DR. B. S. CHANHAN, J. The petitioner in the instant petition has challenged the transfer order dated 30-8-1995 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition ). The petitioner is a work-charge employee of the Ganga Pardushan Unit, U. P. Jal Nigam Deenapur, Varanasi and designated as Work Agent and gets a consolidated monthly salary, Petitioner was trans ferred from Varanasi to Azamgarh in the public interest as the staff at Varanasi had become surplus. Being aggrieved petitioner moved a representation (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) before respondent No. 1 on 10-8-1995 that his transfer order be recalled as the transfer in the mid academic session would adversely affect the education of his children. The respondents did not consider the said representation and thus said transfer order was challenged by the instant writ petition. This Court vide its order dated 22-11-1995 allowed the writ petition directing the respondent to dispose of the said representation by means of speaking order within a period of one month by issuing a further direction that the transfer order dated 20-8-1995 shall not be given effect to till 30-6-1996 as the reliance had been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Director of School Education Madras v. O. Karuppa Thevan, 1994 (Supp) 2 SCC 666, in whfch the mid academic sessions transfer has been depricated. 2. Being aggrieved, respondents preferred Special Appeal against the Judgment and order dated 22-11- 1995, wherein the said judgment and order were set aside and direction was issued to decide the case afresh. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. As the case relates to transfer of an employee and affidavits have been exchanged, with the consent of the counsels the petition is heard and disposed of finally. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the said transfer order mainly of the following grounds :- (a) Transfer order would affect the education of his children as the order has been passed in mid- academic session ; (b) the petitioner being a Class IV employee could not have been transferred outside the District ; (c) the work force in Varanasi was not surplus, as 12 other persons were working there on contract basis, who were Junior to petitioner ; and (d) the transfer order was passed as the respondents were having malice against the petitioner. 4. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents denied all the allegations. In the representation dated 10-8-1995 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition), petitioner has mentioned that mid academic session transfer would adversely affect the education of his children, though there is no whisper regarding the ages and classes of the children, in which they were studying. Such a vague and unsatisfactory demand would and must not force the employer to consider the representation made by an employee. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of O. Karuppa Thevan (supra), does not confer any right upon an employee but merely directs the employer to give "due weight" to the fact and consider as to whether the transfer in the mid- academic session can be avoided, if it was going to affect the education of the children. The Apex Court observed as under :- "although, there is no rule, we are of the view that in affecting trans fer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent". 5. In the instant case petitioners representation, as stated above, does not disclose any particulars about the education of his children. In rejoinder-affidavit, filed before this Court first time on 7-1-1996, it has been disclosed that son of the petitioner was studying in 1st Standard and the daughter was admitted in Lower Kinder-Garden in 1995 (Annexure R-A-1 to the writ petition ). 6. No doubt, there is an awakening in the society to give best possible education to the children but again the question does arise as to whether this Court must exercise its extra-ordinary discretionary juris diction in favour of a person, who did not even think it desirable to place his grievances before his employer with full particulars. I am of the considered opinion that such circumstances do not warrant any interference by this Court. 7. In has further been argued on behalf of the petitioner that there was no surplus work force in Varanasi, and even if it was so, there were transferred as they were juniors to the petitioner. In the counter-affidavit, it has been specifically mentioned that the staff had become surplus at Varanasi and after considering all the relevant factors, he was transferred to his home District. In the counter-affidavit, it has been specifically mentioned that the staff had become surplus at Varanasi and after considering all the relevant factors, he was transferred to his home District. Petitioner cannot claim that his juniors should have been transferred as the principle of first come-last go applies in the case of retrenchment and not in the case of transfer. 8. There is also no force in the submission made on behalf of the peti tioner that a Class IV employee cannot be transferred outside the district. The petitioner is a work-charge employee and has no vested right to remain posted at one particular place. It is entirely upto the employer to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is transferred from his present posting. [union of India v. S. L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 ; Shilpi Base v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 532 ; V. O. I. v. N. P. Thomas, AIR 1991 SC 1605 and Chief General Manager (Tel.) N. E. Telecome Circle v. Rajender Ch. Bhattacharjee, AIR 1995 SC 813 ] 9. The law on transfer has been settled by the Apex Court in a catina of judgments. A person holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right to work on a particular place as the transfer order does not affect any of his legal rights and Court cannot interfere with a transfer order passed in public interest or administrative exigency. In the case of Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atma Ram Sugomal Poshani, 1989 (2) SCC 602 , the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under : "transfer of a Government Servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to the other is an incident of service. No Government servant of employee of Public Undertaking has legal right for being posted at 0ny particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condi tion of service and the employee has no choice in the matter, Transfer from (one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration". 