N. K. BHATTACHARYYA. J. ( 1 ) HEARD the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner Mr. Haradhan Banerjee appearing with Mr. Amitava Pyne and the learned Advocate for the Opposite party Mr. Bidyut Kr. Banerjee appearing with Ms. Shila Sarkar. Considered the materials on record. ( 2 ) BY this application under section 115 of the C. P. C. the petitioner has challenged order No. 101 dared 21st November, 1994 passed by the Ld. Munsif, 7th court, Howrah in Title Suit No. 11 /90, whereby the Ld. Munsif rejected the application of the petitioner made under section 151 of the C. P. C. praying, inter alia, for recalling of the order passed by the learned Munsif of that court in that suit, being order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92. ( 3 ) THE facts silhouetted behind this revision is that admittedly the petitioner is a tenant under the opposite party herein and the opposite party herein, for evicting the defendant from the suit premises, filed Title Suit No. 11/90 in the court of the 7th Munsif, Howrah on the ground of default and reasonable requirement. The defendant-petitioner filed an application in that suit under section 17 (2) and (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, but beyond time and an application for condonation of delay was made for condoning the delay in filing the application under section 17 (2) and (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The ground that has been taken in that limitation application was illness of the defendant and other disturbances in his family. The application came up for hearing before the Ld. Munsif on 20th April, 1992 and the Ld. Munsif found that the defendant could not establish the ground of illness as no evidence was adduced by him as he failed to appear before the court and the application was dismissed on merit, as has been specified by the Ld. Munsif in his order. In the ordering portion he has stated, inter alia, that "the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act is rejected but on merit. " The Ld. Munsif was also pleased to observe that "the defendant has also failed to discharge his obligation to establish the ground as has been made out in the petition u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act. " The Ld. Munsif was also pleased to observe that "the defendant has also failed to discharge his obligation to establish the ground as has been made out in the petition u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act. " ( 4 ) BE that as it may, that order was not challenged before any superior court. It could have been challenged u/s. 115a of the C. P. C. before the District Judge or before this High Court u/s. 115 of the C. P. C. Time limit for moving such application before the District Judge is 30 days and before this High Court is 90 days. But the petitioner preferred not to resort to any of the provisions as indicated earlier and he suffered that order. Thereafter, there was default regarding payment of rent for the month of May, 1993 to July, 1994 and the petitioner, in the meantime, due to the failure of depositing the rent for the month of June, 1993 to April, 1994, made an application for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act which was filed on 4th May, 1994. That application came up for hearing before the Ld. Munsif on 3rd August, 1994 and the Ld. Munsif by his order dated 3rd August, 1994 disposed of that application allowing the same as a concession was given to the plaintiff that if, in the meantime, the rent not being deposited, let it be deposited. But unfortunately, that was not deposited. Thereafter, the rent was deposited and another application was filed for condonation of delay in depositing the rent which was filed on 19th August, 1994. There also the ground of illness was taken and the ground that money could not be collected was also taken. That application came up for hearing before the Ld. Munsif on 4. 8. 94 who held that the defendant failed to show that the defendant has deposited the rent by production of challan and he dismissed the application. The matter rested there. Thereafter the main suit was taken up for hearing and the plaintiff examined herself as P. W. 1 to Chief on 21st November, 1994 and thereafter she was cross-examined partially. At that stage the defendant filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling of the order of the learned Munsif, being Order No. 57 dated 20. 4. At that stage the defendant filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling of the order of the learned Munsif, being Order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92 and thereby to restore the application of the defendant made under section 17 (2) (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. That application was disposed of by the learned Munsif by his order No. 101 dated 21. 11. 94, whereby the learned Munsif dismissed that application of the defendant under Section 151 with cost of Rs. 20/ -. That order is the subject-matter of challenge in this revision. ( 5 ) MR. Haradhan Banerjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner, contended that in disposing of the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act of the defendant for condonation of delay in filing that application under Section 17 (2) (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act on the ground of default, the learned Munsif did not come to a positive finding that the grounds taken in that petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was correct or incorrect and that in doing so the application was not disposed of on merit and thereby there was a failure of Justice on the part of the Munsif and that can be corrected even upon an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 6 ) THE next contention of Mr. Banerjee was that though the application under Section 151 C. P. C. was filed at a point of time two and half years from the date of the order being order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92 but under the, residuary provision of the Limitation Act the period of limitation is three years as there is no period specified for filing the petition under Section 151 C. P. C. The petition under Section 151 C. P. C. will come under the residuary provision of the Limitation Act and as such the observation of the learned Munsif in the impugned order that the application has been filed after the period of two years is illegal and in such observation the learned Munsif has erred in exercising his jurisdiction properly and he has acted with material irregularity. In support of his contention Mr. In support of his contention Mr. Banerjee relied on a Division Bench of decision of this Court in the case of Biswanrth Banerjee and. Ors. v. Amar Nath Mukherjee and Ors. reported in AIR 1962 Cal 110 , wherein the Division Bench has held that section 151 will be attracted when there is no provision specified for that purpose in the Code. The case arose on the fact that the appeal was dismissed for nonpayment of the paper-book costs and as such an application was preferred under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the appeal on an assumption that the restoration as contemplated under Order 41, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not be attracted. In that background the Division Bench held that section 151 will be attracted and that as there is no specific provision specifying the Draft for filing that application the residuary provision of the Limitation Act will apply, meaning the limitation will be three years. Mr. Banerjee also relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Arpee Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs. The United Bank of India reported in AIR 1987 Cal. 60 for the purpose of showing that where there is no provision in the Code for a particular purpose Section 151 can be resorted to. ( 7 ) MR. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate for the opposite party, on the other hand, contended that the learned Munsif specified the reason for dismissing the application of the defendant under section 5 of the Limitation Act in Order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92 and as such it cannot be said that the matter was not disposed of on merit. In the next place, Mr. Banerjee contended by referring to the impugned order being Order No. 101 dated 21. 11. 94 and the application of the defendant made under Section 151 C. P. C. that in the petition the defendant admitted that there was laches on the part of the defendant and as such the learned Munsif has rightly and correctly dismissed that application for recalling the order of the learned Munsif, being Order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92. 94 and the application of the defendant made under Section 151 C. P. C. that in the petition the defendant admitted that there was laches on the part of the defendant and as such the learned Munsif has rightly and correctly dismissed that application for recalling the order of the learned Munsif, being Order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92. ( 8 ) HAVING heard the learned advocates for the parties and in consideration of the materials on record, I find that there cannot be two opinions that where there is no provision specifying or limiting the time for filing any application the residuary provision of the Limitation Act shall apply. It is also not disputed and there cannot be two opinions that where there is no provision in the Code itself section 151 C. P. C. can be resorted to for seeking relief. But the position is otherwise. When there is specific provision in the Act and/or Code, Section 151 cannot be resorted to. That has been laid down in the case of MIS Arpee Properties Pvt. Ltd (supra), as referred to by Mr. Haradhan Banerjee. This principle as has been pointed out in the case of M/s. Arpee Properties Pvt. Ltd (supra) is based on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Padama Sen and. Anr. v. The State of U. P. reported in AIR 1961 SC 218 , wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-"nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complimentary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well-recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code". It is also well-recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code". ( 9 ) IN a subsequent decision the Apex Court also expressed the same view in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 . In Paragraph 43 at page 537 of that decision the Apex Court has held, inter alia, "the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to make orders ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where the Code deals expressly with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive". ( 10 ) IN the instant case, the revision was available against the order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92, but such revision was not taken out either before the learned District Judge under Section 115a of the Code of Civil Procedure of under Section 115 of the said Code before this Court. Now, to obviate that difficulty of limitation, Section 151 C. P. C. has been resorted to by the defendant, which, according to the ratio as laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to above, should not be attracted. That apart, according to Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, the trial court, while disposing of the limitation application by Order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92, did not assign any reason when the matter was disposed of an merit, and the matter was disposed of ex-part,. This submission is not altogether correct, because from the said order it appears that the trial court observed as under "it was the duty of the defendant to adduce evidence in support of his case under Section 5 of Limitation (Act ). The defendant has failed to discharge his obligation. The case as made out in the petition is not established. Hence, the petition under section 5 of Limitation Act is rejected on merit but exparte. " ( 11 ) SO, the learned Munsif has taken the matter in its proper perspective and has come to his own conclusion. It cannot be said that the matter has not been disposed on merit or the learned Munsif did not go into the matter on merit. " ( 11 ) SO, the learned Munsif has taken the matter in its proper perspective and has come to his own conclusion. It cannot be said that the matter has not been disposed on merit or the learned Munsif did not go into the matter on merit. ( 12 ) MR Bidyut Kumar Banerjee in his contention referred to a decision reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 41 (M/s. Bhuban Mohan Shaw Estate (P) Ltd. v. Smt. Asha Gupta and Ors. ). In that case an application under section 151 C. P. C. was filed for life purpose of condonation of delay in depositing the rent. That application under section 151 C. P. C. was made in the trial court after the arguments had been closed and there the Division Bench of this Court held that in the facts and circumstances of that case the application under Section 151 of the Code should not have been allowed. In the instant case too, during the course of hearing, when the plaintiff examined herself as P. W. 1 in chief and she was partially cross-examined by the defendant, at that stage the petition under section 151 C. P. C. had been filed for recalling of the order No. 57 dated 20. 4. 92. In the meantime, a right has accrued to the plaintiff as there was a second default. Restoration of the application of the defendant under sections 17 (2) and 17 (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act read along with Section 5 of the Limitation Act will amount to denial of the right to the petitioner. Even in the case of default two applications for condonation of delay were made, one of such application was conceded by the plaintiff expecting that the rent would be deposited but no such rent was deposited. Thereafter, another application was made under section 5 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of condonation of delay in depositing the rent but when that application came up for hearing the defendant failed to produce necessary papers or challan to show that he had deposited the rent and in such circumstances by order No. 95 dated 4. 8. 94 the learned Munsif dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In such circumstances, in my view, there is no merit in this revisional application. The revisional application is, accordingly, dismissed. 8. 94 the learned Munsif dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In such circumstances, in my view, there is no merit in this revisional application. The revisional application is, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed