Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the writ petitioner impugning the order dated 7th September, 1995 which is at Annexure-1 to this writ petition as also the order dated 18th September, 1995 which is at Annexure-9 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the writ petitioner. This Court is of the view that the grievance of the petitioner. No.1 and the grievance of petitioner Nos.2 and 3 cannot be joined together but the same has been sought to be done in this case. This case thus suffers from misjoinder of cause of action. 2. However, the order which the court proposes to pass is only confined to petitioner No.1. The case of petitioner Nos.2 and 3 has not been pressed at the time of hearing and nothing said in the order will have any effect on the rights and interest, if any, of petitioner Nos.2 and 3. 3. Various factual controversies have been raised in this writ petition and various affidavits and supplementary affidavit have been filed but detailed consideration of the facts of this case is not required for the order which this Court proposes to pass. 4. The cause of action of the petitioner arose initially out of the order dated 7th September, 1995 (Annexure-1) which was passed on the basis of the discussions in the Chamber of Chairman of Bihar Vidhan Parishad and also in accordance with the direction of the Chairman. The said order at annexure-1 shows that the posting and adjustment of service of the respondent no.6 and the petitioner No.1 is done on the basis of the direction given by the said Chairman. 5. The petitioners case is that he is the Headmaster of the Middle school at Dhakaich and joined on the said post of Headmaster on and from 27th September, 1994. But on the basis of the order at Annexure-1 an order was passed on 18th September, 1995 at annexure-9 by which he has adjusted in the post of Headmaster of Ashok Middle school, Dumari and respondent No.6 has been posted in his place as Headmaster, Dhakaieh Middle School. 6. This Court has held repeatedly that if a person is transferred from a transferable post he has virtually a very slander justiciable right which can be agitated before a writ Court. 6. This Court has held repeatedly that if a person is transferred from a transferable post he has virtually a very slander justiciable right which can be agitated before a writ Court. This court has shown utmost reluctance in interfering with the order of transfer when such order is passed bonafide and on administrative grounds and by the appropriate authority who is empowered to pass such order. 7. In the instant case it has been stated by the respondents that the petitioner has been working in the dhakaieh School as an Assistant teacher for years together and the distance between Dhakaieh and Dumri is negligible and the post against which the petitioner is working is a transferable one. As such, transfer order of the petitioners is not to be interfered with by this Court. 8. The petitioner on the other hand in support of his case placed reliance on various factual allegations to show that the order of transfer of the petitioner has been passed only to accommodate respondent No.6 and the same has not been passed in public interest but has been passed mala fide and an extraneous consideration. 9. This Court does not feel called upon to decide the question whether or not the transfer order of the petitioner has been passed mala fide, but the court interferes with the impugned order of transfer for the reasons given below. 10. The admitted facts of this case unmistakably show that the impugned order of transfer has not been passed by the appropriate authority. The impugned order of transfer has been purportedly passed at the dictation and under the direction of the Chairman of the Bihar Vidhan Parishad. Any person by a Reading of the order dated 7th september, 1995 would come to the conclusion that the said order is a direct outcome of the direction given by the Chairman of Bihar Vidhan parishad and the same is stated also in so many words in the order itself and in the subsequent order dated 18th September, 1995 at annexure-9 to the supplementary affidavit has also admittedly been passed on the basis of the order dated 7th September, 1995. While passing the said order dated 7th September, 1995 in so far as posting of the petitioner in a School was concerned the word used is samanjan which means adjustment. While passing the said order dated 7th September, 1995 in so far as posting of the petitioner in a School was concerned the word used is samanjan which means adjustment. In the order dated 18th September, 1995 also the word samanjan has been used. Such adjustment has been obviously ordered to obey of the direction of the said Chairman of Bihar Vidhan Parishad. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has therefore rightly said that the impugned orders are without jurisdiction and in saying so he has relied upon a rule framed by Bihar government under Article 309 of the constitution of India. In the said rule it has been stated that in case of transfer so far as an employee like the petitioner is concerned it has to be made by the Establishment Committee. But in special circumstances, such an order of transfer can be passed with the consent of the Chairman of the Establishment Committee which would have to be subsequently approved by the committee. 12. In the instant case from a perusal of Annexure-9 it will appear that the said order of adjustment is purported to have been passed with the consent of the District Magistrate. But it has not been disclosed by the respondent authority that subsequently the approval by the said District Establishment Committee was obtained. 13. Even though the order dated 18th September, 1995 is purported to be passed by the District Superintendent of Education but unmistakably the order was passed pursuant to the order dated 7th September, 1995 which was passed at the dictate of the said Chairman of Bihar Vidhan Parishad. On this point a specific ground has been taken in the writ petition iff para 2 (iv) which is set out below : that the impugned order has been issued at the direction of the Chairman, Bihar legislative Council which itself shows invalidity and unreasonableness in the eye of law. " the said assertion has not been much controverted in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. " the said assertion has not been much controverted in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent. While dealing with the said ground in the counter-affidavit filed by the State-Respondent the following averments have been made in para-10 of the brief: that in reply to the statements made in para 2 (iv) it is stated that the statement made in this para is partly correct but the same order has been passed after due approval of the District Establishment Committee, which is competent for the same. " 14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent No.6 supporting the role played by the chairman, Vidhan Parishad in passing the impugned orders relied upon a book of Parliamentary Practice and procedure by Kaul and Sakdhar and relied on page-110 of the said book in order to contend that the ruling of the speaker while interpreting the Constitution and the rules in so far as the matters relating to House is concerned, cannot be controverted. There cannot be any question about the authority of the Speaker with regard to his jurisdiction in connection with the matter within the House. But that does not mean that on the strength of said powers he enjoys an extended authority to dictate the passing of orders of transfer and posting of the teachers and headmasters which are governed by relevant rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. Such contention is not acceptable to this Court. This court holds that the Chairman of the bihar Legislative Council has no authority, jurisdiction and competent to dictate in matters of posting and transfer of Head Masters or teachers. Therefore, if any order has been passed on the basis of said dictation by the chairman of Bihar Legislative Council, as has been passed in this case, such order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Therefore, both orders dated 7th september, 1995 and 18th September, 1995 are vitiated by the doctrine of dictation, abdication and surrender which has been propounded in the field of administrative Law as a mode of irregular and improper use of discretion by the authorities. Therefore, both orders dated 7th september, 1995 and 18th September, 1995 are vitiated by the doctrine of dictation, abdication and surrender which has been propounded in the field of administrative Law as a mode of irregular and improper use of discretion by the authorities. In this connection the observations made by Professor wide on the Administrative Law (6th edition) at page 368 are very apposite and are set out below : "closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority may share its power with come one else, or may allow some one else to dictate to it by declining to act without their consent or by submitting to their wishes or instructions. The effect then is that the discretion conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong authority, and the resulting decisions is ultra vires and void. So strict are the courts in applying this principle that they condemn some administrative arrangements which must seem quite natural and proper to those who make them. " To the said effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the Purtappore Co. Ltd. V/s. State of bihar, reported in 1969 (1) S. CC. page 301. To the same effect is also the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. and Another V/s. Mahraj dharmander Prasad Singh and others reported in 1989 (2) S. C. C. page 505. The relevant passage in the case of dharmander Prasads Singhs case (supra) is set out below : "the authority cannot permit its decision to the influence by the dictation of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authoritys discretion that is exercised but someone elses. If an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. " 15. In view of the aforesaid legal position as propounded by the Apex court this Court cannot uphold the impugned orders at Annexure-1 dated 7th september, 1995 in so far as the petitioner and respondent No.6 are concerned. If an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. " 15. In view of the aforesaid legal position as propounded by the Apex court this Court cannot uphold the impugned orders at Annexure-1 dated 7th september, 1995 in so far as the petitioner and respondent No.6 are concerned. The said order in so far it relates to the petitioner and respondent no.6 is set aside as also the order dated 18th September, 1995, which is at annexure-9 to the supplementary affidavit. 16. However, it is open to the respondents to pass appropriate orders of transfer of the petitioner and also an appropriate order of posting of respondent no.6 in accordance with law and on the basis of a proper exercise of discretion without being in any way influenced by any extraneous agencies. 17. The writ petition is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed.