JUDGMENT 1. - In this Petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code , the petitioners are challenging their prosecution launched under Section 29(1) read with Section 3(k) of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (here in-after to be referred to as the Act) and also the process issued to them. Normally, this Court, in exercise of power under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code , is reluctant to interfere in initial stages of the criminal proceedings, but the questions raised in this petition are not only important questions of law, but go to the root of the case requiring serious consideration. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in this petition, it would be conducive to detail out the undisputed necessary facts, in brief, which are thus : Shri Ishpal Singh, Insecticide Inspector, in exercise of powers under section 21(1) of the Act took sample of insecticide known as 'demethote 30% EC' in three sealed containers of 100 N. each from M/s Choudhary Beej Bhandar, Khood (Sikar) on 24.8.93 for getting it analysed/tested by the Insecticide Analyst. One part of the sample (i.e. one container of 100 Ml.) after suitably marking and sealing the same, was sent for analysis to the Insecticide Analyst i.e. State Pesticide Testing Laboratory, Durgapura, Jaipur. On analysis by the Insecticide Analyst, the sample was found mis-branded as it did not conform to the specifications vide report dated, October 21, 1993. The Insecticide Inspector, on receipt of test/analysis report on 27.10.93, delivered one copy of the report to M/s Choudhary Beej Bhandar, Khood, from whom the sample was taken alongwith a notice to show cause as to why legal action be not taken under the Act. In notice it was made dear to notify within 28 days of receipt of the report, its intention of adducing evidence in contravention of the report by getting second sample analysed in the Central Insecticide Laboratory (for short CIL). Copies of show-cause notice were forwarded to (i) M/s Bharat Insecticides Ltd., New Delhi-manufacturer of the insecticide (ii) Joint Director, Agriculture (Plant Protection)/Dy. Director, Agriculture (Quality Control) Rajasthan Jaipur and (iii) Dy. Director, Agriculture (Extension)/Registration Officer, Sikar for necessary action. It may be stated here that a copy of the report of Insecticide Analyst was not sent to M/s Bharat Insecticides Ltd. alongwith show cause notice. Director, Agriculture (Quality Control) Rajasthan Jaipur and (iii) Dy. Director, Agriculture (Extension)/Registration Officer, Sikar for necessary action. It may be stated here that a copy of the report of Insecticide Analyst was not sent to M/s Bharat Insecticides Ltd. alongwith show cause notice. However, M/s Bharat Insecticides Ltd. the manufacturer, vide their communication dated 11th November, 1993 gave reply to the show cause notice. While explaining their stand about sub-standard of the insecticide, the Company, disagreeing with the report, requested the Agriculture Officer (Plant Protection),/Insecticide Inspector to get another sample re-tested/re-analysed in the CIL making it further clear that the Company will bear the expenses of retesting. It appears that inspite of notification of the intention by the Company within 28 days of the receipt of show-cause notice, no step was taken by the concerned officer to get another sample tested in the CIL. However, no such notification expressing intention of adducing evidence in contravention of the report by getting the second sample examined in the CIL was made by the dealer from whom the sample of insecticide was taken by the Inspector. 3. On disclosure by the dealer to have purchased the insecticide from the distributor M/s Jai Kishan Beej Bhandar, Sikar, a sister concern of M/s Kishan Beej Bhandar, Sikar, a similar notice to show-cause alongwith a copy of the Insecticide Analyst's report was given to it. 4. After obtaining necessary written consent, as required under section 31(1) of the Act, from the joint Director, Agriculture (Plant Protection), Rajasthan, Jaipur dated, July 26, 1994 a complaint came to be filed on 18.10.94 in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar, by the Insecticide Inspector/Agriculture Officer (Plant Protection) against the petitioners. On this complaint, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under section 29 of the Act and issued process to all the accused-petitioners. 5. Shri Dharam Chand Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the accused, vehemently contended that the manufacturing Company and its Directors, who have been arrayed as accused in the case, were not delivered or served upon with a copy of the report of the Analyst, but still the Company within 28 days of receipt of show-cause notice from Insecticide Inspector, expressed its intention controverting Analyst's report and to get the second sample examined in the CIL. In spite of that the concerned Inspector did not take steps to get the second sample examined and by the time the complaint was filed, the self-life of the product had expired and as such, they were deprived of their valuable right to get the sample re-tested under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act due to inordinate delay in launching of prosecution. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that the manufacturing Company and its Directors having not been given an opportunity to controvert the report and the prosecution having been launched after expiry of the date of self-life of the insecticide, the prosecution must fail. In support of this contention, learned counsel relied upon certain decisions which shall be referred later on. Another limb of the argument was that there are no allegations in the complaint and there is no material also on the record that the Directors of the Company were incharge of the Company or were responsible to it for the conduct of its business or that the offence was committed with their consent or convenience (sic connivance) or is attributable to any negligence on their part. According to the learned counsel, merely being Directors of the Company, they cannot be made criminally liable. For the dealer M/s Choudhary Beej Bhandar, and its proprietor, Shri Raghunath and the distributors-M/s Jai Kishan Beej Bhandar and its Proprietor, Shri Deepak Dayal, learned counsel urged that admittedly, the sample was taken in sealed containers which were manufactured by M/s Bharat Insecticide Ltd. (Petitioner No.1) and if the same was found to be misbranded or sub-standard, no criminal liability could be fastened on them. Leanred counsel also contended that on account of inordinate delay in launching prosecution, they were denied of their valuable right as before the trial Court they were entitled to make a prayer to get the third sample analysed in the CIL. For all these reasons, learned counsel contended that allowing the proceedings to continue against these petitioners would amount an abuse of the process of the Court and it is a fit case to invoke extra-ordinary power under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code as no useful purpose shall be served in continuation of criminal proceedings. 