G. P. MATHUR, J. This is a defendants appeal against the judgment and decree dated 3-12-1976 of IInd Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, by which the appeal preferred by the plaintiff was allowed and the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed dated 27-5-1969 and for possession was decreed. 2. Sri Thakurji Maharaj, Birajman Mandir, Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur through Baba Sam Ram Das Chela Baba Narain Das filed O. S. No. 60 of 1971 against Kunwar Singh and seven others for cancellation of the sale-deed executed by Jangannath Das in favour of the defendants on 27-5-1969 and for possession over the land in suit situate in village Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur Pargana and Tehsil Nawabganj, District Bareilly. The case of the plaintiff was as follows. One Thakur Johda Singh resident of village Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur Pargana Nawabganj, District Bareilly was a Zamindar and he constructed a temple in his village and installed a deity of Sri Thakuji Maharaj in it after performing all religious ceremonies. Thakur Jodha Singh had no issues and in his life-time, he endowed his entire Zamindari property in favour of the plaintiff and created a public trust by means of a registered waqf deed dated 24-10-1934 for the maintenance and up-keep of temple and for "arti and bhog" expenses etcs. One of the conditions of the waqf deed was that no person shall have any right to sell or mortgage the property endowed in favour of the temple. He remained the manager of the temple till his life-time and after his death Ganga Nandan Chela Brahma Nandan became the manager of the temple. The present Mahant and servarakar of the plaintiff is Baba Sant Ram Das and prior to him Jagannath Das was acting as Mahant and sarvarakar. Jagannath Das executed a sale deed of the endowed property measuring 33 bighas 18 biswas, detailed at the foot of the plaint, in favour of the defendants on 27-5-1969 for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000. After the creation of the waqf the land in suit was recorded in the name of the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaja in the revenue records and used to be cultivated by the manager and sarvarakar of the temple on its behalf. 30,000. After the creation of the waqf the land in suit was recorded in the name of the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaja in the revenue records and used to be cultivated by the manager and sarvarakar of the temple on its behalf. During the period Ganga Nandan was the sarvarakar, Jagannath Das who neither resided in the village where the land in suit is situate nor was in possession thereof got his name recorded over the same in the Khasra with the connivance of the Lekhpal. When Ganga Nandan came to know about it, he moved an application in the form of an objection before the S. D. O. Nawabganj under Section 240-G of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act against Jagannath Das in compensation proceedings which was registered as Case. No. 157-A of 1957. In the said case, Jagannath Das appeared and a compromise was filed by the parties on 21-12-1957 wherein Jagannath Das admitted the title of the plaintiff and further agreed to manage the land in dispute as Mahant of the temple without any right to sell or mortgage the property. The compromise was duly recorded and the proceedings were decided in terms thereof. The compromise was acted upon and Jagannath Das continued to the Mahant and sarvarakar of the plaintiff with effect from the date of the decision of the case and used to manage the land in suit on its behalf. Subsequently he became dishonest and any how he managed to get the land in suit recorded in his personal name in the revenue records fraudulently though it was a trust property. This position continued without the knowledge of anybody else and after obtaining bhumidhari sanad, he executed the impugned sale deed in favour of the defendants. When the true facts came to light, Jagannath Das was removed from the Mahantship of the plaintiff by the Hindu public of the village and Baba Sant Ram Das was appointed as the Mahant and sarvarakar thereof. Jagannath Das died in January, 1971. The property of the plaintiff by its very nature and in terms of original waqf deed is unaliabble. Jagannath Das had no right, title or authority to execute the sale-deed thereof. 3. The case of the defendants as set out in the written statement is as follows. Jagannath Das died in January, 1971. The property of the plaintiff by its very nature and in terms of original waqf deed is unaliabble. Jagannath Das had no right, title or authority to execute the sale-deed thereof. 3. The case of the defendants as set out in the written statement is as follows. There is a temple of Sri Thakurji Maharaj in village Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur Pargana and Tehsil Nawabganj, district Bareilly and that Thakur Jodha Singh was a Zamindar. Jagannath Das was sirdar and in possession of the land in suit in his personal capacity and his possession was not on behalf of the plaintiff. During the Consolidation proceedings he was declared as sirdar thereof and in C. H. Form 45, his name was recorded as sirdar which became final as no objection was filed by anybody else. Thus the suit is barred by Sections 27 and 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short U. P. C. H. Act ). Jagannath Das was not the sarvarakar of the temple and his possession was adverse, he acquired bhumidhari sanad by deposit ing the requisite amount and thereafter executed the sale-deed in favour of the defendants. The Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the issue involved was one for declaration of title which could be done by the revenue court alone. The suit was barred by limitation. Thakur Jodha Singh did not construct the temple nor could create waqf in favour of the temple. Mahant Sant Ram Das was not the Mahant or sarvarakar of the plaintiff and Jagannath Das also never acted as sar-varakar of the plaintiff. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, a large number of issues were framed by the trail court. The learned Addl. Civil Judge after considering the evidence adduced by the parties recorded the following findings. The suit filed on behalf of Sri Thakurji Maharaj through Sant Ram Das was maintainable and was not barred by Section 91 or under Order 1, Rule 8, C. P. C. Jagannath Das was never sarvarakar or manager of the plaintiff. Thakur Jodha Singh executed a waqf deed in favour of the plaintiff on 22-10-1934 and the plaintiff became owner of the property in suit. Sri Thakurji Maharaj was recorded as bhumidhar but subsequently Dheeram Das acquired ad-hivasi rights and became sirdar of the land in suit. Thakur Jodha Singh executed a waqf deed in favour of the plaintiff on 22-10-1934 and the plaintiff became owner of the property in suit. Sri Thakurji Maharaj was recorded as bhumidhar but subsequently Dheeram Das acquired ad-hivasi rights and became sirdar of the land in suit. On his death, Jagannath Das as his heir became the sirdar thereof. The deity cannot be regarded as minor by any stretch or imagination as contemplated by Section 157 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and its position was different. Ganga Nandan took compensation in proceedings under Sec tion 240-G of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and Jagannath Das became sirdar of the land in suit. During the consolidation operations, he was declared as sirdar and therefore the suit is barred by Sections 27 and 49 of U. P. C. H. Act. Jagannath Das had there fore right and title to execute the sale-deed in favour of the defendants. The suit was barred by limitation as plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years. The defen dants were bonafide purchaser for value. On these findings the suit was dismissed on 30-4-1974. 5. In the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the learned IInd Addl. District Judge recorded the following findings. The suit was maintainable on behalf of the deity Sri Thakurji Maharaj by Sant Ram Das. Dheeram Das did not acquire any adhivasi rights, Jagannath Das was not the Chela of Dheeram Das and his name had been fictitiously recorded in the revenue records, nor he was in possession-over the land in suit. In proceedings under Section 240-G of U. P. Z. A and L. R. Act, a compromise was arrived at wherein it was agreed that Jagannath Das will act as Mahant and look after and manage the affairs of the temple including cultivation of the entire land but would have no right to sell or mortgage the same. In the compromise Jagannath Das had given up his rights and title, if any, over the land in suit. Ganganandan had not received compensation. Jagannath Das had accepted to become Mahant of the temple. In the compromise Jagannath Das had given up his rights and title, if any, over the land in suit. Ganganandan had not received compensation. Jagannath Das had accepted to become Mahant of the temple. No compensation statement was prepared nor was it finalised as provided under Section 240-K of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and therefore Jagannath Das was never declared as sirdar or adhivasi and consequently he had no right to acquire bhumidhari sanad or to become bhumidhar of the land in suit. Since Jagannath Das got the property as Mahant of the temple, he could not claim any adverse interest to the same. He had therefore no right or title to execute sale deed in favour of the defendants. The suit was not barred under Section 27 or 49 of U. P. C. H. Act. The land in suit is inalienable trust property, and was not the private property of Jagannath Das. The suit was not barred by limitation. The defendants were not bona fide purchaser for value and cannot claim any benefit under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. On these findings, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial court was set aside and the suit was decreed for a cancellation of the sale deed dated 27-5-1969 executed by Baba Jagannath Das in favour of the defendants and also for possession of the plaintiff after ejectment of the defendants. 