C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed against an interim order passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 8631 of 1996 on November 8, 1996. ( 2 ) WHEN the above petition was moved by the appellant-original petitioner at pre-execution stage of detention order, the learned single Judge passed an interim order. It was, inter alia, observed :"mr. Nanavati has submitted that the petition is maintainable even before the execution of the detention order. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law that the petitions can be entertained at pre-execution stage. But from the decisions, which have been cited by Mr. Shelat, it appears that the sound judicial policy and the selfimposed restraint which are manifest in the decisions above clearly indicate that such petitions are to be heard only after the proposed detenu, who has rushed to the Court even before the serivce of the detention order, surrenders to the detention order and thereafter the matter may be heard and appropriate orders may be passed in accordance with law. Today is the last working day before the commencement of the Diwali break. I, therefore, deem it appropriate to direct that this case may be listed before the Vacation judge on the 1st day of his sitting, i. e. , 13-11-1996 as per the Notice dated 4-11-1996 issued by the Joint Registrar subject to the condition that the petitioner furnishes the proof that he has already surrendered to the detention order on or before 13-11-1996. Put up on 13-11-1996. " ( 3 ) SHORTLY stated the facts are that it is asserted by the appellant that he is a very reputed businessman and carrying on legal and legitimate business of building construction in the City of Ahmedabad. He is a peace- loving and law-abiding citizen and has a mass followers in the society. He is a social worker and political leader and, in that capacity, he is taking keen interest in various activities of the State. ( 4 ) THE appellant stated that respondent No. 1, Commissioner of Police, ahmedabad City, relying upon three First Information Reports said to have been lodged as early as on May 20, 1996, decided to detain the appellant under the prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereafter referred to as "pasa"), and passed an order of detention. ( 4 ) THE appellant stated that respondent No. 1, Commissioner of Police, ahmedabad City, relying upon three First Information Reports said to have been lodged as early as on May 20, 1996, decided to detain the appellant under the prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereafter referred to as "pasa"), and passed an order of detention. The said order was ex-facie illegal, de hors the act, unlawful and mala fide. The same has been passed at the behest of respondent no. 3, Honourable the Chief Minister of the State, as also respondent No. 4, honourable Cabinet Minister. Since no such action could have been taken under the Act, the appellant was constrained to approach this Court by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. As the case is an exceptional in nature, prior to service of so-called illegal and ultra vires order and execution thereof, he has moved this Court and prayed for following reliefs which are mentioned in paragraph 16 of the petition. The said paragraph reads thus :"16. The petitioner, therefore, prays that : (a) Be pleased to admit this petition; (b) Be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions, by quashing and setting aside the order of detention passed against the petitioner, by respondent No. 1; (c) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to stay the operation, implementation, execution and enforcement of the order of detention passed against the petitioner by the 1st respondent, dated 5-11-1996; (d) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, be pleased to direct the respondents to immediately produce the grounds of detention on the record of this case; (e) Be pleased to grant ex-parte ad-interim relief in terms of paras (c) and (d) herein; (f) Be pleased to pass such other and further orders as may be deemed fit in the interest of justice. "the petition was filed on November 6, 1996. A prayer was made to take up the matter on the same day and notice was issued by the learned single Judge by making it returnable on the next day, i. e. , on November 7, 1996. "the petition was filed on November 6, 1996. A prayer was made to take up the matter on the same day and notice was issued by the learned single Judge by making it returnable on the next day, i. e. , on November 7, 1996. On November 8, 1996, the impugned order was passed by the learned single Judge imposing a condition on the appellant herein, and a direction regarding hearing of the matter was issued "subject to the condition that the petitioner furnishes the proof that he has already surrendered to the detention order". Being aggrieved by that part of the order imposing condition, the present appeal is filed. It is not disputed by and between the parties that the petition is still pending for hearing before the learned single Judge. ( 5 ) WHEN this appeal came up before a Division Bench on November 25, 1996, notice was issued. On Civil Application No. 9715 of 1996, the following order was passed :"notice returnable on 2-12-1996. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. S. N. Shelat with Mr. M. R. Raval, A. P. P. , waives service of notice for respondent No. 1 and 2. Mr. Sanjanwala waives service of notice for respondent No. 3. Mr. Tushar Mehta waives service of notice for respondent No. 4. In the meantime, by consensus, further proceedings of Spl. C. A. No. 8631 of 1996 are stayed. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. S. N. Shelat states before the Court that till the hearing of L. P. A. No. 1375 of 1996, petitioner will not be detained pursuant to the order of detention. Learned Advocate for the petitioner states that petitioner shall remain personally present before this Court on all the dates of hearing of aforesaid l. P. A. " ( 6 ) WE have heard extensively Mr. N. D. Nanavati, learned Senior Advocate, instructed by Mr. V. H. Desai, on behalf of the appellant, Mr. S. N. Shelat, learned additional Advocate General, on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Mr. S. H. Sanjanwala, learned Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 3, and Mr. Tushar mehta, learned Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 4. ( 7 ) MR. Nanavati raised various contentions. He submitted that the learned single judge has committed an error of law in imposing the condition by misreading various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court. Tushar mehta, learned Advocate, on behalf of respondent No. 4. ( 7 ) MR. Nanavati raised various contentions. He submitted that the learned single judge has committed an error of law in imposing the condition by misreading various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court. According to him, had the learned single Judge properly applied the ratio laid down in the case of Additional secretary to the Government of India and Ors. v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and anr. , 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 496, reiterated from time to time in subsequent decisions and followed by this Court, he would not have imposed any condition. According to the learned Counsel, there are certain orders which are discretionary in nature, but it is settled law that if discretion is not exercised on sound judicial principle, exercise of discretion is bad and such an order can be interfered with in Letters Patent Appeal. Drawing our attention to that part of the order where it was observed that "from the decisions which had been cited by the learned Additional Advocate General, the learned single Judge was of the opinion that it was manifest on the basis of the decisions cited at the Bar that such petitions could be heard only after the proposed detenu, who has rushed to the Court even before the service of the detention order, surrenders to the detention order," Mr. Nanavati submitted that no such absolute and unqualified statement of law has been made in any of the decisions of the supreme Court. According to him, on the contrary, the Apex Court has posited that in exceptional cases, even prior to execution of detention order, a petition may lie. The Counsel further submitted that had the learned single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case, not thought it fit to grant the prayer, the matter would have been entirely different and the Division Bench may not interfere with the discretion, but since the exercise of discretion was not proper, this appeal requires consideration. Mr. Nanavati submitted that there is a distinction between "law and order" and "public order" and, by no stretch of imagination, the First Information Reports on which reliance is sought to be placed by the detaining authority would fall within the connotation public order. Mr. Nanavati submitted that there is a distinction between "law and order" and "public order" and, by no stretch of imagination, the First Information Reports on which reliance is sought to be placed by the detaining authority would fall within the connotation public order. Even tempo of life was not disturbed (Vide Ram mohan Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 ). It was also submitted that the appellant cannot be termed as dangerous person as defined in Sec. 2 (c) of the Act. ( 8 ) IT was contended that the order is mala fide. There is malice in fact as well as in law inasmuch as only with a view to satisfy personal vendetta against the appellant that the action has been taken. Though the order has been passed apparently by respondent No. 1, in substance and in reality, it has been passed at the instance of respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Mr. Nanavati submitted that, in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, this is one of the exceptional cases in which the Court may grant relief at this stage prior to service of order of detention at pre-execution stage. First Information Reports which are sought to be relied upon by the first respondent are of May 1996. Again, taking face value of those First Information reports, no reasonable man would arrive at satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the first respondent. The so-called subjective satisfaction is arbitrary, irrational and in the eye of law it cannot be said to be satisfaction at all. ( 9 ) MR. Nanavati stated that as per the order of the Division Bench dated november 25, 1996, the appellant was present before the Division Bench earlier when the matter was called out and even today he is present. This is, therefore, not a case in which a person against whom an order of detention is passed has absconded or is likely to abscond or tries to avoid service of order or does not want to proceed with the matter. He is ready and willing to abide by any condition imposed on him. In fact, such a statement was made before the learned single Judge. Even today the appellant