Judgment : 1. THE award dated 9.7.1985 passed by the Presiding officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur in adjudication case No. 108 of 1980 and 196 of 1981 has been challenged by means of this writ petition. The petitioner's case, inter-alia, was that he was a son of an employee of the Central bank of India which had been following a policy of giving preference in the matter of appointment to the sons of its employees. The petitioner had worked for more than 240 days in a period of one year and had continued to work for three consecutive years. Pursuant to the said policy the petitioner was permitted to appear in a selection test in which he was successful. But subsequently, on the basis of a judgment of the Delhi High Court, the policy was reversed by a Circular dated 19.4.1976 issued by the Government of India, Department of Revenue (Banking Wing) (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) wherein the giving of preference to the sons and daughters of employees in future recruitment was discontinued. Admittedly, the petitioner was not recruited till then. 2. BY means of the impugned award the petitioner's claim was negatived because of the said circular, inter-alia on the finding that the petitioner did not complete 240 days of service within a period of one year and that by reason of such circular the petitioner could not have any vested right to appointment. M. K. P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the said award very fairly conceded that from the certificate granted to the petitioner it appears that the petitioner had worked only for 170 days within a period spreading over 3 years. Therefore, the question of 240 days cannot be espoused. In his usual fairness he did not press the said issue. 3. ON the question of the appointment of the petitioner by reason of his selection pursuant to the Bank Policy Mr. Agarwal submits that since the petitioner was successful in the selection test prior to the date of circular, therefore, the petitioner had acquired a vested right to appointment before the circular came into operation. Therefore, the learned Tribunal was wrong in refusing the petitioner's claim. It further contended that the tribunal in the case of S. P. Rastogi in I. D. case no. Therefore, the learned Tribunal was wrong in refusing the petitioner's claim. It further contended that the tribunal in the case of S. P. Rastogi in I. D. case no. 33 of 1980 by an award dated 2.7.85 in similar circumstances appointment was directed to be given. Mr. Agarwal contends that the petitioner is similarly situated as Mr. Rastogi was. Therefore, the relief could not be denied in the case of the petitioner. 4. A copy of the said award in the case of I. D. Case No. 43 of 1980 which is annexure-8 to the writ petition shows that one Sri Jhingaran was appointed much before 1976 denying the claim to the said Rastogi. Therefore, it had come to a finding that the appointment of Jhingaran having been made prior to the said circular could not be set-aside and since such appointment was made denying the right of Rastogi, therefore, Sri Rastogi should also be given appointment from the date when Sri Jhingaran was appointed. According to the tribunal Sri Rastogi had acquired a vested right to appointment prior to 1976 viz. the date when Jhingaran was given appointment. Whereas in the present case the facts are little different. No vested right to appointment have been found to have accrued to the petitioner by the tribunal. It is also not found that such right had accrued prior to 1976. Admittedly no recruitment could be made after the said circular was issued. If the petitioner's claim is allowed, in that event it would be allowing recruitment after 1976. In that event, without entering into the validity or legality of the award in I. D. case No. 33 of 1980 it can be said that the award of the tribunals are not present as is understood in legal parlance and not binding, even on the tribunal. It would be too much which also is fairly conceded by Mr. Agarwal to treat the award of the tribunal as precedent by the High court when the matter is before the High Court. 5. IF the contention of Mr. Agarwal is accepted, in that event, it would be contrary to and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and would not further advance the ends of justice. 6. IN that view of the matter I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the contention of Mr. 5. IF the contention of Mr. Agarwal is accepted, in that event, it would be contrary to and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and would not further advance the ends of justice. 6. IN that view of the matter I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the contention of Mr. Agarwal, on the other hand I find substance in the submission of Mr. S. N. Verma opposing the contention of Mr. Agarwal. In the result, the writ petition No. 17397 of 1986 fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, no order as to costs. 7. THE order passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 17397 of 1986 shall govern the writ petition No. 17396 of 1986 as it is admitted by Mr. K. P. Agarwal that both the awards are on identical issues on the basis of the same or similar facts accordingly the writ petition be no. 17396 of 1986 stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.