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1996 DIGILAW 64 (ORI)

ABHIRAM MUKHI v. STATE OF ORISSA

1996-02-24

P.K.MISRA

body1996
P. K. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner faced trial along with three others under Sections 325/307 read with Section 34, I. P. C, in S. T. No. 6/69 of 1989 is the Court of the Asst. Sessions Judge, Udala. The trial Court while acquitting the three co-accused persons, convicted the petitioner under Section 307, I. P. C. and sentenced him to undergo R. I. for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to undergo R. I. for six months. In appeal, while maintaining the order of conviction the appellate Court has reduced the sentence to R. I. for three years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default to undergo R. I. for six months. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence is under challenge in this revision. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case, in brief, is that on 26-1-89 at about 6. 30 p. m. all the accused persons came in a body and abused the informant (P. W. 1) in filthy language and when P. W. 4 tried to pacify them, the petitioner brought a knife and stabbed P. W. 4 on his abdomen. It is further alleged that the other accused persons assaulted P. W. 4 with Panikhi and Iron Pipe etc. ( 3 ) THE plea of the accused persons was one of denial. ( 4 ) THE prosecution in order to establish its case has examined ten witnesses including the injured who was examined as P. W. 4. The trial Court on consideration of evidence came to the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to prove the charge against the other three accused persons and acquitted them of all the charges. However, it convicted the petitioner under Section 307, I. P. C. on a finding that he had given a blow with knife on the belly of P. W. 4. As already indicated, the appellate Court confirmed the finding of guilt but reduced the sentence. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has challenged the order of conviction on several grounds. He has contended that though the injured was examined by the doctor at about 7 p. m. , the F. I. R. was lodged at 8 p. m. on 26-1-89, and there is development in the prosecution case from stage to stage. He has contended that though the injured was examined by the doctor at about 7 p. m. , the F. I. R. was lodged at 8 p. m. on 26-1-89, and there is development in the prosecution case from stage to stage. He has further submitted that some of the persons named as witnesses in the F. I. R. have been withheld without any reason and persons who were not named in the F. I. R. have been examined as witnesses and there is variance between ocular evidence and the evidence of the doctor. It is also contended that on the self-same evidence the three other accused persons have been acquitted and the order of conviction relying upon the same witnesses is not sustainable. The learned Counsel has also submitted chat even assuming that the petitioner had assaulted P. W. 4 with a knife, it cannot be said that as offence under Section 307, Indian Penal Code, has been made out. ( 6 ) THE contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner excepting the last one do not merit serious consideration. Both the courts below on detailed examination of the materials on record have accepted the prosecution story so far as the assault by the petitioner on P. W. 4 is concerned. The discrepancies in the F. I. R. story and the statements made before the police and the prosecution case as unfolded at the stage of trial are not serious enough to discredit the evidence of eye-witnesses including the injured. Minor discrepancies in the evidence here and there cannot be a ground to discard the entire prosecution case. The findings of the courts below are based on discussion of evidence and in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, I am not persuaded to take a different view of the matter so far as assault on P. W. 4 by the petitioner is concerned. ( 7 ) THE question, however, remains as to whether it can be said beyond all reasonable doubt that an offence under Section 307, I. P. C. , has been made out. ( 7 ) THE question, however, remains as to whether it can be said beyond all reasonable doubt that an offence under Section 307, I. P. C. , has been made out. In order to bring home the charge under S. 307, the prosecution has to establish the followings :- (I) death of human being was attempted to be caused by or in consequence of the act of the accused; (II) such act was done by the accused with intention of causing death or with intention of causing such bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to cause death or was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that by doing such an act as the accused knew to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. IN other words, the prosecution should make out facts and circumstances as envisaged in Section 300, I. P. C. Unless it can be said that the intention or knowledge of the accused was to cause such bodily injury as would come within the scope of Section 300, I. P. C. , he cannot be Found guilty under Section 307, I. P. C. It must be proved that if act complained of would have culminated in the death of the victim, the offence would have come within the ingredients as envisaged in Section 300, I. P. C. I must hasten to add that it is not necessary that in all cases injury must have been caused to the victim to bring home the charge under Section 307, I. P. C. In a given case offence under Section 307, I. P. C. can be said to have been committed even without the slightest injury. It is the nature of the act and not the result thereof that is the determinative factor. FROM the materials on record, it is apparent that while there was a quarrel, the petitioner went inside, brought a knife and gave a blow on the belly. The size of the wound was 1" x 1/2" on the left side abdomen about 2" below the coastal margin. Both the doctors found three other injuries