is prepared to abide by any condition. ( 10 ) MR. Nanavati further submitted that the petitioner is a social and political worker. He is ready and willing to abide by any condition imposed on him. In fact, such a statement was made before the learned single Judge. Even today the appellant is prepared to abide by any condition. ( 10 ) MR. Nanavati further submitted that the petitioner is a social and political worker. If drastic power of detention is indiscriminately exercised with a view to punishing and penalising political rivals and if this Court does not grant relief in such cases, ultimate oblique motive sought to be achieved by the party in power would be achieved. It is indeed an empty solace when a person detained and kept under illegal detention is released after a long lapse of time holding his detention as unlawful. ( 11 ) IT was also submitted that if the condition which is imposed by the learned single Judge is complied with, the petition will become infructuous. Since the appellant wanted the relief at pre-execution stage he had approached this Court before the order was executed. By imposing a condition to surrender, the learned single judge has virtually dismissed the petition. If the order is executed and the appellant is detained, it is always open to him to file a petition. ( 12 ) THERE was unholy haste, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant, in passing the impugned order of detention by detaining authority. For that purpose, reliance was placed on an important fact that respondent No. 3 took over as the chief Minister on October 23, 1996, whereas respondent No. 4 became a Cabinet minister on November 2, 1996. Immediately thereafter the impugned order of detention was passed by the first respondent on November 5, 1996 within a short span of three days. ( 13 ) IT was contended that there is total non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority as there is nothing on record to show as to what weighed with him in making an order of detention. Mr. Nanavati wondered as to why such serious action was taken by the detaining authority. It is really surprising that, when the appellant has come before this Court contending that there is no earthly reason to detain him, instead of producing the order of detention or placing on record the grounds of detention, an affidavit is filed taking preliminary objection as to maintainability of the petition. It is really surprising that, when the appellant has come before this Court contending that there is no earthly reason to detain him, instead of producing the order of detention or placing on record the grounds of detention, an affidavit is filed taking preliminary objection as to maintainability of the petition. According to him, it would have been appropriate, had the detaining authority pointed out the circumstances for passing the order. He stated that the petitioner does not want an order of detention or grounds thereof at this stage, but in the society governed by rule of law, it is incumbent on the authority to satisfy the conscience of the Court as to why an order of detention was required to be passed. ( 14 ) MR. S. N. Shelat, learned Additional Advocate General, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the learned single Judge. A preliminary contention was raised that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge cannot be said to be a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, hence, Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable. He also submitted that against a discretionary order, no appeal would lie and this Court may not entertain the appeal at this stage. ( 15 ) ON merits, it was argued that, even if appeal is maintainable, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the discretion has been exercised unreasonably or the order is otherwise perverse or requires interference by the appellate Court. Relying upon various decisions, it was contended that as a normal rule, the detenu must accept the order of detention. Only after he surrenders to such an order that the Court will hear his grievances. It was submitted that in a number of cases, when the detenu had not surrendered, even though orders were challenged, the Courts have refused to entertain petitions on the ground that first the detenu surrender to custody and thereafter he could proceed with the matters. Regarding non-application of mind, mala fide exercise of power or subjective satisfaction being vitiated on non-existent or vague grounds, Mr. Shelat submitted that such contentions can be considered by a Court in light of the order and grounds mentioned by the detaining authority, which weighed with him in taking the action. Regarding non-application of mind, mala fide exercise of power or subjective satisfaction being vitiated on non-existent or vague grounds, Mr. Shelat submitted that such contentions can be considered by a Court in light of the order and grounds mentioned by the detaining authority, which weighed with him in taking the action. At this stage, the detaining authority is not expected to justify the order and the grounds in support thereof when the order is not before the Court. According to him, satisfaction is not the satisfaction of the Court but subjective satisfaction of detaining authority. The High Court is not acting as a Court of appeal and cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the authority. Only on limited grounds, such orders are open to judicial scrutiny. It is, therefore, not open to the petitioner to contend that, though he has not accepted the order and the grounds in support of the order of detention, he can approach the Court at this stage, can make a request to the Court and the court will direct the detaining authority to produce the order along with the grounds and satisfy as to whether subjective satisfaction was vitiated on any ground. He, therefore, submitted that the order passed by the learned single Judge does not require any interference and Letters Patent Appeal is required to be dismissed. ( 16 ) WITHOUT expressing final opinion as to maintainability or otherwise of a letters Patent Appeal, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that no case is made out to interfere with the order passed by the learned single judge. It is not disputed that till today the appellant has not accepted the order of detention nor the grounds in support of such order. Therefore, the Court, as on today, is not aware of the grounds in support of detention. In absence of an order of detention and grounds of detention, the learned single Judge thought it fit to pass an order imposing condition to surrender. Short question before us is as to whether such discretionary order can be said to be illegal, contrary to law or otherwise unlawful requiring interference by the Division Bench. ( 17 ) NOW, it cannot be gainsaid that a petition is maintainable even at preexecution stage. Short question before us is as to whether such discretionary order can be said to be illegal, contrary to law or otherwise unlawful requiring interference by the Division Bench. ( 17 ) NOW, it cannot be gainsaid that a petition is maintainable even at preexecution stage. At the same time, however, looking to various decisions of the apex Court as well as of this Court, we are of the view that normal rule, which the learned single Judge has read from those decisions is that the Court would hear such petition against order of detention after the order is passed and the detenu surrenders to custody. Strong objection was taken against the order passed by the learned single judge when it was observed that "such petitions could be heard only after the proposed detenu, who has rushed, to the Court even before the service of the detention order, surrenders to the detention order". Without entering into larger question, in our opinion, when the learned single Judge has exercised discretion that the petition may be listed for hearing subject to the condition that the appellant furnishes proof that he has surrendered to the detention order, it cannot be said that there is illegal exercise of discretionary power on his part. ( 18 ) IN this connection, both the sides placed reliance on the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra ). The Supreme Court observed that while Courts power of review under Art. 226 is untrammelled it is guided by self-imposed restrictions. It generally defers its power of review till arrest of the proposed detenu and exercises its discretionary power at pre-arrest stage only in exceptional cases on limited grounds. Those limited grounds have been enumerated in paragraph 30 of the decision, and they are as under :" (I) That the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed; (ii) That it is sought to be executed against a wrong person; (iii) That it is passed for a wrong purpose; (iv) That it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds; or (v) That the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. " ( 19 ) IN Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himingliana, 1994 (6) SCC 14 , again the Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in Alka Subhash Gadia (supra), and observed that five contingencies mentioned therein or other contingencies of the same species can be taken into account by a Court of law while entertaining a petition at pre-execution stage. ( 20 ) NO doubt, Mr. Nanavati is right in submitting that, in those cases, it was observed in the judgments that the detenu had either avoided service of order or was absconding or could not be traced. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel, the appellant was very much there when the Letters Patent Appeal was heard at the admission stage, was also present thereafter when the appeal was taken up for hearing. The Counsel attempted to argue that those observations were made in light of the facts before the Court. Had the detenu not avoided service of order, in all probability, the Court might have entertained petitions. In our opinion, however, principle has clearly been laid down and the principle is that in exceptional circumstances, as enumerated in Alka Subhash Gadia (supra), and reiterated in subhash Muljimal Gandhi (supra), a Court of law may entertain a petition at preexecution stage. The instant case was not one of those cases according to the learned single Judge and, in our considered opinion, it cannot be said that, by not treating this case to be of an exceptional character, the learned single Judge has committed an error of law, which requires interference by the appellate Court. . ( 21 ) WITH regard to the averments of mala fide and colourable exercise of power, in our opinion, the Supreme Court made it clear in Alka Subhash Gadia (supra) that such questions can be decided at the time of hearing of petition. In paragraphs 31 and 32, the Court stated :"31. Lastly, it is always open for the detenu or anyone on his behalf to challenge the detention order by way of habeas corpus petition on any of the grounds available to him. It is not, therefore, correct to say that no judicial review of the detention order is available. In paragraphs 31 and 32, the Court stated :"31. Lastly, it is always open for the detenu or anyone on his behalf to challenge the detention order by way of habeas corpus petition on any of the grounds available to him. It is not, therefore, correct to say that no judicial review of the detention order is available. In the view we are taking which applies also to the cases under other laws, the stage at which the judicial review is made by the Court only stands deferred till after the order is executed. A ground on which a detention order is challenged which requires investigation and cannot be adjudicated without hearing the other side and without proper material, has necessarily to await decision till the final hearing. In such cases the operation of the order of detention by its very nature cannot be stayed pending the final out come. The only proper course in such cases is to hear the petition as expeditiously as possible. 32. This still leaves open the question as to whether the detenu is entitled to the order of detention prior to its execution at least to verify whether it can be challenged at its pre-execution stage on the limited grounds available. In view of the discussion aforesaid, the answer to this question has to be firmly in the negative for various reasons. In the first instance, as stated earlier, the Constitution and the valid law made thereunder do not make any provision for the same. On the other hand, they permit the arrest and detention of a person without furnishing to the detenu the order and the grounds thereof in advance. Secondly, when the order and the grounds are served and the detenu is in a position to make out prima facie the limited grounds on which they can be successfully challenged, the Courts, as pointed out earlier, have power even to grant bail to the detenu pending the final hearing of his petition. Alternatively, as stated earlier, the Court can and does hear such petition expeditiously to give the necessary relief to the detenu. Alternatively, as stated earlier, the Court can and does hear such petition expeditiously to give the necessary relief to the detenu. Thirdly, in the rare cases where the detenu, before being served with them, learns of the detention order and the grounds on which it is made, and satisfies the Court of their existence by proper affirmation, the Court does not decline to entertain the writ petition even at the pre-execution stage, of course, on the very limited grounds stated above. The Court no doubt even in such cases is not obliged to interfere with the impugned order at that stage and may insist that the detenu should first submit to it. It will, however, depend on the facts of each case. The decisions and the orders cited above show that in some genuine cases, the Courts have exercised their powers at the pre-execution stage, though such cases have been rare. This only emphasises the fact that the Courts have power to interfere with the detention orders even at the pre-execution stage but they are not obliged to do so nor will it be proper for them to do so save in exceptional cases. Much less can a detenu claim such exercise of power as a matter of right. The discretion is of the Court and it has to be exercised judicially on well settled principles. "in the instant case, serious allegations of mala fide have been levelled against the detaining authority as also against respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The detaining authority and respondent No. 3 have filed affidavits controverting those allegations. We may hasten to add that we are not expressing any opinion one way or other as the matter is pending before the learned single Judge, but, in light of these facts, when the learned single Judge has imposed the condition, it cannot be said that he has committed any illegality or the order is otherwise bad in law. ( 22 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in any of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant and the appeal is required to be dismissed and, accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. ( 22 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in any of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant and the appeal is required to be dismissed and, accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We may make it clear that all the observations made by us hereinabove have been made only for deciding this letters Patent Appeal and we should not be understood to have stated anything on merits and the learned single Judge will decide the petition in accordance with law on its own merits without being influenced by those observations. ( 23 ) LEARNED Counsel Mr. Nanavati at this stage, requests to extend time to surrender to the detention order by the appellant. Mr. S. N. Shelat, learned additional Advocate General, opposes such prayer. ( 24 ) IN view of the order passed by a Division Bench earlier on November 25, 1996, we pass the following order. ORDER direction regarding surrender by the appellant will not be implemented till december 22, 1996, and the appellant will not be taken under detention till then on appellant giving an undertaking to surrender to detention order on December 22, 1996, if by that time he does not obtain interim relief from a superior Court. The appellant will file such undertaking on or before December 10, 1996. A copy of the undertaking to be given to the learned Additional Advocate General and to assistant Government Pleader. Appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. .