D. K. SETH, J. The petitioner No. 1 is a Federation of Trade Union recognised under Rule 40 of the U. P. Industrial Dis putes Rules, 1957. The petitioner No. 2 is a Trade Union registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926. The employees of the Respondent No. 2 are members of the said Union. The petitioner No. 2 is one of the Constituent of respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 espoused the cause of two workmen namely Sri Ram Raj Sinha and Sri Jogendra Nath Upadhyay, whose services were terminated, out of which two references were made by the State Government. The petitioner No. 1 espoused the cause of the workman Sri Jogendra Nath Upadhyaya relating to his claim of wages for the period 16-3-1981 till 19-3- 1981. Out of the said three references Adjudication Case Nos. 115/81, 145/81 and 44 of 1982 were registered in the Labour Court, Allahabad. A question had been raised as to the competence of the petitioner No. 1 to espouse the cause of the said workmen, who were not members of the petitioner No. 1, but members of petitioner No. 2, who is member of the petitioner No. 1. By an order dated 21-12- 1982 the Labour Court had held that the petitioner No. 1 was not competent to espouse the cause of the said workmen and, therefore, the reference is bad. It is against this order, the present writ peti tion has been moved. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K. P. Agarwal, contends that the im pugned order is bad in law, inasmuch as the federation is also a Trade Union. Therefore, there is no bar in espousing the cause of members of its affiliated units. According to him the objection is purely technical in nature in respect of two of the disputes which are against the order of termination in as much as in those two cases individual workman can have also maintained the dispute by reason of Sec tion 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act as well as Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act and the Central Act respectively ). Therefore, it is immaterial as to who has espoused the cause. Therefore, it is immaterial as to who has espoused the cause. He contends further that the proce dure or mode of the cause of a workman by the Union has not been provided either in the two Acts or in the Rules framed there under. In view of Section 2-A the position has altogether changed. 3. Sri V. R. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents, on the other hand contends that unless the workman is a member of a particular Trade Union, his cause cannot be espoused by such Trade Union. Since the workman are not member of the Federation of the petitioner No. 1, the petitioner No. 1 is incompetent in espousing the cause of the workmen. In support of his contention he refers to the definition of the trade Union as defined in Section 2 (qq) of the Central Act, defining "trade Union means a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. He further refers to Section 2 (h) of the Trade Union Act, 1926, which by defining the "trade Union ex presses that the Trade Union includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions. He further contends relying on the rule for representation that the question of com petence of a Union has to be construed with reference to the rule of repre sentation. He relies on various decisions, to which we shall refer shortly, in support of his contention. 4. Now the reference is made under Section 4-K of the U. P. Act and Section 10 of the Central Act. Section 10 of the Central Act which is almost pan materia identical to Section 4-K of the U. P. Act, has prescribed that where the appropriate Government is of the opinion that any Industrial dispute exist or apprehended, it may, at anytime, by order in writing, refer the dispute to, (a) the Board, (b) Court of enquiry, (c) the Labour Court, and (d) the Tribunal. Therefore, it is the satisfaction of the Government for the purposes of for mation of opinion that an Industrial dis pute exist or is apprehended. So far as the order of dismissal is concerned is also an Industrial dispute, as defined in Section 2 (k) of the Central Act and Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Act. Therefore, it is the satisfaction of the Government for the purposes of for mation of opinion that an Industrial dis pute exist or is apprehended. So far as the order of dismissal is concerned is also an Industrial dispute, as defined in Section 2 (k) of the Central Act and Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Act. The moment the State Government forms an opinion that a dis pute exist or is apprehended, it acquires jurisdiction to refer the matter. Such a reference cannot be questioned. The In dustrial dispute, as defined in Section 2 (k), defines the dispute to mean, any dispute or difference between the employer and workmen with the employment or non-employment or terms of the employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. Dismissal are surely non- employ ment and an industrial dispute. If the cause of a workman is taken up by the Union the same becomes a dispute be tween the employer and the workmen and, if not, then the order of dismissal, gives rise to individual dispute within the mean ing of Section 2-A of the Act. So far as the payment of wages are concerned the same may ^p espoused by le Union so as to make it a dispute between the employer and the workmen. 5. Now it is an established principle of law that reference is made after the failure report is submitted by the concilia tion officer in usual cases. But there might be cases where reference can be made even without failure report or without waiting for the failure report or even without in itiation of Conciliation proceeding. The Court can refer the dispute not only where Industrial dispute exist but when it is ap prehended. Shambhu Nath Goel v. Bank of Baroda, 1978 (2) SCC 353 , and reference can be made even before receiving the conciliation report. Ram Krishna Mill v. Government of Tamil, 1985 (2) LLJ 259. A reference can be made without initiating conciliation proceeding, Jasloke Hospital and Research Centre v. Industrial Tribunal and orders, 1984 (1) LLJ 76. 6. Admittedly, the petitioner No. 1 is a Trade Union within meaning of Section 2 (h) of the Trade Union Act, 1926. The Trade Union defined in the Industrial Dis putes Act, has not made any difference between the Trade Union or the Federa tion of Trade Union. 6. Admittedly, the petitioner No. 1 is a Trade Union within meaning of Section 2 (h) of the Trade Union Act, 1926. The Trade Union defined in the Industrial Dis putes Act, has not made any difference between the Trade Union or the Federa tion of Trade Union. The Trade Union defined in the Industrial Disputes Act in cludes the trade Union as well as its federation. Now in order to be a dispute, the dispute should exist between the employee and the workman. A Union when takes up the cause it become the cause of the workmen. Such Union should be one which operates in the field or class of industry, in which the workman is in volved. In the present case it is not dis puted that the Federation works in the field, in which the Class of industry, in which workman was involved, is covered. The very union namely the petitioner, from which the workmen are members, is affiliated with the federation. The federa tion being a Trade Union, within the meaning of Section 2 (h) of the Trade Union Act, it can not be disputed that it is not a Trade Union as defined in Section 2 (qq) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, in my view the petitioner No. 1 is equality competent to espouse the cause of the workmen, particularly when a par ticular Trade Union, being the petitioner No. 2 is also involved in it. 7. Sri V. R. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 refers to the decision in the case of The Bombay Union of Journalists and others v. The Hindu Bombay and another, AIR 1963 SC 318 . The said judgment was delivered on 27-9-1961. In the said case it was held that "the dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an in dustrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. The persons who seek to sup port the cause of a workman must them selves be directly and substantially inter ested in the dispute and this would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Persons who are not employees of the same employer cannot be regarded as to interested, that by their support they may convert an individual dispute into an in dustrial dispute. Persons who are not employees of the same employer cannot be regarded as to interested, that by their support they may convert an individual dispute into an in dustrial dispute. In each case in ascertain ing whether an individual dispute has ac quired the character of an industrial dis pute the test is whether at the date of the reference the dispute was taken up or sup ported by the Union of the workmen of the employer against whom the dispute is raised by an individual workman or by an appreciable number of workmen. " 8. The said decision does not help V. R. Agarwal, to the extent at which he was interested to draw his inspiration. Firstly this decision was given prior to the intro duction of Section 2-A in the Central Act. Section 2-A was inserted in the Central Act by Act No. 35 of 1965 with effect from 1-12-1965. Section 2- A was introduced in U. P. Act long afterwards, namely, by U. P. Act No. 34 of 1978. The concept of In dustrial dispute was all along different when the said decision was given. After the concept of the Industrial dispute, having undergone a change, by reason of inser tion of Section 2-A including individual dispute arising out of dismissal from ser vice, the concept of Industrial dispute has assured different complexion. The legisla tion has been enacted for the benefit of the workmen and protecting the right of the weaker section, namely, workmen from dominating employer. For such reasons the interpretation beneficial of the workmen are to be preferred than benefi cial to the employer or less beneficial to the workman. Therefore, the applicability of the ratio decidandi in the said case. After the change of complexion of the Industrial disputes, has to be given a new dimension. 9. Then again even on the basis of ratio of the said decision the industrial dispute is an industrial dispute, in which the persons, who seeks to support the case of the workmen must themselves be directly and substantially interested in the dispute. It is not necessary that all the workmen substantially interested in the dispute are to join. A number of workmen may also espouse the cause. It has been held in the said case that the question of interest would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not necessary that all the workmen substantially interested in the dispute are to join. A number of workmen may also espouse the cause. It has been held in the said case that the question of interest would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If appreciable number of workmen supports the cause then the same becomes industrial dispute. It was also held that the persons who are not employees of the same employer can not be regarded as so interested. By the time much water has flown down the ganges, the concept of the Industrial dispute has been developed to a great extent, which has brought about appreciable changes. The workman has a right to form a Union, which is recognised as a Trade Union. The petitioner No. 2 is a Trade Union of the Employees, under the same employer, which is running a different unit. The right to form an Association cannot compel the workman to divide their Union in several small units. They have a right to form one unit against the common employer, having different units. The petitioner No. 2 is a Union of Nation al Thermal Power Corporation at Renukoot, wherein the said National Thermal Power Corporation (hereinafter referred to as N. T. P. C.) had several units and the workmen were engaged in one such unit. Therefore, the Union which consists members from all the Units of the employer, has appreciable number of members, who are employees of the same unit. This fact is not disputed. The petitioner No. 2 is one of the Union of the petitioner No. 1. As the Union of all the units of the employer petitioner No. 2 is substantially interested, having sufficient number of employees in its fold, as mem bers from the same unit. The petitioner No. 2 being the Trade Union is a body corporate representing its members, ap preciable number of whom are the employees in the same unit and the dis pute is not dispute between the Unit but a dispute with the employer, National Thermal Power Corporation, which fact has also not been disputed. Therefore, the federation being the petitioner No. 1, of which petitioner No. 2 is a member is vital ly interested in the dispute through the petitioner No, 2 consisting of appreciable number of employees of the employer. Therefore, the federation being the petitioner No. 1, of which petitioner No. 2 is a member is vital ly interested in the dispute through the petitioner No, 2 consisting of appreciable number of employees of the employer. Therefore, depending on the facts and cir cumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that appreciable number of workmen of the same employer are not interested in the present case within meaning of ratio decidandi in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists (supra ). In the said case the workmen whose case was supported, was posted at Madras and the cause of action whereof had also arisen at Madras, whereas in the present case cause of action arose where the Union itself operates. 10. Sri V. R. Agarwal, next cites the decision in the case of Workman of Mis. Dharam Pal Prem Chand v. Mis. Dharampal Prem Ghana, AIR 1966 SC182. In the said case while interpreting Section 2-K, it was held that where number of individual employees were dismissed, those employees can raise a dispute by themsel ves in a formal manner. It was further held in the said case while dealing with the Industrial disputes, industrial adjudica tion will not generally lay down any hard and fast rule or adopt any test of general or universal application. The approach has necessarily to be pragmatic and the tests which it will apply and the considerations on which it would rely would vary from case to case and would admit of no right or inflexible formula. The limitations intro duced by the decisions of Supreme Court in interpreting the effect of the definition in Section 2 (k) were based on such prag matic considerations. It may also be said that if the dismissal of an individual employees working in an establishment in Delhi is taken up by the Union of Workmen in a place away from Delhi that would clearly not make the dispute an in dustrial dispute. Section 36 of the Act dealing with the representation of parties, incidentally suggest that the Union which can raise an individual dispute as to a dis missal validly should be a Union of the same industry. It is generally the Union of workmen working in the same estab lishment which passed the order of dis missal. Section 36 of the Act dealing with the representation of parties, incidentally suggest that the Union which can raise an individual dispute as to a dis missal validly should be a Union of the same industry. It is generally the Union of workmen working in the same estab lishment which passed the order of dis missal. But it is conceivable that the workmen of an establishment have no Union of their own and some or all of them join the Union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. In such a case if the said union takes up the cause of the workmen working in an establishment which has no union of its own, it would not be reasonable to hold that the dispute does not become an industrial dispute because the Union which has sponsored it is not the Union exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. In every case where industrial adjudica tion has to decide whether a reference in regard to the dismissal of an industrial employee is validly made or not, it would always be necessary to enquire whether the Union which has sponsored the case can fairly claim a representative character in a manner that its support to the cause would make the dispute an industrial dispute. Industry has been defined in Section (j) of the Act and in some cases, the Union of workmen working in one in dustry may be competent to raise a dispute about the wrongful dismissal or an employee engaged in an establishment belonging to the same industry where workmen in such an establishment have no Union of their own, and an appreciable number of such workmen had joined such other Union before their dismissal. In fact, the object of Trade Union movement is to encourage the formation of large and big ger Unions on healthy and proper Trade Union lines. But this object would be frustrated if industrial adjudication were to adopt the rigid rule that for any dispute about wrongful dismissal to be validly referred under Section 10 (1) of the Act it should receive the support of the Union consisting exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. " 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case the ratio decidendi in the case of Workmen of Mis. Dharmpal (supra) sup ports the view which I have taken. " 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case the ratio decidendi in the case of Workmen of Mis. Dharmpal (supra) sup ports the view which I have taken. In the present case two is the member of larger union whereas the petitioner No. 2 is itself a large Union drawing members from dif ferent Units of the same employer and, the petitioner No. 2, therefore, having in its fold appreciable number of members not only from the same unit but