JUDGMENT R.S. Garg, J. 1. In the suit filed by the husband seeking relief of divorce against the wife, inter alia, stating that even after a decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed, in favour of the husband the wife did not come to slay with the husband, the Court while granting decree also made an order under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage, 1955, directing that the husband shall pay Rs. 500/- per month to the wife as permanent alimony and Rs. 400/- to the minor son for maintenance. So far as the decree for divorce is concerned, it has not been challenged by either of the party, therefore, the matter in relation to that part of the decree is not required to be considered. 2. The short question for consideration before this Court is whether the trial Court was justified and acted within jurisdiction in granting maintenance under section 25 to the wife and minor son without there being any application for the purpose. 3. Shri Singh learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Court can assume jurisdiction only when an application is filed and if there is no application, then the Court has no jurisdiction to pass order. On the other hand, Shri Agrawal submits that in view of the language of section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, an application would be required to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, if a request is made at any time subsequent to the passing of the decree. According to him when the Court is granting a decree of divorce, then without application or on oral request permanent alimony can be granted: Section 25 (1) reads as under: 25(1) Any Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree of any time subsequent thereof, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, the case may be, order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant..............by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. According to Shri Singh, the Court has no jurisdiction under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act to grant an order even at the time of passing of any decree or at any time subsequent thereto unless an application is made to the Court for the purpose, either by the wife or the husband. According to Shri Singh, the Court has no jurisdiction under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act to grant an order even at the time of passing of any decree or at any time subsequent thereto unless an application is made to the Court for the purpose, either by the wife or the husband. On the other hand, Shri Agrawal submits that looking to the scheme and the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 25 which is benevolent in nature and is to be used as a shield by the weaker section for gating maintenance, it must be held that the words 'on application made to it for the purpose' are only related to the words 'at any time subsequent thereto'. 4. The question is whether the words 'on application made to it for the purpose' would cover the entire phrase between the two commas, i.e. at the time of passing any decree or subsequent there to. For considering the scheme of section 25, it would be important to consider the provisions of section 24 of the Act. Section 24 reads: Where in any proceeding under this Act, it appears to the Court mat either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner.......it may seen to the Court to be reasonable. From Section 24, it would appear that when the Court is of the considered opinion that the person making the application has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, the Court on application of the wife or the husband may order the respondent to pay to the petitioner expenses of the proceeding, etc. If the logic pleaded by Shri Agrawal is applied to section 24 it would lead to a fallacious position. In such a situation, in a case under section 24, a person who has no sufficient income for her or his support would not be required to make an application because as interpreted by Shri Agrawal, the words 'on application' shall qualify the words 'necessary expenses of the proceeding'. In such a situation, in a case under section 24, a person who has no sufficient income for her or his support would not be required to make an application because as interpreted by Shri Agrawal, the words 'on application' shall qualify the words 'necessary expenses of the proceeding'. Shri Agrawal now submits that the distinction is to be found in the use of the word 'and' in section 24 and the word 'or' in section 25. In my opinion, the use of the words 'and' and the word 'or' would not make any difference. According to section 24, if a person does not have sufficient income for his/her support and the necessary expenses, he can make an application to the Court for grant of maintenance amount or necessary expenses of the proceeding or make a claim jointly by an application. The word 'and' used section 24 is conjunctive which only shows that the person claiming maintenance can claim necessary expenses at the same time. 5. Section 25 read, either in the light of section 24 or independently, would show that the Court would have jurisdiction to pass an order under section 25 only if an application is made to it for the purpose by the person claiming permanent alimony. The interpretation put forth by Shri Agrawal may appear to be attractive but is hollow on legal foundation. Section 25, as quoted above, clothes the civil Court to pass an order under section 25 at the time of passing of any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. Whether the Court is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction on or without application has to be seen in view of the language employed in section 25 itself. The rule of interpretation and grammar speak that when a phrase is used within two commas, it would not affect the main sentence or the intent of the main sentence. Section 25 if is read without the particular phrase, i.e. 