JUDGMENT Advocates appeared : C.J. Sawant, Advocate General with R.S. Deshpande, Asst. Govt. Pleader, for the appellant-State. S.M. Paranjape, for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. G.S. Hegde, for respondent No. 3. Per M.L. DUDHAT, J. :---This first appeal arises out of the land acquisition proceedings. The appellants in this case is the State of Maharashtra. The appellants have preferred this first appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated 21st August, 1995 passed by the learned Joint District Judge, Nashik, in Land Acquisition Reference No. 257 of 1990. By the aforesaid judgment and decree, the trial Court has granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 300/- per sq. metre for the land acquired. The trial Court has also granted solatium at the rate of 30 per cent on the total market value and additional compensation at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the notification published under sub-section (1) of section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 i.e. 1st February 1982 till the date on which the possession was taken viz. 28th November, 1988. The Lower Court also granted interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on the net amount of the compensation from the date of possession for the first year and at the rate of 15 per cent per annum thereafter till realisation. This compensation amount and the additional benefits granted to the respondents-claimants are the subject-matters of challenge before us in this first appeal. Against the said judgment and decree, the respondents-claimants have also preferred cross-objections challenging the compensation awarded by the trial Court and by the aforesaid cross-objections, the respondents-claimants claim compensation at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq. metre. The aforesaid first appeal on behalf of the respondents-claimants are argued before us. 2.Since in this matter, there has arisen a substantial question of law, we would like to deal with and decide the said substantial question of law first and after deciding this first appeal on the said substantial question of law, we will dispose of the appeal and the cross-objections of the respondents-claimants after taking into consideration the respective arguments of both the sides. 3.Shri C.J. Sawant, learned Advocate General appeared on behalf of the appellant-State along with the learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri R.S. Deshpande. Shri G.S. Hegde, learned Counsel appeared on behalf of respondent No. 3. 3.Shri C.J. Sawant, learned Advocate General appeared on behalf of the appellant-State along with the learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri R.S. Deshpande. Shri G.S. Hegde, learned Counsel appeared on behalf of respondent No. 3. Respondents-claimant were represented by the learned Counsel Shri S.M. Paranjape. 4.The learned Advocate General, in his arguments, pointed out that while passing the impugned judgment and decree, the trial Court had granted additional benefits under sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended on 24th September 1984 by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984. According to the appellants, the provisions relating to payment of additional benefits such as solatium, additional compensation at the rate of twelve per cent per annum etc. are separate and distinct and they do not form components of the compensation as defined under section 23(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. According to appellants, only certain provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as they stood on 20th December 1966, were incorporated in the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and were not adopted by general reference as it was not the intention of the Legislature to include all the subsequent amendments to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 made from time to time. According to appellants, the intention of the Legislature was clear i.e. to incorporate only certain provisions in the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 as they stood on 20th December 1966. It was, therefore, strenuously contended by the learned Advocate General that the trial Court had erred in granting the additional benefits to the respondents-claimants under sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the said provisions were introduced on 24th September 1984 i.e. after the 20th December 1966 when the said Maharashtra Regional and Town Planing Act, 1966 came to be published in the Maharashtra Gazette. 5.Mr. G.S. Hegde, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 supported all the arguments on the law point as made by the learned Advocate General. 5.Mr. G.S. Hegde, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 supported all the arguments on the law point as made by the learned Advocate General. 6.On the other hand, the learned Counsel Shri Paranjape, appearing on behalf of the respondents-claimants, contended that under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (Maharashtra Act No. XXXVII of 1966) (hereinafter referred to as "the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966"), there is no independent provision for acquisition of land and there is also no independent provision for paying and determination of compensation for the land acquired under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966. Shri Paranjape submitted that for the purpose of acquisition of land and also for the purpose of payment of compensation the source of power as well as the procedure emanates from the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, the amendments made to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will have to be also applied while deciding the rate of compensation to be paid for the land acquired under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966. According to Mr. Paranjape, had the State Legislature not been in agreement with the payment of the additional benefits given under the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, then the State Legislature would have amended the provisions of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 itself by expressing its intention to the contrary. According to Mr. Paranjape, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-claimants, under section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are adopted by reference and, therefore, any amendment made to Land Acquisition Act, 1894, more particularly, with regard to payment of compensation shall be made applicable mutatis mutandis for the land acquired under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966. 7.Both the sides, in order to support their respective contentions, relied upon the ratio of several decisions of the Supreme Court and of this and other High Courts. 8.The only important question of law to be decided in this appeal is as to whether the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, more particularly, sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 are applicable for determining the compensation payable in respect of the land acquired under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. 8.The only important question of law to be decided in this appeal is as to whether the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, more particularly, sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 are applicable for determining the compensation payable in respect of the land acquired under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. If this Court comes to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature at the time of legislating the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, was to adopt the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by reference, then, in that event, the aforesaid amendments to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 viz. sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 will be applicable for determination of the compensation for acquisition of the land under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966. However, if this Court comes to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature at the time of legislating the M.R.T.P. Act, of 1966 was to incorporate the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as they stood on 20th December 1966, then, in that event, sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended on 24th September 1984, by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984, shall not be made applicable. 9.The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the Appellant-State of Maharashtra, firstly, relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in (State of Maharashtra v. Joginder Singh)1, A.I.R. 1995 Supreme Court 2181. According to the learned Advocate General, in the aforesaid Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court has arrived at a conclusion that the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 had incorporated the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and held that the amendment to section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be applied to the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966. In view of this, according to the learned Advocate General, the question of law as to whether the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 had incorporated the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or adopted by reference the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, is already decided by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in State of Maharashtra v. Joginder Singh. 