Judgment A.K. Ganguly, J. These seven writ petitions were heard analogously as common questions of law are involved. There are, however, certain factual differences in 'respect of these matters and the same will be pointed out while dealing with them separately in this judgment. In all these writ petitions proceedings initiated under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeitures of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the SAFEMA) have been challenged. 2. Before dealing with the specific Challenge to the proceedings initiated under the said Act, certain salient features of the said Act and the nature of the proceedings initiated and the legal questions involved therein are considered by this Court. 3. SAFEMA being Act No. 13 of 1976 was promulgated to provide for the forfeiture of illegally acquired properties of Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The preamble to SAFEMA explains the purpose behind the enactment as follows :- "An Act to provide for the foreiture of illegally acquired properties of smugglers and foreign exchange manipulators and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. WHEREAS for the effective prevention of smuggling activities and foreign exchange manipulations which are having a deleterious effect on the national economy it is necessary to deprive persons engaged in such activities and manipulations of their ill-gotten gains; AND WHEREAS such persons have been augmenting such gains by violations of wealth tax, income-tax or other laws or by other means and have thereby been increasing their resources for operating - in a clandestine manner. AND WHEREAS such persons have in many cases been holding the properties acquired by them through such gains in the names of their relatives, associates and confidants ;" 4. It is clear from the Preamble, set out above, that SAFEMA is a Special Legislative device for curbing certain economic offences and dealing with the offenders who are acting against the interest of the national economy 5. In 1978 when all these writ petitions were filed, the petitions contained averments challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter called the COFEPOSA for short) as also questioning the constitutional validity of SAFEMA. 6. In 1978 when all these writ petitions were filed, the petitions contained averments challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter called the COFEPOSA for short) as also questioning the constitutional validity of SAFEMA. 6. Since as a result of constitutional amendments both the aforesaid Acts were included in the 9th Schedule Vide Entry 104 and 127 respectively, no argument on the questions relating to constitutional validity of those two Acts were advanced before me in the course of hearing. 7. Apart from that it appears that this batch of writ petitions, after their admission, were transferred to the Supreme Court where various legal questions about the validity of the SAFEMA including the scope and ambit of the various provisions of SAEEMA were considered by a Constitution Bench considering of nine learned Judges and after the said Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered in the case of Attorney General for India Vs. Amratlal Prajivandas reported in AIR 1994 S.C. page 2179, the matters were again put up for hearing before this Court. A learned Judge of this Court by an order dated 14th July, 1995 dismissed all these writ petitions in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General (Supra) without deciding the writ petitions on merits. 8. Against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, Special Leave Petition was again filed before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court after hearing the said appeal was pleased to remand the writ petitions-for hearing in accordance with law and in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court virtually set aside the order of the learned Single Judge by passing the following Order. "The grievance of the applicant is that the Patna High Court has not correctly appreciated the purport of the judgment of the 9-Judge Bench of this Court in Attorney General of India and Ors Vs. Ramnik Lal Jadav Ji & Ors. The said judgment was rendered in a batch of matters which included writ petitions, transfer petitions and some-Special Leave Petitions. They were all disposed at in the following terms-"All the writ petitions, transferred cases and appeals are disposed of accordingly. Ramnik Lal Jadav Ji & Ors. The said judgment was rendered in a batch of matters which included writ petitions, transfer petitions and some-Special Leave Petitions. They were all disposed at in the following terms-"All the writ petitions, transferred cases and appeals are disposed of accordingly. The court and authorities before whom proceedings are pep ding under SAFEMA shall proceed to dispose them of in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. It is in the interest of all concerned that the proceedings are 'concluded with all deliberate speed.' It was specifically directed that the court and the authorities before whom proceedings are pending under SAFEMA shall proceed to dispose them of in accordance with law and in the light of the said Judgment. Once the transferred cases are disposed of in the above terms, they go back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with the said judgment. The High Court may, therefore, take up the writ petitions and dispose them of in the light of the judgment of this Court. The order of the High Court, dated 14-7-1995, which is complained of herein, shall not stand in the way of such fresh disposal. The Interlocutory Application is disposed of accordingly." 