ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is a revision Under Section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Henceforth, 'the Act'). It is directed against the order dated 24th of January, 1995, passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Bhopal, in Case No. 89/RCA/92-93. 2. The claim of the non-applicant/landlady was for eviction of the applicant/tenant from the suit house, based on Section 23-A(b) of 'the Act' and the applicant tenant contested it on merits by denying the existence of the ground on which his eviction was sought. 3. During the cross-examination of the non-applicant, it was discovered by the applicant, that she claimed to be the landlady of the suit house by virtue of the will executed by her father-in-law in her favour. The will became operative upon his death from 11-1-1992. The application for eviction Under Section 23-A(b) of 'the Act' was filed within one year from the date of operation of will on 4-11-1992. 4. Thereupon, the applicant, relying on the proviso to Section 23-A of 'the Act', filed an application for dismissal of the application of the non-applicant, filed Under Section 23-A(b) of 'the Act', for the reason that under the proviso a landlord is prohibited from filing any application for eviction within one year from the date of transfer. It was claimed that the non-applicant acquired the suit house by transfer upon the death of her father-in-law on 11-1-1992. She could have filed the application for eviction on the grounds mentioned in Section 23-A of 'the Act' only after 11-1-1993 i.e. after expiry of one year from the date of transfer and acquisition. Thus, in sum, the application of the non-applicant for eviction of the applicant was liable to be dismissed, as premature. 5. The Rent Controlling Authority, Bhopal, repelled the contention of the applicant and dismissed the application by the order impugned. The applicant has now approached this Court by this revision. 6. Before embarking upon a discussion of legal controversy at hand, it is necessary to point out that proviso to Section 23-A of 'the Act' is similar to Section 12(4) thereof. For the sake of convenience both are being reproduced hereinafter. The applicant has now approached this Court by this revision. 6. Before embarking upon a discussion of legal controversy at hand, it is necessary to point out that proviso to Section 23-A of 'the Act' is similar to Section 12(4) thereof. For the sake of convenience both are being reproduced hereinafter. The relevant proviso of Section 23-A of 'the Act' reads as under :- "Provided that where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition." Section 12(4) of 'the Act' is as follows :- "Section 12(4) Where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under Sub-section (1) on the ground specified in Clause (e) or Clause (f) thereof, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition." 7. The aforesaid sections of 'the Act', thus, bar filing of a suit or an application, as the case may be, within one year from the date of acquisition of an accommodation. Therefore, if we read Section 12(4) and proviso to Section 23-A (ibid) together, we shall find that the most important words are 'acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by way of transfer' in the proviso are comparable to 'acquired any accommodation by way of transfer'. The omission of words 'any interest therein' in Section 12(4) of 'the Act' would make only marginal difference and is not relevant for our purpose. We are here required to interpret the words 'acquired by way of transfer' in both the sections because they are pari materia. 8. Shri S. C. Jain, counsel for the applicant argued that the Court must give widest connotation to words 'acquired' and 'transfer'. The learned counsel argued that absence of any limitation in the proviso to Section 23-A (ibid) would not be the function of the Court to confine the words to any particular mode of transfer. He asserted that in whatever manner the property passes from one person to another, it would be an acquirement. The person who acquires the property gets only by change of hands from one person to another. He asserted that in whatever manner the property passes from one person to another, it would be an acquirement. The person who acquires the property gets only by change of hands from one person to another. The change of right and title, according to him, would be a transfer. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the non-applicant, Shri H. C. Kohli, argued that the transfer herein cannot be given a very wide meaning. According to learned counsel for the non-applicant, the words 'acquire' and 'transfer' are used by legislation in ordinary legal sense of conveying the property by one person to another. According to the counsel for the non-applicant, the passing of property on account of death of a person could not be a 'transfer' because this mode of acquisition of property is not, in real sense, a conveyance of property by the volition of parties. The learned counsel brought to the attention of this Court the case of Indusingh v. Smt. Leelawati, 1988 MPLJ 682 , at page 684, para 8. 