JUDGMENT T.S. Doabia, J. 1. This second appeal has been preferred against concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below. The Courts below have concluded: that the respondent-plaintiff landlady does require the premises bona fide for her occupation as her residence. A finding has also been recorded that tenant has sublet the premises and as was liable to eviction on that ground also. It is these findings which are sought to be assailed in this Court. 2. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the judgment given by the first appellate Court is brief and it does not deal with the evidence which was brought on record. No doubt, the appeal Court should have dealt with the matter at some length but this would be no reason to set aside the judgment. It is precisely for this reason, I have gone through the evidence on the record. 3. As to what constitute bona fide need, the position of law is well settled. It is settled law that the Courts are not to substitute its own view with regard to the need of the landlord. Reasonable view to be taken is that if the need of the landlord is genuine then the Courts would not superimpose its own opinion with a view to determine the reasonable need of the landlord. The genuineness of the need is to be seen and this need is never static. It varies from person to person, place to place and from profession to profession. The meaning to be given to the term need or requirement should neither be artificially extended nor its language should be unduly restricted as such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act. At the same time, the proposition that the landlord is the sole arbitrator of his need is not to be accepted as the only view on the matter. There is no doubt that the subjective choice exercise in a reasonable manner by the landlord should normally be respected by the Court. Where the need for accommodation is proved the Court is not to dictate the landlord to continue in the same premises. 4. The term bona fide represents something more than a desire or wish to occupy. There is no doubt that the subjective choice exercise in a reasonable manner by the landlord should normally be respected by the Court. Where the need for accommodation is proved the Court is not to dictate the landlord to continue in the same premises. 4. The term bona fide represents something more than a desire or wish to occupy. It is quite clear that it does not convey the idea of absolute necessity in the sense that there would be no other possible alternative for the landlord for meeting his requirement except by occupying his property. The Rent Control Legislation is primarily meant for protecting the tenants against the tactics of greedy and unscrupulous landlords who are taking advantage of the difficulties and helplessness of the tenants and extract exorbitant rents from them. It does not appear to be designed to penalise the owners by disabling them from occupying their own property when they bona fide require it. There is adequate provision in the Act safeguarding against a possible abuse of the privilege or the right of eviction on their part. 5. In Rekhachand Doorgar v. J.R.D.'Cruz, AIR 1923 Cal 223, Buckland J., observed that "I do not think it is enough that a plaintiff in order to defend a plea under the Calcutta Rent Act should merely say that he desires the premises bona fide for his occupation. The word in the Act is not desires but requires. This in my opinion involved something more than a mere wish and it involves an element of need to some extent at least." Thus, the term "bona fide requires" connotes something more than desire to have something and much less than absolute necessity. This matter has also been dealt with and considered in Bhogi Lal M. Devay v. S. R. Subramanian Iyer, AIR 1954 Mad. 514 . Taking note of the above position of law, the evidence which has come on record be examined. 6. The respondent-landlady has stated that the house in which she is residing belongs to her father-in-law. A statement to this effect has been made by the respondent landlady. There is no serious opposition to this statement of hers. As a matter of fact, this aspect of the matter is admitted by the appellant-tenant. Reference in this regard be made to para 3 of the statement made by tenant who has appeared as D.W. 3. A statement to this effect has been made by the respondent landlady. There is no serious opposition to this statement of hers. As a matter of fact, this aspect of the matter is admitted by the appellant-tenant. Reference in this regard be made to para 3 of the statement made by tenant who has appeared as D.W. 3. In her statement the landlady stated that she is staying with her husband in an accommodation which consists of one room, one verandah and one kitchen (rasoi). She has five children. She has also made a statement that there is no other accommodation available with her. In the face of this statement made by the landlady, it cannot be said that the Courts below have faulted in recording a finding in favour of the respondent-landlady. 7. So far as the question of sub-letting is concerned, it has been established that the premises were sub-let to Chhotesingh. Chhotesingh is no more. He is now represented by his legal heirs. They are the appellants in this appeal. The plea taken by Chhotesingh was that he was inducted as tenant with the consent of the landlady. This was not believed by the trial Court. 8. Now it is established that there can be no sub-letting without written permission of the landlord. General Authority given by landlord to induct sub-tenants has been held to be not equivalent to previous consent. See : Shantilal Rampuria and Ors. v. M/s Vega Trading Corporation and Ors., AIR 1989 SC 1819 and M/s Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H. C. Sharma and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 145 . Earlier to this similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case reported as : South Asia Industries Private Ltd. v. S. Sarupsingh and Ors., AIR 1966 SC 346 . 9. In this view of the matter, this appeal is found to be without merit and is dismissed with costs. Costs Rs. 500/-. A period of two months is allowed to the present appellant to vacate the premises. This would be subject to the condition that the appellant tenant deposits up-to-date arrears of rent and also gives an undertaking in the trial Court that he would hand over vacant possession to the landlady. The undertaking be given within a period of 15 days.