit in this case may be said to be vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of it because neither in the application form nor in the temporary permit granted any such thing is mentioned. In the application also no such thing is mentioned. So the grant of temporary permit in this case may be said to be vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of it because neither in the application form nor in the temporary permit granted any such thing is mentioned. In this the circumstances are no doubt very special, special in the sense that this is the second day of hearing. After 7th October, 1996, application for early hearing of this case was taken up but it cannot be disputed that mishap had taken place at Chitradurga where a Bus had fallen in the lake and about 70 persons are reported to have died respondent's Counsel has stated that his client could not contol him because his very near relatives had also suffered. The statements of bar unless otherwise shown is always taken to be correct. In the first instance as suggested for adjournment of the case by the respondent's Counsel but as the petitioner's Counsel had opposed it, I had to decide the matter. In these circumstances as well these facts which the learned Counsel for respondent has asserted in the course of arguments cannot be ignored. In such a situation if I exercise my jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India quashing the temporary permit, it may on one hand adversely affect the respondent who is alleged to be suffering, in the circumstances mentioned above, while on the other hand the temporary permits life is only for 5 or 6 days when petitioner has kept on waiting without taking steps from 3-10-1996 onwords and to this day of 25th October and time has passed, it appears to me just and proper in this case that this Court should exercise the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution in this matter to quash the temporary permit granted which is to expire on 31st October, 1996 itself but this Court may put a note of caution for the regional Transport Authority and dispose of this petition. The regional Transport Authority before whom the petitioner's application for regular permit is pending and only time-table is to be fixed as asserted by the Counsel for the respondents, the proper course for the 1st respondent is to expedite the fixing of the time table and to finally dispose of that matter of grant of regular permit which technically has been ordered to be granted but for implementation of that time table has not yet been fixed. That it would be proper if the petitioner's application for grant of regular permit is disposed of after fixing the time table within a period of eight weeks from 31-10-1996 and that during this period of eight weeks the respondent further be allowed to continue the operation on the basis of a temporary permit. With these observations and directions to 1st respondent the writ petition is disposed of. Let the necessary directions be issued to 1st respondent within a period of 2 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order and for that period in continuation a temporary permit may be granted after on or after 31-10-1996. --- *** --- .