from different units of the same employer, having inter est in the dispute, espousing the same with the aid of its federation who is espousing different affiliated Units and its members. Therefore, it satisfies the tests laid down in the ratio decidendi in the case of Workmen of Mis. Dharmpal (supra ). If the narrow meaning or interpretation which Sri V. R. Agarwal wants to interpret is given then the object of the Trade Union Act would be frustrated. The powerful establishment of big Industry like N. T. P. C. can be matched by a powerful Union of a greater magnitude, as in the present case. The workmen themselves being a weaker sec tion, cannot be left to defend themselves against the mighty employer through a small unit of Trade Union. It would be furthering the aim and object of the Industrial Statute which has given a right of collective bargaining. Admittedly, the petitioner No. 2 is operating in the field, in which the workmen is involved and then again the petitioner No. 1 is also operating in the area where the workmen are employed where the Principal employer is N. T. P. C. and majority of the workmen are employed by N. T. P. C. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner No. I Union is not interested in the dispute substantially. 12. The decision in the case of Vishnu Das v. State of U. P. and others, 1974 (29) FLR 335 FB, cited by Sri V. R. Agarwal, does not help him, in the facts and cir cumstances of the case, inasmuch as there the Union consisted of heterogeneus ele ments being conglomeration of workers, salesman, shop assistants, tailors and ar tisans in various commercial estab lishments cannot be said to be a union representing one industry so as to be com petent to represent the workman who are working as tailors. Here admittedly the petitioner No. 2 is a Union consisting of number of employees of the employer, who were appreciable in number. 13. The decision in the case of Deepak Industries Limited and another v. State of West Bengal and others, 1975 (1) LLJ 293, is clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case the ratio decidendi was that if group of workmen raises dis pute constituting industrial dispute espoused by a Union, in that event if the authority of the Union is challenged by the employer, it was to be proved that the Union was duly authorised by a resolution by its members or otherwise that it has authority to represent the workmen whose cause it is espousing. Here such a question has not been raised and we are not called upon to decide the said issue. The issue herein is altogether different which need no repetation since indicated, above. 14. The decision in the case of Abad Hussain and others v. Labour Court and another, 1982 (44) FLR 396, cited by Sri V. R. Agarwal, also does not help him. In asmuch as in the said case it was held that the test to determine as to whether the individual dispute had acquired the char acter of an Industrial dispute was whether at the time of reference the dispute was taken up or supported by the Union of workmen or the employer or by an ap preciable number of workmen employed by him is that the dispute was sponsored by those who had a direct and substantial interest in it. It should be sponsored by a Union of workmen competent to do so in the sense that either it is a Union of the workmen of the employer or of workmen of the same trade or by an appreciable number of the employees of the employer. It was further found in the said case from the evidence that four persons concerned with the dispute, were members of U. P. Vanijya Adhisthan Sharamik Sangh, which was affiliated to U. P. Industrial Mazdoor Federation and the dispute having related to the wages of a group which forms a class by itself espousing the dispute by the Union, was held to be valid. The present case stands on a better footing than the said U. P. Vanijya Pratishthan Karmchari Sangh, as the case may be. The reasons need not be repeated since has been elaborated earlier that in the present case appreciable number of employees are substantially interested in the dispute who are members of petitioner No. 2 repre sented by the petitioner No. 1. 15. Thus, the discussion of the above cases leads us to a conclusion that for a healthy Industrial relations formation of larger Trade Union is to be encouraged. In order to convert the individual dispute into industrial dispute, if appreciable number of employees of the same employer are matched by larger Union operating in the area, then it can be said that some larger Union are substantially interested in the affairs of its affiliated Units and, therefore, members by reasons of Units, involved, it can not be said that the federation is not interested or involved in the dispute. 16. For all these reasons, it appears that the labour Court had mis-appreciated the situation in law and has proceeded on misconceived conception. 17. In that view of the matter the impugned order dated 21-12-1982, being Annexure 1 to the writ petition, is hereby quashed. The dispute is hereby remitted to the labour Court for proceeding with the same in terms of the order of reference on merits in accordance with law after giving opportunity to either of the parties. This Court hopes and trust that the labour Court will make all endeavour to dispose of the said dispute, as early as possible, preferably within one year from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the learned labour Court. Both the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties assured that the parties would not ask for adjournment unless the same is exceptionally unavoidable. 18. In the result the writ petition suc ceeds and is allowed. Accordingly a writ of certiorari do issue quashing the impugned order, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition. A writ of mandamus do also issue containing the above directions to the learned Tribunal. 19. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .