Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. O.S.A. Nos. 62 to 64 of 1996 arise out of one proceeding viz., Application No. 33 of 1994 filed by the appellants for leave to institute a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. O.S.A. No. 62 of 1996 is against the order dismissing the said application for leave to sue. O.S.A. No. 63 of 1996 is against the order allowing Application No. 2421 of 1994 filed by respondents 1 to 3 for dismissing Application No. 33 of 1994 in limine under Sections 92 and 151, C.P.C. O.S.A. No. 64 of 1996 is against an order dismissing Application No. 1030 of 1994 filed by the appellants for amendment of the proposed plaint. All the three applications are disposed by a common order dated 21.12.1995. 2. The facts leading to the present proceedings are as follows:— One S.B. Adityan, familiarly known as Si.Pa. Aditanar in this State, executed a deed of declaration creating a public charitable trust by name “Thanthi Trust”, which is the third respondent herein, on 1.3.1954. Earlier in 1943, he had started a Tamil daily called ‘Dhina Thanthi’ with his own funds. In the Deed of Declaration of Trust, he appointed besides himself, his brother S.T. Adityan and his eldest son B.R. Adityan, who is the first appellant herein, as trustees of the third defendant trust. The purposes of the trust are (a) to establish ‘Dhina Thanthi’ or Daily Thanthi as an oran of educated public opinion for the Tamil reading public; (b) to disseminate news and to ventilate opinion upon matters of public interest through the said newspaper; (c) to maintain the said newspaper and its press in an efficient condition devoting the surplus income of the said newspaper after defraying all expenses in improving and enlarging the said news paper and its services and placing the same on a footing of permanency. The deed provided that the trustees for the time being may appoint one of themselves to be the Director of the Daily Thanthi and on such appointment, he shall be designated as such. The deed proceeded to appoint S.B. Adityan as the Director of the Daily Thanthi. The deed provided that the trustees for the time being may appoint one of themselves to be the Director of the Daily Thanthi and on such appointment, he shall be designated as such. The deed proceeded to appoint S.B. Adityan as the Director of the Daily Thanthi. A clause in the deed read, ‘The Founder may appoint from time to time inter vivos or by will any persons to be Trustees in addition to or in substitution of the First Trustees or the Trustees for the time being. After the lifetime of the Founder the surviving trustees, and the trustees for the time being may appoint any persons to be trustees or trustees in addition to themselves; and it is the desire of the Founder that if and when such additional trustees are appointed, and if and when a Court has to appoint trustees or additional Trustees, the heirs of descendants of the Founder may be preferred to others. A supplementary deed was executed on 9.7.1957 by which three more clauses were added with reference to remuneration of the trustees excepting the founder, the exercise of the power conferred on the trustees or director being confined to the purposes of the Trust only on the irrevocability of the Trust. 3. On 11.7.1957, one Ramarathinam was added as a Trustee. By a deed dated 6.11.1957 the first appellant herein was appointed as Director of Daily Thanthi, as the Founder had resigned on that day and relinquished his Directorship. On 19.5.1959, the first appellant resigned from the Trust and relinquished his position both as Trustee and as Director of Daily Thanthi. On 22.5.1959, respondents 1 and 2 herein were appointed by a deed as Trustees of the Trust and the first respondent as the Director of the newspaper. By a Supplementary Deed dated 28.6.1961 executed by the Founder, the newspaper Daily Thanthi was placed on a permanent footing and the surplus income of the Trust after defraying all expenses was directed to be devoted for six purposes named therein. That document also refers to the Trust as a Public Charitable Trust. On 8.11.1961, the Founder resigned from the Trust. 4. The brother of the Founder, Mr. S.T. Adityan and three others filed Originating Summons in this Court in C.S. No. 90 of 1961 seeking certain reliefs for establishing and running a school or college etc. That document also refers to the Trust as a Public Charitable Trust. On 8.11.1961, the Founder resigned from the Trust. 