ORDER Dubey J. – 1. Aforesaid five appeals under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') arise out of the order of refusing to grant temporary injunction on the applications under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code which came up for hearing before D.P.S. Chauhan, J., wherein a question cropped up as to whether' 'the order which is not the order of grant of injunction under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code is appealable order as provided under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code." D.P.S. Chauhan, J. after referring to the definition of 'Order' in section 2 (14) and, section 104, Order 43, Rule 1, observed that Order 43, Rule 1 provides categories of orders which have been made appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code and other category or nature of order not provided thereunder or such order made appealable under the provisions of law have not been made appealable. Then it was observed that Order 43, Rule 1 has provided three categories of appealable orders-(i) where the order refusing the relief is made appealable; and (ii) the order of grant of relief is made appealable; and (iii) the order where refusal or grant of relief is made appealable. Hence, from the language of Order 43, Rule 1 (r) the intention of Legislature is apparent that if-an order of grant of injunction is passed on an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2, then, an appeal lies under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) while an order of refusal to grant an injunction on an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 no appeal would lie under Order 43, Rule 1 (r). However, the matter was of general importance, therefore, D.P.S. Chauhan, J. vide common order dated 23.3.1996 referred the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice to Constitute a Bench of two Judges for deciding the following question. "As to whether the order which is not the order of grant of an injunction under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an appealable order as provided under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure?" 2. "As to whether the order which is not the order of grant of an injunction under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an appealable order as provided under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure?" 2. To deal with the question it would be appropriate to reproduce the definition of "Order" under Clause 14 of section 2, section 104, and Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code- "2. (14) -- 'Order' means the formal expression of any decision of civil Court which is not a decree." "Section 104. Orders from which appeal lies -- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders :-- xxx xxx xxx (ff) an order under section 35A; (ffa) an order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in section 91 or section 92 as the case may be; (g) an order under section 95; (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree; (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules; Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section." "Order XLIII Rule 1-- Appeals from Orders-- An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely :-(a) an order under Rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court (except where the procedure specified in Rule 10A of Order VII has been followed; (b) omitted by Amendment Act, 1976) (c) an order under Rule 9 of Order IX rejecting "an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (d) an order under Rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte; (e) omitted by Amendment Act, 1976 (f) an order under Rule 21 of Order XI; (g) omitted by Amendment Act, 1976 (h) omitted by Amendment Act, 1976 (i) an order under Rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement; (j) an order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale; (ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (I) of Rule 105 of that order is appealable. (k) an order under Rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit; (l) an order under Rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave; (m) omitted by Amendment Act, 1976 (n) an order under Rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit; (na) an order under Rule 5 or Rule 7 of the Order XXXIII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent person; (o) omitted by Amendment Act, 1976. (p) orders in inter-pleader suits under Rule 3, Rule 4 or Rule 6 of Order XXXV; (q) an order under Rule 2, Rule 3 or Rule 6 of Order XXXVIII; (r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2A, Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX; "(s) an order under Rule I or Rule 4 of Order XL; (t) an order of refusal under Rule 19 of Order XLI to re-admit or under Rule 21 of Order XLI to re-hear, an appeal; (u) an order under Rule 23 or Rule 23A of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the appellate Court; (v) omitted by Amendment Act, 1976. (w) an order under Rule 4 of Order XL VII granting an application for review." , 3. From a bare look at the definition of 'Order' in sub-section (14) of section 2 of the Code, it is evident that order means a formal expression, in the nature of any decision of a civil Court which is not a decree as defined in sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Code. The expression 'Order' is used in contradistinction to decree and as such is distinguished from 'judgment' . The essence of distinction between 'Decree' and "Order' is of the nature of the decision as the words '"formal expression of an adjudication" appear in both the definitions. Against a decree an appeal lies under section 96 and also a second appeal lies as provided under section 100 of the Code. Whereas an 'Order' as defined under section 2 (14) of the Code, an adjudication is not generally appealable except in cases specified in section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code, which is evident from the opening words in sub-section (I) of section 104 of the Code, it is clear that an appeal lies from the orders enumerated in this section save as expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force and from no other orders. Therefore, section 104 of the Code has to be read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code which clearly shows that the appeal lies only against an order passed under rules from which appeal is expressly allowed in section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 which authorises and creates a forum of appeal against the orders specified in Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. See- Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar ( AIR 1974 SC 1126 ). 