Judgment Dharmpal Sinha, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also counsel for the State. 2. In both the cases bearing no. 6624 of 1990 and 5318 of 1990 similar points have arisen on the basis of the contention raised and this judgment will govern both the cases. 3. In both the petitions the petitioner, who has been made accused for allegedly committing an offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (To be hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), has questioned the legality of the orders dated 7.5.1990 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Samastipur in G.O. Case No. 24 of 1990, Trial No. 1272 of 1990 and in G.O. Case No. 23 of 1990, Trial No.1271 of 1990, whereby the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act and directed issue of summons against the petitioner. 4. The orders have been passed in the following back-grounds on 14.5.1988 two .different food Inspectors, opposite party no.2 in the two cases, took some sample of some food article, namely, iodised salt from the shop of petitioner situated at Samastipur. One of the sealed file containing part of salt purchased by each of the Foot Inspectors was sent to the Public Analyst and Public Analyst sent a report dated 31st of May, 1988 in one case and dated 8.6.1989 in the order case, a copy of, which is Annexure-5 to these petitions. The reports indicated that on analysis of sample salt, it was found that it had iodine content only to the extent of 10.05 pp.m., though the minimum which is prescribed by the Food Adulteration Act for such iodised salt at the' retail outlet is 15 ppm. The salt was thus held by the analyst to be adulterated for containing less of Iodine content than of prescribed standard. It appears that after the Public Analyst sent the reports (Annexure-5) for some time, nothing was done by the complainant side. Later, however, two prosecution reports were filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate against the petitioner in April, 1990 (a copy of the prosecution report has been brought on the record as Annexure-6 in each of the cases). Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after receipt of the aforesaid prosecution report passed the impugned orders on 7.5.1990. 5. Later, however, two prosecution reports were filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate against the petitioner in April, 1990 (a copy of the prosecution report has been brought on the record as Annexure-6 in each of the cases). Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after receipt of the aforesaid prosecution report passed the impugned orders on 7.5.1990. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the sample had been taken as early as on 14.5.1988 and even the report of the Public Analyst had been prepared within 40 days as prescribed by the rules, .nothing was done for a long time; and only on 27.4.1990 that is about two years after taking of the sample the petitioner received a copy of the Public Analyst report, and he was thus deprived of getting the sample of salt, part of which at the time of taking sample had been handed over to the petitioner under a sealed cover, examined by the Central Food Laboratory. His further submission is that he even made a prayer within the prescribed period of 10 days before the court to send the sample of salt given to the petitioner by the Food Inspector at the time of taking of sample for examination by the Central Food Laboratory; but that was not accepted and the petitioner has been seriously prejudiced by being deprived of the opportunity to show through the report of the Central Food Laboratory that the iodised salt Was not adulterated. In this connection he has also submitted that the iodine element of the iodised salt gets reduced day by day in natural course and this is why, in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, it has been indicated that when iodised salt is taken out from the manufacturer premises it should contain 25-35 pp.m. of iodine, but at the retail outlet the prescribed minimum is only 15 ppm. In support of his argument that because of the delay the petitioner has been prejudiced for the reason of being deprived of the opportunity, which the law gives to him under Section 13(2) of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited decisions reported in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 970 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram), 1991 Suppl. (2) S.C.C. 652 (Ahmad Dada Bhai Adwani v. State of Mal1arashtra) and 1995 Suppl. (4) S.C.C. 659 (Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P.). 6. (2) S.C.C. 652 (Ahmad Dada Bhai Adwani v. State of Mal1arashtra) and 1995 Suppl. (4) S.C.C. 659 (Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P.). 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has submitted that there is no prescribed time limit for lodging such complaint or submitting prosecution report and mere delay in filing prosecution report before the Chief Judicial Magistrate by itself cannot be a reason for quashing the impugned orders dated 7.5.1990 taking cognizance of the offence when the Public Analyst after analysis of die sample sent to him had submitted the reports (Annexure-5) that the iodised salt was adulterated for containing less of iodine than the standard prescribed. 7. I have considered carefully the submission and I am inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There may not be any time limit for lodging the complaint or filing prosecution report; but if the prosecution side makes such sort of delay as has been made in these cases whereby the petitioner has been deprived of availing the opportunity which Section 13(2) of the Act definitely gives to him, of getting the sample of salt, which had been left in his possession at the time of taking sample of salt, examined by the Central Food Laboratory, prejudice had been caused to him. If such delay is made by the prosecution, which is not likely to cause prejudice then the contention of the learned counsel for the State may hold good, that mere delay in lodging complaint could not justify the interference with the order taking cognizance. The decisions, which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner as cited above, definitely go to settle the principle that if prejudice has been caused in the sense that the accused has been deprived of availing the benefit of the legal provision as contained in Section 13(2) of the Act, which if availed could show through the report of the higher body, Central Food Laboratory that the public analysis report was not necessarily a correct report, the petitioner accused would get benefit. In the instant cases there does not seem to be any good ground for delay in lodging of the complaint after such a long period. In the instant cases there does not seem to be any good ground for delay in lodging of the complaint after such a long period. The public analyst reports (Annexure-5) show that it had been prepared on 31st of May, 1988 or 8th of June, 1988 that is within 40 days as prescribed by rule. There seems to be no explanation at all given for withholding of taking further action after the reports had been received by the concerned authority. From the letters (Annexures-4) through which the report of the public analyst had been sent to the petitioner, it appears that it was signed on 25.4.1990 and there is mention in it about the public analyst report with date of the reports. If the concerned authorities keep silent in such matter for such a long time and such delay has caused prejudice to the petitioner in the sense that he had been deprived of the opportunity which the law as contained in Section 13(2) of the Act allowed to him, I think the order of cognizance cannot be allowed to stand. The whole case is based on the question as to whether the iodised salt which was taken from the shop of the petitioner on 14.5.1988 was adulterated or not adulterated if measured with the standard laid down by the provision of the Act and Rules framed thereunder, and it could be conclusively determined only by the report of the Central Food Laboratory, which under the law could be approached by the petitioner for testing the sample of salt with him and he had been deprived of that opportunity because of the delay in sending the public analyst report to the petitioner, who has been definitely prejudiced. 8. So, in this view of the matter, I allow both the petitions and quash the impugned orders dated 7.5.1990 taking cognizance of the offence and directing issue of summons against the petitioner in both the cases.