6. For all these reasons, learned counsel contended that allowing the proceedings to continue against these petitioners would amount an abuse of the process of the Court and it is a fit case to invoke extra-ordinary power under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code as no useful purpose shall be served in continuation of criminal proceedings. 6. Shri R.S. Agrawal, learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand, contended that under the provisions of the Act, the Insecticide Inspector was not obliged to deliver a copy of the report to all the accused except the person from whom the same is taken and as such, the prosecution cannot stand vitiated by non-supply of a copy of the Analyst's Report to them. It was also contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that even after the expiry of self-life of the product, the sample could be sent to the CIL for analysis and no benefit can be derived by the accused at this stage unless the sample is found to be unfit for examination. According to him, the manufacturing Company or its Directors, as well as, the distributors of the insecticide have no right to get the sample re-analysed in the CIL and this right was available only to the person or the firm from whom the sample was taken by the Inspector. It was further contended that the Directors of the Company, by virtue of holding their posts, can be said to be incharge or responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company and unless they prove otherwise by leading cogent evidence, they are liable for manufacturing and selling the mis-branded insecticide. Lastly, it was contended that the questions raised in this petition should be left for the decision of the concerned trial Magistrate and no interference can be made by this Court at this stage in exercise of power under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 7. I have given my careful consideration to the rival contentions made before me by the learned counsel and I also carefully examined the relevant law in light of the above submissions. 8. At this juncture, it would be useful to briefly examine the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules as the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners have a bearing on their interpretation. 8. At this juncture, it would be useful to briefly examine the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules as the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners have a bearing on their interpretation. The Insecticides Act, 1968 is a Central Act, which has been enacted to regulate the import, manufacture, sale, transport, distribution and use of insecticides with a view, to prevent risk to human beings or animals and for matters connected therewith. Section 16 of the Act provides that the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette establish a Central Insecticides Laboratory (CIL) under the control of a Director to be appointed by the Central Government to carry out functions entrusted to it by or under the Act. Section 17 prohibits of import and manufacture of certain Insecticides enumerated therein and Section 18 prohibits of sale etc. of certain insecticides mentioned in the section. Then, Section 19 makes a provision for the appointment of Insecticide Analysts possessing such technical and other qualifications as may be prescribed. Similarly, Section 20 makes provisions for appointment of Insecticides Inspectors, possessing such technical and other qualifications as may be prescribed, for different areas as may be specified in the notification of the Central Government or the State Government. Section 21 describes the powers of Insecticide Inspectors, which include taking of sample of any insecticide and send such sample for analysis to the Insecticide Analyst. Rule 27 of the Insecticides Rules, 1971, framed by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by Section 36 of the Act, enumerates the duties of a Insecticide Inspector. They include, inspection of such establishments selling insecticides within the area of his jurisdiction and do institute prosecution in respect of breaches of the Act and the rules made there-under. Rule 28, then, describes the duties of Inspectors specially authorised to inspect manufacturers of insecticides. They include inspection of all premises licensed for the manufacture of insecticide within the area of his jurisdiction at least twice a year to satisfy that the conditions of the licence and the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder are observed and also to draw samples of the insecticides manufactured in the premises and send them for test or analysis in accordance with the rules. Section 22 of the Act describes the procedure to be followed by the Insecticide Inspector and sub-sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 deal with the procedure to be followed for taking sample of an insecticide. Sub-section (3) says that where an Insecticide Inspector takes any sample of any insecticide, he shall tender the fair price thereof and may require a written acknowledgment therefor. Sub-section (4), then, states that where the price tendered under sub-section (3) is refused or where the Insecticide Inspector seizes the stock of any insecticide under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 21, he shall tender a receipt therefor in the prescribed form. Sub-section (5) provides that the Inspector taking sample for the purpose of test or analysis shall intimate such purpose in writing in the prescribed form to the persons from whom the sample is taken. It also provides that he shall divide the sample into three portions and effectively seal and suitably mark the same and permit such person to add his own seal and mark to all or any of the portions. Where the insecticide is made up in containers of small volume, instead of dividing the samples as aforesaid, the Inspector shall take three of such containers. Then, sub-section (6) requires the Inspector to restore one portion of a sample so divided or one container, as the case may be, to the person from whom the sample is taken and shall retain the remainder and dispose of the same as follows : (i) One portion or container, he shall forthwith send to the Insecticide Analyst for test or analysis, and (ii) The second, he shall produce to the Court before which proceedings, if any, are instituted in respect of the insecticide. 9. Section 24 of the Act deals with the report of Insecticide Analyst. As interpretation of this Section shall be required for deciding the present petition, it would be fruitful to reproduce the whole of the section which runs as under:- "24. Report of Insecticide Analyst-(1) The Insecticide Analyst to whom a sample of any insecticide has been submitted for test or analysis under sub-section (6) of section 22, shall within a period of sixty days, deliver to the Insecticide Inspector submitting it a signed report in duplicate in the prescribed form. Report of Insecticide Analyst-(1) The Insecticide Analyst to whom a sample of any insecticide has been submitted for test or analysis under sub-section (6) of section 22, shall within a period of sixty days, deliver to the Insecticide Inspector submitting it a signed report in duplicate in the prescribed form. (2) The Insecticide Inspector on receipt thereof shall deliver one copy of the report to the persons from whom the sample was taken and shall retain the other copy for use in any prosecution in respect of the sample. (3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conducive unless the person from whom the sample was taken has within 28 days of the receipt of a copy of the report notified in writing the Insecticide Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to up adduce evidence in contravention of the report. (4) Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central Insecticides Laboratory, where a person has under sub-section (3) notified his intention of adducing evidence in controversion of the Insecticide Analyst's report, the Court may, of its own motion or in its discretion, at the request either of the complainant or of the accused, cause the sample of insecticide produced before the Magistrate under sub-section (6) of Section 22 to be sent for test or analysis to the said Laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis and report in writing signed by, or under the authority of the Director of the Central Insecticides Laboratory the result thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. (5) The cost of a test or analysis made by the Central Insecticide Laboratory under sub-section (4) shall be paid by the complainant or the accused, as the Court shall direct. 10. Section 29 deals with the offences and punishment. Section 30 provides for some defences which may or may not be allowed in prosecution under the Act. Section 31 provides for cognizance and trial of the offences and section 33 deals with the offences committed by the companies. 11. 10. Section 29 deals with the offences and punishment. Section 30 provides for some defences which may or may not be allowed in prosecution under the Act. Section 31 provides for cognizance and trial of the offences and section 33 deals with the offences committed by the companies. 11. A perusal and survey of the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules manifest the following things:- (i) The Insecticides Inspector taking a sample of insecticide for the purpose of test or analysis shall divide the same in three portions and if the container of insecticide is of small volume, he shall take three of such containers. One portion of the sample or a container, as the case may be, shall be immediately sent by him to the Insecticide Analyst for test of analysis after taking all precautions as described by the relevant provisions. The second portion of the sample or container shall be restored to the person from whom he takes the sample. The third portion/container of the sample shall be produced to the Court before which proceedings, if any, are initiated in respect of the insecticide, in case the sample does not conform to the prescribed standards or is mis-branded. (ii) The Insecticide Analyst to whom a sample of any insecticide is sent for test or analysis shall within a period of sixty days deliver to the Insecticide Inspector submitting it a signed report in duplicate in the prescribed form. (iii) The Insecticide Inspector on receipt of the report shall deliver one copy of the said report to the person from whom the sample was taken and shall retain the other copy for the use in any prosecution in respect of the sample. (iv) The report of the Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken, has within 28 days of the receipt of a copy of the report notified in writing to the Insecticide Inspector or the Court before which any proceeding in respect of the sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in contravention of the report. (v) The Court/Magistrate before whom any criminal proceeding in respect of the sample is pending may, of its own motion or in its discretion at the request either of the complainant or of the accused, cause the third sample of insecticide produced before him to be sent for test or analysis to the Central Insecticides Laboratory (CIL) provided (a) the sample has not been already tested or analysed in the Central Insecticides Laboratory (CIL) and (b) where the person has under sub-section (3) notified his intention of adducing evidence in contravention of the Insecticide Analyst's report. 12. At the out-set, it may be stated that Section 24 is not happily worded. However, the object behind sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) is clear which is to provide an opportunity to a person accused of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act to have the sample tested or analysed in the CIL in order to challenge the report of the Insecticide Analyst-The report of Insecticide Analyst is subject to the report of the CIL and were there is such report, it supersedes the report of Insecticide Analyst and is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. In absence of any report of the CIL, the report of Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein. The emphasis in section 24 is to get a export from the CIL if no such report is obtained earlier. A combined reading of sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) further makes it clear that the opportunity to challenge the report or Insecticide Analyst is to be availed of within 28 days of the receipt of a copy of the report and if such opportunity is not availed within this period, then sub-section (3) says that the report of Insecticide Analyst shall be conclusive. 13. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 enjoins an obligation on the Insecticide Inspector to deliver one copy of the report to the person from whom the sample is taken by him and sub-section (3) also states that the report of Insecticide Analyst shall become conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was taken, within 28 days of the receipt of a copy of the report, notified in writing to Insecticide Inspector or the Court his intention to adduce evidence in contravention of the report. The above provisions, no doubt, do not make it obligatory for the Insecticide Inspector to deliver a copy of the Analyst's report to all the accused against whom it is sought to be used, but sub-section (4) provides an opportunity to a person accused in the case to have the sample tested or analysed in the CIL. The word 'accused' used in sub-section (4) is wide and comprehensive and would include all persons against whom cognizance is taken and process is issued by the concerned Magistrate. Thus, other persons, other than the person from whom the sample has been taken may also be the accused, for example, the manufacturer, the distributors etc. as in the present case. The intention of the Legislature cannot be to provide the benefit of re-testing or re-analysing by the CIL only to the person from whom the sample is taken and to deprive others of such benefit. To give such interpretation would be discriminatory and violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice also. The report of Insecticide Analyst is admissible in evidence against all the accused as the said report is sought to be used against every accused. Hence, interpretation of sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 24 should be given in such manner which would lead to justice. In order to enable every accused to challenge the correctness and authenticity of report of Insecticide Analyst it is necessary that Analyst's report should be made available to all of them. It is, therefore, implicit in Section 24(2) of the Act, having regard to the intendment of the Legislature expressed in sub-section (4), that a copy of the report of the Insecticide Analyst should be delivered to or served upon all the accused against whom it is sought to be used. It may be however, observed that failure to furnish a copy of the report to all the accused persons would not by itself vitiate the prosecution unless prejudice is occasioned to the accused persons for not supplying them a copy of the Analyst's report. 14. It may be however, observed that failure to furnish a copy of the report to all the accused persons would not by itself vitiate the prosecution unless prejudice is occasioned to the accused persons for not supplying them a copy of the Analyst's report. 14. On a deep and careful consideration to the purpose and intendment of section 24 and the scheme of the Act, I am of the view that this section should receive the interpretation to lay down the following guidelines : (a) On receipt of Insecticide Analayst's report, the Insecticide Inspector shall deliver one copy of the report to the person from whom the sample is taken. In case the sample is found sub-standard or misbranded and the Inspector intends to launch prosecution against other persons also, then a copy of the said report should be made available to all the accused against whom the report is sought to be used in order to give them an opportunity to challenge the correctness or authenticity of the report within the specified time as provided in sub-section (3). (b) The right to challenge Analyst's report within 28 days of the receipt of a copy of such report as provided in sub-section (3) should be available to all the accused against whom the report is sought to be used in the criminal prosecution. (c) If the correctness of Analyst's report is challenged by the person from whom the sample was taken or any other accused within the prescribed period, the Insecticide Inspector is bound to send the second part of the sample/container, which was restored to the person from whom the sample was taken to the CIL for re-testing or re-analysing. If this interpretation is not taken, the very purpose of giving one part of the sample to the person from whom it was taken shall be meaningless. Further, the opening words of sub-section (4) "Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central Insecticides Laboratory" indicate that the second sample can be got analysed or tested in the CIL without intervention of the Court. (d) In case the second sample is sent for re-testing or re-analysing in the CIL as aforesaid, the report of the CIL shall be conclusive and there would be no further right to any accused to get the third sample produced in the Court to be analysed or re-tested in the CIL. (d) In case the second sample is sent for re-testing or re-analysing in the CIL as aforesaid, the report of the CIL shall be conclusive and there would be no further right to any accused to get the third sample produced in the Court to be analysed or re-tested in the CIL. (e) In case, the second sample is not analysed or re-tested as aforesaid for any reason, including that criminal proceedings in respect of the sample are pending in the Court, the third sample may be sent for analysing or re-testing by the Court on its own motion or at the request either of the complainant or of the accused, as the case may be. (f) After receipt of a copy of Analyst' s report if the same is not challenged by any of the accused within the prescribed period, it would be conclusive under Section 24(3) of the Act and it would not be open to be challenged by them in the criminal proceedings which are pending or initiated against them. In that situation, it would not be open for them to say that they have been deprived of their right to get the sample re-tested or re-analysed in the CIL. In case, the Analyst's report was not made available to other accused before launching prosecution against them, they should have a right to get a report from the CIL by making request to the court concerned to get the third sample produced in court retested or re-analysed. (g) In case the second part of the sample is not sent to the CIL for re-test or re-analysis inspite of the notification expressing intention to adduce evidence in contravention of the report made within 28 days and the prosecution is launched after inordinate delay i.e. after expiry of self-life period of the insecticide, then it would be fatal to the prosecution as it would deprive the accused of their valuable right to get the sample tested or analysed in the CIL. 15. The above interpretation to Section 24 would be harmonious and in consonance to the principles of natural justice. 15. The above interpretation to Section 24 would be harmonious and in consonance to the principles of natural justice. Applying the aforesaid guidelines in the instant case, it transpires that the Company-M/s Bharat Insecticides Ltd. and its Directors, who are accused in the case, were not delivered a copy of Insecticide Analyst's report, even then in his reply dated 11.11.93 to the show cause notice dated 27.10.93 of the Insecticide Inspector the Manager (Quality Control) of the Company had requested the Insecticide Inspector to get the second sample of the insecticide re-tested in the CIL, but no steps were taken by him in this direction. The complaint in the case was filed in court on 18.10.94 i.e. after the expiry of self-life period of the insecticide. The cognizance was taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 18.10.94 and process was issued on the same day, with the result the Company and its Directors had no occasion to make a request to the Court to get another sample tested in the CIL and as such, they have been deprived of their valuable right under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act. The argument of the learned Public Prosecutor that even after the expiry of self-life period of the insecticide, another sample could have been sent to the CIL for analysis can not be accepted. It is not disputed that pesticide in the instant case was effective for a maximum period of one year from the date of its manufacture. It was effective upto April, 1994 while the complaint itself was filed on 18th October, 1994. 16. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, (1967) 69 PLR 300 , while dealing with a similar argument in a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, it was observed in the following terms by the Supreme Court : "That section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act confers a right on the accused vendor to have a sample given to him examined by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory and to obtain a certificate from him. It is only when the accused exercises this right that the certificate given by the Director supersedes the report given by the Public Analyst. If in any case, he does not choose to exercise this right, the case against him can be decided on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst. It is only when the accused exercises this right that the certificate given by the Director supersedes the report given by the Public Analyst. If in any case, he does not choose to exercise this right, the case against him can be decided on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst. But when the accused is denied this right on account of the deliberate conduct of the prosecution, for example, delay in institution of the prosecution and the sample becoming unfit for test, the accused is so seriously prejudiced that it would not be proper to uphold his conviction on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst. This principle is applied to the cases where the conduct of the prosecution has resulted in the denial to the accused of opportunity to exercise this right." 17. In S.K. Ahuja V. State of Rajasthan and others 1990(1) RLR 504 =1990 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 701 ; U.S. Madan V. State, 1991 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 799 ; M/s Artee Minerals & another V. State and another, 1992 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 59 ; Agrawal Khad Bhandar V. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 510 ; Hindustan Ciba-Geigy Ltd. and others V. State of Rajasthan and others, 1994(2) R.L.R. 514 =1995(1) WLC (Raj.) 124 ; this Court has quashed criminal proceedings under Section 29 of the Act on the ground of delay in launching prosecution thereby depriving valuable right to the accused to get another sample re-analysed in the CIL. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mr. H. Lang V. State of Punjab and others, 1986 (1) PLR Vol. 89 P.263 that if the conduct of the prosecution has resulted in denial to the accused of an opportunity to controvert correctness of the report of the Insecticide Analyst on which the prosecution is based, the prosecution stands vitiated and the proceedings can be quashed by this court in exercise of power under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and also to secure the ends of justice. 18. However, the case of the dealer and distributary firm and their proprietors in this case stands on a different footing. 18. However, the case of the dealer and distributary firm and their proprietors in this case stands on a different footing. They did not avail the opportunity under section 24(3) of the Act by notifying their intention to adduce evidence in contravention of the report by getting second sample tested or analysed in the CIL, as such, they cannot have any grievance for the delay in launching prosecution. The report of Insecticide Analyst became conclusive against them as provided in sub-section (3). The benefit under sub-section (4) was available to them if they had notified intention of adducing evidence in contravention of the Insecticide Analyst's report. 19. The second limb of the argument of Shri Dharm Chand Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners is that in absence of allegations in the complaint and evidence on record that the Directors of the Company were incharge of or were responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company, their prosecution is not sustainable, has also force. For criminal liability, the law is well settled. The penal provisions must be strictly construed in the first place; Secondly, there is no vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute takes that also within its fold. Section 33 of the Act, which deals with offences by companies, does not make all the Directors liable for the offence committed by the company because of their holding the office of Directors. For the sake of convenience, Section 33 of the Act may be reproduced which reads as under:- 33. Offences by companies.-(1) Whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a Company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was incharge of, or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of, the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly : Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment under this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section. (a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. 20. A bare reading of the above section shall make it dear that the following categories of persons can be liable to be prosecuted and convicted whenever an offence under the Act is committed by a company : (i) the company itself ; and (ii) every person who at the time when the offence was committed was incharge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company; (iii) any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, if the offence is committed with the consent or connivance or is attributable to any negligence on his part. 21. The burden to prove the charge of an offence always lies upon the prosecution unless under some provision of law it is made for the accused to satisfy the Court that the offence was committed without his knowledge or with his consent or connivance; or it was not attributable to any neglect on his part.In companies, there could be directors who are not incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. There can be directors who merely lay down the policy and are not concerned with the day-to-day working of the company. Consequently, the mere fact that the accused person happens to be director of the company shall not make him criminally liable for the offence committed by the company unless the other ingredients are established which make him criminally liable. There can be directors who merely lay down the policy and are not concerned with the day-to-day working of the company. Consequently, the mere fact that the accused person happens to be director of the company shall not make him criminally liable for the offence committed by the company unless the other ingredients are established which make him criminally liable. To put it differently, no director of the company can be prosecuted and convicted for the offence under section 29 of the Act unless it is proved that the sub-standard or misbranded insecticide was manufactured or sold with his consent or connivance or was attributable to any neglect on his part or it is proved that he was a person incharge of or responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. 22. In Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta and another, (1971) 3 SCC 189 the expression "a person incharge and responsible for the affairs of the company" came for consideration of the Apex Court in a criminal case wherein the accused was convicted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, being a partner of the firm. Section 23-C (1) and section 23-C (2) of the aforesaid Act are analogous to Section 33 of the present Act deals with the offences committed by a company, which include a firm under the connotation of company and a 'partner' under the connotation of a 'director'. Dealing with Section 23-C (1) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, their Lordships observed that it was highly penal section as it makes a person who was incharge and responsible for the conduct of business of the company vicariously liable for an offence committed by the company, therefore, in accordance with the well settled principle this Section should be construed strictly. Their Lordships further observed thus : "What then does the expression "a person incharge and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of a company means ? It will be noticed that the word 'company' includes a firm or other association, and the same test must apply to a director incharge and a partner of a firm incharge of a business. It seems to us that in the context a person 'in-charge' must mean that the person should be in overall control of the day to day business of the company or firm. It seems to us that in the context a person 'in-charge' must mean that the person should be in overall control of the day to day business of the company or firm. This inference follows from the working of Section 23-C (2). It mentions director, who may be party to the policy being followed by a company and yet not be in-charge of the business of the company. Further, it mentions manager, who usually is in charge of the business but not in overall charge. Similarly, the other officers may be incharge of only some part of business." (Emphasis supplied) 23. The same principle was reiterated in State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand and others (1981) 2 SCC 335 , wherein Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 came for interpretation, a provision similar to the one we are concerned and it was held : "A person 'incharge of and 'responsible to' the company for the conduct of the business of the company contemplated in Section 34 (1) must be a person in overall control of the day to day business of the Company or firm. If a partner of a firm is not in such overall control be cannot be liable to be convicted merely because he had the right to participate in the business of the firm under the terms of the partnership deed." 24. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Krishna Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 Cr.L.R. (SC) p.9 , a complaint was filed for violating the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act against the Manager as well as the Directors of the Company under section 7/16 of the Act. The High Court quashed criminal proceedings under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code against the Directors and the Manager on the ground that there was no dear averment of the fact that they were really incharge of the manufacture and responsible for the conduct of business. The High Court quashed criminal proceedings under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code against the Directors and the Manager on the ground that there was no dear averment of the fact that they were really incharge of the manufacture and responsible for the conduct of business. Against the order of the High Court, the appeal preferred by Municipal Corporation was dismissed by the Supreme Court with the following observations : "So far as the Directors are concerned, there is not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. In these circumstances, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of the High Court that no case against the Directors (accused Nos. 4 to 7) has been made out ex facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed." 25. It may be stated here that Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is similar to Section 33 of the Act. Reference was also made by Mr. Sharma to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in G. Atherton and Co. Pvt. Ltd. V. Corporation of Calcutta, 1979 G.L.J. p. 86 . It was observed in this case that under Section 17, a Company has been made primarily liable, but to make other persons vicariously liable, it has to be shown that such persons were incharge of or were responsible to the Company for the conduct of its day to day business. In the absence of any mention in the complaint as to how the accused persons were concerned in carrying-on of the day-to-day business of the company, process could not have been issued against them. 26. In P.R. Neelkantham V. State of Rajasthan, 1986 RLR 172 =1986 RLW 70 , a learned Single Judge of this Court (M.C. Jain, J. as he then was) quashed criminal proceedings against the Directors and Salesman as they were not incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. 27. A similar view has been taken by me in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 273/85, H.S. Ranks V. P.K. Mehra, decided on 6.4.92 while quashing criminal proceedings under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 28. 