10.On the other hand, the learned Counsel Mr. 10.On the other hand, the learned Counsel Mr. Paranjape submitted that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2181 is not applicable while deciding about the additional benefits payable under sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. According to Mr. Paranjape, the observations of the Supreme Court are made with reference to the amended section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act and since there is a contrary intention provided by the Legislature under section 126(4) of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966, the Supreme Court, in that case held that the specific provision made in that behalf shall be applicable in place of the amended provision contained in section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Mr. Paranjape further contended that on a perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it would appear that the amendment to section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 expresses contrary intention as has been expressed in section 126(4) of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 and, therefore, the Supreme Court in that case held that the said section 11-A is inapplicable. 11.In order to resolve these rival contentions in their right perspective, it is desirable to go through the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Development Act, 1966. Chapter VII of the M.R.T.P. Act deals with land acquisition. When the land is needed for the purposes of regional development plan, development plan or town planning schemes, then the relevant provisions are sections 125, 126, 127, 128 and 129 of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966. 12.Section 125 of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 provides that if any land is required, reserved or designated in a regional plan, development plan or town planning scheme for a public purpose, including plans for any area of a comprehensive development or for any new town, it shall be deemed to be needed for a public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, as per the aforesaid section, when the land is required for a regional plan, development plan or a town planning scheme, etc., under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966, then the said requirement of land shall be deemed to be needed for a public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, as per the aforesaid section, when the land is required for a regional plan, development plan or a town planning scheme, etc., under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966, then the said requirement of land shall be deemed to be needed for a public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, there is no need to issue a notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for deciding as to whether the land is needed for a public purpose or not. 13.Further, section 126(1) of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 provides that when after the publication of the draft regional plan, a development plan or any other plan or town planning scheme, any land is required or reserved for any public purpose specified in any plan or scheme under this Act at any time, the Town Planning Authority, Development Authority, or as the case may be, any appropriate authority may, except as otherwise provided in section 113-A, apply to the State Government for acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 126(2) of the M.R.T.P. Act further provides that on receipt of an application, if the State Government is satisfied that the lands specified in the application are needed for the public purpose therein specified or if the State Government (except in the cases falling under section 49 and except as provided in section 113-A) itself is of opinion that any land in any such plan is needed for any public purpose, it may make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette in a manner provided in section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of the said land. The declaration so published shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, be deemed to be declaration duly made under the said section. Proviso to this sub-section (2) of section 126 further provides that subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), no such declaration shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan. Proviso to this sub-section (2) of section 126 further provides that subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), no such declaration shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan. Sub-section (3) of section 126 further provides that on publication of such declaration under section 6, the Collector shall proceed to take order for the acquisition of the land under the said Act, and the provisions of the said Act shall apply to the acquisition of the said land with the modification that market value of the land shall be -(i) where the land is acquired for the purposes of a new town, the market value prevailing on the date of publication of the notification constituting or declaring the Development Authority for such town; (ii) where the land is acquired for the purposes of a Special Planning Authority, the market value prevailing on the date of publication of the notification of the area as an undeveloped area; and (iii) in any other case the market value on the date of publication of the interim development plan, the draft development plan, or the plan for the area or areas for comprehensive development, whichever is earlier, or as the case may be, the date of publication of the draft town planning scheme. By the first proviso to the aforesaid sub-section (3) of section 126, it is provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the date for the purposes of determining the market value of land in respect of which proceedings for acquisition commenced before the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972 (Mah. XI of 1973). It is further provided by the second proviso to the aforesaid sub-section (3) of section 126 that for the purpose of Clause (ii) of this sub-section, the market value in respect of land included in any undeveloped area notified under sub-section (1) of section 40 prior to the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972 (Mah. XI of 1973) shall be the market value prevailing on the date of such commencement. XI of 1973) shall be the market value prevailing on the date of such commencement. 14.It is further provided by sub-section (4) of section 126 that if the declaration is not made within the period referred to sub-section (2) or having been made, the aforesaid period expired at the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993, (Mah. 14 of 1993) the State Government may make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the manner provided by sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section, subject to the modification that the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for acquiring the land afresh. 15.As per section 126(1) of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 whenever land is required or reserved for a public purpose specified in the plan, then the appropriate authority can acquire the land either by an agreement or by making an application to the State Government for acquiring the land under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. That means, as per sub-section (1) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, the appropriate authority can acquire the land by entering into an agreement with the owner of the land or it may apply to the State Government for acquisition of the land required under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is important to note that if the appropriate authority is unable to acquire the land under an agreement, then, in that event, intention of the Legislature appears to be to allow the appropriate authority to make use of the complete machinery already available under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is also pertinent to note that under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966, if there is a failure on the part of the appropriate authority to acquire the land by entering into an agreement, then there is no machinery, whatsoever, provided for acquisition of land required for any plan and, therefore, the Legislature intended to allow the appropriate authority to make use of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for that purpose. 