5. We are concerned in these references, with an order passed under Rule 1, Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code which has been made appealable under clause (r) of Rule 1, of Order 43 of the Code. In clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43, the words used are 'an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 2A, Rule 4.or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX'. The words used do not specify the nature of the order, that is, whether of grant or refusal of an injunction on an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 as the nature and category of the order has been specified in other clauses of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code. Therefore, the expression 'Order' has to be understood in' the meaning as assigned in section 2 (14) of the Code, which necessarily means the formal expression of any decision by a civil Court which is not a decree. When an order is passed on an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code, it decides the application either by way of grant of temporary injunction, or by refusal to grant temporary injunction. If no case is made out for grant of injunction, it would be an order of refusal to grant an injunction on an application under Rule 1 and 2 of Order 39 of the Code. Clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code does not prohibit an appeal against the order of refusal nor it specifies that an appeal shall lie against order of grant of an injunction. It is well settled rule of interpretation that the Court should lean in favour of an interpretation which expands rather than shrinks a remedial right. A remedial provision of law is generally construed liberally. It is well settled rule of interpretation that the Court should lean in favour of an interpretation which expands rather than shrinks a remedial right. A remedial provision of law is generally construed liberally. Rule 1 (r) of Order 43 of the Code creates a remedial right of appeal for protection of substantial and substantive rights. Rule 1 (r) of Order 43 does not say that an appeal shall lie from an order of grant of injunction under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order XXXIX. Therefore, there is no adequate reason for interpolating the words 'of grant' after the wards 'an order" in Rule 1 (r). Courts do not ordinarily make additions in enactments. That is a legislative function. The words 'an order of refusal' or an order of 'grant' in the language of clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code significantly have not been used by the Legislature. In the context of clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43 the word 'Order' is to be understood in its plain meaning as assigned in section 2 (14) of the Code, which means the formal expression of any decision of the civil Court on an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 whether it may be of grant or refusal of an injunction. 6. The question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Ishardass Devi Chand and another v. R.B. Parkash Chand ( AIR 1969 SC 938 ), where in a suit by an order dated 20th July, 1961 of Sub-Judge Amritsar, application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code and section 151 of the Code filed by the plaintiffs for grant of temporary injunction till the disposal of the suit was dismissed. Against that order, an appeal was filed under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code, wherein on a preliminary objection, the appellate Court (District Judge, Amritsar) held that no appeal lay against that order on the ground that the order was passed under section 151 of the Code and not under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code. A revision filed against the order of the District Judge was also dismissed by the High Court. A revision filed against the order of the District Judge was also dismissed by the High Court. Against that in civil appeal on grant of special leave, the Supreme Court observed that dismissal of the application holding that no primafacie case had been made out and that liability to be ejected in execution of valid order could not be said to be "injury" within Order 39, Rule 1 and 2, order of dismissal is appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code and the order cannot be said to have been passed under section 151 of the Code inasmuch as for holding that Order 39, Rule 2 did not apply the Court was not exercising its inherent powers. What the learned District Judge seems to have done is to hold that the application for temporary injunction did not fall within Order XXXIX, Rule 2 and, therefore, no appeal lay. This reasoning is really on the merits of the case and not relevant to the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the District Judge and the High Court erred in holding that no appeal lay against the order of the trial Court. 7. In case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another ( AIR 1981 SC 1786 ) the Supreme Court while dealing with an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay High Court against an order passed on original side by a Single Judge of the High Court observed that section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 expressly authorises and creates a forum for appeal against the orders falling under various clauses of Order 43, Rule 1 passed by the Single Judge to the Division Bench of High Court. The Supreme Court also observed that an order refusing to appoint a Receiver or grant an injunction and similar other orders, mentioned in various clauses of Order 43, Rule 1, will fall within the definition of 'Judgment' and an internal appeal will lie. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in Firm Chhunnilal Laxmi Prasad v. M/s. Agarwal & Co. and others ( 1987 JLJ 377 = AIR 1987 MP 172 ) while dealing a case of Letters Patent. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in Firm Chhunnilal Laxmi Prasad v. M/s. Agarwal & Co. and others ( 1987 JLJ 377 = AIR 1987 MP 172 ) while dealing a case of Letters Patent. Appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge appointing Receiver or granting or refusing injunction in some original proceedings in exercise of his original jurisdiction, observed that appeal would lie. But, if the order passed by the High Court is not an order, but had been passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under section 104, read with Order 43, Rule I of the Code then a Letters Patent Appeal would not lie in view of sub-section (2) of section .104, CPC. 9. In case of Dhundasingh v. Leeladhar and another ( AIR 1982 MP 14 ), while considering the scope of an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) a learned Judge of this Court observed that scope of an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code is limited. It extends to adjudication of challenge to an order of grant' or refusal of interim injunction as envisaged by Order 43, Rule 1 (r), CPC. 10. The same is the view expressed by Sikkim High Court in case of Apex Tshering Lama v. Tshering Wangdi (AIR 1982 Sikkim 20). 11. In our opinion the ratio of the decision in Firm Ishardass Devind Chand and another v. R.B. Parkash Chand (supra) is final and binding under article 141 of the Constitution and cannot be said to have no application on the ground that the facts of the said case operate in different field and the question whether the appeal would lie under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) against an order of refusal to grant of an injunction on application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code was not involved. The consistent view of this Court is also that an appeal lies under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) of the Code against an order of grant or refusal of an interim injunction. 12. As a result of the above discussion, we answer the question referred and hold that an appeal under clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code lies against the order which is not the order of grant of an injunction under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code. 13. 12. As a result of the above discussion, we answer the question referred and hold that an appeal under clause (r) of Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code lies against the order which is not the order of grant of an injunction under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code. 13. Before parting with the aforesaid matters, we place on record our appreciations to Shri Ravish Agrawal, Advocate, amicus curiae, who ably assisted the Court during the course of hearing. 14. Let the record of the view appeals be placed before the learned referring Judge for deciding the appeals in accordance with the decision on the question referred.