6. I have heard Sri Subodh Kumar for the defendant-appellants, Sri G. N. Verma for the plaintiff- respondent and have gone through the record. Before dealing with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, it will be convenient to first refer to the proceedings under Chapter IX-A of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act relating to conferment of Sirdari rights on adhivasis. Both the courts below have placed great reliance on these proceedings but have deferred as to the effect of the proceedings and also extinguishment of the rights of the parties. Both the courts below have placed great reliance on these proceedings but have deferred as to the effect of the proceedings and also extinguishment of the rights of the parties. Ganga Nandan, the erstwhile Mahant and sarvarakar of the plaintiff, on coming to know about the entry of the name of Jagaanath Das in the khasra, moved an application in the form of an objection before the S. D. O. Nawabganj, Bareilly in proceedings under Section 240-G of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act in compensation proceedings case No. 157-A of 1957. In the said case, a compromise was filed by Baba Ganga Nandan Chela Sri Brahama Nandan and Baba Jagannath Das Chela Sri Narain Das. A certified copy of the compromise which is in Hindi was filed in the trial court and was Ex. 7 on the record. The compromise deed has been reproduced in the judgment of the learned Addl. District Judge as translated into English, which reads as follows: "it is humbly submitted that parties have compromised. Ganga Nandan will have no objection if his case is rejected and if compensation is paid to Ganga Nandan in terms of the compromise as follows: (1) That Baba Jagannath Das will look after and manage the cultivation of the entire land, but would have no right to sell or mortgage it. (2) That the entire income from cultivation shall be spent on the necessary expenses of the temple of Sri Raghunath Ji situated in Mauza Gauntia Dhamipur, Tehsil Nawabganj by Baba Jagannath Das and he shall properly look after and manage the temple in the capacity of its Mahant. (3) That Baba Ganga Nandan the erstwhile sarvarakar of the temple would not object to the management and the Mahantship of Baba Jagannath Das who would have full control and right to manage the temple affairs. (4) That the expenses of food and clothes of Sri Ganga Nandan would be the respon sibility of Baba Jagannath Das and it would be his duty to see that in his old age Baba Ganga Nandan is not put to any trouble and is properly looked after during his sickness etc. (5) That the public of Mauza Gauntia Dhamipur have the right to lawfully remove the Mahant and sarvarakar in case of any mismanagement of the temple etc. by them. " 7. (5) That the public of Mauza Gauntia Dhamipur have the right to lawfully remove the Mahant and sarvarakar in case of any mismanagement of the temple etc. by them. " 7. The compromise shows in unequivocal terms that Baba Jagannath Das had agreed to look after the temple of Sri Raghunath Ji (plaintiff) in the capacity of its Mahant and to spend the entire income from cultivation on the temple itself. Baba Ganga Nandan had relinquished his rights as sarvarakar of the temple and Baba Jagannath Das was given the right to act its Mahant. He was given the right to look after and manage the cultivation of the entire land but no right to sell or mortgage was conferred upon him and he was specifically precluded from doing so. The public of the village had been given further right to lawfully remove the Mahant and sarvarakar of the temple (plaintiff) in case of mismanagement. In view of this compromise, it is not at all open to the defendant-appellants to contend that Jagannath Das had acquired any independent right by virtue of adverse possession or that he was adhivasi or sirdar of the land in suit and consequently he could riot become bhumidhar so as to execute a sale deed of the disputed property. The possession of Baba Jagannath Das was merely in his capacity as Mahant of the temple as he was given right to look after and manage the property and his possession, if any, was not at all in a private or personal capacity. The possession over the land in suit was that of the deity namely, Sri Thakurji Maharaj. 8. Regarding the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that Jagannath Das acquired adhivasi or sirdari rights in view of Section 240-A of U. RZ. A. and L. R. Act and that the right, title and interest of the landholder namely, the plaintiff ceased or extinguished, if may be noticed that the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that there is no evidence on record to show that compensa tion was paid to Ganga Nandan in accordance with Section 240-C of the Act. A. and L. R. Act and that the right, title and interest of the landholder namely, the plaintiff ceased or extinguished, if may be noticed that the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that there is no evidence on record to show that compensa tion was paid to Ganga Nandan in accordance with Section 240-C of the Act. There is no evidence on record to show that the requirement of section 240-J of the Act was complied with or that Form No. 101 in accordance with Ruje 193 (b) of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Rules was ever prepared. Similarly, there is no evidence that compensation roll having been prepared was signed and sealed. It has been held by a Full Bench in Awadesh Singh v. Bikarnw Ahir, AIR 1975 Allahabad 324 that the right of the land holders are extinguished in compensation proceedings only upon preparation of compensation assessment roll and signing and sealing of the same. The question whether compensation assessment