16.If one refers to sub-section (2) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966, it will be seen that the State Government has to be satisfied when an application is made under sub-section (1) of section 126 that is land is, in fact, needed for a public purpose and after such a satisfaction is reached at by the State Government, then, in that event, the State Government may make a declaration for acquiring the said land in the manner provided under section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This section further provides that such a declaration, if made, shall be deemed to be the declaration duly made under the said section. However, the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126, provides that if such declaration under section 126(2) is not made within three years from the date of publication of the draft regional plan or any other plan, then after the expiry of three years no such publication can be made. As per sub-section (3) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, after publication of declaration under section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Collector shall proceed to take order for acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to the acquisition proceedings of such land with the modification in respect of the market value of the land as per Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (3) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. The first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 126 further makes it clear that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the date for the purpose of determining the market value in respect of the land where the proceedings for acquisition commenced under Maharashtra Regional Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972. As per the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 126, for the purpose of Clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 126, the market value in respect of the land included in any undeveloped area notified under sub-section (1) of section 40 prior to the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 1972, shall be market value prevailing on the date of such commencement. 17.This sub-section (3) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act makes it abundantly clear that after publication of declaration under section 6, as envisaged under section 126(2) of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, the Collector has to take order for acquiring the land under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only with the modification as provided in Clause (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (3) of section 126. That means as per sub-section (3) of section 126, in order to determine the market value, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are to be applied, unless there is a modification as provided in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (3) of section 126. Therefore, one can safely draw an inference that for determining the market value, the intention of the Legislature under the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 is to apply the complete machinery already available under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, unless there is a modification as provided in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (3) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act. Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 makes it abundantly clear that the declaration to acquire the land under sub-section (2) shall be made in three years. However, if such declaration is not made till the expiry of three years, then, in that event, the State Government has to make a fresh declaration under section 126(4) for acquiring the said land under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as per sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act subject to the modification that the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for acquiring the land afresh. It is important to note that proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 has prescribed the limitation for acquiring the land and that period is three years from the date of the publication of the draft regional plan etc. It is important to note that proviso to sub-section (2) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 has prescribed the limitation for acquiring the land and that period is three years from the date of the publication of the draft regional plan etc. However, an option is also given to the State Government by sub-section (4) of section 126 to issue a fresh declaration under section 126(4) for acquiring the land under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the manner provided under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, subject to the modification that the market value which the claimant would be entitled to receive, shall be the market value at the date of the fresh declaration issued under sub-section (4) of section 126 and not as per the earlier publication of plans which expired after three years. This section makes the aforesaid intention of the Legislature abundantly clear. 18.After discussing the provisions of sections 125 and 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 in their right prospective, we would like to discuss the rival contentions as advanced by both the sides before us. Before discussing the rival contentions, one must keep in mind the date on which the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 came into force. The said Act came in to force on 20th December 1966. According to the appellants, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as on 20th December 1966 are incorporated in the M.R.T.P. Act and any amendment to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after 20th December 1966 will not be applicable to the acquisition of land under the M.R.T.P. Act, of 1966. To support their contention, the learned Advocate General has strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R. 1995 Supreme Court 2181. The learned Advocate General, more particularly, relied upon paragraphs 6 and 10 of the said decision which are as under : "6. Dr. N.M. Ghatate, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, contends that since acquisition of the land is compulsory expropriation, restrictive interpretation should be given. The learned Advocate General, more particularly, relied upon paragraphs 6 and 10 of the said decision which are as under : "6. Dr. N.M. Ghatate, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, contends that since acquisition of the land is compulsory expropriation, restrictive interpretation should be given. He further contends that though there is no express provision that the notification published under section 125 would lapse, by operation of section 11-A of the Central Act introduced by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984, award has to be made within two years from the date of declaration published under section 6 of the Central Act i.e. under section 126(2) of the Act; and this period of limitation must be deemed to have been incorporated in the Act. Thereby, the only course open to the State is to issue the notification under section 125 afresh, if law permits and it should not resort to the publication of the declaration under sub-section (41) of section 126." "10. It is next contended by Dr. N.M. Ghatate that in appeal arising from S.L.P. No. 5251/90 since the award has not been made within two years from the date of the declaration under sub-section (2) of section 126, by operation of section 11-A of the Central Act, the notification published under section 125 shall be deemed to have been lapsed and, therefore, the authorities are devoid of jurisdiction to proceed further. We find no force in the contention too. It is seen that the State Legislature amended the Act by the Amendment Act and introduced three years limitation for publication of the declaration under sub-section (2) of section 126. In section 126, it had expressly engrafted the provisions of sections 16, 17 and 24 of the Central Act as its part. In other words, wherever the Legislature intended to apply the specific procedure or the fetters in exercising the power as visualised by the Central Act, it did so specifically, After the Central Act 68 of 1984 has come into force, no attempt was taken by the State Legislature to amend the Act introducing or incorporating section 11-A of the Central Act as part of the Act. Since the legislature had incorporated specific provisions of the Central Act, the necessary conclusion is that the Legislature did not intend to apply the unspecified provisions of the Central Act to the exercise of power under the Act. Since the legislature had incorporated specific provisions of the Central Act, the necessary conclusion is that the Legislature did not intend to apply the unspecified provisions of the Central Act to the exercise of power under the Act. In this behalf it is to be remembered that there is a distinction between incorporation and adoption by reference. If the Legislature would have merely adopted the Central Act, subsequent amendment to that Act made under Act 68 of 1984 would have become applicable per force." 19.It appears that the question before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was as to whether the failure to make a declaration under section 126(2) within three years of the publication of a plan would result in the lapsing of the earlier acquisition proceedings. An argument was also advanced that failure to make an award within two years of the declaration under sub-section (2) of section 126, would also result in lapsing of the entire acquisition proceedings in view of section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in the year 1984. While commenting upon sub-section (4) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, we have already pointed out that if the State Government fails to make a declaration before the expiry of three years from the publication of a plan, then in that event, the State Government has to issue a fresh declaration under sub-section (4) of section 126 for the purpose of acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in the manner provided by sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, subject to the modification that the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for acquiring the land afresh. Section 11-A, as amended by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984 on 24th September 1984 is as under: "11-A. Period within which an award shall be made. Section 11-A, as amended by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984 on 24th September 1984 is as under: "11-A. Period within which an award shall be made. The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse : Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation. In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded." As per the aforesaid amended provision of section 11-A, the Collector has to make an award within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under section 11 and if an award is not made within the aforesaid period, the entire acquisition proceedings shall lapse. On the other hand, as per sub-section (2) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, declaration has to be made within three years from the date of publication of the Regional Plan, Development plan or any other plan. The Government can issue a fresh declaration for acquiring the land as per sub-section (4) of section 126. Therefore, there is no question of acquisition proceedings getting lapsed. However, the claimant will get the market value as prevalent on the date of issuance of the fresh declaration. On the other hand, under section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, if an award is not made by the Collector and if the Collector fails to make such award within two years from the date of publication of declaration under section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, the entire acquisition proceedings shall lapse. Referring to the aforesaid amendment, it was argued before the Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case, that after the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, under section 11-A, award has to be made within two years from the date of publication of the declaration and the said period of limitation must be deemed to have been incorporated in the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966. It was, therefore, argued before the Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case, that the only course left to the State was to issue a notification under section 125 afresh, if law permits, and the State should not resort to the publication of a declaration under sub-section (4) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. It is in this context, the Supreme Court observed that the Legislature being cognizant of the consequences that would flow from long delay in publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette under sub-section (2) of section 126, provision was made in that behalf to put a fetter on the exercise of power under section 126(2) and simultaneously mitigated the hardship to be caused to the public purpose as well as to private interest of the owner of the land. The Supreme Court further observed that, in other words, while permitting the State to exercise its power of eminent domain, the owner of the land or the person interested in the land has been relieved of hardship of payment of the compensation as per the price prevailing as on the date of publication of the notification under section 125 (Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) and directed that market value be determined as on the date of publication of the fresh declaration under sub-section (4) of section 126. 20.On a perusal of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it would be clear that the Supreme Court, has taken into consideration the fact that under sub-section (4) of section 126, the Legislature has taken into consideration all the consequences that would flow on account of the delay in publication of the declaration under sub-section (2) of section 126 and, therefore, the Legislature had added sub-section (4) to section 126. 21.It is true that even though the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966 had adopted the entire acquisition machinery provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, still sub-section (4) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 provides an intention to the contrary. There is no need to adopt the amendment under section 11-A to Land Acquisition Act to the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. 22.The learned Advocate General further referred to para 10 of the aforesaid judgment to reiterate his contention. According to him, while rejecting the argument of Dr. There is no need to adopt the amendment under section 11-A to Land Acquisition Act to the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. 22.The learned Advocate General further referred to para 10 of the aforesaid judgment to reiterate his contention. According to him, while rejecting the argument of Dr. N.M. Ghatate, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in that case, to the effect that the time limit prescribed under section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act must be deemed to have been incorporated in the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, the Supreme Court in the said judgment concluded as under : "In this behalf it is to be remembered that there is a distinction between incorporation and adoption by reference. If the Legislature would have merely adopted the Central Act, subsequent amendments to that Act made under Act 68 of 1984 would have become applicable perforce." Relying upon the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case law, the learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that as per the aforesaid decision, in the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is incorporated and not adopted by reference. Prima facie, the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court support the contentions as raised by the learned Advocate General in the present case. However, it appears that the Supreme Court has made the aforesaid observations with reference to the procedural provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as laid down by section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act, more particularly, because the said amendment to the Land Acquisition Act was brought mainly with a view to mitigate the hardship caused to the owners of the land, whose land had been acquired, due to long delay in passing the award and since, according to the Supreme Court, sub-section (4) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 has substantially taken care of the hardships and the loss caused to the claimants due to delay in acquisition proceedings, section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be made applicable, unless the Legislature thinks it fit by amending the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 to that effect. 23.The aforesaid view of ours is definitely supported by the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 12 of the said judgment, which reads as under : "12. 23.The aforesaid view of ours is definitely supported by the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 12 of the said judgment, which reads as under : "12. It is next contended that since no separate procedure was prescribed by the Act for determining the compensation, by necessary inference, the Central Act was intended to be applied mutatis mutandis to the acquisition under the Act. He seeks support from the award made by the Collector in that behalf. It is true that there is no express provision under the Act to determine compensation for the land acquired under the Act. Therefore, by necessary implication, compensation need to be determined applying the principles in section 23 of the Central Act. But, there is a distinction between procedural and substantive provisions of a statute. Determination of compensation by applying appropriate principles is relatable to substantive provision, whereas making of award within a prescribed period is basically procedural. So, merely because section 23 of the Central Act would apply to acquisition under the Act, is not enough to hold that what is contained in section 11-A would also apply. Further, what has been provided in sub-section (4) of section 126 of the Act is clear indication that failure to make the award within two years from the date of the declaration under sub-section (2) of section 126 of the Act, would not render the notification published under section 125 of the Act non est." By the aforesaid para 12 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held that since there is no separate machinery prescribed under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 for acquisition of land, substantive provisions of Land Acquisition Act for determining their compensation are applied mutatis mutandis for acquisition of land under M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. In the aforesaid para, the Supreme Court made a distinction between the procedural and the substantive provisions of Land Acquisition Act. According to the Supreme Court, the principles as laid down in the Land Acquisition Act for determining the compensation under section 23 are substantive provisions, while making an award within a prescribed time, is a procedural provision. In the aforesaid para, the Supreme Court made a distinction between the procedural and the substantive provisions of Land Acquisition Act. According to the Supreme Court, the principles as laid down in the Land Acquisition Act for determining the compensation under section 23 are substantive provisions, while making an award within a prescribed time, is a procedural provision. Further, the Supreme Court also held that what has been provided in sub-section (4) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 is a clear indication that failure to make an award within two years from the date of declaration under sub-section (2) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 would not render the notification published under section 125 of M.R.T.P. Act non est. Therefore, according to our opinion, the Supreme Court has not applied section 11-A of Land Acquisition Act for mitigating the effect of delay, as there is already a provision in the M.R.T.P. viz. sub-section (4) of section 126 which has already taken care of mitigating the effect due to delay in making the declaration. Therefore, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, in fact, supports the proposition that in any case provisions laying the principles for determination of compensation under section 23 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are adopted by reference. 24.In our case, limited question is as to whether the amendments to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 made by adding section 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 were applicable to the land acquisitions made under M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. All these sections were brought into force by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984. By virtue of section 23(1-A), in addition to the market-value of the land, the claimants are entitled to receive an amount calculated at the rate of twelve percent per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Though the additional benefit accured under the said amendment is over and above the market-value arrived at under section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, still the said additional benefit is linked with the market value and in fact the additional benefit in addition to compensation arrived at under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act is to be paid as the owner of the acquired land is not in a position to use his land after publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of Land Acquisition Act. So, the additional compensation in addition to the market-value provided under section 23(1-A) is also an additional compensation towards the land being acquired over and above the compensation under section 23 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The only difference is that in the case of land acquired under M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, as in the present case, instead of the date of publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1) under Land Acquisition Act, one has to take into consideration the notification under section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, which in this case is 7th May 1987. Similarly, under sub-section (2) of section 23 also, compensation in the form of solatium is given to the owner of the land which is also linked with the market value of the land. Under section 28 also the Collector is directed to pay interest on excess compensation, which in the opinion of the Collector ought to have been awarded. All these aforesaid provisions are substantive provisions dealing with the principles as to how compensation is to be awarded to claimants on acquisition of their lands. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2181 (supra), more particularly, in paragraph twelve thereof, these provisions are substantive provisions and since there are no provisions in the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 to determine the price of the land acquired under M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, according to our opinion, the aforesaid amendments shall be attracted in respect of the acquisition of lands made under M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, as these provisions have been adopted by reference. 25.The learned Advocate General has also referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in (Urban Improvement Trust v. Gokul Narain)2, 1996(4) Supreme Court Cases 178. 25.The learned Advocate General has also referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in (Urban Improvement Trust v. Gokul Narain)2, 1996(4) Supreme Court Cases 178. According to the appellant, sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of Land Acquisition Act are not the components of the compensation for the acquired land determinder under section 23(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellant in the aforesaid reported case contended that they are, in fact, in addition to and independent of the compensation determined under section 23(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Relying on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is contended on behalf of the appellant-State in the present case, that the additional benefits accrued under the amended provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 viz., sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 cannot be made applicable to the acquisition of land made under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. In the aforesaid case, the land was acquired prior to 1-8-1987 under section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (35 of 1959) for construction of an overbridge. According to the State, in that case, there was no provision in the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 for payment of solatium and other additional benefits. Hence the Supreme Court held that the amended provisions of sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 shall not apply to acquisitions made prior to 1-8-1987 under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. However, subsequently, the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 was amended with effect from 1-8-1987 and sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28, as amended by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984 were made applicable to the acquisitions made under the sections. The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case, refused to give restrospective effect to sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of Land Acquisition Act. In view of this, according to the Appellant-State in this appeal, unless and until the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 incorporates the said newly amended sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of Land Acquisition Act, the additional benefits under those provisions cannot be given to the claimants. 26. As against this, the learned Counsel Mr. Paranjape submitted that the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 26. As against this, the learned Counsel Mr. Paranjape submitted that the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. According to him, paragraphs 3, 13 and 14 of the said judgment seem to suggest that only the provisions of the Central Act 68 of 1984 were made applicable to the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and on this assumption contention has been raised that a similar amendment was necessary to the M.R.T.P. Act of 1966, so as to attract the provisions introduced by the Central Act 68 of 1984. According to Mr. Paranjape, the legal position is quite contrary to what has been suggested on behalf of the State. To the State of Rajasthan, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was not applicable till 24-9-1984 and the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 was the relevant Act for acquisition of land by the State. The aforesaid Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 was introduced in the year 1959 and the said Act independently provided for acquisition of land as well as determination of compensation as per the provisions of the said Act. The power to acquire land was contained in section 52 of the said Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. By virtue of provisions of section 52(4) of the said Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, the land vested in the Government absolutely with the issuance of the notice therefore under sub-section (1) of section 52 in the Official Gazette. Procedure for acquisition of land has been laid down under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act. 1959. Section 53 of the said Act deals with determination of compensation. There was no reference to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 as the same was a complete Code in itself, which gave powers of compulsory acquisition, prescribed procedure to be followed in respect of such acquisitions and the method to be followed in arriving at the figure of compensation payable to the claimants. However, in 1987, the State of Rajasthan amended the provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 by Rajasthan Act 29 of 1987 by amending section 52(1) and for the first time the entire provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the Central Act 68 of 1984, were made applicable with effect from 1-8-1987. 27. However, in 1987, the State of Rajasthan amended the provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 by Rajasthan Act 29 of 1987 by amending section 52(1) and for the first time the entire provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the Central Act 68 of 1984, were made applicable with effect from 1-8-1987. 27. Similarly, provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) of section 52, sections 53 to 59, 59-A and 59-B were deleted. Amendments to provisions of section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 by the Rajasthan Act 29 of 1987 are material, because, for the first time, the provision of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were made directly applicable in its entirety for the purpose of acquisition of land under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Section 60-A of Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 was introduced by Act 29 of 1987 (Rajasthan) as and by way of a transitory provision and it covered only those cases referred to in the said section. According to Mr. Paranjape, the said judgment of the Supreme Court, if read carefully, would show that the issue before the Supreme Court was only with regard to the date of applicability of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 68 of 1984. The State of Rajasthan had two independent Acts. Both provided for acquisition as well as determination of compensation. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act No. 68 of 1984, was made applicable to the State of Rajasthan, firstly, in the year 1984 and then in the year 1987 by the Rajasthan Amendment Act No. 29 of 1987 the entire provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were introduced in the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust v. Gokul Narain (supra) deals with the transitory provision viz. section 60A of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and, therefore, the same may not be of much help in deciding the facts of the present case. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust v. Gokul Narain (supra) deals with the transitory provision viz. section 60A of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and, therefore, the same may not be of much help in deciding the facts of the present case. On the contrary, the amended provisions of section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, will show that by legislating the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, the State Government has, by reference, adopted the entire provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and section 60A of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 also provided for a transitory provision to give the additional benefits available under the amended provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1984, as they stood on 24-9-1984. According to Mr. Paranjape, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in the present case before us, a comparison of the provisions of section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and the language of section 126(3) of M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, will show that as far back as in 1973, entire provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were adopted into the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, but subject to modification, and, therefore, as per the ruling referred to above, all the subsequent amendments would be applicable to the acquisition of land initiated from the date on which notification/declaration under sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 126 of M.R.T.P. Act were published i.e. from 7-5-1987; meaning thereby that the provisions of Land Acquisition Act as they stood on 7-5-1987 are applicable, which includes the additional benefits provided by sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, so far as they related to determination of the market value and other statutory benefits attached to the market value. According to opinion of this Court, as expressed above, the benefits of the amended provisions of Land Acquisition Act i.e., the additional benefits under section 23(1A) 23(2) and 28 do not form components of the compensation as defined under section 23(1) of Land Acquisition Act, but are the additional benefits to be given to the owner of the land whose land is acquired and these provisions are a substantive piece of legislation and, therefore, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2181 (supra), the said provisions are adopted by reference. In view of these observations made by the Supreme Court, the case law in Urban Improvement v. Gokul Narain, 1996(4) Supreme Court Cases 178 (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. 28. Both the sides to this appeal have relied upon the ratio as laid down by the Supreme Court in (Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh)3, 1994(4) Supreme Court Cases 368. According to our opinion, the facts before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are vitally important from the point of view of deciding the issue before us in the present case. Under the aforesaid case, the appellant, Bhatinda Improvement Trust framed a development scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. Notices under section 36 of the said Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. Notices under section 36 of the said Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 in respect of the said development scheme, setting out the particulars referred to in the said section, were published in the Daily Tribune on May 31, 1977, June 7, 1977 and June 14, 1977. The said Notices were also published in the local daily Ajit on May 30, 1977, June 6, 1977 and June, 13, 1977 and in the Punjab Government Gazettee on June 12, 1977, June 24, 1977 and July 1977. A notification as required under section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was published on June 30, 1980 sanctioning the aforesaid development scheme. The said notices and notifications were challenged by the respondents in Civil Writ Petition No. 2508 of 1982 filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, inter alia on the ground that the notification under section 42 was not issued within the stipulated period of three years from the first publication of the notice under section 36 and on that account it was bad in law. This contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court who allowed the writ petition and set aside the notification under section 42 which was issued on June 30, 1980. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the said judgment was dismissed by a Division Bench of the said High Court. This contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court who allowed the writ petition and set aside the notification under section 42 which was issued on June 30, 1980. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the said judgment was dismissed by a Division Bench of the said High Court. When the aforesaid matter came before the Supreme Court, it was submitted before the Supreme Court by the appellant, Bhatinda Improvement Trust that the time-limit of three years for the issue of the notification under section 42 of the said Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was not prescribed under the said Act and that the first proviso to section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was not applicable to the scheme in question. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant, Bhatinda Improvement Trust that the provisions of section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were, in effect, incorporated in the said Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 which was enacted in 1922 from the very time of its enactment and hence, any amendment to the said section after that date would not be applicable to acquisitions under the said Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. It was further submitted on behalf of the appellant, Bhatinda Improvement Trust that the aforesaid time-limit of three years was inserted in the Land Acquisition Act in 1984, long after the said Act was enacted as set out particularly hereinafter (in the aforesaid judgment) and hence, it could not have any application to the acquisitions made for the purposes of the said Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. It is pertinent to note that the aforesaid case before the Supreme Court related to acquisitions of land under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and the present case before us also relating to acquisition of lands is under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966. In both these legislations, there is no separate machinery provided for acquiring the land and the acquisitions under both these Acts are made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the aforesaid case before the Supreme Court, the question was whether for the purpose of acquiring the land, the amended provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 could be made applicable ipso facto to the acquisitions of lands under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 or not. In the aforesaid case before the Supreme Court, the question was whether for the purpose of acquiring the land, the amended provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 could be made applicable ipso facto to the acquisitions of lands under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 or not. In the present case also we have to consider as to whether the amendments made to Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984 could be made applicable ipso facto to the acquisitions of lands under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966. According to our opinion, the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, Bhatinda Improvement Trust (supra) will assume great importance and these observations will provide definite guidelines for deciding the issue before us in the present case. The Supreme Court in para eight of the aforesaid judgment has observed as under: "8. We find ourselves unable to accept the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant. As pointed out by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee in the aforesaid decisions, it is well settled law that where a statute is incorporated by a reference into a second statue, the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second. Similarly, in a case where a statute is incorporated by a reference into another statute an amendment of the statute so incorporated after the date of incorporation does not affect the second statute and the provisions of the latter statute remain the same as they were at the time of incorporation. It is again well settled that where one statute is referred to in another, it may be merely by way of reference or by way of incorporation of the same. This depends on the language used in the latter statute and other relevant circumstances. In the present case, however, we find that there is no question of incorporation of any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the said Act at all. The said Act does not deal with acquisition of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the said Act. In the present case, however, we find that there is no question of incorporation of any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the said Act at all. The said Act does not deal with acquisition of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the said Act. The acquisition of such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition Act which has to be resorted to for the purposes of acquisition of land for the purposes of the schemes contemplated under the said Act. The only difference is that some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as referred to in the relevant sections of said Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant sections of the said Act. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been incorporated into the said Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which have to be applied, are the provisions as they stand at the relevant time, namely, at the time of acquisition, in the absence of a contrary intention. There is nothing to indicate that there was any such contrary intention in the present case. In these circumstances, the notification under section 42 should have been published within the period of three years of the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, as required under the First Proviso to section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Under sub-clause (1) of Clause (2) of the Schedule to the said Act, which we have referred to earlier, the first publication of a notice of any improvement scheme under section 36 of the said Act, is substituted for and has the same effect as the publication of the Government Gazette of a notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The notice under section 36 of the said Act is required to be published, inter alia, in a newspaper or newspapers as set out in section 36(2)(a) of the said Act. In the present case, such a notice was first published in the daily Ajit on May 30, 1977, and hence, the notification under section 42 of the said Act should have been published on or before May 30, 1980. In the present case, such a notice was first published in the daily Ajit on May 30, 1977, and hence, the notification under section 42 of the said Act should have been published on or before May 30, 1980. In fact, the notification under section 42 of the said Act i.e. Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, admittedly, was published on June 30, 1980, and hence, was clearly beyond time. In these circumstances, the notice under section 36 of the said Act lapsed on the expiry of three years from May 30, 1977, and no action pursuant to the said notice could be taken thereafter. The notification under section 42 of the said Act was clearly beyond time and bad in law, as it was not published within the period provided. The acquisition proceedings lapsed. The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant must be rejected. No other point was canvassed before us." In the aforesaid para eight, after distinguishing a statute by incorporation and a statute by adoption by reference, as per the Supreme Court, the language used in the latter statute and other relevant circumstances have to be taken into consideration. Since the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 does not deal with the acquisition of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the said Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, according to the Supreme Court, acquisition of such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition Act. In the present case also, the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 does not deal with the acquisition of land for the purposes of plans or schemes contemplated under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. Therefore, for the acquisition of land for the purposes of such plans and schemes contemplated under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, according to our opinion, acquisition of land is left to the general law of the land, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which has to be resorted to for the purposes of the schemes and plans contemplated under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. The only difference is that some of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, as referred to in the relevant sections of the said Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant sections of the said Act. The only difference is that some of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, as referred to in the relevant sections of the said Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant sections of the said Act. The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case, therefore, observed that in these circumstances, it cannot be held that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been incorporated into the said Act i.e. the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which have to be applied, are the provisions as they stand at the relevant time, namely, at the time of acquisition, in the absence of a contrary intention. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held that there was no such contrary intention expressed in the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and, therefore, the Supreme Court held that in these circumstances, the notification under section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 should have been published within the period of three years from the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, as required under the First Proviso to section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the present case also for determining the compensation for the land acquired under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, there is no machinery provided under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966, nor is there any contrary intention expressed in the said M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 and, therefore, as per the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, according to our opinion, in the case of acquisition of lands under the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 also the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are adopted by reference and, therefore, the amended provisions under sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 are applicable to the respondents-claimants in this appeal. 29. At this stage, we may mention that the ratio of the case decided by the Division Bench of this Bombay High Court in (Ramchandra v. Collector)4, 1989 Maharashtra Law Journal 558 also supports our view. 30. The Advocate General also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd.)5, Judgement Today 1996(8) Supreme Court 16, more particularly on paragraphs 10 to 14 thereof. 30. The Advocate General also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd.)5, Judgement Today 1996(8) Supreme Court 16, more particularly on paragraphs 10 to 14 thereof. According to our opinion, the observations made by the Supreme Court in that case are not applicable as the said observations are made with reference to the procedural provisions of Land Acquisition Act and provisions of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. We have also held, by relying on para twelve of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Joginder Singh (supra) that the principles for determination of compensation are not procedural but the same form a substantive law. In view of this, observations contained in the aforesaid authority cited by the appellant-State are not of any help in deciding the issue in this matter. 