10. Let us then take up the plain meaning of word 'acquire'. The word 'acquire' in the context does not mean anything but becoming an owner. The word 'transfer' is used in the sense of conveying or passing of right to hold the property in one person to another see the case of Tribhuwandas v. Premchand, 1964 MPLJ 904. 11. We must bear in mind the object of the proviso to Sections 23-A and 12(4) of 'the Act'. K. L. Shrivastava, J., in lndusingh's case, (supra), admirably indicated the object as follows :- "8. The object behind the proviso to the Sub-section 23-A of the Act appears to be to dissuade persons to resort to transfer of property as a device for securing eviction of tenants and in the context in which the question of acquisition of interest by transfer arises in the proviso. ..." 12. If we bear in mind the object of the aforesaid Section 12(4) (ibid) and the proviso (ibid) in mind, there is no escape from the conclusion that the words 'acquire' and 'transfer' are not used in a very wide sense. They are used in a narrow sense. 13. Death is a natural event. Whether a person wants it or not, the result of death is transfer of property. They are used in a narrow sense. 13. Death is a natural event. Whether a person wants it or not, the result of death is transfer of property. The transfer of property on account of death is not designed because normally a death is not designed. It occurs naturally according to circumstance. Nobody can help passing of his property after his death in other hands. Law of succession merely regulates it. The will is merely a device given to a person, if recognized by law, to express his last will and testament. By writing a will one may change a mode of succession provided by general law. To that extent, if will, if recognized, is law upto itself. However, the property changes from one hand to another under a will on account of death and not on account of the will alone. A will can be changed during the lifetime of a person as many a time as the propounder likes. After the death of the maker, it is immutable. Thus, death plays a most vital role. Court such acquisition by will be operative after death of person was intended to be covered by legislature in the words 'acquire' or 'transfer'? It appears to this Court that such was not the intention. These words were confined to getting of ownership solely on the volition of transferor and the transferee without interference by any natural event like death. The word 'transfer' was used in the sense of 'conveyance' as understood in English law. The acquirement here refers to change of title on account of design of living persons for themselves or on behalf of some other persons including the juristic persons. The proviso to Section 23-A or Section 12(4) of 'the Act' cannot apply to a transaction when it become operative on the death of a party. Such acquirement of an accommodation would not be a transfer within the meaning of proviso to Sections 23-A and 12(4) of 'the Act'. This Court is aware that in case of partition there is an element of design and yet this Court held in the case of Tribhuwandas v. Premchand (supra) that partition is not transfer. However, this ruling would be confined to the facts of that case. It is based on peculiar concept of coparcenary, confined to Mitakshara School of Hindu law. This authority may not be extended to partition among other co-owners. However, this ruling would be confined to the facts of that case. It is based on peculiar concept of coparcenary, confined to Mitakshara School of Hindu law. This authority may not be extended to partition among other co-owners. 14. Apart from that there are other considerations, why the narrow view is preferable. If we interpret the aforesaid words widely, then death of landlord during the pendency of a trial would result in abatement of the suit and legal representatives in view of Section 12(4) of 'the Act' would only be entitled to sue after a year. Similarly, a widow could not get the property for a year after the death of her husband Under Sections 23-A(a) or 23-A(b) of 'the Act'. Thus, so far as the proviso is concerned, it will nullify the object of Section 23-A of 'the Act' to give back the property to most needy persons within a maximum period of six months. A newly widowed woman shall have to wait for one and half years. Thus, this construction of Statute is beneficial to the tenant for whose sake Section 23-A of 'the Act' was created. 15. Before parting with the case, it is stated that this Court has refrained from referring to Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and adopt the definition of transfer given therein for the purpose of interpreting Section 12(4) or proviso to Section 23-A of 'the Act' as was done in Indusingh's case (supra). The reason is that the definition of 'transfer' in Transfer of Property Act cannot be incorporated by judicial reference. Both statutes do not run on the same judicial scale. Their purpose is not the same. To adopt that definition would not be proper. Nevertheless there is no difference in the conclusion. The overall view taken in Indusingh's case (supra) is same as in this case. 16. For the reasons aforesaid, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.