roll was prepared or not or whether compensa tion was paid to the land holder is a pure question of fact. The lower appellate court has recorded finding of fact that there is no evidence on record to show that any compensation was paid to Ganga Nandan. In this view of the matter, it cannot be held that the rights of the land holder extinguished or that Jagannath Das became adhivasi or siradar of the land in suit. In this connection, it was also be noticed that Ganga Nandan had never claimed himself to be the land holder but was merely acting as Mahant without claiming any independent right over the property. There is no evidence on record to indicate that the name of the plaintiff namely, Sri Thakurji Maharaj who was the real land holder in view of the waqf deed executed by Thakur Jodha Singh in its favour on 24-10-1934 was ever recorded in any compensation roll prepared in accordance with section 240-D of the Act or that any compensation was paid to it in accordance with Section 240-E of U. P. Z. A. and LR. Act. Therefore in so far as the objection filed by Ganga Nandan is concerned its decision could not effect or extinguish the rights of the plaintiff. However, Jagannath Das is bound by the admission made by him in the compromise which was filed by him. 9. Act. Therefore in so far as the objection filed by Ganga Nandan is concerned its decision could not effect or extinguish the rights of the plaintiff. However, Jagannath Das is bound by the admission made by him in the compromise which was filed by him. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants however, submitted that Jagannath Das never entered into any compromise nor any such compromise was filed by him. In my opinion, it is not open to the appellants to raise such a contention at this stage. In the second appeal, no such ground has been taken. On the contrary, ground Nos. 4,* 5, 7 and 8 show that existence of the compromise in proceedings under Section 240-O of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act is admitted but the effect of the order passed therein or the interpretation placed upon the compromise by the lower appellate Court is challenged. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court have also placed great reliance upon the compromise which was arrived at in proceedings und r Section 240- G of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act but they have only deferred on the legal effect of the orders passed in these proceedings. The judgment of the two courts below do not show that it was ever contended on behalf of the appellants before them that Jagannath Das never entered into any compromise or no such compromise was filed. Thus, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that Jagannath Das never entered into any compromise or that no such compromise was filed cannot at all be accepted. 10. The appellants have moved an application on 11-1-1979 under Order XLI, Rule 27, C. P. C. praying that three certificates filed along with the application be admitted as additional evidence. On 26-2-1980 an order was passed that the application may be considered at the time of hearing of the appeal. The certificate show that Ganga Nandan was paid Rs. 129 on 10-2-1958, Rs. 387 on 14-8-1957 and Rs. 258 on 2-2-1960 from Sub Treasury, Nawabganj under Adhivasi Scheme. In my opinion, the conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of sub-rule (1) of Order XLI, Rule 27, C. P. C. are not at all satisfied. Therefore the certificates filed along with the application cannot be admitted as additional evidence. 387 on 14-8-1957 and Rs. 258 on 2-2-1960 from Sub Treasury, Nawabganj under Adhivasi Scheme. In my opinion, the conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of sub-rule (1) of Order XLI, Rule 27, C. P. C. are not at all satisfied. Therefore the certificates filed along with the application cannot be admitted as additional evidence. The certificates show that they have been issued by Sub-Treasury Officer, Nawabganj on 25-11-1978. If a Government Department can issue certificates in November, 1978 there was no difficulty for the defendants to have obtained the same and filed them when the suit was pending in the trial court or even before the lower appellate court. The certifi cates ire not required by this court for enabling it to pronounce judgment in the second appeal. The application dated 11-1-1979 is, therefore, rejected. That apart the certificates do not show that the compensation amount was paid to Ganga Nandan with regard to the land which is subject-matter of dispute in the present case as they are conspicuously silent about the same. They merely mention that certain amount was paid under the head "adhivasi Scheme". Even the name of the Village where the land regarding which amount was paid is not mentioned. Thus the certifi cates cannot at all be connected with the land which is subject-matter of dispute in this case. Another important aspect of the matter is that as already noticed, the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj was the land holder and not Ganga" Nandan and therefore even assuming that any amount was paid to Ganga Nandan by way of compensation, it can have no baring on the title of the plaintiff. 