R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) ). The petitioner, a student of Dental college, challenges the impugned notification dated 25-5-1995 cancelling his result of Second BDS (Bachelor of Dental surgery) Examination which he passed in january 1995 standing first in the university in his batch. Under the impugned notification the earlier Notification dated 13-1-1995 was modified and the result of the petitioner was ordered to be treated as cancelled. The impugned Notification dated 25-5-1995 was communicated to the Dean of the College by the University under its letter dated 21-9-1995. In that letter the only reason given for cancellation of the petitioners result was that in the provisional eligibility certificate which was issued in favour of the petitioner it was mentioned that he would be eligible to appear in the examination of Second BDS which will be held 12 months after joining the Second BDS course and despite this condition, the petitioner had without the knowledge of the College and the university appeared in October 1994 at the second BDS examination, though due in may 1995 as per the said condition. ( 2 ) THE petitioner who had done his first bds course from the Buddha Institute of dental Science, Patna, took transfer to the government Dental College, Ahmedabad and started attending classes from January 1994 for the Second BDS course. The petitioner was provisionally admitted in the first term of the second BDS course of october batch 1993-94 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the Government resolution dated 13-1-1994. Under that order the Government had granted transfer of the petitioner in the first term of Second bds course. The transfer was allowed on the petitioners paying transfer fees of Rs. 10,000/- before joining the Dental College, ahmedabad. It is thus clear that the petitioner joined first term of Second BDS course which commenced in November 1993. Thereafter, admittedly the petitioner was allowed to join the Second term from june 1994 to October 1994. After completion of that Second term the petitioner was allowed to appear at the second BDS examination which was held in November 1994. The result of the examination was declared on 13-1-1995 in which the petitioner was declared successful and according to him he stood first in his batch securing 416 marks out of 600 marks. After completion of that Second term the petitioner was allowed to appear at the second BDS examination which was held in November 1994. The result of the examination was declared on 13-1-1995 in which the petitioner was declared successful and according to him he stood first in his batch securing 416 marks out of 600 marks. Admittedly, without following any procedure the University proceeded to cancel the result of the petitioner by issuing the impugned Notification dated 25-5-1995, a copy of which seems to have been sent to the Dean by the University only on 21-9- 1995 for being served on the petitioner. ( 3 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned Notification was issued beyond a period of 3 months from the declaration of result on 13-1-1995 and therefore it contravened the provisions of the second part of Ordinance 146, of the ordinance framed by the respondent- university, which lays down that result of no candidate at any University examination shall be altered to his detriment after 3 months from the declaration of the result except when the case of such candidate falls under Ordinance 134 or 147. It was submitted that the respondent-University was estopped from now cancelling the result of Second BDS examination of the petitioner. Reliance was placed, in support of this submission, on the decisions of the supreme Court in the cases of Sanatan gauda v. Berhampur University reported in air 1990 SC 1075 , A. Sudha v. University of Mysore reported in AIR 1987 SC 2305 and Smita Johnbhai v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1981 SC 1633 . It was also submitted that the impugned Notification which adversely affected the petitioner was issued behind his back and without giving him any hearing whatsoever. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent-University on the other hand contended that in the provisional eligibility certificate which was issued by the university in favour of the petitioner there was a specific condition that the petitioner could appear at the Second BDS examination only 12 months after the date of his admission in the BDS class and that he was being admitted for the academic year 1994-95. This provisional eligibility certificate was issued on 1-2-1994. This provisional eligibility certificate was issued on 1-2-1994. It was further argued that the petitioner had committed improper conduct by appearing at the Second BDS examination which was held in November 1994 because he had acted contrary to the aforesaid condition which was incorporated in his provisional eligibility certificate. It was argued that the requirement of completing 12 months after joing the class was the requirement under the University Ordinances and Regulations which had statutory effect and therefore the petitioner cannot plead any estoppel against a statute. It was argued that the petitioner had the knowledge of the fact that he could not have appeared at the Second BDS examination before lapse of 12 months from the date on which he joined the Second bds examination and therefore estoppel could not be pleaded against the action of the University in cancelling the result of the petitioner on the ground that he had appeared at the said examination before completion of 12 months period mentioned in the provisional eligibility certificate. It was also submitted that there could be no estoppel against public policy and therefore in the instant case since the question of university discipline was involved, inasmuch as only those who had duly kept their terms could appear at the examination, no estoppel can be pleaded against the university by the petitioner since he had not duly kept his terms. It was also contended that the form of the petitioner was forwarded by the College under mistake because he could not have completed the requisite attendance in the first term which he joined in the latter part of January 1994. In support of his contentions the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision in C. Vasantkumar Radhakisan vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay reported in AIR 1991 SC 14 , M. P. Sugar Mills v. State of U. P. reported in air 1979 SC 621 , Prasun Roy v. Calcutta m. D. Authority reported in AIR 1988 SC 205 (207), Maddanappa v. Chandramma reported in AIR 1965 SC 1812 , Pradip v. Gujarat University reported in AIR 1985 guj. 99 . ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner was permitted to join first term of Second BDS course which was from November 1993 to april 1994. He thereafter completed his second term also and his examination form was forwarded by the Dean to the university. 99 . ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner was permitted to join first term of Second BDS course which was from November 1993 to april 1994. He thereafter completed his second term also and his examination form was forwarded by the Dean to the university. He did appear at the examination held in November 1994 and passed out with flying colours in January 1995. The main grievance of the University against his result is that he appeared at the examination though in the provisional eligibility certificate which was issued to him a condition was incorporated that he could appear at the examination only after a lapse of 12 months from the date of his joining the Second BDS Class. The provisions of Ordinance 70 which relate to admission of students from other universities prescribe a form of eligibility. There is no provision therein for imposing conditions. The topic of the form is only regarding eligibility of the student for admission to a particular class in the university. The Government had passed resolution dated 18-1-1994 allowing the transfer of the petitioner to the first term of second BDS. The provisional admission was also granted to the petitioner on the basis of that Resolution in the first term of october batch 1993-94. When the petitioner was eligible to join first term of october batch 1993-94 then obviously he would become entitled to appear at the examination intended for that batch if he had duly kept his two academic terms and there was no scope for the imposition of any condition in the provisional eligibility certificate that the petitioner could appear at the examination only after a lapse of 12 months from the date of joining the class. This is more so if we consider the relevant provisions relating to the terms which are to be kept by such candidates and which do not refer to any specific period of 12 months. Under Ordinance 74 the academic year of the University is divided into two terms and for faculties of Medicine, pharmacy, and Dental Surgery the first term commences from 15th June and concludes on 20th October while the second term commences from 11th November and concludes on 7th April. The Vice- chancellor is empowered to permit rearrangement of a term on account of diwali Holidays or any academic programme or any other reasons deemed sufficient by him. The Vice- chancellor is empowered to permit rearrangement of a term on account of diwali Holidays or any academic programme or any other reasons deemed sufficient by him. It is inter alia provided under Ordinance 369 relating to second year examination for the degree of BDS (New Course) that no candidate shall be admitted to Second BDS examination unless he has passed the First BDS examination and for at least two years after joining Dental College recognised by this university and produces the required certificate. Under Ordinance 369-A no candidate shall be admitted to the second year examination unless he produces certificates of the Dean of good character and of having attended not less than three quarter of hours of the course extending over two terms in each of the subjects of examination and has completed the requirements to the satisfaction of the heads of the respective departments. There is therefore a specific provision regarding certificate to be issued in respect of the attendance of a student of Second Year bds course. Clause (ii) of Ordinance 369- a requires minimum attendance of three- quarter of hours of course extending over two terms in each of the subjects. Therefore, his hours of attendance over two terms were required to be considered. This specific provision regarding requirement of attendance by a candidate requiring to attend the second year examination is a specific provision and therefore would apply in the case of the petitioner. Reference to other general provisions regarding attendance of students would therefore not be relevant in view of this specific provision. Admittedly, the Dean had forwarded the form of the petitioner for allowing him to appear at the examination which was to be held in November 1994. The assumption would, therefore, be that the Dean had found that the petitioner had complied with the requirement of attendance of not less than three-quarter of the hours of the course extending over two terms in each of the subjects as envisaged by Ordinance 369-A (ii ). ( 6 ) AS noted above under the provision of ordinance 74 an academic year has reference to two terms and it does not speak of any period of 12 months which was imposed in the provisional eligibility certificate which was issued to the petitioner. The objection that the petitioner did not duly keep his term was never taken up by the Dean or the University. The objection that the petitioner did not duly keep his term was never taken up by the Dean or the University. There is a contention now raised that the Dean had forwarded his form to the University under a mistake but that contention seems to have been hurriedly taken in ignorance of the provisions of the Ordinance 369-A (ii ). If the petitioner had not duly kept his terms then as per second part of Ordinance 83a his name would have been treated as cancelled from the list of candidates for the examination and his fees would have been refunded in full. That was never done. The petitioner seems to have acted under a reasonable and bona fide belief that since he was allowed to join the first term commencing from October 1993 and he also kept the second term from June 1994 he was eligible to appear at the Second bds examination which was to be held in november 1994. Therefore, there was no improper conduct on the part of the petitioner in offering his form for being forwarded