31. In view of our aforesaid observations, we confirm the decision of the trial Court whereby the trial Court has granted the additional benefit under sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After dealing with the law point as aforesaid, we will now deal with the factual aspects of this appeal. This appeal is preferred by the Government challenging the compensation awarded by the trial Court. Under the award, the Land Acquisition Officer granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. metre. The trial Court has, however, granted Rs. 300/- per sq. metre in respect of the acquired land. The said compensation granted by the trial Court is the subject-matter of this First Appeal No. 1135 of 1966. On the other hand, the respondents-claimants have also preferred cross objections wherein they are demanding Rs. 400/ per sq. metre in place of Rs. 300/- per sq. metre awarded by the trial Court. The trial Court, while determining the valuation, in para five of its judgment, has observed that the land under acquisition is near Satana town. The same was acquired for extension of the State Transport Bus Depot. There are residential buildings, shops, Bank, nearby the land under acquisition. The suit land, though agricultural, had acquired non-agricultural potentialities. In the background of these facts, the trial Court scanned the evidence as led by the parties. Respondents-claimants led the evidence of certain sale instances. In all, the respondents-claimants relied upon three sale instances. There are residential buildings, shops, Bank, nearby the land under acquisition. The suit land, though agricultural, had acquired non-agricultural potentialities. In the background of these facts, the trial Court scanned the evidence as led by the parties. Respondents-claimants led the evidence of certain sale instances. In all, the respondents-claimants relied upon three sale instances. Admittedly, the relevant date for arriving at the figure of compensation is 7th May 1987. The first sale instance relied upon by the respondents-claimants is in respect of the land bearing Survey No. 115/3/2/1. It is dated 5th July 1984. Therefore, according to the claimants, taking into consideration the escalation in prices for three years, the valuation of the land on 7th May 1987 on the basis of this sale instance will come to about Rs. 395/- per sq. metre. The trial Court, took into consideration the fact that in the first sale instance, the land was a small piece of land i.e. 33.92 sq. metres while the land acquired in the present case was 5,800 sq. meters. The trial Court also took into consideration the fact that the said sale instance was of the year 1984 and the date of acquisition of the land under section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act was 7th May 1987. After taking all these aspects into consideration, the trial Court determined the valuation of the land acquired at the rate of Rs. 300/- per sq. metre. 32. Mr. Deshpande, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-Government, contended that for determining the market value on the basis of a comparable sale instance, the Court has to take into consideration the size, shape, yield and the potentiality of the land under acquisition. According to him, the land under acquisition was about 5800 sq. metres, while the land under the said sale instance dated 5th July 1984 is hardly 33.92 sq. metres and, therefore, the said sale instance ought not to have been taken into consideration by the trial Court. It is true that the land in the present case is quite large in size in comparison to the aforesaid sale instance relied upon by the respondents. However, the learned trial Judge has also taken into consideration the fact that the said sale instance is of 5th July 1984 while in respect of the land presently under acquisition valuation as on 7-5-1987 has to be arrived at. However, the learned trial Judge has also taken into consideration the fact that the said sale instance is of 5th July 1984 while in respect of the land presently under acquisition valuation as on 7-5-1987 has to be arrived at. It appears that the trial Court has given a set off towards the increase in the price from 1984 to 1987 as against circumstance that the said sale instance is in respect of a smaller piece of land and then arrived at the valuation of land under acquisition at Rs. 300/- per sq. metre. Therefore, it appears that the trial Court has applied its mind to the aspect that the aforesaid sale instance is in respect of a smaller plot of land and then arrived at the market value of Rs. 300/- per sq. metre in respect of the land under acquisition. Therefore, we do not find any reason to differ with the valuation arrived at by the trial Court. 33. The second sale instance relied upon by the respondents-claimants is the sale instance dated 5th August 1987. As per that sale instance, one Mr. Sambhaji had purchased land bearing Survey No. 118/11 admeasuring about 54.32 sq. metres at a price of Rs. 25.000/- i.e. at the rate of Rs. 460/- per sq. metre. The trial Court has first observed that the said sale instance is in respect of a smaller portion of land admeasuring 54.32 sq. metres, while the land under acquisition is a large plot of land about admeasuring 5800 sq. metres. Further, according to the trial Court, the land under acquisition in the present case is partly agricultural i.e. it is a bagayat land, while the land purchased by Sambhaji under the aforesaid sale instance dated 5th August 1987 was for residential purposes and the said plot of land had the facilities of electricity and road. Therefore, the trial Court discarded the said sale instance dated 5th August 1987 for the purpose of arriving at the figure of valuation in respect of the land under acquisition. 34. The third sale instance relied upon by the claimants for arriving at the figure of valuation in respect of the land under acquisition was the sale instance dated 30th July 1987 in respect of land bearing Survey No. 114/2/2. The said land admeasured 713.09 sq. metres and purchaser-Bank paid an amount of Rs. 4,60,500/- i.e. at the rate of Rs. The third sale instance relied upon by the claimants for arriving at the figure of valuation in respect of the land under acquisition was the sale instance dated 30th July 1987 in respect of land bearing Survey No. 114/2/2. The said land admeasured 713.09 sq. metres and purchaser-Bank paid an amount of Rs. 4,60,500/- i.e. at the rate of Rs. 650/- per sq. metre. As regards this sale instance, the trial Court observed that there is no evidence to show as to how the contract of purchase in respect of the said land was intered into. As regards this instance of sale dated 30th July, there were some formal talks between the parties and thereafter a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the Bank and the land was purchased on payment. Though this sale instance dated 30th July 1987 and the earlier sale instance pertaining to the land of Sambhaji was round about the same time when the notification under section 6, Land Acquisition Act, was issued i.e. 7th May, 1987, still the trial Court found that both the sale instances are not comparable instances of sale. According to the trial Court, in the land belonging to Sambhaji (sale instance dated 5th August 1987), there was no development, which was not available in respect of the land acquired, and as regards the plot of land purchased by the Bank viz. Survey No. 114/2/2, according to the trial Court, there was a housing activity thereon. The trial Court also observed that since the land under acquisition was an agricultural land, i.e. a bagayat land, the development for housing in this land would have taken few more years. Taking all these circumstance into consideration, the trial Court has arrived at the valuation of the land at Rs. 300/- (Rupees three hundred) per sq. metre, which according to us, is a reasonable valuation and there is no cause for disturbing the same finding. 35. At this stage, we may also mention that Mr. Paranjape, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, has drawn our attention to the cross-objections preferred by the respondents-claimants. Relying upon the aforesaid sale instances, the respondents-claimants have demanded compensation under their cross-objection compensation at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq. metre. We have heard Mr. Paranjape, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-claimants, and also the learned Advocate General. Relying upon the aforesaid sale instances, the respondents-claimants have demanded compensation under their cross-objection compensation at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq. metre. We have heard Mr. Paranjape, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-claimants, and also the learned Advocate General. According to our opinion, since the trial Court has given proper reasoning for arriving at the figure of valuation of the land at the rate of Rs. 300/- per sq. metre, we dismiss the Cross Objections filed on behalf of the respondents-claimants. 36. Hence the First Appeal No. 1135 of 1966 filed by the Appellant-State is dismissed. The cross objections filed by the respondents-claimants are also dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 21st August 1995 passed by the learned Joint District Judge, Nashik, in Land Reference No. 257 of 1990 is confirmed with no order as to costs. 37. Mr. Deshpande, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the appellant-State prays for stay of this order so as to enable the appellant-State to approach the Supreme Court. Mr. Paranjape, the learned Counsel for the respondents-claimant resisted the said application. Heard both sides. The judgment and decree passed by us in this First Appeal No. 1135 of 1966 is stayed for a period of six weeks from today in order to enable the Appellant -State to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court, if they decide to do so. 38. Copy of this judgment be sent to the trial Court. Authenticated and certified copies expedited. After the appeal period is over, copy of this judgment be sent to Civil Judges concerned with land acquisition references. Appeal cross objection dismissed. *****