Judgment :- S. S. Subramani, J 1. Petitioner in E.I.O.P. No. 2 of 1984, on the file of the Civil Court, Madras, is the appellant in this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The respondent herein, on 15.7.1976, issued a notification whereby certain establishments were also brought into its coverages and one of the establishments was shops. Thereafter, respondent issued notice to the appellant herein why it is not implementing the Notification. A reply was sent and since the same did not satisfy the respondent, it issued a notice on 9.6.1983 that in case the Act is not implemented and the contributions thereunder are not paid, coercive steps will be initiated against it. The appellant/petitioner being aggrieved by the said notice, filed the above original petition before City Civil Court, Madras, for declaration that the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 are not applicable to the petitioner/Society and that the Notification is not binding on it and for a further declaration that it is not liable to pay any amount mentioned in the notice issued by the respondent or for any future contribution, and for other consequential reliefs. 3. A written statement was filed by the respondent E.S.I. Corporation contending that the petitioner is an establishment to which the Act is applicable, and that these petitioner/Society acts as an agent for purchasing domestic and other requirements for its members and that it is also transacting surety loans, and that it is also rendering service for consideration. Therefore, it was contended that it is a shop coming with the definition of Sec. 1(5) of the Act and, therefore, liable for contribution. After taking evidence, the Employees State Insurance Court, as per order dated 13.3.1985, came to the conclusion that the petitioner/Society is neither a shop nor an establishment and, therefore, the Notification has no application. It also declared that the petitioner/Society is not liable to contribute any amount as demanded. 4. Against the order of the Insurance Court, an appeal was taken by the respondent under S.82 of the Act as appeal against Order no. 51 of 1986 before this Court. The learned Judge, after hearing, came to the conclusion that the appellant/petitioner is an establishment and, therefore, bound by the Notification. The appeal was allowed and the E.I.O.P. was dismissed. It is against the judgment of the learned Judge, this letters patent appeal is filed. 51 of 1986 before this Court. The learned Judge, after hearing, came to the conclusion that the appellant/petitioner is an establishment and, therefore, bound by the Notification. The appeal was allowed and the E.I.O.P. was dismissed. It is against the judgment of the learned Judge, this letters patent appeal is filed. The only point that requires consideration in this L.P.A. is, whether the petitioner/Society is a shop and, therefore, bound by the Notification. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even though the bye-laws of the Society provide for the Society to act as agent for purchasing domestic requirements of its members, such business is not being done by it. The main contention that is put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is only financing the members or their use and recovering the same with interest. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition filed before the City Civil Court, it is averred thus : "... The object of the Society shall be to borrow funds from members or others to be utilised for loans to members for useful purposes, and to generally encourage thrift, self-help and co-operation among the members by providing the necessary facilities therefor ...." Further down, it is said : "... The petitioner/Society is purely a credit institution catering to the needs in the form of financial assistance to the members of the Society ....." On the basis of this contention, it is urged that the Act or Notification will have no application. Before the City Civil Court, P.W. 1 was examined and he gave evidence in accordance with the allegations in the petition. From his evidence, it is clear that the petitioner/Society is running a financial institution though the assistance is given only to its members and not to the public at large. 5. While interpreting a Statute, the court will have to look into the intention of the legislature. But it is unreasonable to think or confine the intention to a meaning attributed to the word used at the time when the law was made. The court has to presume that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the enlarged meaning and also the revolution of the changes brought about in special economic, political and scientific fields of human activity. It was held in Senior Electric Inspector & Ors. The court has to presume that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the enlarged meaning and also the revolution of the changes brought about in special economic, political and scientific fields of human activity. It was held in Senior Electric Inspector & Ors. v. Laxminarayan Chopra & Others 1962 AIR(SC) 159, 1962 (1) SCJ 593, 1962 (3) SCR 146 as follows : "The legal position may be summarized thus : The maxim contemporaneous exposition is