to the University. Even the Dean forwarded that form and there is no reason to believe that he acted carelessly. In any event since there was no improper conduct on the part of the petitioner, his result which was declared on 13-1-1995 could not have been altered to his detriment in May 1995 under the impugned Notification. Under Ordinance 146 in second paragraph it is specifically provided that"notwithstanding anything contained above, the result of no candidate at any University examination shall be altered to his detriment after three months from the declaration of the result except when his case falls under Ordinances 134 and 147". Admittedly, the petitioners case did not fall under Ordinance 134. It was contended by the respondent-University that his case fell under Ordinance 147 since he had conducted himself improperly by appearing at the examination. It cannot be said that the petitioner appeared at the examination without the knowledge of the College or the university, As noted above since he was allowed to join first term and had already completed the second term, he legitimately offered himself for the Second BDS examination which was held at the conclusion of these two terms in November 1994. It cannot be said that the petitioner appeared at the examination without the knowledge of the College or the university, As noted above since he was allowed to join first term and had already completed the second term, he legitimately offered himself for the Second BDS examination which was held at the conclusion of these two terms in November 1994. When he was eligible under the university Ordinance to appear at the said examination that eligibility could not have been taken away in advance by imposing an uncalled for condition of 12 months lapse of period from the dale of joining the class which was incorporated in the provisional eligibility certificate. Therefore, apart from the general doctrine of estoppel, under the provisions ol Ordinance 146 itself the result of the petitioner cannot be cancelled. Even paragraph 2 of Ordinance 83a has to be read in harmony with the second paragraph of Ordinance 146. Under second paragraph of Ordinance 83a if any of the terms is not duly kept by a candidate as per the requirement of the University for the relevant course of the studies, be shall not be permitted to appear in the examination concerned and in the event of his appearing in the examination his name shall be deemed to be cancelled from the list of candidate for the examination and his fees shall be refunded in full. When however a result becomes liable to bo cancelled on the ground that the candidate had not duly kept his term then that should be done within the outer limit of 3 months envisaged in second part of Ordinance 146 unless the case falls under Ordinances 134 and 147. The petitioners case does not at all fall under ordinances 134 and 147 and is clearly covered by second part of Ordinance 146 and therefore his result could not have been cancelled. In fact, the second part of paragraph (1) of Ordinance 146 itself incorporates the principle of estoppel. The university after a period of 3 months is estopped from cancelling the result of a candidate unless there is malpractice, fraud or improper conduct under Ordinance 147 or unless the case falls under Ordinance 134. In fact, the second part of paragraph (1) of Ordinance 146 itself incorporates the principle of estoppel. The university after a period of 3 months is estopped from cancelling the result of a candidate unless there is malpractice, fraud or improper conduct under Ordinance 147 or unless the case falls under Ordinance 134. ( 7 ) IN this context we may profitably refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University reported in AIR 1990 SC 1075 in which it was held that the University was estopped from refusing to declare the result of the appellants examination when he was permitted to appear at the pre-law and intermediate examinations and admitted to final year of the course. In that case, the candidate while securing his admission in the law college had admittedly submitted his mark-sheet along with the application for admission but Law College had admitted him and he had pursued his studies for two years. The University had also granted him the admission card for pre-Law and Intermediate Law examinations. He was permitted to appear at those examinations. It was only at the stage of declaration of this result of Pre- law and Inter-Law examinations that the university raised objection to his ineligibility to be admitted to the Law course. It was held that the University was clearly estopped from refusing to declare the results of the appellants examination or from preventing him from pursuing his final year course. In the process it was held that the plea that the Principal wrongly assured the University authorities that he had verified the position and that all the candidates were eligible would not be tenable. It was observed that the Principal could not be condemned for recommending the candidature of the appellant for the examination in question and it was the boundan duty of the University to have scrutinised the matter thoroughly before permitting the appellant to appear at the examination and not having done so it cannot refuse to publish his results. Even in that case it was observed that the student was not guilty of any fraud or misrepresentation. Therefore, even on the ratio of the decision in Sanatan Gauda (supra) the University could not have cancelled the petitioners result since there was absolutely no malpractice, fraud or improper conduct on his part. Even in that case it was observed that the student was not guilty of any fraud or misrepresentation. Therefore, even on the ratio of the decision in Sanatan Gauda (supra) the University could not have cancelled the petitioners result since there was absolutely no malpractice, fraud or improper conduct on his part. ( 8 ) UNDER these circumstances, the petition succeeds and the impugned notification No. 348 of 1995 dated 21-5- 1995 and the consequential order dated 21- 9-1995 of the University are hereby set aside. Rule is made absolute according with no order as to costs. As a consequence of this order the result of the petitioner for third BDS which has been withheld will now be declared. Rule made absolute. .