9. These writ petitions have now come before this Court for hearing on merits. As the Supreme Court has made it clear by its order, quoted above, that these writ petitions are to be heard in the light of the observations made in the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Attorned General (Supra), this Court finds that the following questions are now settled in view of the aforesaid constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Attorney General (Supra). Those questions are enumerated below ;- (i) SAFEMA is a valid piece of legislation The Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General (Supra) held that apart from the protection which was given to the SAFEMA as a result of its inclusion in the 9th Schedule, the provisions of SAFEMA are not violative of either Articles 14, 19 or 21 of the Constitution. (ii) The Supreme Court also held in its judgment in Attolney General (Supra) that SAFEMA may not be a law relating to preventive detention but it is designed to achieve the very same objective by different means”. (ii) The Supreme Court also held in its judgment in Attolney General (Supra) that SAFEMA may not be a law relating to preventive detention but it is designed to achieve the very same objective by different means”. While COFEPOSA seeks to deter the person concerned by means of preventive detention, SAFEMA seeks to punish them by depriving them of their illgotten gains. SAFEMA is thus a measure "designed to protect the economy of the country as also a measure to discourage the law breaking-in particular economic violation". While dealing with the provisions of the SAFEMA elaborately, in paragraph 15 of its judgment in Attorney General for India (Supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that section 2 of the SAFEMA specifies the person to whom the SAFEMA applies and it has been stated that there are. (iii) Five categories of persons to whom SAFEMA applies. In the first category fails the persons convicted under Sea Customs Act, 1878 or Customs Act, 1962 of an offence in relation to goods of a value exceeding one lakh of rupees. The said requirement of value is not attracted in relation to second or subsequent conviction. Within the first category also falls persons convicted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 or Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, the amount of which exceeds rupees one lakh. The said requirement of one lakh does not apply in the second or subsequent conviction. (b) The second category of persons comprises of those in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the COFEPOSA but which order was not revoked or set aside in any of the situation enumerated in the four sub-clauses of the proviso to Section 2 (2) (b) of SAFEMA. (c) The third category of persons to whom SAFEMA applies are relatives of persons referred to in the first category and the second category. (d) The fourth category of persons consist of associates of the persons referred to in the first category and second category. (c) The fifth category of persons consists of holders of such property which was previously held by a person in the first category or in the second category unless such holder of properties proves that he is a transferee in good faith and for valuable consideration. (iv) Some explanations have been added to Section 2 of SAFEMA defining the word "relative" and "associate". (iv) Some explanations have been added to Section 2 of SAFEMA defining the word "relative" and "associate". It goes without saying that both the explanations added to the words "relatives" and "associates" are given in very wide terms. 10. After the definitions clause, and clause relating to application of SAFEMA, as stated above, from section 6 onwards of SAFEMA starts the adjudicatory provisions of the Act. Section 6 provides for issuance of a notice of forfeiture by the competent authority before such competent authority actually forfeits the property under section 7 of the SAFEMA. Under section 7 of SAFEMA provisions have been given for passing a final order for the forfeiture of the property in respect of which show cause notice has been issued under section 6 of SAFEMA. Section 12 of the SAFEMA provides for the constitution of the appellate tribunal which shall hear the appeal from an order passed under section 7 of SAFEMA as also under sections 9 and 10 of the SAFEMA. The Appellate Tribunal shall, of course, be headed by a Chairman who is or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court. The competent authority and the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, has been empowered to amend any order made by it ,within a period of one year from the date of the order if there are any mistake apparent from the record in the order. 11. The other significant features of the said Act are that no finding of any Officer or authority under any other law shall be conclusive for the purpose of any proceeding under the said Act. This has been provided under section 21 of the said Act. Section 24 of the SAFEMA gives the said Act an over riding effect over any other law for the time being in force. 12. It is, however, clear from the provisions of the said Act that the adjudicatory provisions under the said Act provide for full fledged quasi judicial proceedings before Tribunals which have all the trappings of a Court and both the competent authority and the appel1ate tribunal shall have the usual powers of a civil court while functioning as a quasi-judicial bodies. It is, however, clear from the provisions of the said Act that the adjudicatory provisions under the said Act provide for full fledged quasi judicial proceedings before Tribunals which have all the trappings of a Court and both the competent authority and the appel1ate tribunal shall have the usual powers of a civil court while functioning as a quasi-judicial bodies. The said Act has certain other important features, namely, that under section 8 of the SAFEMA, the burden of proof to show that the property is not an illegally acquired property is on the person who is proceeded against. 13. The Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General (Supra) while upholding the wide definition given to "illegally acquired property" under section 3 (a) (c) of the said Act has held that the provisions of the SAFEMA are not un-reasonable or arbitrary apart from the protection given to it under section 31 (b) of the said Act. So the Supreme Court refused to read down any provision of the SAFEMA. The' learned Judges of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Attorney General (Supra) held that definition of "illegally acquired property" in clause (c) of Section 3 (1) of the SAFEMA cannot be read down to confine it to mere cases of violation of the SAFEMA referred to in Section 2 (2) (a) thereof. 