laid down by Coke was applied to construing ancient statutes, but not to interpreting Acts which are comparatively modern. There is a good reason for this change in the mode of interpretation. The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether the court is asked to construe a provision of an ancient statute or that of a modern one, namely, what is the expressed intention of the legislature. It is perhaps difficult to attribute to a legislative body functions in a static society that its intention was couched in terms of consideration breadth so as to take within its sweep the future developments comprehended by the phraseology used. It is more reasonable to confine its intention only to the circumstances obtaining at the time the law was made. But in a modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of a legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, for a modern legislature making laws to given a society which is fast moving must be presumed to be aware of an enlarged meaning the same concept might attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary changes brought about in social, economic, political and scientific and other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them ...."In that case their Lordships were considering the meaning for the words" Telegraph Inc" * 6. Indeed, unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them ...."In that case their Lordships were considering the meaning for the words" Telegraph Inc" * 6. In so far as the statutory construction of welfare legislations is concerned, it was held in State Bank v. N. S. Money 1976 AIR(SC) 1111, 1976 (32) FLR 197, 1976 (49) FJR 78, 1976 LIC 769, 1976 (1) LLJ 478 , 1976 (1) SCC 822 , 1976 (3) SCR 160 , 1976 UJ 215 , 1976 SCC(L&S) 132 S.C. thus : "Statutory construction, when courts consider welfare legislation with an economic justice bias, cannot turn on cold print glorified as grammatical construction but on teleological purpose and protective intendment. While canons of traditional sanctity cannot wholly govern, courts cannot go haywire in interpreting provisions, ignoring the text and context. The dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law and, more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation." 7. It was observed in The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination & Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. v. Ramjee 1977 AIR(SC) 965, 1977 (34) FLR 381, 1980 (1) LLN 284, 1977 (2) SCC 256 , 1977 (2) SCR 904, 1977 UJ 184 , 1977 SCC (L & S) 226 S.C. (in paragraph 5) thus : "... law is meant to serve the living and does not beat its abstract wings in the jural void. Its functional fulfilment as social engineering depends on its sensituated response to situation, subject matter and the complex of realities which required ordered control. A holistic understanding is simple justice to the meaning of all legislations. Fragmentary grasp of rules can misfire or even backfire as in this case 8. In Royal Talkies, Hyderabad & Ors. Its functional fulfilment as social engineering depends on its sensituated response to situation, subject matter and the complex of realities which required ordered control. A holistic understanding is simple justice to the meaning of all legislations. Fragmentary grasp of rules can misfire or even backfire as in this case 8. In Royal Talkies, Hyderabad & Ors. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation through its Regional Director, Hill Fort Road, Hyderabad 1978 AIR(SC) 1478, 1978 (37) FLR 128, 1978 (53) FJR 319, 1978 LIC 1245, 1978 (2) LLJ 390 , 1978 (2) LLN 268, 1978 (4) SCC 204 , 1979 (1) SCR 80 , 1978 UJ 546 , 1978 SCC (L&S) 497 S.C., the Supreme Court was considering the very Statute in question and how it has to be interpreted in para 20 at page 1483, it was held thus : "Shri Chitale tried to convince us that on a minute dissection of the various clauses of the provision it was possible to exclude canteen employees and cycle stand attendants. May be punctilious sense of grammar and minute precision of language may sometimes lend unwitting support to narrow interpretation. But language is handmaid, not mistress. Maxwell and Fowler move along different streets sometimes. When, as in S. 2(9), the definition has been cast deliberately in the widest terms and the draftsman has endeavoured to cover every possibility so as not to exclude even distant categories of men employed in the primary work or cognate activities, it will defeat the object of the statute to truncate its semantic sweep and throw out of its ambit those who obviously are within the benign contemplation of the Act. Salvationary effort, when the welfare of the weaker sections of society is the statutory object and is faced with stultifying effect, is permissible judicial exercise. 