'at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto' it would read as follows ; Any Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act, may on, application made to it for the purpose by either the wife........ 6. It clearly shows that the Court's jurisdiction is attracted only if an application is made. 6. It clearly shows that the Court's jurisdiction is attracted only if an application is made. To say that the phrase regarding the application and making of it would apply to and qualify the words 'at any time subsequent thereto' would be incorrect. In a case where the wife does not move an application under section 25, does not raise a plea under section 25, nor any issue is cast nor evidence is led, she cannot, at the time of final hearing claim before the Court that she is entitled to permanent alimony. Shri Agrawal submits that as the applicant spouse does not know whether a decree is likely to be passed or not he/she cannot move an application under section 25. I am unable to accept this contention. The plea that in the event of a decree being granted in favour of the petitioner, an order for permanent alimony be passed in favour of the other spouse can always be raised. If such a plea is raised, the Court would be called upon to enquire into the factum of income and the entitlement of the person claiming maintenance. If an independent application is made during the pendency of the petition for divorce, then the Court shall always keep that application pending and may in its discretion allow the said application if the suit is decreed and a decree for the divorce is granted. It cannot be gainsaid that because the result of the litigation is uncertain, a party is not entitled to raise certain pleas. The alternative plea that in the event of the suit being decreed, the respondent wife be awarded permanent alimony can always be raised. 7. It is further to be seen from section 25 that the phrase 'at the time of passing any decree or any time subsequent thereto' is encompassed between two commas. In my opinion, the whole of the phrase would be governed by the subsequent sentence, i.e. 'on application made to it for the purpose'. If the intention of the Legislature was to qualify the words 'at any time subsequent their to' with the phrase on application made to it for the purpose then there was no necessity of commas between these two phrases. If the intention of the Legislature was to qualify the words 'at any time subsequent their to' with the phrase on application made to it for the purpose then there was no necessity of commas between these two phrases. The language of the section then would have been 'at the time of passing any decree, or at any time subsequent thereto an application made to it for the purpose'. If the Legislature in its wisdom thought to put a bar on exercise of jurisdiction without an application then the interpretation which is contrary to the intent of the legislature and also contrary to the principles of natural justice, cannot be accepted. 8. Referring to section 26 of the Act, Shri Agrawal submits that in any proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court may torn time 10 time pass such interim orders and make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of the minor children consistently with their wishes, where ever possible, and may, after the decree, upon application by the petition for the purpose, make from time to time, all such orders and provision with respect to the custody, etc. According to him, in this section also the words 'upon application by petition for the purpose' would only qualify the words after the decree. I am unable to accept the contention. The section is one and complete. It provides that the Court can pass interim orders, the court can make provision in the decree in relation to custody, maintenance and education of the minor children. It also provides that after the decree, the court can pass all such orders and make provision with respect to the costody, maintenance and education of such children. According to Shri Agrawal, the words 'upon application by petition for the purpose' would qualify not the first part but the latter part of the section only. If the second part is only qualified by those qualifying words 'all such orders and provisions with respect to' would become redundant. According to Shri Agrawal, the words 'upon application by petition for the purpose' would qualify not the first part but the latter part of the section only. If the second part is only qualified by those qualifying words 'all such orders and provisions with respect to' would become redundant. In my opinion, for claiming jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of section 26, an application has to be made even for obtaining an interim order or a request can be made in the pleadings so that the Court is alive to the situation and ultimately passes final order and make provision in the decree. Shri Agrawal now submits that if this interpretation is accepted, then the words in case the proceedings for obtaining such decree were still pending' would become redundant. The argument of Shri Agrawal is based on misinterpretation of the legal position. This phrase merely provides a deeming fiction. Where the Court on application has made an interim order under section 26 or has made provision in the decree on application of the claimant and in a situation the said order is required to be modified on the application of either spouse, the Court shall consider the said application with deeming fiction that the proceedings for obtaining the said decree were still pending. Pendency of proceeding is to be considered for the simple reason that the Hindu Marriage Act which is complete Code in itself does not want the parties to run from pilar to post and file suit one after another. The normal rule is that once a decree is passed, it cannot be modified by the very same Court. Considering the situation and the change in the circumstances, the law has given right and authority to the Court to change the order already passed or to make all such orders and make provisions with respect to the requirement of section 26. Reading from any angle, even for the purpose of section 26, it cannot be held that without application, the court can pass an interim order or can make provisions in the decree. 9. If the argument of Shri Agrawal is accepted, it would lead to a chatoic situation. Reading from any angle, even for the purpose of section 26, it cannot be held that without application, the court can pass an interim order or can make provisions in the decree. 9. If the argument of Shri Agrawal is accepted, it would lead to a chatoic situation. Where an application is not filed, reply is not received, pleading are not raised, issue is not cast, evidence is not led and the parties do not know what they are to lose or gain, the Court in its discretion without knowing anything may pass an order in relation to the custody, maintenance and education of the minor children. The intention of the legislature is, and the same is based on the principles of natural justice, that if a party is seeking relief from the Court, then it must make an application to apprise other party as to what case he is required to meet. 10. Coming to section 25 of the Act, it is clear from the language that the words 'on application made to it for the purpose' would qualify the whole of the sentence i.e. 'at the time of passing any decree or all any time subsequent there to.' If Shri Agrawal's argument is accepted, the situation which is created would be like that, the wife does not file application for grant of permanent alimony, does not raise the plea the court does not cast any issue and the parties do no lead any evidence and the Court in its discretion without there being any prayer, makes provision. In my opinion, this is not law. The law is based on the principles of natural justice and commands every court that before an adverse order is passed, the person, against whom the order is passed, is heard. 11. Referring to para 8 of the judgment, Shri Agrawal submits that it appears that the order was passed with the consent of the counsel for the appellant. I read the said paragraph many a time but 1 am unable to find even a single inking which may show that the order was passed with the consent of counsel for the other side. Maintenance granted in favour of the minor children and the wife under section 25 or under the provisions of section 26, in my opinion, are illegal. 12. Maintenance granted in favour of the minor children and the wife under section 25 or under the provisions of section 26, in my opinion, are illegal. 12. Shri Agrawal relying upon the order dated 3.5.96 passed in C.R. No. 561/96 submitted that a single Judge of this Court has held that a separate application under section 26 of the Act is not necessary, therefore, an order during the pendency of the suit in favour of a minor can be passed. Drawing the analogy, he submits that for an order under section 25, an application would not be required. In the matter of C.R. No. 561/96, decided on 3.5.96, the husband has filed a petition for divorce and in the said petition, an application under section 24 of the Act was filed. Counsel for the husband raised an objection that under the provisions of section 24 of the Act, separate amount of maintenance in favour of a minor cannot be granted. The court observed that in a proceeding under the Act, on application under section 24 of the Act, maintenance pendente lite can be awarded only in favour of the wife and not in favour of the children. This observation clearly shows that an order in favour of a minor cannot be passed even under section 24 of the Act. It also says that the application under section 26 of the Act is a must to claim jurisdiction of the Court. According to this order, maintenance for minor children could have been awarded only under section 26. The Court being alive to the situation that an application under section 26 is mandatory, observed that no separate application under section 26 of the Act was made in that case but the Court was of the opinion that the application filed under section 24 of the Act by the wife can be considered to be an application filed jointly under section 24 read with section 26 of the Act. The Court has not dispensed with the requirement of tiling an application but has come to the conclusion that the application filed under section 24 claiming maintenance for the wife and the minor children can be considered to be application filed under sections 24 and 26 of the Act. 13. In Civil Revision No. 1125/82, decided on 13.10.82 (Jithandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi), this Court has considered this aspect of the matter. 13. In Civil Revision No. 1125/82, decided on 13.10.82 (Jithandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi), this Court has considered this aspect of the matter. The Con has observed as under; Further, the jurisdiction under section 25 is attracted on application made to it (Court) for that purpose by either the wife or the husband. The Court further observed that in the absence of application under section 25, an order passed by the Court is virtually a nullity. There was lack of jurisdiction in that case even according to the pure theory of jurisdiction which limits the defects of jurisdiction to the stage of commencement of proceedings. Such defects arise when (a) authority is assumed under an ultra vires statute; (b) the Court or the Tribunal is not properly constituted or is disqualified to act; (c) the subject-matter or the parties are such over which the Court or Tribunal has no authority to enquire and (d) there is want of essential preliminaries prescribed by law for commencement of the enquiry. The Court further held that the absence of an application under section 25, gave rise to want of essential preliminaries prescribed by the law for clothing the Court with the jurisdiction to act under section 25. The wife and children can always move an application for seeking relief as an interim measure by filing an application under section 24 for the wife and for the children under section 26 of the Act. They are always free to move an application under section 25 and section 26, after passing the decree for grant of maintenance to the wife and children. In my opinion, the court below committed an illegality in granting maintenance to the wife and the children in the absence of an application. The order contained in para 9 (b) of the judgment is hereby set aside. The wife and the children shall be free to make an application before the said Court either under section 25 or under section 26 of the Act and if such applications are filed, they shall be decided on their own merits. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above, there shall be no orders as to costs.