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1996 DIGILAW 690 (KAR)

STATE OF KARNATAKA v. MELVIN D SOUZA

1996-12-03

H.N.NARAYAN, M.F.SALDANHA

body1996
M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal preferred by the State of Karnataka and it is directed against the judgment of the learned sessions judge, dakshina kannada in sessions case No. 150 of 1993. Of the four accused, three of whom are brothers and the fourth one being the wife of a-3, are closely related to the p. ws. And to the deceased insofar as they belong to the same family and they live next to each other. It is alleged that on the early morning of 26-6-1993 at about 6. 30 a. m. , a dispute arose between the two parties insofar as P. W. 3 had erected a fencing in the garden land between the properties which were in possession of the two parties in order to prevent persons and cattle from passing through his land. According to P. W. 3, he did this because, the accused were not allowing him to take water from their land. The accused are alleged to have not only objected to the fencing, but they started removing it in the course of which, a quarrel took place. The prosecution alleges that in the course of the events that followed, accused nos. 1 and 2 dealt blows to the deceased and to P. W. 3 and that as a result of these blows, the deceased got injured and ultimately died, whereas P. W. 3 though injured, survived the assault. It is relevant to record that a-4 who is a lady and who is the wife of a-3, was aged about 48 years and is a middle aged person. The record shows that a-4 had sustained an injury of some seriousness in the course of this incident and one of the defence taken up before the lower court was that the p. ws. Had assaulted a-4 and because of this, the other accused virtually came to her rescue in order to extricate her and save her and in the process, the deceased and P. W. 3 sustained injuries. The learned trial judge has very carefully assessed all the evidence on record and the judgment is a well considered and detailed judgment wherein the learned judge has also had occasion to examine the position in law and to hold that in substance, it would be impossible to record a conviction against the accused. The learned trial judge has very carefully assessed all the evidence on record and the judgment is a well considered and detailed judgment wherein the learned judge has also had occasion to examine the position in law and to hold that in substance, it would be impossible to record a conviction against the accused. All the four accused were accordingly acquitted of the charges under Section 326 read with Section 34, Section 324 read with Section 34 and Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC respectively. It is against this order of acquittal that the present appeal has been preferred. ( 2 ) THE main submission canvassed by the learned s. p. p. is that undoubtedly the learned trial judge has considered every aspect of the case and has devoted considerable amount of attention to a revaluation of the evidence before him, but the learned Advocate submits that in the process, the learned judge has unduly carried away by some insignificant factors and has discarded the evidence which was otherwise more than sufficient to record a conviction. Learned Advocate has taken us in detail through the medical evidence to start with and he has pointed out that as far as the deceased is concerned, that he has suffered a serious head injury which was dealt with so much offeree, that it has resulted even in fractures of the vertebrae. The doctor has clearly opined that such an injury could be caused if a full-blooded blow were to be landed on the head with a heavy wooden object such as m. o. 1. Similarly, the learned Advocate has drawn our attention to the injuries sustained by P. W. 3 and he has pointed out that though the injury is not as serious as the one received by the deceased, that it could have been sustained under similar circumstances. Learned Advocate has submitted that P. W. 3 has very clearly given the background of the case in his evidence, that there is no difficulty with regard to identification because the parties know each other and furthermore, P. W. 3 has deposed to the fact that it was the accused who were the aggressors. In this background, learned Advocate has submitted that the reasons on which the evidence of P. W. 3 has been rejected by the trial court are unsustainable. In this background, learned Advocate has submitted that the reasons on which the evidence of P. W. 3 has been rejected by the trial court are unsustainable. His contention is that the evidence of P. W. 3 is corroborated by that of p. ws. 4, 5, 6 and 7 who are persons who arrived on the scene virtually seconds after the assault has taken place. He also submits that in the background of hostility which existed between the parties, that it is very clear that the accused were responsible for the assault in question and that consequently, a conviction must follow. ( 3 ) AS against this position, the respondents' learned Advocate submitted that the prosecution evidence is inconclusive and that having regard to the fact that there is a background of hostility between the parties, that the court must insist upon independent evidence in a case of this type before recording a conviction on such serious charges. Learned Advocate has taken us in some detail through the evidence on record and he has sought to emphasize the fact that a-4 who is a lady, has sustained an injury in this incident and his argument proceeds on the footing that in this background, if the accused had come to the rescue of a-4, that there is every possibility that some injuries may have occured. The submission proceeds on the footing that the trial court was perfectly justified in having not only rejected the prosecution evidence, but having also come to the conclusion that the accused could have been acting in exercise of the right of self-defence. As regards the medical evidence, the learned Advocate has sought to place heavy reliance on the fact that the P. W. 3 himself admits that in the course of the incident, the participants were pushing and pulling each other and that