10. No Government servant of employee of Public Undertaking has legal right for being posted at 0ny particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condi tion of service and the employee has no choice in the matter, Transfer from (one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration". 10. Similarly in the case of Union of India v. H. N. Kirtania, 1989 (3) SCC 445 the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under : "transfer of a public servant made on administrative grounds or in public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on ground of mala fide". 11. In the case of Tar a Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1977 (2) SCR 198 , the Honble Supreme Court has held as under : "it has been held time and again by this Court that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegation of mala fides if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition. Keeping in view the well established rule that the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and considering all the allegations made by the appellant in regard thereto, we do not think that they could be considered as sufficient to establish malus animus". 12. Similarly in the case of E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 (2) SCR 348 , the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under : "secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The alle gations of mala fides are often more easily made that proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. The alle gations of mala fides are often more easily made that proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a rather extra-ordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to act which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may land them selves to mis-constructions and suspicion as to the bona fide of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against ministers and other, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set-u -. ^. . . . these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach. . . but because other wise, functioning effectively would become? difficult in a democracy". 13. The Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1982 (1) SCC 31 (Para 12) was pleased to observe as under: "the court would be justified in refusing to carry out investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition. The burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned order of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias of misuse by the Government of its powers". 14. In the case of Dr. The burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned order of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias of misuse by the Government of its powers". 14. In the case of Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi v. Shivajirao Nilangerkar Patil, 1987 (1) SCC 228, the Supreme Court has observed as under : "that it was somewhat unfortunate that allegations of mala fide which could have no foundation in fact were made and several cases which, had come up before this Court and other courts and it had been found that these were made merely with a view to cause prejudice or in the hope that whether they have basis in fact or not some of which might at least stick. It is therefore the duty of the Courts, warned this Court in the said decision, to scrutinize these allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them in cases where they have no foundation in fact. . . . . . Therefore, while the court should be conscious to deal with the allegations of mala fide or cast aspersions on holders of high office and power, the court cannot ignore the probabilities arising from proven circumstances". 15. In the case of M. Sankarnarayana, I. A. S. v. State of Karnataka, 1993 (1) SCC 54 , the Supreme Court observed as under : "it may be permissible in an appropriate case to draw reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of insinuation, surmise or conjecture". In the case of N. K. Singh v. Union of India, 1994 (6) SCC 98 , the Supreme Court has held as under : "the inference of mala fides should be drawn by reading in between the lines and taking into account the attendant circumst ances. . . . . . No other suspicious circumstance is made out to permit the contrary inference. No rowing inquiry into the matter is called for or justified within the scope of Judicial review of a transfer scrutinised with reference to the private rights of an individual. . . . . . . . . . . . . No other suspicious circumstance is made out to permit the contrary inference. No rowing inquiry into the matter is called for or justified within the scope of Judicial review of a transfer scrutinised with reference to the private rights of an individual. . . . . . . . unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinised judicially, transfers and the manageable standards for scrutinising all there are no judicially Courts lack the necessary expertise for per sonnel management of all Government departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to be limited judicial scruitiny indicated" 16. In view of the above, the petitioner in the instant petition has not made any firm foundation for alleging that his transfer is contrary to any statutory provision or has been actuated by any malice. Vague and mellow allegations of mala fides without material to substantiate the same do not warrant this Court to interfere. 17. In the last, it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that if the petitioner is transferred he would suffer great hardship. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. S. S. Kaurav AIR 1995 SC 1056 : 1995 (1) LBESR 669 (SC), the Apex Court has held that it is not permissible for the Court to go into the relative hardship. It is for the administration to consider the facts of a given case and mitigate the real hardship in the interest of good and efficient administration. In the instant case the petitioner has already made a representation though as stated above is totally vague and the petitioner has not furnished sufficient material to the respondents in respect of the said representation which may compel the respondents to take a contrary view and cancel the transfer order. 18. In view of the above, the petition lacks merit, whatsoever, and is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .