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1996 DIGILAW 661 (PAT)

Barmeshwar Dayal v. State Of Bihar

1996-10-01

ASOK KUMAR GANGULY

body1996
Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 5.11.1985 passed by Respondent No.3, the Deputy inspector-General of Police, Central range, Patna by which the punishment of dismissal from service was imposed upon the petitioner. On the basis of various charges a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, being Departmental proceeding No.28/77. The petitioner has made various averments in the writ petition to the effect that he is not guilty of the charges and he has been made a victim. Even though there is no counter affidavit to the averments made in the writ petition, this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction is not going into those question of facts. 3. Learned Counsel of the petitioner has contended that the imposition of penalty of dismissal against the petitioner by the Deputy Inspector general of Police, Respondent No.3 is violative of Police Manual, particular rule 825 (c) of the said Manual. The said Rule 825 (c) of the Bihar Police manual is set out below:- "825 (c) A Deputy Inspector-General may Impose any police officer subordinate to him and below the rank of Deputy superintendent any of the punishments in rule 824 except dismissal, compulsory retirement and removal in the case of an Inspector. " 4. From a perusal of the said Rule, it is clear that the Deputy inspector-General of Police may impose on any police officer subordinate to him and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent any of the punishments excepting the punishment of (a) dismissal (b)compulsory retirement and (c) removal in the case of an Inspector. 5. In the instant case by the impugned order the Deputy Inspector general of Police, Respondent No.3 has imposed upon the petitioner the punishment of dismissal from service in the year 1985. It is an admitted position that in the year 1981 the petitioner has become the Inspector as has been stated in paragraph 10 of the writ petition. So when the order of dismissal was passed against him, he was an Inspector. 6. The learned Advocate-General has contended when the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner he was Sub-Inspector of police and, as such, the said Rule 825 (c)would not be a bar to the imposition of penalty of dismissal on him by the respondent No.3. 7. So when the order of dismissal was passed against him, he was an Inspector. 6. The learned Advocate-General has contended when the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner he was Sub-Inspector of police and, as such, the said Rule 825 (c)would not be a bar to the imposition of penalty of dismissal on him by the respondent No.3. 7. I am unable to accept this contention in view of the aforementioned rule 855 (c) of the Bihar Police manual. Apart from that, this Court is of the view that the provision of Rule 825 (c) is a penal provision for imposition of penalty on a delinquent servant. In interpreting such a provision, the court will keep in its mind the cardinal rule of construction that when a penal provision admits of two reasonable construction, the one in favour of the delinquent must be preferred to the one which supports the donee of the power. Here, of course, the provision of Rule 825 (c) of the Manual is simple and does not admit of any ambiguity. The mandate is clear about the limited authority of the Deputy Inspector-General of police to impose certain punishment on certain Officers. 8. Therefore this Court comes to the conclusion, on the basis of the uncontroverted facts in the writ petition, that the order of dismissal was illegally passed against the petitioner when he was an Inspector of Police. In that view of the matter, the impugned order of dismissal which was imposed upon the petitioner is clearly beyond the competence of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. 9. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ-petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 5.11.1985 (Annexure-1) is quashed. Since the petitioner is continuing in service by virtue of the stay granted by a Division Bench of this court by its order dated 18.12.1985, there is no question of ordering his reinstatement. The petitioner must be given all consequential benefits, if any, on the basis that no order of dismissal was ever passed against him. No order as to costs. Petition Allowed.