JUDGMENT 1. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. On August 24, 1993 Promod Dass respondent filed a complaint 145 Criminal Procedure Code in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambhar Lake, Distt. Jaipur alleging therein that one deceased Chotu Ram was the tenant of Khasra Nos. 299, 303 and 304 admeasuring 18 Bighas and 11 Biswas situate at village Rojdi, that the said Chotu Dass had legally and lawfully declared in 1985 the Respondent as his Chela and also executed a will to that effect on 4.3.92 and he entered into possession of the aforementioned land alongwith late Sri. Chotu Dass, that the petitioner had nothing to do either with late Sri. Chotu Dass or his land but when he started threatening respondent's possession over the disputed land and also created bad blood between the Respondent and the late Chotu Dass, the respondent had to file a suit for injunction against the petitioner and the Late Chotu Dass in a court of competent jurisdiction and obtained ad-interim injunction against them. It was further alleged that since the petitioner was bent upon dispossessing the Respondent from the land in dispute by forcible means, likelihood of breach of the peace had arisen. The learned Executive Magistrate forwarded the complaint to the S.H.O. Police Station Phulera for enquiry and report. On July 20, 1993 the SHO submitted his report alongwith his complaint against both the parties informing the learned Executive Magistrate that a dispute concerning the land in question and likely to cause breach of peace between the parties existed within his jurisdiction. Though this police report was received in the office of the Executive Magistrate on 24.9.93 and was also put up before him on 21.12.93 but the proceedings under section 145(1) Criminal Procedure Code were initiated as late as on 11.4.94 and the learned Executive Magistrate required the parties to attend his court and produce their written statements in support of their respective claims for actual possession over the subject-matter of dispute. At the same time the learned Magistrate attached the subject-matter of dispute under section 146(1) Criminal Procedure Code and appointed Tehsildar, Phulera to be the Reciever thereof. It is that composite order as passed by the learned Magistrate under Sections 145(1) and 146(1) G.P.C. on 11.4.94 which is being challenged through this petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 3. At the very outset Mr. It is that composite order as passed by the learned Magistrate under Sections 145(1) and 146(1) G.P.C. on 11.4.94 which is being challenged through this petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 3. At the very outset Mr. Narendra Jain, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 Promod Dass, submitted that the impugned order was an order revisable under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code by the concerned Sessions Judge and, therefore, the present petition was not maintainable. The objection raised by Mr. Jain carries weight. On the face of it the validity and legality of the impugned order may be examined either by this Court or by the Sessions Judge under their revisory power under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, when an alternate remedy has specifically been provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for redressal of a wrong to a party, recourse to the inherent powers of the court under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code cannot be made. Therefore, this petition is directed to be treated as a petition under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. 4. It was then urged by Mr. Jain that it has been the practice of this court to stress upon the parties to respect hierarchy of courts in the matter of invoking their revisory powers under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, keeping with that practice and procedure and to maintain consistency in its views this court should direct the petitioner to approach the Sections Judge in the first instance. 5. section 397 Criminal Procedure Code confers revisory powers to examine the correctness, legality and validity of the orders passed by the inferior courts on the High Court as well as the Sessions Judge. Since in a given case this Court and the Sessions Judge may have concurrent revisory jurisdiction in respect to an order made by an inferior court and the person aggrieved by such order may approach either this Court or the Sessions Judge for the redressal of the wrong which such order is alleged to have done to him, judicial set up and discipline demands that heirarchy of courts be observed in choosing the forum for the redressal of the alleged wrong and the Sessions Judges be not by-passed in invoking the powers under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. This has also been the practice and procedure of this court and such practice and procedure is required to be generally followed. It is also true that I have taken such a view in several cases and have discouraged the ever increasing practice of the parties to approach directly to this Court for exercise of the power under section 397 by-passing the power of the Sessions Judge under that provision. It need not be stressed that consistency in the views should be maintained as it leads to the stability of legal position and convenience to the parties. But consistency in views should not be at the cost of justice and development of law. If the facts and circumstances of a given case and the ends of justice so demand the stagnancy and rigidity which is likely to be brought about by consistency of views may be broken, in the interest of the administration of justice, particularly when it relates to practice and procedure of the court and to the realm of procedural law. 6. I would have certainly accepted the suggestion of Mr. Jain and would have directed the petitioner to first approach the Sessions Judge under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code had I not been of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case such a course would not only give an avoidable lease of life to this meaningless litigation but would also result in wastage of public time and energy of the litigating parties. The reasons for this opinion are the following. 7. In para 5 of his complaint Respondent Promod Dass had himself asserted that before filing the complaint he had already filed a suit for injunction against the petitioner and the late Chotu Dass in a court of competent jurisdiction and had also obtained ad-interim injunction from that court against them. This averment dearly showed that a competent Civil/Revenue court was already seized of the subject matter of the dispute in this criminal litigation. This fact is dearly borne out from a number of certified copies of the documents filed by the Respondent/petitioner from the case file of Revenue Suit No. 99 of 1993 Promod Dass v. Chotu Dass pending in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Sambhar Lake, Jaipur. This fact is dearly borne out from a number of certified copies of the documents filed by the Respondent/petitioner from the case file of Revenue Suit No. 99 of 1993 Promod Dass v. Chotu Dass pending in the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Sambhar Lake, Jaipur. The documents filed go to show that not only a suit was simply filed in a competent Court for determination of the rights and title of the parties in respect to the subject matter of the dispute but also the said court was in a position to pass appropriate order for the protection of the subject-matter of the suit and did in fact pass such orders at the instance of the Respondent Promod Dass. That court could have still passed orders relating to the appointment of a Receiver of the property in question if the circumstances of the case so demanded and justified. Under such circumstances there could have hardly been any justification to have initiated the criminal proceedings under section 145(1) and to have attached the subject matter of dispute under section 146(1) Criminal Procedure Code and that too as late as almost one year after the making of the police report by the SHO, Police Station Phulera. The order of attachment of the property could have very well been passed by the Revenue Court. In case of the parties insisting upon causing branch of peace they could have been proceeded against for violation of the orders of the Revenue Court and/or under Sections 107/116 and 151 Criminal Procedure Code to maintain and enforce peace. The duality or plurality of criminal proceeding was thus uncalled for in the facts and circumstances of this case. Such meaningless exercise consuming the precious public time of the court of the Magistrate and also adversely affecting the resources of the parties did in fact amount to the abuse of the process of law besides being invalid. 8. In the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 472 , the Apex Court observed that : "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. In the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 472 , the Apex Court observed that : "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2 to 5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined and the parties are in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the order of the learned Magistrate by which the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code has been initiated and the property in dispute has been attached. We leave it open to either party to move the appellate Judge in the Civil litigation for appropriate interim orders if so advised in the even of dispute relating to possession." 9. The above view was reiterated in the case of Dharampal & Others Vs. Ram Siri & ors., (1993) 1 SCC 435 . This court too followed this view in a number of cases e.g. Shyam Sunder & Others Vs. State & ors., 1985 R.L.R. 1036 , Tikuda Vs. State, 1961 R.L.W. 469 (F.B.) , Udmi Ram Vs. Dharam Singh, 1988 (2) RLR 459 = 1988 (2) RLW 269 , Kanhiya Lal Vs. State of Raj., 1991 (1) RLW 73 . 10. This court too followed this view in a number of cases e.g. Shyam Sunder & Others Vs. State & ors., 1985 R.L.R. 1036 , Tikuda Vs. State, 1961 R.L.W. 469 (F.B.) , Udmi Ram Vs. Dharam Singh, 1988 (2) RLR 459 = 1988 (2) RLW 269 , Kanhiya Lal Vs. State of Raj., 1991 (1) RLW 73 . 10. In view of the above discussion it needs no stress that initiating of the proceedings under Section 145 and attaching the property under section 146 Criminal Procedure Code in the present case when the Revenue case was already pending for the very same property wherein the question of possession was involved was not only bad in law but was also in total disregard and violation of the law declared by the Apex Court on the point. Under such circumstances the observance of the technical formality of directing the petitioner to approach the Sessions Judge under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code for no other fate of this criminal litigation would simply lead to harassment of the parties and abuse of the process of law. Mt. Jain's objection is, therefore, overruled. 11. In the result, the order of the learned Magistrate by which the proceeding under section 145 Criminal Procedure Code has been initiated and the property in dispute has been attached is hereby quashed leaving it open to either party to move the Revenue Court for appropriate orders, if so advised, in the event of dispute relating to possession. The petition is allowed.Petition allowed. *******