14. While coming to the said conclusion the learned Judges of the Constitution Bench observed that violation of Foreign Exchange Laws and Laws relating to Import and Export necessarily involves tax laws. Their Lordships also noted that over the last few decades smuggling, foreign exchange violation, Tax Evasion, Drugs and Crimes have all got mixed up. Evasion of tax is an integral part of such activities. Therefore, their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the following conclusion at page 2203 of the report ;- "In would be difficult for any authority to say, in the absence of any accounts or other relevant materials that among the property acquired by a smuggler, which of them or which portions of them are attributable to smuggling and foreign exchange violations and which properties or which portions thereof are attributable to violation of other laws (which the Parliament has the power to make). It is probably for this reason that the burden of proving that the properties specified in the show cause notice are not illegally acquired properties is placed upon the person concerned. May be this is a case where a dangerous disease required a radical treatment. Bitter medicine is not bad medicine. In law it is not possible to say that the definition is arbitrary or is coud1ed in un-reasonably wide terms. Further, in view of clear and unambiguous language employed in clause (c) of S.3, it is not possible or permissible to resort to the device of reading down. The said device is usually resorted to save a provision from being declare unconstitutional, incompetent and ultra vires. We are therefore, of the opinion that neither the constitutional validity of the said definition can be questioned nor is there any warrant for reading down the clear and unambiguous words in the clause. So far as justification of such a provision is concerned, there is enough and more, After all, these illegally acquired properties are earned and acquired in ways illegal and corrupt -at the cost of the people and the State. The State is deprived of its legitimate revenue to that extent. These properties must justly go back where they belong-to the State. What we are saying is nothing new or heretical." 15. This Court is of the view that the aforesaid conclusion of the Supreme Court constitutes the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Attorney General (Supra) in so far as it relates to the interpretation of the SAFEMA. 16. Subsequently also while dealing with the question of power of the Court in order to prevent undue enrichment of persons indulging in fraud, the Supreme Court in the Case of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Limited and another reported in (1996) 4 S.C.C. page 622 affirmed the aforesaid principles enumerated in Attorney General (Supra). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority (Supra) observed that the crying necessity in the present state of our society is that once it is proved that the holders of the property have indulged incorrupt act all such properties should be attached forthwith. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority (Supra) observed that the crying necessity in the present state of our society is that once it is proved that the holders of the property have indulged incorrupt act all such properties should be attached forthwith. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority (Supra) further held that the law should place the burded of proving that such properties were not acquired with the aid of tainted money on the persons who are proceeded against. In Delhi Development Authority (Supra) it was further held that such a law like SAFEMA is an absolute necessity if' the canker of corruption is not to prove the death knell of this nation." In Development Authority Supra) it was also observed that absence of any law like the present Act (SAFEMA) will not deter the Supreme Court from passing necessary orders for attaching the property of a person who is defrauding others in view of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. In view of their Lordships, that is what is required by equity and their Lordships held that the Court in India are not only Court of law but are also Courts of equity. 17. Again in the of Shangrilla Food Products Limited Vs. L.I.C. reported in (1996) 5 S.C.C. page 54 the Apex Court held that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is to be exercised keeping the principles of equity in mind. In the same decision, the Apex Court also clarified that one of the ends of equity is to promote honesty and fair play. 18. In the course of hearing, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners relied on several judgments in connection with adjudication proceedings under the Income tax Act and some under the provisions of Sales-tax Act. "But this Court is of the view that reliance on those judgments under Income-tax Act and Sales-tax Act are not of much relevance in deciding the correctness of the decision making process in this Act for the reasons discussed below: SAFEMA and the Income-tax Act have been enacted to achieve completely different purposes. Income-tax Act is a general law applicable to people in general. Income-tax Act is a general law applicable to people in general. So the burden under the Income-tax Law is on the revenue authorities to show that a particular receipt constitutes income and further to show that such income is liable to tax under the Income-tax Act. This onus does not shift except when the assessee claims an exemption from taxation in respect of an income. But the SAFEMA is a Special legislative device to provide for the forfeiture of illegally acquired property of smugglers and foreign exchange manipulatoars. From the preamble of the Act, it is clear that the said law is addressed to the aforesaid class of persons who have been increasing their resources and augmenting the same by violations of Wealth Tax, Income-tax and other laws. Therefore, the legislature, in its wisdom, thought that the provisions of those general laws are inadequate to tackle the menace created by such group of people and enacted this special law which has many special features. 