27. A similar view has been taken by me in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 273/85, H.S. Ranks V. P.K. Mehra, decided on 6.4.92 while quashing criminal proceedings under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 28. In Shyam Sunder and others V. State of Haryana, 1990 (67) Company Cases p.1 the Apex Court of the country examined Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act 'providing offences by companies', which is similar to the provision of Section 33 of the Act. While acquitting the partners of the firm against whom there was no evidence that they were incharge of or were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, their Lordships observed as under : "But we are concerned with criminal liability under a penal provision and not a civil liability. The penal provision must be strictly, construed in the first place. Secondly, there is no vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute takes that also within its fold. Section 10 does not provide for such liability. It does not make all the partners liable for the offence whether they do business or not. It is, therefore, necessary to add an emphatic note of caution in this regard. More often, it is common that some of the partners of a firm may not even be knowing of what is going on day-to-day in the firm. There may be partrlrers, better known as sleeping partners, who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm. There may be ladies and minors who were . admitted only for the benefits of partnership. They may not know anything about the business of the firm. It would be a travesty of justice to prosecute all the partners and ask them to prove under the proviso to sub-section (1) that the offence was committed without their knowledge. It is significant to note that the obligation of the accused to prove under the proviso that the offence took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such offence arises only when prosecution establishes that the requisite condition mentioned in sub-section (1) is established. The requisite condition is that the partner was responsible for carrying on the business and was, during the relevant time, in charge of the business. In the absence of any such proof, no partner could be convicted. The requisite condition is that the partner was responsible for carrying on the business and was, during the relevant time, in charge of the business. In the absence of any such proof, no partner could be convicted. We, therefore, reject the contention urged by counsel for the State". (Emphasis supplied) 29. In Krishna Kumar Bagla V. B.L. Sharma, Superintendent (Prosecution) Central Excise and Customs, Jaipur, 1994 (2) WLC 547 , a learned Judge of this Court (N.C. Kochhar, J.) quashed criminal proceedings under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code against the Directors of the Company facing trial under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, as there was no allegation in the complaint that they were incharge of the company or were responsible to company for the conduct of its business or that the offence was committed with their consent or connivance or because of any neglect on their part. 30. In the instant case, petitioners No.2 to 6, namely, S/Shri S.K. Gupta, M.P. Gupta, Dinesh Jain, R.P. Gupta and S.K. Gupta are arrayed as accused in the complaint simply their being Directors of the Company. There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint that at the time the offence was committed, they were incharge of or were responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business or that the offence has been committed with their consent or connivance or is attributable to any neglect on their part. In the absence of such averments and evidence on record, they cannot be prosecuted and convicted for the offence committed by the Company simply by virtue of their being Director of the said Company. As stated earlier, in criminal law, there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides for it. section 33 of the Act in my opinion, does not create such vicarious liability. The order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate taking conizance and issuing process against the Directors of the Company is therefore, without any basis. A perusal of the order issuing process shows that it has been passed in a casual manner without application of mind on the facts and the relevant law. It was expected from the Magistrate of the rank of Chief Judicial Magistrate to be conversant with the relevant law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court. A perusal of the order issuing process shows that it has been passed in a casual manner without application of mind on the facts and the relevant law. It was expected from the Magistrate of the rank of Chief Judicial Magistrate to be conversant with the relevant law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court. The continuation of proceedings against the Directors of the company would therefore, be an abuse of the process of the Court. 31. The argument made by the learned Public Prosecutor that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the Act places burden on the accused to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent commission of such offence, is fallacious as the proviso applies only when the requisite condition mentioned in sub-section (1) is established. The requisite condition is that as directors of the company they were incharge of or were responsible for the conduct of business of the company during the relevant time. The responsibility of the accused to prove that they had taken the steps to prevent the contravention or that the offence was committed without their knowledge would arise only if the prosecution first establishes that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) exist in the case. 32. Before passing final order in the matter, I may also refer to the objection seriously raised by the learned Public Prosecutor that at the initial stage of the case, powers under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code should not be exercised and the matter may be allowed to be gone into by the concerned Magistrate to be finally decided by him after recording evidence. It is true that this Court is always reluctant to consider the matter on merits at the initial stage of the trial. It is also true that the inherent power under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases. However, the objections which have been raised in this petition go to the root of the prosecution and they manifestly show that continuation of criminal proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of the case, would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 33. However, the objections which have been raised in this petition go to the root of the prosecution and they manifestly show that continuation of criminal proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of the case, would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 33. In R.P. Kapur V. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 866 , (Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was), observed for the Bench as under : "There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount, to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceeding would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category." 34. The above view was approved in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye V. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 47 , wherein his Lordship Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court observed as under : "But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of quashing of a vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption 'Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the detrains of Autrefois Acquit. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption 'Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the detrains of Autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing process is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end ? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers." 35. In Sharda Prasad Sinha V. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1754 . His Lordship Bhagwat, J. speaking for the Court has observed as under : "It is now settled law that where the allegation set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence." 36. In Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia V. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 709=1988 Cr.L.J. 853 , while dealing with section 482 Criminal Procedure Code it was laid down as under:- "The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the un-controverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features, which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features, which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceedings even though it may be at the preliminary stage." (Emphasis supplied) 37. In view of the above decisions and the decisions referred as to earlier whereby this court has quashed proceedings in exercise of powers under section 482 G.P.C. in similar circumstances, the objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor is rejected having no substance. This Court in a given case can quash proceedings in a criminal case if continuation of the same amounts an abuse of the process of the Court or in order to secure the ends of justice. 38. The argument of Shri Sharma to quash proceedings against the dealer and distributor of the mis-branded insecticide on the ground that the sample was taken in sealed containers cannot be accepted at this stage. In this connection it would be relevant to refer to sub-section (3) of Section 30 which runs as under:- "A person not being an importer or a manufacturer of an insecticide or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall not be liable for a contravention of any provision of this Act, if he proves - (a) that he acquired the insecticide from an importer or a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer thereof; (b) that he did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained that the insecticide in any way contravened any provision of this Act; and (c) that the insecticide, while in his possession, was properly stored and remained in the same state as when he acquired it. A perusal of the above sub-section would reveal that the above defence is subject to proof of certain conditions enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) and the burden to prove them lies on the accused. A perusal of the above sub-section would reveal that the above defence is subject to proof of certain conditions enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) and the burden to prove them lies on the accused. The above argument shall be available to the dealer and the distributor at the stage of trial where they will have an opportunity to lead evidence to prove those conditions to get benefit of the defence available under sub-section (3) of Section 30. 39. The net result of the above discussion is that this petition succeeds in part Criminal proceeding against the manufacturing Company and its Directors (Petitioner Nos. 1 to 6) pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar in Criminal Case No. 209/94 is hereby quashed. The proceeding against the remaining accused shall continue. 40. Before concluding, I would like to express my anxiety and serious concern towards the manner in which such cases are instituted and prosecuted by the complainants i.e. the Insecticide Inspectors. By and large, the complaints are filed in a casual manner and without application of mind on the facts and relevant law. Many of the cases are instituted after inordiante delay i.e. after expiry of the life of insecticide and steps are not taken by the Inspector to get the second sample tested or analysed in the CIL inspite of notification of the intention under sub-section (3) of Section 24 of the Act. It appears that the concerned Department and the Insecticide Inspectors remain contended by mere filing complaints and feel that their duties are over. It does not appear to be their worry to see that the guilty persons are convicted. The Act came into force in 1968 and the Apex Court and various High Courts of the country have laid down law on various points including the interpretation of Section 24. But, it appears that the Insecticide Inspectors are either not well conversant with those decisions or they want to ignore them by filing complaints to show that they have done their duties. Such practice should be checked by the higher authorities, if they are really interested that guilty persons are brought to the book. It is therefore, advisable that concerned Department should establish a legal cell in every State to monitor such cases. Such practice should be checked by the higher authorities, if they are really interested that guilty persons are brought to the book. It is therefore, advisable that concerned Department should establish a legal cell in every State to monitor such cases. If the accused are acquitted or discharged due to lapses on the part of the concerned Insecticide Inspector or other officer then action must be taken against the erring officer to fix accountability.I am also pained to note that the concerned Magistrates also take these cases in a casual manner. The order of taking cognizance and issuing process is generally passed without application of mind on the facts and the relevant law as has been done in the present case. Not only this, they appear to be unmindful that these cases require special attention for prompt decision. It is often seen that months or even years are taken in getting service effected on the accused and cases art adjourned without any effective hearing. These cases require that service on the accused should be effected as early as possible so that their right to get another sample to be tested or analysed by the CIL is not defeated. I, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be sent to the Director, Agriculture, Rajasthan, Jaipur and the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court for doing the needful. The Registrar, Rajasthan High Court is directed to issue circular to all the concerned Magistrates to give top priority in trial of the cases under this Act and other Acts, like Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Essential Commodities Act, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, etc. It is advisable that the concerned Magistrates be directed to send progress report of such cases after every six months with reasons for the delay, if any.Petition partly allowed. *******