which were minor and simple in nature. The size of the wound was 1" x 1/2" on the left side abdomen about 2" below the coastal margin. Both the doctors found three other injuries which were minor and simple in nature. The same cannot be attributed to the assault by the present petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt, as the prosecution story is highly discrepant on this score. The size of the knife with which the injury was inflicted is about 6" including the handle portion. No doubt, the assault has been given on the belly, but keeping in view the nature of the injury, the manner of assault as well as the fact that the incident arose out of a sudden quarrel, it cannot be said beyond all reasonable doubt that the petitioner intended to commit the offence under Sec. 307, I. P. C. ( 8 ) THE next question is as to whether the offence which has been committed is one under Section 326, or under Section 324, I. P. C. If it is held that the injury caused by the action of the petitioner was grievous in nature, there would be no escape from the conclusion that the offence is one under Section 326, otherwise it will be under Section 324, I. P. C. In the present case, the doctors, examined as P. Ws. 7 and 8, have baldly stated that the injury was grievous in nature without giving any reason as to why they consider the injury to be grievous. What is considered to be "grievous injury" under the Indian Penal Code is ascertainable from Section 320, I. P. C. , wherein eight clauses have been included. Section 320 runs as follows :-"320. Grievous hurt.-The following kinds of hurt only are designated as 'grievous' :firstly; - Emasculations. Secondly, - Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. Thirdly.- Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear. Fourthly.- Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly.- Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member of joint. Sixthly.- Permanent disfigurations of the head or face. Seventhly.- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Eighthly.- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. "evidently, the injury does not come under the first seven clauses. Sixthly.- Permanent disfigurations of the head or face. Seventhly.- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Eighthly.- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. "evidently, the injury does not come under the first seven clauses. In the present case, the injury inflicted also does not come under the 8th clause as there is no material on record to come to a conclusion that the injury endangered the life of the injured who was discharged from the hospital after a few days. There is no material on record to conclude that the injury caused severe physical pain for twenty days or that the victim was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for twenty days. In the absence of any categorical evidence on record through the mouth of the doctor that the injury had endangered the life of the victim, it would not be appropriate to come to a conclusion that a grievous injury had been caused in spite of the opinion of the two doctors to the contrary. THE medical evidence is "opinion evidence" admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. Medical evidence is only with regard to the physical aspects of the injury and the opinion of a medical expert on that score is relevant. The doctor while giving evidence in court also gives evidence on facts based on his own examination of the injured. His evidence regarding the situs, the extent and the physical appearance of the injury is "evidence of fact", whereas his evidence regarding the possible weapon used, the nature of injury, that is to say, whether simple or grievous, is "opinion evidence". Such opinion should be backed by actual observations as well as reasons. The records should reveal as to why a doctor considers a particular injury to be grievous in nature. If from the facts observed by the doctor, the court is not in a position to come to a conclusion that the injury comes within any of the eight clauses mentioned in Section 320, it becomes difficult for the court to come to a definite conclusion regarding the nature of the injury. No doubt, keeping in view the situs and the extent of injury, the court may come to its own conclusion. No doubt, keeping in view the situs and the extent of injury, the court may come to its own conclusion. However, in, the absence of clear materials in this case, it is difficult to come to a conclusion from the mere ipse dixit of the two doctors that grievous injury had been caused. In short, it is held that the offence committed is one under Section 324 and not under Section 307 or Section 326, I. P. C. Almost in similar circumstances, similar view had been taken by this Court in Gangadhar Bohidar v. State of Orissa, (1995) 8 OCR 175. In view of the aforesaid, the conviction of the petitioner is altered to one under Section 324, I. P. C. ( 9 ) NOW the question of sentence. From the lower Court record, it appears that the petitioner was in custody for a total period of about 25 days in two installments, first during investigation and secondly after order of conviction by the trial Court. Keeping in view the nature of the evidence and the fact that no previous conviction against the petitioner had been alleged, I do not think it proper to send the petitioner to custody for the third time. I think, interest of justice would be met if the custodial sentence is reduced to the period already undergone and in addition, a fine is imposed. ACCORDINGLY this revision is allowed in part and the order of conviction and sentence is altered. It is directed that the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to period already undergone and the accused is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- (One thousand), in default, to undergo R. I. for one month. Out of the fine, if realised, a sum of Rs. 500/- (five hundred) be paid to the injured (P. W. 4 ). Petition partly allowed. .