19. Such special features are (i) the shifting of burden of proof on the person proceeded against (Section 8), (ii) the power of the competent authority to require the officers and authority of the Central and State Government to furnish such information in respect of persons, points or matters as are considered relevant by the competent authority to any enquiry under the Act (Section 16), (iii). The assistance to be given by various Officers exercising statutory functions under various Jaws such as Customs Act, Central Excise Laws, Income-tax Act, FERA and also Police Officers to the competent authority (Section 17), (iv) The powers of the competent authority to initiate or conduct any enquiry, investigation, survey and for that purpose the competent authority may require any Officer of the Income-tax Department to conduct or cause to be conducted such an enquiry and for this purpose the Officer conducting such enquiry may exercise any power which he may exercise under the Income-tax Act (Section 18), (v) Sweeping powers have been given to the competent authority to take possession of a forfeited property (Section 19), (vi) Finding under any other Jaws is not considered conclusive in a proceeding under this Act (Section 21), (vii) The Act has been given an over riding effect over any other law in force (Section 24). 20. 20. It is clear from the scheme of the said Act that Officers exercising statutory functions under various acts dealing with taxation-both direct and indirect, are to work in aid of the authorities under the said Act. The said Act has certain portions which are penal in nature but even then the same has been given retrospective operation. However, the SAFEMA having been upheld by the nine Judge Constitution Beach of the Supreme Court in Attorney General (Supra) and apart from its enjoying the protection of the Ninth Schedule, no argument was understandably advanced before this Court about the validity of the said Act. 20-A. Therefore the principal query in adjudication proceeding under the said Act in respect of 'the illegally acquired property' is about the legitimacy of source of acquisition of such property and the nexus between such acquisition and 'every person' mentioned in section 2(2) of the SAFEMA and also the relative and associate of such person. 21. Designedly very wide definition and import of "illegally acquired property", 'every person' 'relative' and 'associate' have been given under the said Act. Such clear legislative mandate cannot be whittled down by an interpretative process by this Court nor can the width and amplitude of such provisions be undermined by this Court by holding that adjudicating authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial functions are bound by standards and parameters followed while adjudicating cases of tax evasion or income escaping assessment under various fiscal laws. 22. SAFEMA has undoubtedly certain coercive measures but in Attorney General (Supra the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court upheld the same as a 'bitter pill' which is a social measure having regard to the felt necessities of time. 3. Keeping those principles as decided by the Supreme Court in Attorney General (Supra) in view this Court proceeds to deal with the cases separately. 24. C.W.J.C. Nos. 2843 of 1978, 2844 of 1978 and 2821 of 1971 are inter-related inasmuch as C.W.J.C. No. 2844 of 1978 relates to Pushkar Lal Banka, C.W.J.C. No. 2843 of 1978 relates to Rang Lal Banka, father of Pushkar Lal Banka and CWJC No. 2821 of 1978 relates to Smt. Sita Devi wife of Pushkar Lal Banka. 24. C.W.J.C. Nos. 2843 of 1978, 2844 of 1978 and 2821 of 1971 are inter-related inasmuch as C.W.J.C. No. 2844 of 1978 relates to Pushkar Lal Banka, C.W.J.C. No. 2843 of 1978 relates to Rang Lal Banka, father of Pushkar Lal Banka and CWJC No. 2821 of 1978 relates to Smt. Sita Devi wife of Pushkar Lal Banka. Out of these three persons Pushkar Lal Banka was detained under COFEPOSA and the other two persons, namely, Ranglal Banka and Sita Devi have been brought under the purview of the provisions of the SAFEMA as relatives of Pushkar Lal Banka. Against Pushkar Lal Banka, the order of detention dated 19th December, 1974 was issued. It appears that the said order of detention against Pushkar Lal Banka was not quashed by this Court even though the same was challenged. By an order dated 21st March, 1975, the writ petition filed by Pushkar Lal Banka against his detention order was dismissed. Thereupon on 21.3.1975, the Division Bench of this Court granted, on the oral prayer of the petitioner, a certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India. Then the appeal which was filed before the Supreme Court was numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1975 but the said appeal was disposed of as anfractuous in view of the fact that Pushkar Lal Banka was released from detention. This appears from the order dated 6th April, 1981 passed by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1975. Therefore, petitioner Pushkar Lal Banka is a person to whom the SAFEMA can be applied. 25. Pushkar Lal Banka received a notice under section 6 (1) of the SAFEMA in which he was asked to explain the source of investment of item Nos. 1 to 5 of the Schedule annexed to the said show cause notice. To that he sent a reply on 27th October, 1977 by registered post and the date of hearing was fixed and the case was 18th November, 1977 and 21st November, 1977 by the competent authority. Thereafter on 28th December, 1977 he received the order of the competent authority under section 7 (1) of the said Act. To that he sent a reply on 27th October, 1977 by registered post and the date of hearing was fixed and the case was 18th November, 1977 and 21st November, 1977 by the competent authority. Thereafter on 28th December, 1977 he received the order of the competent authority under section 7 (1) of the said Act. By the said order, the competent authority came to the conclusion that item No.2 in the Schedule to the notice under section 6 of the Act, namely, a loan of Rs.20,000/- given by Pushkar Lal Banka to Smt. Sita Devi, petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2821 of 1978 was illegally acquired property and the competent authority declared that the said amount stands forfeited to the Central Government. Against the said order, Pushkar Lal Banka preferred an appeal under section 12 of the SAFEMA and the Tribunal by its order 11th May, 1978 affirmed the order of the competent authority regarding the forfeiture of the amount of loan of Rs.20,000/given by petitioner Pushkar Lal to his wife Smt. Sita Devi. 26. So far as the case of Rang Lal Banka, since deceased petitioner in CWJC No. 2843 of 1978 is concerned, this Court by an order dated 18th September, 1996 allowed the substitution petition filed by the heirs of Rang Lal Banka to substitute him by his heirs which the mentioned in paragraph 3 of the substitution petition Rang Lal, since deceased, was substituted by his son Pushkar Lal Banka. 27. In so far as Rang Lal Banka is concerned, in his case also a notice dated 29th October, 1976 under section 6 (1) of the SAFBMA was issued by the competent authority. To the said notice certain schedule of property was annexed which to the competent authority, prima facie, appeared to be illegally acquired property of Rang Lal, since deceased the said Schedule of property is set out below :- The Schedule Description of the Names of the present holder Property. of property. 1. Investment of Rang Sri Rang LaI Banka. Lal Banka in the firm Stainless Emporium, Motijheel, Muzaffarpur. 2. Credil balance in the -do- account of Ranglal Banka with Bharat Glass Company, Saraiyaganj, Muzaffarpur. 28. of property. 1. Investment of Rang Sri Rang LaI Banka. Lal Banka in the firm Stainless Emporium, Motijheel, Muzaffarpur. 2. Credil balance in the -do- account of Ranglal Banka with Bharat Glass Company, Saraiyaganj, Muzaffarpur. 28. To the said show cause notice, Rang Lal, since deceased, gave a reply and the matter was adjudicated by the competent authority and an order was passed to the following effect, the relevant portions of which are set out below :- "I have already stated above that Rangalal Banka was never assessed to Income-tax. His only source of income from 1967 to 1974 was 30% share in the Profits of the partnership firm M/s. Stainless Emporium, Muzaffarpur, Bihar. He became a partner in this firm on 18-8-1967 with a capital contribution of Rs.7,500/- As regards the sources of this investment which was explained by Rangalal Banka to his Income Tax Officer that prior to entering into partnership of M/s. Stainless Emporium, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, he was a partner in the firm M/s. Jagdish Prasad Mohanlal, Bajpatti from 1954 to 1960. On dissolution of the firm in 1960 he had with drawn his entire share. The initial capital introduced in M/s. Stainless Emporium of Rs.7,500/- according to Rangalal Banka was party from his share capita withdraw from the firm M/s. Jagdish prasad Mohanlal. Banjpatti and partly from his agricultural income but he could not product any books of account or evidences of his agricultural income to substantiate his statement regarding possession of any amount as claimed from any of the sources. The Income-tax Officer has, therefore, remarked in his report as follows :- "On being asked to prove the source of the investment it was stated that the amount was a partner in the firm of M/s. Jagdish Prasad Mohanlal since 1954 to 1960 when the firm was dissolved. He claimed to have withdrawn his entire amount to capital in this firm at the time of dissolution. It was stated that the amount of Rs.7,500/-represented his withdrawal amount as well as savings from agricultural land measuring about 20 bighas. However he never disclosed the amount of capital withdrawn from M/s. Jagadish Prasad Mohanlal even if some amount was withdrawn from this firm in 1960. It cannot be believed that he remained in possession of such money for several long years during this period as he had no known source of Income. However he never disclosed the amount of capital withdrawn from M/s. Jagadish Prasad Mohanlal even if some amount was withdrawn from this firm in 1960. It cannot be believed that he remained in possession of such money for several long years during this period as he had no known source of Income. Therefore, any amount which might have been withdrawn by him from M/s. Jagadish Prasad Mohanlal would have been consumed during this period. It is thus, clear that the amount of Rs.7,500/- has come out of the source which cannot be proved. This amount became his capital in the firm which stood at Rs.10,343, 82 P. at the end of financial year 1973-74 when he ceased to be a partner in this firm. Deposit in his name as per balance sheet filed by the firm along with return of income for the assessment year 1975-76 stand Rs.10,052.77P. This deposit represents his illegally acquired property according to the provision of the SAFFM (FOP) A. The competent authority further recorded the following fact: "No evidence of any income from agriculture has been proved. Rangalal Banka has also not proved that any income from agriculture was saved and was available with him. The entire submission in this regard is nothing more than his oral assertion for which any evidence whatever is conspicuous by its absence. It was further pleaded that after resolution of the firm of M/s. Jagadish Prasad Mohanlal, he had started a business, in grocery at Bajpatti. The same business continued for nearly six years Part of his investment in M/s. Stainless Emporium was also drawn from this source. But as the Income Tax Officer has mentioned and likewise before me no evidence in the nature of accounts of book of any of the concerned was produced. Thus his entire explanation has no evidence to prove it. I cannot help as drawing the conclusion that the books have been deliberately withheld dated 29-7-1977 for had these been produced before me the facts would have gone against him. In the circumstances I feel constrained to conclude that the amount of Rs.7,500/- introduced in the business of M/s. Stainless Emporium by Ranglal represented his income earned from prohibited sources in terms of section 3 (1) (c) (3) and 3 (1) (iv) or the SAFEM (FOP) A the subsequent accretion of this capital which amounting to Rs.10,052.77p. In the circumstances I feel constrained to conclude that the amount of Rs.7,500/- introduced in the business of M/s. Stainless Emporium by Ranglal represented his income earned from prohibited sources in terms of section 3 (1) (c) (3) and 3 (1) (iv) or the SAFEM (FOP) A the subsequent accretion of this capital which amounting to Rs.10,052.77p. on 31-3-75 is also illegally earned income under the provisions of section 3 (1) (c) of the SAFEM (FOP) A," 29. But in respect of an advance of Rs.6000/-, the competent authority accepted the explanation of Rang Lal. On appeal also the said finding was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. 30. So far as Smt. Sita Devi Banka, petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2821 of 1978 is concerned, who is the wife of Pmhkar Lal Banka against her also a notice under section 6 (1) of the SAFEMA was issued and in the said notice the "chedule of property contained the house property, namely, Holding No.141, Ward No, 26, Motijheel, Muzaffarpur. In the said show case notice Sita Devi was asked to explain the source of income earnings or assets out of which and by means of which the aforesaid house property was acquired. To the said notice Sita Devi filed a reply and the matter was examined by the competent authority, It appears from the order passed by the competent authority that the defence which Sita Devi had taken was that the property was purchased by Sita Devi with the help of loan of Rs.20,000/- taken by her from her husband Pushkar Lal Banka and her husband Pushkar Lal Banka also filed an affidavit stating therein that he had advanced the sum of Rs.20,000/- to his wife. 31. After a detail ed discussion of the explanation given by Smt. Sita Devi, the competent authority came to the following conclusion :- "Indeed, in absence of any day to day cash book, it is impossible to verify if at all, Pushkar Lal Banka had with him sufficient cash balance to enable him to advance the sum of rupees twenty thousand to his wife. On these considerations in the case of pushkar Lal Banka, by a simultaneous order passed today under section 7 (1) of the SAFEM (FOP) A, I have held therein that under section 3 (1) (c) (iii) of the SAFEM (FOP) A, this amount of Rs.20,000/- represented Pushkar Lal Banka's income illegally earned." Therefore, the competent authority came to the conclusion that the said house property amounts to illegally acquired property within the meaning of the said Act and came to the following conclusion ; "Judged by all standards, therefore, the property being Holding No. 141, Ward No. 26, Motijheel, Muzaffarpur, Bihar held by Sita Devi is an illegally acquired property. 7. After considering the explanations to the show cause notice issued under sec. 6 of the SAFEM (FOP) A and the material is available before me and after giving to the person Sita Devi all reasonable opportunities of being heard I find under sub-section 1 of Sec. 7 of the SAFEM (FOP) A that the house property being Holding No. 141, Ward No, 26 Motijhi1, MuzafIarpur, Bihar held Sita Devi is an illegally acquired property, In pursuance of the provisions of subsection 3 of Sec. 3 of the SAFEM (FOP) A I hereby declare that the property shall subject to the provisions of the SAFEM (FOP) A, stand forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances." 32. Against the said order, an appeal was filed by Smt. Sira Devi and the said appeal was also dismissed by the appellate tribunal by a reasoned order dated 11th May 1978 and the Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the said house property having been acquired with the help of Rs.20,000/- which was received from Pushkar Lal is also an illegally acquired property and stands forfeited. 33. Here a question arose whether both the orders of forfeiture, one in the case or Pushkar Lal Banka where the amount of Rs.20,000/- was directed to be forfeited and in the Case of Smt. Sita Devi where the house property was directed to be forfeited as the same was acquired with the help of the said amount of Rs.20, 000/- can be sustained. 34. 34. This Court has considered this aspect of the matter and learned counsel for the respondents has fairly submitted that the Central Government cannot forfeit the said amount of Rs.20,000/- and again the house property in view of the fact that the same was acquired with the help of the said Rs.20,000/-. In other words two orders of forfeiture cannot be passed in respect of the amount of Rs.20,000/-. In that view of the matter, this Court is 0f the view that the order of forfeiture in so far as the house property is concerned, in the case, of Sita Devi cannot be upheld. But in so far as forfeiture of Rs.20,000/- as against pushkar Lal Banka, there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the same. The reasons for non-interence will be indicated hereinafter. 35. The case of Shyam Babu (petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2058 of 1978) and that of Lilavati Devi (Petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2191 of 1978) are taken up together Lilawati Devi is the wife of Shy am Babu. Regarding Shyam Babu an order of detention was issued on certain allegations. Initially the order of detention was passed against him on 27th September, 1974 under the provisions of Maintenance of Internal Security Act (as amended). There after the ground of detention was also served upon him on 4th October, 1974. Ultimately, after coming into force of the COFEPOSA, a new detention order under the COFEPOSA was served upon the petitioner on 19th December, 1974. 36. The petitioner's challenge against the said detention order failed and the Patna High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by petitioner Shyam Babu challenging the detention order by its order dated 21st January 1975 Against that a proceeding was filed the Supreme Court but the' same was also withdrawn by Shyam Babu. 37. Ultimately a notice under section 6(1) of the SAFEMA was issued against the petitioner by the competent authority in the month of August, 1976. Petitioner Shyam Babu replied to the said show-cause notice. In the show cause notice which was issued against Shyam Babu under section 6 of the SAFEMA, various properties were mentioned and they were included in the Schedule to the said notice. Petitioner Shyam Babu replied to the said show-cause notice. In the show cause notice which was issued against Shyam Babu under section 6 of the SAFEMA, various properties were mentioned and they were included in the Schedule to the said notice. Syam Babu gave reply to the said show cause notice and by the order dated 14th October, 1977 the competent authority passed an order under section 7(1) and (3) of the SAFEMA holding, inter alia, that the property mentioned in the Schedule to the show cause notice issued under section 6(1) of the