9. In Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation, Madras v. S.I. Flour Mills (P) Ltd. 1986 (53) FLR 178 S.C. also, the question as to how the Act in question has to be interpreted came for consideration, and in paragraph 13 (at page 1690), it was held thus : "The Act is a piece of social security legislation enacted to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury. To hold that the workers employed for the work of construction of buildings for the expansion of the factory are not employees within the meaning of S.2(9) of the Act on the ground that such construction is not incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of the factory will be against the object of the Act. In an enactment of this nature, the endeavour of the court should be to interpret the provisions liberally in favour of the persons for whose benefit the enactment has been made." * 10. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court, again under the same Act, reported in C.E.S.C. Ltd. v. Subhash Chandra Bose 1992 AIR(SC) 573, 1992 (64) FLR 248, 1991 (6) JT 373 , 1992 LIC 332, 1992 (1) LLJ 475 , 1992 (3) SLR 16, 1991 (2) Scale 996 , 1992 (1) SCC 441 , 1991 (S2) SCR 267, 1992 (1) UJ 111 , 1992 (1) LLN 353, 1992 SCC (L&S) 313 = 1992 I CLR 932 in paragraph 32 (at pages 585 and 586), it was held thus : "The Act aims at relieving the employees from health and occupational hazards. The interpretation calls for in this case is of the meanings supervision and agent in S. 2(9)(ii) of the Act. The legal interpretation is not an activity sui generis. The purpose of the enactment is the touchstone of interpretation and every effort would be to given effect to it. The Judge acts as a vehicle of communication between the authors and the recipients. The end result is to promote rule of law and to enliven social order and humane relations." 11. The Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (Act 34 of 1948) is a piece of legislation intended for social security. The Act was originally made applicable only to factories. By virtue of a provision, namely, S. 1(5), "the appropriate Government may, in consultation with the Corporation and where the appropriate Government is a State Government, with the approval of the Central Government, after giving six months notice of its intention of so doing by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this Act or any of them, to any other establishment or class of establishments; industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. It is in pursuance of S. 1(5), the Notification was issued by the respondent in this case. The Act has not defined shop or establishment. It is in pursuance of S. 1(5), the Notification was issued by the respondent in this case. The Act has not defined shop or establishment. But the preamble of the said Act says :" An Act to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. "12. The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant was that there is no commercial activity in so far as the financial transactions are concerned, and therefore, the petitioner/Society is not a shop, and, if it is not a shop, it cannot be an establishment under the Act. So, the only point that has to be considered is, whether because of the lending of money, the petitioner/Society can be considered as a shop for the purpose of this Act. In M/s. Hindu Jea Band, Jaipur v. Regional Dir., E.S.I.C. Jaipur 1987 I CLR 228 S.C. in paragraph 3 of the judgment, the Supreme Court said that a shop is a place where services are sold on retail business. That is a case where the petitioner therein was carrying on the business of playing music on occasions, such as, marriages and other social functions. Accepting the meaning of the word shop in Collins English Dictionary which was given thus : (i) a place esp. a small building for the retail sale of goods and services, and (ii) a place for the performance of a specified type of work; workshop, "the Supreme Court said that the playing of music was available on payment of stipulated amount and, therefore, it was a shop. 13. In M/s. International Ore and Fertilizers (India) Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation 1988 I CLR 41 the question raised was, when there is no transaction in the nature of goods in the premises, whether that could be a shop. In paragraph 4 of the judgment (at page 206), their Lordships accepted the meaning of the word shop provided in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, namely, "a house or building where goods are made or prepared for sale and sold". Their Lordships further said that it also means a "place of business" or "place where ones ordinary occupation is carried on". In paragraph 4 of the judgment (at page 206), their Lordships accepted the meaning of the word shop provided in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, namely, "a house or building where goods are made or prepared for sale and sold". Their Lordships further said that it also means a "place of business" or "place where ones ordinary occupation is carried on". Dealing with the subject, their Lordships further held that it is not actually necessary that the delivery of the goods to the purchaser should take place at the premises in which the business of buying or selling is carried on to constitute the said premises into a "shop". Their Lordships further went on to hold that while construing a welfare legislation like the Act and the notification issued thereunder a liberal construction should be placed on their provisions so that the purpose of the legislation may be allowed to be achieved rather than frustrated or stultified. 