D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. The plaintiff-appellant, Devendra Singh, having remained un-successful in the first appel late court, has preferred this second ap peal. 2. The brief facts are that the appel lant Devendra Singh was appointed as Agricultural Supervisor-cum- Tractor Operator by the Deputy Director of State Farm, Tarai Phoolbagh, on a probation of Six months, on 6th January, 1958. He joined on 8th January, 1958. After com pletion of probationary period, no order of confirmation was passed by the State Government, hence the appellant placed that he stood automatically confirmed on 8th July, 1958. In the year 1961, the State Government transferred the State Farms Tarai, Phoolbagh, to the defendant-respondent University along with its staff. In the deed of grant, it was contemplated that the permanent staff of the State Government employees in the farm shall be taken over by G. B. Pant University on deputation and shall not be dismissed, removed etc. without prior approval in writing of the State Government. For the temporary staff, it was decided that it shall continue in service subject to service rules of the University. It was also stipulated that in case the University intended to ter minate temporary employees, it shall inform the State Government, atleast three months in advance so that the Government may explore the possibility of absorbing such staff in the State services. The services of the plaintiff were transferred to the University in the year 1961. In November, 1969 the plaintiffs services were terminated by the University by giving one months notice. This order of termination was challenged. However, subsequently the plaintiff was ap pointed as Officiating Senior Agricultural Inspector and he continued till 12th April, 1972. The plaintiffs services were again terminated on 10th May, 1974 through an order simpliciter without attaching any stigma. This order was challenged to be illegal and invalid. 3. The defendants contest was that the suit is barred by Sections 14 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act and that the plaintiff was never appointed on permanent post on probation and he was temporary employee, hence his services were rightly terminated in accordance with the contract. 4. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The lower appellate court reversed the Judgment and decree of the trial court. 5. There is no force in the defendants plea that the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 4. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The lower appellate court reversed the Judgment and decree of the trial court. 5. There is no force in the defendants plea that the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Consequential relief of injunction was sought in the main relief of declaration, hence bar of Section 34 is not attracted. 6. There is also no force in the defendants plea that the suit is barred by Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. It is true that the University is autonomous body. However, it was rightly contended that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India are not applicable to be employees of the University, an autonomous body. Autonomous body like University is also a statutory body and is governed by the statutory Rules and Regulations. Autonomous body cannot be permitted to act arbitrarily. The leading case on the subject is Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Shamli and others v. Laxmi Narain and others, AIR 1976 SC 888 . In this case it was laid down that a contract of personal service cannot or dinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declara tion that the contract subsists. An employee after having been removed from service cannot be deemed to be in service, against the will and consent of the employer. It was further laid down that this rule, however, is subject to three well recognized exceptions: (1) where a public servant is said to be removed from service in contravention of provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. (2) Where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the In dustrial Lawand where a statutory body acts in breach of the statute. (3) Where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute. " 7. In the case in hand exceptions 1 and 2 do not apply, but exception 3 does apply because the allegation is that University, a statutory body acted in breach and violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute, namely, U. P. Agricultural University Act, 1958. Special reference was made to Section 28 of the Act. As such the suit was maintainable and it could not be dismissed. 8. Special reference was made to Section 28 of the Act. As such the suit was maintainable and it could not be dismissed. 8. The last point to be determined is whether the order of termination is hit by the contract of service and whether any stigma is attached in the termination order. 9. The lower appellate court upon consideration of material on record found that the plaintiff was appointed on tem porary post in a temporary capacity and not on probation against a permanent post. This finding of fact does not suffer from any error of law. 10. The plaintiff was initialy ap pointed by the State Government in Of ficiating capacity on probation of six months vide Ext. 1 and A-4. These docu ments therefore, show that the initial ap pointment of the plaintiff was temporary and officiating appointment and not against a permanent post. The period of probation was no doubt six months, but no confirmation order was passed after the expiry of six months. For a temporary employee, no confirmation order could be passed upon expiry of period of probation. The period of probation was wrongly men tioned in the letter of appointment. It is only a person appointed on a permanent post, who is placed on probation and not a temporary employee. The services of the plaintiff were terminated initially by giving one months notice. Subsequently the plaintiff agreed to serve with the defen dant and undertook to be guided by the rules framed by the University. This hap pened after the services of the plaintiff were transferred by the State Government to the defendant University. Thus till the plaintiffs services were transferred to the University he was not confirmed by the State Government. 11. Even the University never con firmed the plaintiff nor the plaintiff was appointed by the University against a per manent post. Section 28 (r) (4) (c) lays down conditions for probation. It provides that every employee of the University, on his first appointment against a permanent post, shall be on probation. Since it could not be established by the plaintiff that his initial appointment in the University was against a permanent post, there was no question of placing him by the University on probation nor any document has been filed in the lower court that the University appointed him against a permanent post on probation. Since it could not be established by the plaintiff that his initial appointment in the University was against a permanent post, there was no question of placing him by the University on probation nor any document has been filed in the lower court that the University appointed him against a permanent post on probation. Consequently the conse quences flowing from Section 2 (r) 4 (c) (iii) will not follow nor it was a case of termination because the plaintiffs ser vices were not found to be satisfactory. There was no automatic confirmation provided under the terms of the contract or under the statute. Under the statute the provision is that at the end of the probation period, the employee may be con firmed provided his work and conduct are found to be satisfactory. If he is not con firmed, his services shall be deemed to have been terminated at the end of the probation period. Since the University never placed the plaintiff on probation, this rule is hardly attracted. Further, there is no confirmation order passed by the University in favour of the plaintiff-appel lant. As such there is no error in the find ing of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff was a temporary employee of the University. 12. A temporary employee has no right to post. In the State of Utter Pradesh and another v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991)1 SCC, 691, it was held that in the case of ad hoc or temporary Government servant where termination order simpliciter in terms of contract of service and rules in passed, such order is not in valid nor punitive so as to attract Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. 13. On a plain reading of the im pugned order terminating the plaintiffs services, it can safely be said that no stigma was attached and as such it is hardly illegal or invalid. If the termination order does not suffer from any illegality or invalidity, the suit was bound to fail and it was rightly dismissed by the lower appellate court. The appeal has, therefore, no merit and is bound to fail. 14. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. .