Judgment : I. P. Vasishth, J. 1. It is a defendant's appeal against the order dated 29-7-1989 passed by Sri S. P. Singh, 1st Additional Civil Judge, Sultanpur in a suit for permanent injunction brought by the respondent-plaintiff. 2. THE gist of the matter is that the plaintiff was in possession of the demised premises consisting of a residential house situated in Mohalla Majorganj (Rohatta), Pargana Meeranpur, Tehsil and District Sultanpur as a tenant under the defendant for quite a long time, that on 20-1-1974 the parties entered into a sale agreement. THE defendant agreed to transfer the title of the said house in favour of the plaintiff against a total consideration of Rs. 7 lacs only to be paid in easy instalments during the next sixteen years, meanwhile he received an amount of Rs. 24,0000/- as earnest money from the plaintiff. THE plaintiff was also to bear the registration expenses of the sale deed. It was further averred that by 26-5-1988 the plaintiff cleared off the entire sale consideration of Rs. 7 lacs and thus the parties executed another agreement on the same day i.e. 26-5-1988 endorsing the incident of payment. It was also agreed that the defendant would get the sale deed executed in the next thirty days, in a manner of speaking the outer limit for getting the sale deed executed upto 19-1-1990, as fixed in the original agreement dated 20-1-1974, was reduced. It was pleaded that during the aforesaid period, and in the legitimate expectation of the fulfilment of the agreement the plaintiff incurred considerable expenses by making certain improvements and additions in the demised premises which probably promoted the defendant to back out from the agreement and as such the latter started threatening his possession as well as title by opening negotiations with third parties for the sale of the house. 3. FORCED by the circumstances, the plaintiff thus brought a suit for permanent injunction to protect his possession. During the pendency of the suit, he prayed for interim relief under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC to restrain the defendant's interference in his possession and also to refrain him from alienating the suit property. 4. THE plaintiffs suit as well as prayer for interim relief was resisted by the defendant on the short ground of denial of the sale agreement. 4. THE plaintiffs suit as well as prayer for interim relief was resisted by the defendant on the short ground of denial of the sale agreement. For the obvious reasons receipt of earnest money sale consideration or any part thereof was also denied. Of course, his possession in pursuance to the tenancy rights was not seriously contested. Under the impugned order the learned trial court restrained the defendant from evicting the plaintiff from the suit house in any illegal manner and further asked him to refrain from selling the house to any other person till the final decision of the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant brought the instant appeal. 5. IN all fairness to him, the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant did not question the validity of the impugned order insofar as it directed him not to evict the plaintiff from the suit house except in due course of law. His grouse was thus limited only against the embargo placed on his right to alienate the property. 6. ON a careful scrutiny of the entire material on record and hearing the parties we are not inclined to sustain the impugned portion of the order under appeal because it has a tendency of not only prejudging the issue but also places an un reasonable restriction on owner's right to deal with his property. Assuming for the sake of arguments that there was a sale agreement on 20-1-1974 between the parties which permitted them to conclude the agreement in the next sixteen years i. e. the period required by the proposed vendee plaintiff to clear off the consideration amount of Rs. 7 lacs, there is no proper explanation as to why he did not insist on an early and expeditious execution of the sale deed after making the entire payment of such a huge amount by 26-5-1988. ON his own showing, the second agreement of this date obliged the parties to get the sale deed registered in the next thirty days. The plaintiff had to do nothing else except to bear the registration expenses and it goes without saying that there is neither any plea nor any material on record to show his offer, much less, readiness, insistence or even willingness to complete his part of the agreement. The plaintiff had to do nothing else except to bear the registration expenses and it goes without saying that there is neither any plea nor any material on record to show his offer, much less, readiness, insistence or even willingness to complete his part of the agreement. As a patter of fact, the instant suit itself was filed in court in 1988 i. e. after the alleged execution of the second agreement dated 26-5-1988. From his own point of view certain rights had accrued in his favour which could be enforced under the law, but instead of seeking enforcement of those rights, he brought a simple suit for permanent injunction. It was argued on his behalf that in view of the original agreement the plaintiff could not insist upon the execution of the sale deed for a period of sixteen years starting from 20-1-1974. The agreement is devoid of force because this agreement was, then modified by the subsequent agreement of 26-5-1988 which evidenced the payment of the entire sale consideration of Rs. 7 lacs and stipulated the parties to get the sale deed executed within the next thirty days. Be that as it may, even after 20-1-1990 the plaintiff did not bring a suit for specific performance of agreement within the statutory limitation of three years. During the course of hearing it was submitted that the plaintiff did file a suit in April 1991 but unfortunately it could not be registered till September 1993 as he was not able to pay the court-fee. A little pause is required hew, firstly as to how come that a person after having paid a huge amount of Rs. 7 lacs in anticipation of the completion of the sale transaction was short of funds to get the sale deed registered during all this period of more than three years and that too after having initiated action at law. The second aspect of the matter is that the suit could be legally accepted as having been instituted only when the court-fee was paid in September, 1993. It is besides the point that on the records of this case, there is no plea of his willingness and readiness to abide by the terms of the contract. 7. The second aspect of the matter is that the suit could be legally accepted as having been instituted only when the court-fee was paid in September, 1993. It is besides the point that on the records of this case, there is no plea of his willingness and readiness to abide by the terms of the contract. 7. THE learned counsel for the plaintiff was at pains to argue that his client could legitimately protect his possession in pursuance to a sale agreement under the concept of part performance of agreement as envisaged by Section 53-A of the Trans fer of Property Act. Reliance was placed on the case of Chaitan Das v. Murali Dalai, AIR 1971 Orissa 41. 8. WE are not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel firstly because of the stark lack of proper pleading that the plaintiffs possession, which originated in tenancy, was ever converted into possession in pursuance to the alleged sale agreement. The other angle is that the doctrine of part performance is a defence and not a weapon of offence as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Delhi Motor Company v. U. A. Basrurkar, 1968 (2) SCR 720 ; Ranchhoddas Chhagan-lal v. Devaji Supdu Dork, 1977 (3) SCC 584 ; M/s. Technicians Studio Private Ltd. v. Smt. Lila Ghosh, 1977 (4) SCC 324 . Otherwise too, the facts of the case of Chaitandas were entirely different inasmuch as the plaintiff there had reclaimed certain land and continued in possession thereof for a number-of years and applied to the management of the estate for the lease and deposited the lease money, the formal deed had of course not been executed. The learned single Judge held that the plain tiff could protect his possession and press his claim on the basis thereof under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. We thus find no good reason to place any indefinite embargo on the right of the appellant- defendant to exercise his proprietory right with regard to the suit house. Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed to the extent that even though the respondent-plaintiff will neither be evicted nor his possession distubed except in due course of law, the defendant-appellant will be at liberty to exercise all his proprietary rights; including regarding alienation. 9. THE impugned order stands modified accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed to the extent that even though the respondent-plaintiff will neither be evicted nor his possession distubed except in due course of law, the defendant-appellant will be at liberty to exercise all his proprietary rights; including regarding alienation. 9. THE impugned order stands modified accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.