14. In M/s. Cochin Shipping Co. v. E.S.I. Corporation 1992 II CLR 623 S.C. the petitioner therein was only processing the document at the Customs Clearing House and there was no other activity. When notice was issued under the Act, the same was challenged that there is no commercial activity and, therefore, it was not bound by the provisions of the Act. While considering the same, their Lordships said thus : Clearing the documents, even if it be in the Custom house, is necessary for the export or import of goods. These services form part of the carriers job. The appellant is rendering service to cater to the needs of exporters and importers and others who want to carry the goods further. Therefore, it is a shop carrying on a systematic economic or a commercial activity. This would be enough to bring in the appellant without specifically enumerating the specific activities carried on by the appellant. Merely because other establishments which are akin to a shop are enumerated, it does not, in any manner, oblige the court to give a narrow meaning to the word shop nor does it in any way dispute the meaning of shop. The Act is an outcome of a policy to provide remedy for the widespread evils arising from the consequences of national poverty. Indeed, it is a piece of social security. The Act is an outcome of a policy to provide remedy for the widespread evils arising from the consequences of national poverty. Indeed, it is a piece of social security. The benefits conferred by the Act cover a large area of employees than what the Factories Act and the akin legislations intended. It is thus a welfare legislation. The endeavour of the court should be to place a liberal construction so as to promote its objects to which a reference has been made. "15. In that case also, the Supreme Court reiterated that a liberal interpretation has to be given since the Act is an outcome of a policy to provide remedy for the widespread evils arising from the consequences of national poverty. In paragraph 18 of the said judgment, at page 252, their Lordships also accepted the meaning for the word shop as given in Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 2nd Edition, at page 73 which reads thus : Shop includes dwelling-house and ware-house, or other place of business, or place where business is transacted. "16. The contention in that case was that though the word shop would take within its ambit the other establishments like hotels or restaurants, yet in view of enumeration of other establishments, viz., hotels, restaurants, etc., in contradistinction to shops, the word shop must be held to relate to place where commercial activity of buying and selling merchandise takes place; otherwise the enumeration of other establishments would become meaningless. The contention of the Department was that the word shop has a wider meaning, and it means a place where any kind of commercial activity is pursued and where services are rendered to customers. The contention of the Department was accepted by the Supreme Court in that case. In paragraph 21 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus :" ..... merely because other establishments which are also akin to shop are enumerated, it does not, in any manner, oblige us to give a narrow meaning to the word shop nor does it in any way dilute the meaning of shop. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the object is to envelop as many establishments as possible without leaving any room for doubt. That is precisely what the notification intends to to. "17. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the object is to envelop as many establishments as possible without leaving any room for doubt. That is precisely what the notification intends to to. "17. In Employees State Insurance Corporation v. R. K. Swamy, 1994 AIR(SC) 1154, 1994 (1) CompLJ 255, 1993 (67) FLR 1145, 1994 (84) FJR 67, 1993 (6) JT 176 , 1994 (1) LLJ 636 , 1993 (2) LLN 639, 1993 (4) Scale 284 , 1994 (1) SCC 445 , 1994 SCC(L&S) 586, which is also a case under the same Act, their Lordships said that the word shop has acquired extended meaning. That was a case where an advertising agency was sought to be covered under the provisions of the Act. The above decision was rendered against an order of our High Court in W.P. Nos. 1891 of 1982 and 3123 of 1983, wherein this Court has said that an advertising agency will not come within the ambit of the Act. But this finding was set aside by the Supreme Court. The earlier decisions cited supra were also followed, and their Lordships reiterated that a place where a systematic economic or commercial activity is carried on, will be a shop. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, their Lordships further reiterated as to how the Act should be interpreted. The relevant portion of the said paragraph 13 read thus :" * .... The object which the Act purported to achieve was to require that appropriate provision should be made for employees employed in establishments to which the Act applied. That meant that in construing the material provisions of such an Act if two views were reasonably possible, and the courts should prefer the view which helped the achievement of the object. When the words used in an entry were capable of a narrow or a broad construction, each construction being reasonably possible, and it appeared that the broad construction would help the furtherance of the object, then it was necessary to prefer that construction. This rule postulated that there was a competition between two constructions, each one of which was reasonably possible. The rule did not justify spraining words or putting an unnatural or unreasonable meaning on them just for the purpose of introducing a broader construction. "18. This rule postulated that there was a competition between two constructions, each one of which was reasonably possible. The rule did not justify spraining words or putting an unnatural or unreasonable meaning on them just for the purpose of introducing a broader construction. "18. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court had occasion to consider a similar question and the decision rendered thereon is reported in Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. E.S.I. Corporation 1980 (40) FLR 256 wherein it was held thus : Employees State Insurance Act is undoubtedly a labour welfare legislation enacted with the intention to benefit the workers of all categories as far as feasible. It was at first extended to all the workers in the factories and the definition of employee under S.2(9) of the Act was subsequently amended to give as wide a meaning as feasible to that term. This was to include and bring under the Act as far as possible workers belonging to all categories. The word shop has not been defined either in the Act or in the Notification. The Employees State Insurance Act being a social welfare legislation, intended to benefit as far as possible workers belonging to all categories, one has to be liberal in interpreting the words in such a social welfare legislation. It is not expedient or desirable to lay down any hard and fast rule in the interpretation of a statute whether it is a social document or not. The relevant word or the phrase has to be interpreted consistent with the modern trend in the field of labour jurisprudence and the object of the Act. There should not be much emphasis on the words : what is important is that the interpretation must be consistent with the object, the general purpose and policy of the statute. In construing a beneficial legislation, the court has a duty to make such construction as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The word "shop" occurring in the Notification is used in a larger sense than its ordinary meaning. It is not always necessary that there should be a building or land for conducting a shop. Where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if that is fairly susceptible ... "19. It is not always necessary that there should be a building or land for conducting a shop. Where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if that is fairly susceptible ... "19. On the above principles of law, we have to consider whether the petitioner/Society is a shop, and whether the notice issued by the respondent is in any way invalid. In view of the decision in Senior Electric Inspectors case which is also a case under the same Act, their Lordships said that the word shop has acquired extended meaning. That was a case where an advertising agency was sought to be covered under the provisions of the Act. The above decision was rendered against an order of our High Court in W.P. Nos. 1891 of 1982 and 3123 of 1983, wherein this Court has said that an advertising agency will not come within the ambit of the Act. But this finding was set aside by the Supreme Court. The earlier decisions cited supra were also followed, and their Lordships reiterated that a place where a systematic economic or commercial activity is carried on, will be a shop. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, their Lordships further reiterated as to how the Act should be interpreted. The relevant portion of the said paragraph 13 read thus : .... The object which the Act purported to achieve was to require that appropriate provision should be made for employees employed in establishments to which the Act applied. That meant that in construing the material provisions of such an Act if two views were reasonably possible, and the courts should prefer the view which helped the achievement of the object. When the words used in an entry were capable of a narrow or a broad construction, each construction being reasonably possible, and it appeared that the broad construction would help the furtherance of the object, then it was necessary to prefer that construction. This rule postulated that there was a competition between two constructions, each one of which was reasonably possible. The rule did not justify spraining words or putting an unnatural or unreasonable meaning on them just for the purpose of introducing a broader construction. "18. This rule postulated that there was a competition between two constructions, each one of which was reasonably possible. The rule did not justify spraining words or putting an unnatural or unreasonable meaning on them just for the purpose of introducing a broader construction. "18. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court had occasion to consider a similar question and the decision rendered thereon is reported in Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. E.S.I. Corporation 1980 (40) FLR 256 wherein it was held thus : Employees State Insurance Act is undoubtedly a labour welfare legislation enacted with the intention to benefit the workers of all categories as far as feasible. It was at first extended to all the workers in the factories and the definition of employee under S.2(9) of the Act was subsequently amended to give as wide a meaning as feasible to that term. This was to include and bring under the Act as far as possible workers belonging to all categories. The word shop has not been defined either in the Act or in the Notification. The Employees State Insurance Act being a social welfare legislation, intended to benefit as far as possible workers belonging to all categories, one has to be liberal in interpreting the words in such a social welfare legislation. It is not expedient or desirable to lay down any hard and fast rule in the interpretation of a statute whether it is a social document or not. The relevant word or the phrase has to be interpreted consistent with the modern trend in the field of labour jurisprudence and the object of the Act. There should not be much emphasis on the words : what is important is that the interpretation must be consistent with the object, the general purpose and policy of the statute. In construing a beneficial legislation, the court has a duty to make such construction as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The word "shop" occurring in the Notification is used in a larger sense than its ordinary meaning. It is not always necessary that there should be a building or land for conducting a shop. Where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if that is fairly susceptible ... "19. It is not always necessary that there should be a building or land for conducting a shop. Where the usual meaning of the language falls short of the whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words, if that is fairly susceptible ... "19. On the above principles of law, we have to consider whether the petitioner/Society is a shop, and whether the notice issued by the respondent is in any way invalid. In view of the decision in Senior Electric Inspectors case 1962 AIR(SC) 159, 1962 (1) SCJ 593, 1962 (3) SCR 146 the court has to interpret a statute taking into consideration the new factual situation and also taking into consideration the social, economic, political and scientific advancement in Society. Probably that may be the reason why in this statute, there is no definition for the word shop or establishment, since the legislature did not want to restrict the scope of its applicability to changed situations. The definition of shop which is meant as a house or building where goods are made or prepared for sale and sold, has now undergone a great change. In the present legal sense, it is not necessary that there should be building or land for conducting a shop, nor is it necessary that in the premises there should be buying or selling. Once an ordinary occupation is carried on, if there is a systematic economic or commercial activity, that will be sufficient to bring that place within its sphere. 20. Even services which are sold for a price will amount to a shop, the learned Judge has taken into consideration the above facts and has correctly interpreted the scope of the Notification, giving loan to the members of the Society is a service and the word price has also been given a wider connotation. The learned Judge has held : "....... The word price should not be taken as a price paid for a product or a particular article ...." 21. The charging of interest and sharing the profits among the various members will be sufficient to bring the impugned notification within the ambit of the Act, the interest charged by the petitioner/Society is the price for rendering services. We are in agreement with the finding of the learned Judge that the petitioner cannot impeach the Notification. The charging of interest and sharing the profits among the various members will be sufficient to bring the impugned notification within the ambit of the Act, the interest charged by the petitioner/Society is the price for rendering services. We are in agreement with the finding of the learned Judge that the petitioner cannot impeach the Notification. It is in evidence of P.W. 1 and can also be seen from the averments in the petition that the petitioner is doing money-lending business and interest is also charged from the debtors. By self-imposed restrictions, the facility is extended only to its members and not to the public at large. But it cannot be disputed that what the petitioner is doing is systematic commercial or economic activity, and it is one of its ordinary occupations. 22. Taking into consideration the principles laid down in the decisions cited above, and also the social purpose behind the enactment, we have no hesitation to hold that the finding of the learned Judge is correct and that the same does not call for any interference. The Letters Patent Appeal is without any merits and the same is, therefore, dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.