11. Shri Subodh Kumar has strenuously urged that in consolidation proceed ings, no objection was filed by the plaintiff and in C. H. Form No. 45 which is a final khatauni the name of Jagannath Das was recorded as sirdar and therefore in view of Section 49, U. P. C. H. Act the civil court was debarred from going into the question of rights and title of parties. It is urged that the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj should have filed an objection in accordance with the provisions of U. P. C. H. Act and it having not done so, the present suit which requires declaration and adjudication of its right cannot be entertained by the civil court. It is urged that the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj should have filed an objection in accordance with the provisions of U. P. C. H. Act and it having not done so, the present suit which requires declaration and adjudication of its right cannot be entertained by the civil court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Smt. Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh and others AIR 1990 SC 1173 wherein it was held that suit to set aside the sale deed instituted at time when consolidation proceedings were pending was barred by Sec tion 49 of U. P. C. H. Act. The authority cited by the learned counsel is clearly distin guishable as the suit therein had been filed during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings. Such is not the case here. For considering the submission made by the learned counsel, it is necessary to examine the character and position of dedicated or temple property. In the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust by B. K. Mukherjee, it has been stated in Article 5. 1 as under : ". . . . . . . it is in an ideal sense that the dedicated property vests in an idol, and in the nature of things the possession and management of it must be entrusted to some person as Shebait or manager. . . . . . . the person so entrusted must, of necessity, be empowered to do whatever may be required for the service of the idol and for the benefit and preservation of its property, at least to as great as the manager of an infant heir. If this were not so, the estate of the idol might be destroyed or wasted, and its worship discontinued for want of necessary funds to preserve and maintain them. This human ministrant of the deity, who is its manager and legal representative, is known by Shebait. . . . . He is a person entitled to speak on behalf of the deity on earth and is endowed with authority to seal with all its temporal affairs. As regards the temple property, the manager is in the position of trustee, but as regards the service of the temple and the duties that appertain to it he is rather in the position of the holder of an office of dignity. " In Article 6. As regards the temple property, the manager is in the position of trustee, but as regards the service of the temple and the duties that appertain to it he is rather in the position of the holder of an office of dignity. " In Article 6. 29 it has been stated as under: " (1) An idol is a juristic person in whom the title to the properties of the endowment vests; but it is only in a ideal sense that (he idol is the owner. It has to act through human agency and that agent is the Shehait, who is, in law, the person entitled to take proceedings on its behalf. The personality of the idol might, therefore in one sense, be said to be merged in that of the Shebait. (2) Where, however, the Shebait refuses to act for the idol, or where the suit is to challenge the ac: of the Shebait himself as prejudicial to the interests of the idol, then there must be some other agency which must have the right to act for the idol. In such cases, \the law accordingly recognises a right in persons interested in the endowment to take proceed ings on behalf of the idol. " In Article 6. 97 it has been stated as under : ". . . . . . . A Shebait who has accepted the office of a Shebait or acknowledged himself as such, is incapable of asserting any hostile title against the idol or setting up jus terrii in others. This disability is, in law, implicit in any person who holds a fiduciary position in relation to another. Furthermore, unlike a human beneficiary, an idol cannot act except through a natural person, and normally, the personality of the idol is bound up with that of the Shebait. As was pointed put by Rankin, C. J. , in Surendra Krishna Roy v. Shre Shree Ishwari Bhubaneshwari Thahurani, if after a Shebait has accepted the trust, there is a change in an intention with which he Holds the citys properties, and he applies the rents and profits of the property to his own purposes, the idols title cannot be affected thereby. Any change of intention on the part of the Shebait can be brought home to the idol by means of the Shebait only, and the idol can react to it through the Shebait. Any change of intention on the part of the Shebait can be brought home to the idol by means of the Shebait only, and the idol can react to it through the Shebait. Adverse possession in such circumstan ces is a notion wholly devoid of content. . . . . . . . " 12. It is obvious that the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj could file objection in consolidation proceedings only through its Mahant or Shebait and if Jagannath Das who had become Mahant in the year 1957 did not file any objection on account of any oblique motive and for usurping the property, it cannot be said that the bar created by Section 49 of U. P. C. H. Act will come into play. This is squarely covered by the dictum of the Supreme Court in Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another, AIR 1981 SC 77 wherein it has been held that suit by a co-sharer to challenge the deletion of her name in joint Khewat in consolidation proceedings on the grounds of fraud of co-sharers in possession was not barred under Section 49 of U. P. C. H. Act. Similar view has been taken by our Court in Smt. Prabhawati v. Kashi, 1983 Revenue Decisions 196 with regard to minor and in Mohd. Ahmad v. Allah Rabbul Alemin, 1984 Revenue Decisions 321 with regard to waqf property where a mutavalli got his own name recorded. Thus I am clearly of the opinion that the bar created under Section 49 of U. P. C. H. Act would not operate and the suit instituted by the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj is maintainable. 13. Learned counsel next urged that the relief claimed in the suit, in effect, amounts to declaration of plaintiffs title and according to the plaintiffs case the sale-deed in favour of the defendants is void and in such circumstances, the jurisdic tion of the civil court was barred under Section 331, U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and the revenue court alone had the jurisdiction to try the suit. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on Chandrika Misra, 1973 R. D. 365 ; Indra Pal v. Jagannath, 1992 R. D. 231 and a Full Bench decision in Ram Padarath v. llnd Addl. District Judge and others, 1989 R. D. 21. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on Chandrika Misra, 1973 R. D. 365 ; Indra Pal v. Jagannath, 1992 R. D. 231 and a Full Bench decision in Ram Padarath v. llnd Addl. District Judge and others, 1989 R. D. 21. In my opinion, it is not necessary to refer to the various authorities cited at the bar as the controversy has been concluded by a decision of Supreme Court in Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad and others, 1989 ALJ 1355 where the Apex Court approved the decision of this Court in Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari, 1982 ALJ 1308 wherein it was held that the cause of action for cancellation of sale-deed is not denial of plaintiffs title which may be said to be implicit in the execution of the sale deed by the defendant but the execution of the deed itself. The Apex Court held that where the party in her suit prima fade proceeded on the premise that she could not ignore the sales but that the sales require to be set aside before she is entitled to possession and other consequential reliefs, the suit would not be barred by Section 331 and the civil court would have jurisdiction to entertain it. That apart this ground has been taken for the first time in the second appeal one in view of Section 331 (1-A) of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act unless the appellants show failure of justice, this ground cannot be entertained here. Learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to point out any thing to show that oh account of the suit being tried by the Civil Court, there has been a failure of justice. Thus the submission made by the learned counsel has no substance. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to point out any thing to show that oh account of the suit being tried by the Civil Court, there has been a failure of justice. Thus the submission made by the learned counsel has no substance. 14. It is next submitted by the appellants that the compromise in proceedings under Section 140-G of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act was entered into and the orders in the said proceedings were passed in 1957 whereby the name of Jagannath Das was recorded in the revenue records but the suit was filed on 25-2- 1971 and as such the same was barred by limitation, it is urged that the period of limitation for filing a suit for possession after ejectment of a trespasser under Section 209 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act, at the relevant time, was 12 years and as no such suit was filed, Jagannath Das perfected his title by adverse possession and the title of the plaintiff was extinguished. In my opinion, the contention raised is wholly misconceived. The question of filing a suit by the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj for ejectment of Jagannath Das did not at all arise as he was acting in the capacity of a Mahant of the plaintiff and in law governing the relationship of a Mahant or servarakar and the deity, there is no question of the former pleading any adverse title. The possession of Jagannath Das was on behalf of the deity Sri Thakurji. The present is a suit for cancellation of sale-deed which was executed on 27-5-1969 and the suit having been filed in Feb. 1971, it is well within limitation. 15. Another contention based on Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act has equally no substance. In order to get the benefit of the aforesaid provision on, the defendant-appellants must show that their transferor namely, Jagannath Das was the ostensible owner by the express or implied consent of the real owner namely, Sri Thakurji. Neither such a case has been pleaded by the defendants nor there is any evidence on record to substantiate such a plea. In fact there was no question of deity giving such express or implied consent. Thus the defendants are not all entitled to get benefit of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act. 16. Neither such a case has been pleaded by the defendants nor there is any evidence on record to substantiate such a plea. In fact there was no question of deity giving such express or implied consent. Thus the defendants are not all entitled to get benefit of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act. 16. In the end, the learned counsel for the appellants also urged that Jagannath Das applied for being granted bhumidhar sanad on 27-5-1969 by depositing ten times of the land revenue in order to execute a sale-deed and an objection was filed by Baba Sant Das under Section 137-A of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act for cancellation of the bhumidhari sanad. This objection was rejected by the Tehsildar, Nawabganj, Bareilly and the appeal preferred by Baba Sant Ram Das against the said order was abated by the Addl. Commissioner on 27-11-1971 on account of non-substitution of the heir of Jagannath Das who had died on 8-1-1971. It is thus urged that the challenge to the grant of bhumidhari sanad to Jagannath Das having failed his right to execute sale deed in favour of the defendants cannot be assailed now. The argument raised has hardly any merit. Firstly the proceedings for grant or cancellation of bhumidhari sanad are in the nature of summary proceedings which can have no bearing on a regular suit. Secondly the objection to the grant of bhumidhari sanad to Jagannath Das was not filed by Sri Thakurji Maharaj, the present plaintiff and the real owner of the property nor Sri Thakurji Maharaj was a party to the aforesaid proceedings. Thus, any order passed in proceedings under Section 134/137/137-A of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act can have no bearing in so far as the present suit for cancellation of sale-deed is concerned. 17. The appellants have filed one more application under Order XLI, Rule 27, C. P. C. on 27-1-1995 for bringing on record a questionnaire which shows that the file of case No. 157-A of 1951-Ganga Nandan v. Jagannath Das under Section 240-G of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act had been weeded out on 10-4-1975. 17. The appellants have filed one more application under Order XLI, Rule 27, C. P. C. on 27-1-1995 for bringing on record a questionnaire which shows that the file of case No. 157-A of 1951-Ganga Nandan v. Jagannath Das under Section 240-G of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act had been weeded out on 10-4-1975. This has been filed to show that the certified copy of the order passed by Tehsildar on 21-12-1957 which has been filed in this court could not have been obtained as the copy of the same purports to have been issued on 6-7-1984. I am of the opinion that no ground has been made out to admit any additional evidence at this stage. That apart the questionaire merely shows that the file has been weeded out. It does not show that the final order passed by the Tehsildar has also been weeded out. Whenever any file is weeded out, the order passed in the case is retained and other document like plead ings evidence etc. only are weeded out. Secondly the copy of order dated 21-12-1957 had been filed before the trial court as Ex. 7 and has been extensively referred to both by the trial court and the lower appellate court. Even accepting the date of weeding out mentioned in the questionaire as correct, the same is after the suit had been decided by the trial court. Thus the questionaire has absolutely no bearing. Before parting with the case, it may be observed that the finding of the lower appellate court is that the land in suit was owned by Thakur Jodha Singh and in view of the waqf deed executed by him, there could not be any sale of property. Jagannath Das could get the property only either by inheritance or by prescription or by loss of right by the deity. The cause of the defendants is that Dheeran Das who was "guru Dada" became adhivasi and Jagannath Das in his capacity as grand Chela inherited it. If he inherited the property as "chela" it is obvious that it was a dedicated property of the deity Sri Thakurji Maharaj and Section 171 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act can have no application. Thus Jagannath Das could not inherit the property in his own right. 18. No other point was urged. If he inherited the property as "chela" it is obvious that it was a dedicated property of the deity Sri Thakurji Maharaj and Section 171 of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act can have no application. Thus Jagannath Das could not inherit the property in his own right. 18. No other point was urged. The appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with cost. It is needless to clarify that it is the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj who would be the owner of the land in suit and not Baba Sant Ram Das through whom the said suit was filed or the present, sarvarakar or pujari of the deity Sri Om Prakash who has been substituted after the death of Baba Sant Ram Das or anyone else who may act as servarakar or pujari of the deity in future. Appeal dismissed. .