Act are illegally acquired properties of the petitioner. The said order was passed after full consideration of the factual aspect of the matter. This Court sets out the following observations made in the said order by the competent authority :- "It is further seen, significantly, that the entire loan as when to have been paid off in a couple of months time, and this is also a material fact which should have been considered by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax ill accepting the alleged loan transactions. What was the extraordinary gain to the creditor in risking an investment of his earned salary by lending it for a few months only and more so when it was practically without any security whatever, and the alleged creditor had no recourse to enforce the repayment of the loan against Shyam Baboo in absence of even a promissory note executed by him. 22. It is also patent that there was dire need for introduction of cash in the books on 13.5.1974 or also the purchase of the land at Bokaro could not be explained satisfactorily to the Income-tax Officer by Shyam Baboo. It is evident that Shyam Baboo was indeed, ploughing back his own funds earned by him elsewhere in transaction not disclosed here-to-before by him and it is not difficult to see that the most convenient modus operandi to achieve the object could only be through benami account. 23. On the aforesaid consideration, facts and circumstances, I disregard the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax u/s. 21 of the SAFEM (FOP)A as being not conclusive to prove the contention of Shyam Baboo before me in these proceedings. On the contrary, in the facts and background of the case the preponderance of the probability is against the apparent state of affairs as made out by Shyam Baboo. On the contrary, in the facts and background of the case the preponderance of the probability is against the apparent state of affairs as made out by Shyam Baboo. The evidence brought on record when examined critically, as here-in-before, established positively that the apparent state of affairs was not the real state of affairs, with Shyam Baboo particularly vis-a-vis the purchase of land at Bokaro and the procurement of funds from Shri H.P. Agarwalla on 13.5.1974." 38. Those findings of the competent authority were affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal by the order dated 17th May, 1988. 39. In this connection learned counsel appearing for petitioner Shyam Babu tried to furnish various materials before this Court in order to contend that the adjudication proceeding before the competent authority and the Appellate Tribunal was wrong on facts and the competent authority has not considered various materials like partition decree in Title Suit No. 29 of 1996, copy of some of the orders passed by the Income Tax Officer, Income Tax Authority and Copy of deposition before Customs authorities. 40. This Court for the reasons stated here-in-below is unable to consider those materials especially when, in the opinion of this Court, all the relevant materials were considered by the appropriate authority and a finding has been arrived at on consideration of those materials by the proper quasi-judicial authority and in a manner which does not show that the quasi-Judicial authority acted either in a perverse or un-reasonable manner. 41. The case of Lilawati Devi, who is the wife of Shyam Babu was also brought under the provisions of SAFEMA as Lilawati Devi is certainly a relative of Shyam Babu within the meaning of SAFEMA. 42. Against the said Lilawati Devi also a show cause notice under section 6(1) of SAFEMA was issued by the competent authority on 7th August, 1976 and in the Schedule to the notice two properties were mentioned. 42. Against the said Lilawati Devi also a show cause notice under section 6(1) of SAFEMA was issued by the competent authority on 7th August, 1976 and in the Schedule to the notice two properties were mentioned. In answer to the said show cause notice, Lilawati Devi gave a reply and then an order dated 14th September, 1677 was passed by the competent authority and the said order both house properties at 163 Ward No. 8, Circle No. 17 of Mohalla Dariapur Gola Patna and the deposit of Rs.20,000/- on the business of her husband under the name and style of Shyam Babu were found to be illegally acquired properties and both the properties were forfeited by the Central Government. 43. Ag1inst the said order Lilawati Devi filed an appeal, and the appellate authority also by order dated 23rd May, 1978 dismissed the appeal after holding by a speaking order that there is no merit in this appeal. 44. The case of two other petitioners, namely, Bharat Prasad (petitioner in CWJC No. 2059 of 1978) and that of Smt. Kamla Devi (petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2190 of 1978) are taken up together. Against Bharat Prasad also an order of detention was passed initially under the maintenance of Internal Security Act (As amended). Thereafter, while Barat Prasad was under detention in connection with the said detention order, another order of detention under COFEPOSA was served on the petitioner Bharat Prasad. The detention order served on Bharat Prasad under COFEPOSA was not quashed and ultimately the said writ petition was withdrawn. In the meantime, a notice was issued to Bharat Prasad by the competent authority in the month of August, 1976 under section 6(1) of SAFEMA. Bharat Prasad however did not disclose the said notice either in the writ petition or in the supplementary affidavit filed ultimately, by a detailed order dated 14th September, 1977, the competent authority held that the source of investment of the business of Stainless Steel at Bakarganj, Patna has not been proved. The competent authority further held that the amount of Rs.10,000/- introduced in the business of Bharat Prasad in the name of his wife Smt. Kamala Devi has not been proved. The competent authority further held that the amount of Rs.10,000/- introduced in the business of Bharat Prasad in the name of his wife Smt. Kamala Devi has not been proved. Therefore, the Competent authority held that the credit balance to his capital account standing in the books of accounts of the business of Stainless Steel at Bakelganj, Patna and also the deposit of Rs.10,000/- introduced in the business in the name of his wife Smt. Kamala Devi during the financial year 1973-74, are illegally acquired properties and both the properties stand forfeited to the Central Government. 45. Against the said order, an appeal was preferred by Bhart Prasad before the Appellate Tribunal and the appeal was partly allowed by the Tribunal by only upholding the order of forfeiture in respect to the deposit of Rs.10,000/- in the name of the wife of Bharat Prasad. The order of forfeiture passed by the competent authority for a sum of Rs.60,698/- was quashed by the Appellate Tribunal. 46. In so far as the case of Kamala Devi, petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2190 of 1978 is concerned, a notice under section 6 (1) of SAFEMA was issued on the ground that she is the relation of Bharat Prasad and in the said notice the house property at 164 Ward No.8, Circle No. 197 at Mohalla Dariapur Gola, Patna and the deposit of Rs.10,000/- was treated as two items of the property which are illegally acquired property in the said show cause notice. In the order which was passed by the competent authority on 14th September, 1977 both items of the properties stood forfeited as illegally acquired property within the meaning of SAFEMA. 47. Against the said finding Kamala Devi filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellant Tribunal dismissed the app and affirmed the order of the competent authority. 48. Having considered the factual aspect of the case, as discussed above, and the legal questions involved in SAFEMA this Court now proceeds to consider whether in exercise of its power of judicial review, this Court will interfere with the decision rendered by the competent authority and which has been affirmed in all cases by the Appellate Tribunal in the facts of this case. 49. 49. On the parameters of judicial review, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given several guidelines and this question has been discussed very elaborately in the case of Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India reported in (1994)6 S.C.C. page 651. In the said judgment the Honble Supreme Court has made it clear that it is not the function of a judge to act "with the zeal of a pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. On the other hand the court has made it clear that the duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality and meaning thereby, that the Court should ask itself the following questions :- (i) Whether the decision making authority has committed any error of law? (ii) Whether the decision-making authority has committed breach of the rules of natural justice? (iii) Whether the Tribunal has reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached or whether it has abused its power? 50. Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular decision taken by the Tribunal in the fulfilment of the statutory policy is fair or not. The Court is merely concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. In other words the Court has short-listed the grounds of interference as follows :- (a) Illegality. (b) Irrationality. (c) procedural impropriety. 51. These are by and large the broad grounds on which Hon'ble Supreme Court approved interference by Courts in exercise of its power of retrial. But the Court has also stated that a further ground may also be added, namely, principles of proportionality. 52. The Apex Court in the aforesaid Tata Cellular (Supra) has also pointed out that it is open to the Court to review the decision maker's evaluation of the facts only when the Court considers that the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. On the other hand, if the Court finds that the weight of facts taken to gather point one course of action overwhelmingly and a contrary decision has been taken by the decision-maker in that case the said decision cannot be upheld. 53. On the other hand, if the Court finds that the weight of facts taken to gather point one course of action overwhelmingly and a contrary decision has been taken by the decision-maker in that case the said decision cannot be upheld. 53. Going by the aforesaid principles in relation to judicial review of the action of the competent authority and that of the Appellate Tribunal, this Court finds that no interference is called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. 54. In this connection this Court also takes into consideration the following observation made by Lord Brightman in Puhlhofer Vs. Hillingdon London Borough Council reported in (1986)1 All. E.R. page 461, At page 474 of the report the learned Judge has very succinctly laid down the principles as follows :- "Where the existence or non-existence of a fact if left to the judgment an discretion of a public body am, that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the Just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or unconsciously, are acting perversely." 55. Here it is no bodys case that cither the competent authority or the Appellate Tribunal is acting perversely. In that view of the matter the findings given by the competent authority and the Appellate Tribunal which have been assailed in the aforesaid writ petitions do not call for any interference by this Court. 56. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not interfere with the findings arrived at by the competent authority which has been subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal in any of the cases save and except in the case of Smt. Sita Devi where the Court has considered that the amount of Rs.20,000/- has been made subject matter of two orders of forfeiture. Therefore, the order of forfeiture in so far as the house property is concerned in the case of Smt. Sita Devi cannot be upheld. Therefore, the order of forfeiture in so far as the house property is concerned in the case of Smt. Sita Devi cannot be upheld. Therefore, the writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 2821 of 1978 in which the order of forfeiture of the house property of Smt. Sita Devi being Holding No. 141, Ward No. 26, Motijeel, Muzafrarpur is concerned is quashed and C.W.J.C. No. 2821 of 1978 is allowed to the extent indicated above. Save as aforesaid, all other six writ petitions are here by dismissed and intrim orders are all vacated. There will be no order as to cost.