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1996 DIGILAW 699 (RAJ)

Ram Chandra v. State Of Rajasthan

1996-07-11

M.A.A.KHAN

body1996
JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the lower court as also the impugned orders. 2. This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment' dated February 2, 1991 whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur confirmed the order dated 9.11.1990 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate Sambhar in Case No. 6/1990 State v. Ramchandra and others under Section 145 Cr.P.C. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are : One Bheru was the original tenant of agricultural land which is the subject matter of the present litigation. Bheru died about 70 years back, leaving behind him Chhitar his son and Smt. Barji, his widow as his legal heirs. It is an undisputed position that Smt. Barji remarried with one Ladu who is said to be the father of respondent No. 2, Ramu. The present petitioners are the sons of Shri Chhitar who died some 10 or 12 years back, after leaving behind him the 3 petitioners and one Kalyan deceased as his legal heirs. Smt. Birji gave birth to Ramu respondent No. 2 and three daughters allegedly from Ladu. It appears that the agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 25 to 28,29 to 32, 309 to 313 and 32/144 admeasuring 33 bighas 9 biswas situated at village Maleda, Tehsil Dudu, Jaipur became the bone of contention between the petitioner on one hand and Ramu non-petitioner and his sons respondent No. 3 to 6 on the other. The dispute took the parties to the Revenue as well' as Criminal Courts. Again, it is an admitted position that on 26th April, 1989, the respondent No. 2, Ramu filed a suit for declaration of partition and permanent injunction in respect of the land in dispute in the court of Assistant Collector, Dudu against the petitioner, their brother Late Shri Kalyan and Tehsildar, Dudu. During the pendency of the said case, the respondents further appears to have obtained an exparte ad-interim injunction and also to have moved for appointing a receiver of the property in dispute. 4. If further appears that the institution of the revenue suit by the respondent No. 2 could not deter the parties from asserting their title to the land in dispute and the dispute over the agricultural' land was considered by the authorities as likely to cause breach of the peace. 4. If further appears that the institution of the revenue suit by the respondent No. 2 could not deter the parties from asserting their title to the land in dispute and the dispute over the agricultural' land was considered by the authorities as likely to cause breach of the peace. Therefore, the S.H.O., Phulera inferred the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Sambhar Lake on or before 13th July, 1990 that a dispute concerning the disputed land and likely to cause breach of the peace had arisen within his jurisdiction. Therefore, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambhar, initiated proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in respect of disputed land on 13th July, 1990 and directed the parties to appear before him with evidence in support of their respective claims regarding the possession of the property in question within two months prior to the issue of the preliminary order. It further appears that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambhar passed a separate order under Section 146(1) Cr.P.C. attaching the property in dispute on 9.11,1990. Aggrieved against the orders of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate initiating proceedings under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. and attaching the property under Section 146(1) Cr.P.C., the petitioners approached the revisional court i.e. Sessions Judge, Jaipur District Jaipur who confirmed the said orders. The petitioners have, therefore, approached this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 5. It is well settled position of law that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised very sparingly and in rarest of rare cases to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice. It is also well settled that where an order has been revised by the Sessions Judge, a second revision in the garb of petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be entertained by the High Court. In view of these settled principles, I would have certainly not entertained this petition and would have dismissed it out rightly had I not noticed that the continuation of the present proceedings amounts to the abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, in order to prevent such an abuse and to secure the ends of justice, the plurality of the proceedings are required to be stopped. 6. Therefore, in order to prevent such an abuse and to secure the ends of justice, the plurality of the proceedings are required to be stopped. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the parties before me were fair enough to state that there may be some difference between them in so far as the fact regarding percentage of the parties was concerned, but they were not at variance in so far as the basic fact of having instituted a revenue suit by respondent No. 2 Ram1 against the . petitioners before the initiation of proceedings under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. and attachment of the property in question under Section 146(1) Cr.P.C. was concerned. Since it was much before the initiation of proceedings under Section 145(1) and the attachment of disputed property under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. that the parties had already started litigation before a court competent to adjudicate upon their rights to the property in question, the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1985 SC 472 ) and Dharam Pal and Ors. v. Ram Siri & Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 435 as also by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Tikuda v. State (1961 RLW 469) stood attracted. 7. In the case of Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P. (supra) , the Supreme Court considered the effect of the pendency of civil proceedings on the initiation and/or pendency of the criminal proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. Reversing the decision of the Allahabad High Court, their Lordships held as under: "Where civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel -criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope of doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the Criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. There is no scope of doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the Criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2 to 5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parralel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the Criminal Court should not allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and the parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation." (Emphasis supplied). 8. The same principle was reiterated in the case of Dharampal & Others v. Ram Siri & Ors. (supra). In para 9 thereof their Lordships observed that : "It is obvious from sub-section (1) of Section 146 that the Magistrate is given proper to attach the subject of dispute "untill the competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof". The determination by a competent court of the rights of the parties spoken of there has not necessarily to be final determination. The determination may be even tentantively at the interm stage when the competent court passes an order of interim injunction or appoints a receiver in respect of the subject matter of the dispute pending the final decision in the suit. The moment the competent court does so, even at, the interim stage, the order passed by the Magistrate has to come to an end. Otherwise there will be inconsistency between the order passed by the civil court and the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146 itself takes cognizance of such a situation when it states that "Magistrate pay withdraw the attachment. at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of any breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute". The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146 itself takes cognizance of such a situation when it states that "Magistrate pay withdraw the attachment. at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of any breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute". When a Civil court passes an order of injunction or received, it is the civil court which is seized of the matter and any breach of its order can be punished by it according to law. Hence, on the passing on the interlocutory order by the civil court, it can legitimately be said that there is no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute." (Emphasis Supplied). 9. It is, thus, well settled that where the parties had already approached, a court competent to adjudicate upon their rights with regard to the subject matter of the litigation, criminal proceedings of the nature contemplated under Section 145/140 Cr.P.C. in respect of the same property would amount to simply a plurality of the proceedings and such multiplicity of the proceedings would be abuse of the process of the court. Such a view was taken by this court in the case of Ali Mohammed v. State of Rajasthan 1986 RCC 166 and reiterated in Kanhiyalal v. State of Rajasthan 1991(1) RLW 73. The sameviewwas followed by this Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 721/94, Mangal Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., decided on June 14, 1996. 10. In view of the above, the plurality of the proceedings under Section 145/146 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to go on in respect of the same subject matter which is pending for adjudication before the Revenue Court as such the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 11. Since the pendency of the proceedings under Section 145/146 Cr.P.C. amount to abuse of the process of the Court and the learned lower courts appear to have exercised their jurisdiction in the matter in the absence of the knowledge of the law declared by the Supreme Court, the present petition deserves to succeed. 12. This petition is, therefore, allowed and the proceedings under Section 145/146 Cr.P.C........ on the file of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambhar in respect of Khasra Nos. 12. This petition is, therefore, allowed and the proceedings under Section 145/146 Cr.P.C........ on the file of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sambhar in respect of Khasra Nos. 25 to 28, 29 to 32, 309 to 313 and 32/444 admeasuring 33 bighas 9 biswas are hereby quashed. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 to 6 submitted that the Assistant Collector, Dudu, before whom the revenue suit is pending, should be directed to c...... the proceedings of the suit. The participatory .......said court for the purpose. This court expects the Assistant Collector to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties in respect of property in question as expeditiously as possible and to pass such interim orders in the case as the facts and circumstances thereof may warrant and justify. *******