they had also fallen down on the ground in the course of the fight. Learned Advocate draws our attention to the fact that the doctor has opined that the injuries in question could also be possible if the persons were to fall violently on a hard substance or in particular, on a stone. He also draws our attention to that part of the evidence where there is some reference to the use of stones and stone throwing and he attributes the injuries possibly to this activity. He also draws our attention to that part of the evidence where there is some reference to the use of stones and stone throwing and he attributes the injuries possibly to this activity. Learned Advocate also submits that where the trial court which had the benefit of assessing the demeanour of the witnesses in the course of the trial, has carefully examined all the evidence and in the course of a detailed judgment come to the conclusion that the evidence does not inspire confidence, that this court ought not to interfere with the decision unless it can be demonstrated that the verdict in question is incorrect to the extent of categorising it as being perverse. In sum and substance, the learned Advocate submits that this is not a case in which the appeal court should exercise its powers in the face of a detailed and well considered judgment. ( 4 ) WE have spent considerable time examining the entire record very carefully. We have also heard the two learned advocates at some length and we have perused the detailed judgment against which this appeal is directed. We are in agreement with the submission canvassed by the learned Advocate who represents the respondents, that it is a well-settled principle of law that where the trial court which has the benefit of a first hand knowledge of the witnesses, their demeanour and all other factors that require to be assessed, has, without omitting or overlooking any part of the record, come to the conclusion that the evidence does not inspire confidence, that unless there are very strong and valid grounds to interfere with that decision, particularly in an appeal against acquittal, that this court would not disturb those findings. We have taken note of the fact that the trial court has meticulously assessed the evidence and that detailed reasons have been given for the findings that have been recorded and in this background, we see no justification to interfere with that decision. ( 5 ) IT is true, as pointed out by the learned s. p. p. that on adetailed consideration of the record, another parallel view would perhaps be possible. ( 5 ) IT is true, as pointed out by the learned s. p. p. that on adetailed consideration of the record, another parallel view would perhaps be possible. However, in an appeal against acquittal, merely because another view is possible, the appeal court would not be justified in disturbing an otherwise correct decision unless it is demonstrated that the view taken by the trial court is wrong to the extent that it has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. As regards this last aspect of the matter, we need to record that on a very careful consideration of the evidence, the position that emerges is that it would not be either safe or correct to finally hold that one or the other of the parties was the aggressor. One factor that does stand out is the fact that a-4, who is a middle aged lady, has sustained an injury of some seriousness. The prosecution is duty bound to explain how this injury had occured and in the absence of such an explanation being forthcoming, a serious doubt arises as to whether the prosecution witnesses are deposing to the whole truth or whether they are covering up for something. Obviously, there was a free-for-all and force was used on both sides and in the process, the a-4 who is a middle aged lady, sustained an injury of some seriousness and in this context, one cannot Rule out the possibility that this triggered off a rather violent reaction, particularly on the part of the other accused who would naturally come to her rescue and in the process, the injuries occured to the other side. ( 6 ) IT is well-settled law that the prosecution must explain how the injuries occured to the accused and if the evidence is silent in this regard, that it is a lacuna of some seriousness which the court will take due note of. This is allied to the other aspect of the case, namely the question as to whether the accused persons could have been acting in self-defence. This is allied to the other aspect of the case, namely the question as to whether the accused persons could have been acting in self-defence. Again, the law is very clear with regard to the amount of force and the degree of force that can be used even while acting in self-defence and the law postulates that if the force used is excessive or if the force used is more than what is absolutely necessary to defend oneself, then the plea is not available as the person using the force gets relegated to the position of the aggressor. In this case, we find it impossible on the record before us to Rule out the situation wherein the accused were acting in exercise of the right of self-defence and we have noted the fact that even though there are references to knives having been brought, that these were not used and in this background, it would be risky to hold that the accused have used excessive force. The Supreme Court has laid down the proposition that the degree of force which a person is entitled to use while acting in exercise of the right of self-defence cannot be measured in golden scales and that a reasonable view of the matter will have to be taken. Having regard to the position in law therefore, where only two injuries have resulted, it would not be correct to outright reject the plea of self-defence. ( 7 ) ON a total consideration of the record, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a case which calls for any interference with the judgment under appeal. The appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed. The bail bonds of the respondents are accordingly cancelled. The fees payable to the learned Advocate who represented the respondents as amicus curiae is quantified at rs. 1,000/ -. --- *** --- .