H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal filed under order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the interim order dated 15-9-1993 passed on la. Viii (interim application) which had been filed by the plaintiff-respondent in original suit No. 1071 of 1989. ( 2 ) THAT, application la. Viii has been made with a prayer that the court would be pleased to direct the defendant No. 5, Karnataka wakf board, to withdraw its order No. Ktw/msc/9/bnu/93-94 and to commit the chairman and the secretary of the karnataka wakf board to civil prison for six months which is necessary in the interest of justice. The photostat copy of the order shows that the order was made on 13-9-1993, but it appears that it was placed before the court on 15-9-1993. On 15-9-1993, the court passed the following order :"heard the Advocate for plaintiff and Advocate for defendant 5, pending hearing of la. , the 5th defendant is directed not to implement the order ktw/mss/9/bnil/93-94. Call on 30-9 sd/-15/9". ( 3 ) ONE of the grievances of the learned counsel for the appellant Sri Basavaraj V. Sabrad is That This Order is passed without any enquiry and without giving any opportunity to the appellant's counsel to file any objections. The learned counsel for the present appellant namely the learned counsel for defendant No. 5 could not file objections before the passing the order. The learned counsel for the appellant raised the question of jurisdiction and non-maintainability of the application and urged that the application has been made under order 39, Rule 2-a and such an order cannot be passed under order 39, Rule 2-a. Certain other contentions were also made which are not necessary to be referred. ( 4 ) THE contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellant have been contested by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2, Sri seshagiri rao. He submitted that mentioning of wrong Provisions, even if any, will not make the application non-maintainable. He submitted that the application has been made under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with order 39. No doubt order 39, Rule 2-a has been referred, but the purport of that was that no interference be made with the appellant i. e. , present respondent's possession during the pendency of the suit. He submitted that the application has been made under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with order 39. No doubt order 39, Rule 2-a has been referred, but the purport of that was that no interference be made with the appellant i. e. , present respondent's possession during the pendency of the suit. He contended that the court had jurisdiction to entertain it. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that it is wrong to say that the matter was unrelated to the matter in dispute and it is wrongly contended as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the application for interim relief was unconnected with the property in dispute or with the relief claimed in the suit. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the counsel for the opposite party was heard and no doubt, that the order was passed on same day and that it does not appear form the order that the court gave an opportunity to the party to file any objection. But, he further submitted that, it was the duty of the counsel appearing for defendant No. 5 to have sought the time for filing the objections. This suggestion of the learned counsel for the respondents was controverted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the time was sought for, but was not granted. ( 5 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. Firstly it is pointed out that the copy of the application, that has been placed before me reveals that the application has been made under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with order 39, Rule 2-a. Without observing whether right provision has been mentioned or not. I may observe that the mentioning of wrong provision will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to pass the order nor will an order be illegal or without jurisdiction on this basis. See l. Hazari Malkuthiala v Income-tax Officer, special circle, ambala cantt. And another and Loknath and Company v Commissioner of Wealth tax. I may observe that the mentioning of wrong provision will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to pass the order nor will an order be illegal or without jurisdiction on this basis. See l. Hazari Malkuthiala v Income-tax Officer, special circle, ambala cantt. And another and Loknath and Company v Commissioner of Wealth tax. Even if for a moment if it be taken that the Provisions under the code and the order 39, Rule 2-a does not apply, but the interest of Justice requires certain order to be passed, then in the interest of Justice and to avoid the abuse of the process of the court, the court has got inherent powers to pass suitable orders and the powers under Section 151 in that regard cannot be said to be adversely affected in any manner by any provision of the code particularly when Section 151 provides in clear terms that, "nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of Justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court". This Section 151 is declarative of the inherent powers which are vested in every court of law. Section 151 does not by itself confers the inherent powers instead it declares that the inherent powers are vested in every court of civil jurisdiction to pass orders which are necessary for the ends of Justice as well as for preventing the abuse of the court. Section 151 only declares that no provision of the code should be taken or should be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court. When I so observe, I find support for this view from the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the Case of Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal. Their lordships, after having referred Section 151, observed in paragraph No. 2 as under:"section 151 itself says that nothing in the code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the Provisions of the code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the Provisions of the code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the court; it is a power inherent in the court by virtue of its duty to do Justice between the parties before it. Further, when the code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the code". ( 6 ) IN the present case, a perusal of the order indicates that the order dated 15-9-1993 had been passed as an interim order pending hearing of the interim application and the court had fixed 30-9-1993 for that purpose. The appellant's case is that he had already filed objections to that application, but in addition he has filed the appeal in this court. The learned counsel states that the objections filed are still pending disposal. When the objections have been filed, it would have been proper for the present appellant to have pursued the objections and should have got those objections disposed of expeditiously. As the order was only pending hearing of i. a. , la. Viii had to be finally disposed off and the order dated 15-9-1993 is only an interim order. It is open to the appellant to press those objections after placing all the necessary facts he wants to place before the court and it is expected la. Viii along with objections will be disposed off expeditiously. As the objections had already been filed before filing this appeal and the applicant had already opted for one-recourse, the present appeal was misconceived. When two remedies are available against an interim order and the party opts for one course, then the other course is closed. It was proper for him that after the objections would have been disposed of and if he felt aggrieved, he could have filed the appeal. The present appeal, in this view of the matter, appears to be misconceived though it had been kept pending for almost three years and the appellant enjoyed the benefit of interim order granted by this court. The appeal is hereby dismissed as misconceived as it is not maintainable as the objections had been preferred earlier to the filing of the appeal. The appeal is hereby dismissed as misconceived as it is not maintainable as the objections had been preferred earlier to the filing of the appeal. With these observations, this appeal is hereby dismissed as misconceived and non-maintainable. The order impugned shall operate but subject to an other final order that may be passed by the trial court on la. Viii after considering and disposing of the objections filed by the appellant. The court below is expected and directed to expeditiously dispose of la. Viii after hearing the parties as well as after considering the objections whatsoever that have been filed. The application had been filed during the year 1993. Let it be disposed within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. --- *** --- .