ORDER 1. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged that proviso to c1ause-4 of Ordinance 4 and has prayed for striking down the same. It is further prayed by the petitioner that the order Annexure-P5 dated 4.10.1989 directing petitioner to retire with effect from 31st October 1989 may be set aside. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner was born on 1st November 1929. He became professor in the Department of Criminology and Forensic Science of Dr. Hari Singh Gour Vishwa Vidyalaya, Sagar. He submits that his date of birth is 20th January 1930. He filed an application for correction in the date of his birth but without any result. Hence, so far as the present case is concerned, his date of birth as per record is 1st November, 1929. 3. Clause 4 of Ordinance 4 was amended and it reads as under: "Provided that a teacher retiring on or after 1st November shall uniformly continue automatically until the end of session i.e. 30th April following." According to this proviso, a uniform policy has been laid down that persons retiring on or after 1st November shall uniformly continue automatically until the end of the session. The idea was that the teaching staff retiring in the mid of session may be allowed to continue till the academic session is over. But, in the present case, the petitioner's date of birth is 1.11.1929 and he was not allowed to continue upto 30th April following i.e. 30th April 1989. Therefore, he has challenged this provision as well as order Annex.-P6 passed by the respondents retiring the petitioner on 31st Oct. 1989. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the validity of the proviso; but he has submitted that as per this proviso, the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years which is the date of retirement on 1st November 1989, hence he should be allowed to continue in service upto 30th April 1920, as per proviso. The contention of the learned counsel appears is misconceived. The last date is always not counted in service because the day begins in the midnight after 12 and as per that principle, the petitioner attained 60 years on the mid-night of 31st Oct, 1989 and not on 1st November 1989, on 1st November 1959, he entered in the 61st year. The contention of the learned counsel appears is misconceived. The last date is always not counted in service because the day begins in the midnight after 12 and as per that principle, the petitioner attained 60 years on the mid-night of 31st Oct, 1989 and not on 1st November 1989, on 1st November 1959, he entered in the 61st year. Accordingly, the petitioner stood retired on 31st Oct. 1989 and as per the proviso, he could not be permitted to have continued in service. Similar view has been taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal Seema v. State of Rajasthan [ (1985) 4 SCC 59 ]. After making reference to section 4 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, their lordships observed as under :- "The section embodies that in computing the age of any person, the day on which he was born is to be included as a whole day and he must be deemed to have attained majority at the beginning of eighteenth anniversary of that day. As already stated, a legal day commence at 12 O' clock mid-night and continues until the same hour the following night. It would therefore appear that the appellant having been born on January 2, 1956, he had not only attained the age of 28 years but also completed the same at 120' clock on the midnight of January 1, 1984. On the next day, i.e. on January 2, 1984, the appellant would be one day more than 28 years. The learned Judges were therefore right in holding that the appellant was disqualified for direct recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative service and as such was not entitled to appear at the examination held by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission in 1983. We affirm the view' taken by the learned Judges as also the decision in G. Vatsala Rani case." Their Lordships referred to two English decisions from Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition. Vol. 37, paragraph 178 at page 100 and the law stated reads thus: "In computing a period of time, at any rate when counted in years or months, no regard is, as a general rule, paid to fractions of a day, in the sense that the period is regarded as complete although it is short to the extent of a fraction of a day......... similarly, in calculating a person's age the day of his birth counts as a whole day; and he attains a specified age on the day next before the anniversary of his birthday." Similarly in the case of Rox v. Scoffin, the question was whether the accused held or had not completed 21 years of age. Section 10 (1) of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914 provides that a person might be sent to Borstal if it appears to the Court that he is not more than 21 years of age. The accused was born on February 17, 1909. Lord Hewart, C.J. held that the accused completed 21 years of age on February 16, 1930 and that he was one day more than 21 years of age on February 17, 1930, which was the commission day of Manchestar Assizes. 5. In this view of the matter, the petitioner stands to have attained the age of 60 years on the mid-night of 31st Oct., 1989 and he was to retire on 31st Oct, 1989. As per proviso 4 of Ordinance 4, teachers would be allowed to continue in service up-to the end of academic session i.e. 30th April following that year in case they retire on or after for Nov. 1989. As the petitioner stand retired on 31.10.1989, the respondent University rightly did not allow him to continue till 30th April, 1989 hence, there is no merit in the writ petition; consequently, it is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. Security, if any, be refunded to the petitioner.