4. The brother of the Founder, Mr. S.T. Adityan and three others filed Originating Summons in this Court in C.S. No. 90 of 1961 seeking certain reliefs for establishing and running a school or college etc. The Court held that the objects of the Trust were not in any manner opposed to law and the prayers made in the said proceeding could be allowed. A consequential order was, therefore, passed. Thus, in the said proceeding, the character of the Trust was recognised to be a Public Charitable one. 5. On 7.11.1962, one Saravanaperumal was appointed as Trustee. On 27.12.1963, S.T. Adityan resigned his trusteeship. In 1965, Saravanaperumal also resigned. On 20.6.1978, the Founder appointed the first appellant as an additional trustee by a deed for the proper administration of the Trust and to raise the strength of the Trust Board. On the same day, another document was executed by the Founder, called a Supplemental Deed, clarifying the position regarding the rights and powers of the additional trustee, as the same as those of the trustees then in office. By another deed dated 30.6.1978, the Founder appointed his brother S.T. Adityan also as an additional trustee to act jointly with the existing trustees. 6. Then commenced the first round of litigation at the instance of the first respondent herein, who for himself and on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 filed Application Nos. 2378 and 2433 of 1978 for leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure to file a suit challenging the appointments made by the Founder on the ground that the Founder had no power to appoint Additional Trustee and such appointment could be only by the Court. The applications wee opposed by the Founder, his brother and the first appellant. But the Court granted leave and the plaints were taken on file and the suits were registered as C.S. Nos. 352 and 353 of 1978. The first respondent filed Application Nos. 2823 and 2825 for interim injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with his managing the Trust. Those applications were opposed. On 29.8.1978, the first appellant and S.T. Adityan filed Application No. 3147 of 1978 for leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for removing the first respondent herein from trusteeship. The first respondent filed Application Nos. 2823 and 2825 for interim injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with his managing the Trust. Those applications were opposed. On 29.8.1978, the first appellant and S.T. Adityan filed Application No. 3147 of 1978 for leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for removing the first respondent herein from trusteeship. As many as 16 allegations were made against him relating to misappropriation and breach of trust. On 13-9-1978, an interim order was passed in the application for injunction filed by the first respondent herein directing him to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month as a condition for grant of interim order. The first respondent did not deposit any amount. 7. It is the case of the appellants that at that stage there were some negotiations between the parties who were members of the family and an agreement was arrived at pursuant to which the three newly appointed trustees resigned their trusteeship. Application No. 3147 of 1978 was also withdrawn, but without leave of Court. As a consequence, the first respondent herein withdrew C.S. Nos. 352 and 353 of 1978. 8. In January 1981, the first appellants two sons by name Kannan Adityan and Kadiresa Adityan filed Application No. 165 of 1981 for grant of leave under Section 92, C.P.C. to file a suit against respondents 1 to 3 herein for appointment of the plaintiffs as additional trustees, rendition of accounts and other reliefs. Seven allegations were set out as against the first respondent. It may be mentioned that those two persons are the plaintiffs in C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 out of which O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996, which is also dealt with herein, has arisen. In that application the first respondent herein filed Application No. 879 of 1981 for cross-examining the plaintiffs to establish that they had no interest of their own in the Trust and they were only projecting the cause of their father. The said application was dismissed on 21-9-1981 by a learned single Judge. On appeal, in O.S.A. No. 152 of 1981, it was allowed on 15-3-1982. A petition for Special Leave in S.L.P. 6040 of 1982 against the judgment of the Bench was dismissed on 21-7-1982, but with a direction that the cross-examination should be confined only to the question of sanction and the principles governing the same. 9. On appeal, in O.S.A. No. 152 of 1981, it was allowed on 15-3-1982. A petition for Special Leave in S.L.P. 6040 of 1982 against the judgment of the Bench was dismissed on 21-7-1982, but with a direction that the cross-examination should be confined only to the question of sanction and the principles governing the same. 9. The first respondent filed Application No. 3124 of 1982 for inspection of plaint documents, which was dismissed by the trial judge on 2-9-1982. On appeal in O.S.A. No. 160 of 1982, a Division Bench allowed the same on 8-9-1982. Thereafter, inspection was given, but the respondents filed Application No. 4736 of 1982 for rejecting the main Application No. 165 of 1981 on the ground of non-complicance with the order of inspection. That application was allowed by a learned single judge on 11-2-1983 whereby he dismissed Application No. 165 of 1981 also. The plaintiffs therein filed O.S.A. Nos. 105 and 106 of 1983. They were dismissed. The plaintiffs filed S.L.P. Nos. 3362 and 3363 of 1987. On 19.10.1992, the Supreme Court directed the first respondent to file an affidavit meeting the allegations made against him by the plaintiffs. He filed a counter affidavit and a reply was filed by the plaintiffs on 4-1-1993. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition on 18-1-1993 by a non-speaking order. 10. On 3-1-1994, the appellants filed Application No. 33 of 1994 for leave to file a suit under Section 92, C.P.C. With the permission of the Court, the application was moved on 4-1-1994. At that time, respondents 1 to 3 took notice through their counsel, who prayed for time for filing counter. Time was granted upto 11-1-1994. In the counter affidavit it was stated that three additional trustees had been appointed to the third defendant Trust and that they were necessary parties to the proceeding. Copies of certain documents were filed along with the counter affidavit to show that three additional trustees were appointed on 29-12-1993 by a resolution passed by the Trust. Another document appointing the said three persons as additional trustees was registered on 3-1-1994 between 5 and 6 PM in the office of the Sub Registrar, Periamet, Madras. Two advocates of this Court filed Application Nos. 214 and 215 of 1994 for impleading themselves as plaintiffs in the proceeding. They were also posted along with the main application for leave. Another document appointing the said three persons as additional trustees was registered on 3-1-1994 between 5 and 6 PM in the office of the Sub Registrar, Periamet, Madras. Two advocates of this Court filed Application Nos. 214 and 215 of 1994 for impleading themselves as plaintiffs in the proceeding. They were also posted along with the main application for leave. On 31.1.1994 respondents 1 to 3 filed Application No. 657 of 1994 for cross-examining the applicants in Application No. 214 and 215 of 1994. On 8-2-1994, they filed Application No. 868 of 1994 for cross-examining the applicants in the main Application No. 33 of 1994. 11. The appellants filed Application No. 1030 of 1994 for amending Application No. 33 of 1994 and the draft plaint and for impleading the three additional trustees as defendants/respondents and also to add certain paragraphs regarding the invalidity of the appointment of the said additional trustees, besides making allegations against the said person. The appellants also filed O.A. No. 153 of 1994 for appointment of receiver to manage the trust. The three additional Trustees appeared before Court through counsel and represented that they have no objection to implead them as parties but opposed the amendment of the Application and the draft plaint. They were impleaded as parties and the cause title was consequentially amended. 12. Another Advocate filed Application No. 1901 of 1994 for impleading himself as a plaintiff. 13. Respondents 1 to 3 filed Application No. 2421 of 1994 for dismissal of Application No. 33 of 1994 in limine under Order 7, Rule II, C.P.C. on the ground that the proposed suit is a vexatious one and an abuse of process of Court. It was also alleged that no cause of action is disclosed in the plaint. 14. The two sons of the first appellant filed C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 on 19-8-1994 for setting aside the orders passed in Application No. 165 of 1981 on the ground that the said orders were procured by the first respondent by playing a fraud on the Court by suppressing a vital document viz., a memorandum. The plaintiffs also filed Application No. 1056 of 1994 for appointment of a receiver for managing the trust. The plaintiffs also filed Application No. 1056 of 1994 for appointment of a receiver for managing the trust. In November 1994, respondents 1 to 3 filed Application No. 6571 of 1994 for dismissing C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 on the ground it does not disclose a cause of action, it is vexatious and is an abuse process of court. As respondents 1 to 3 insisted upon all matters being heard together, they were all posted together for hearing. The request of the appellants to dispose of Application No. 1030 of 1994 in the first instance before the applications are taken up was rejected. All the applications were argued and orders were reserved in April 1995. On 21.12.1995, the learned Judge passed orders dismissing Application No. 33 of 1994 and C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 under Order 7, Rule 11. C.P.C., in limine , as a result of allowing Application Nos. 2421 of 1994 and 6571 of 1994. Consequently, the learned Judge dismissed Application Nos. 153 of 1994, 214 of 1994, 215 of 1994, 1030 of 1994, 1056 of 1994 and 1901 of 1994. 15. Applicants in Application No. 33 of 1994 have filed O.S.A. Nos. 62 to 64 of 1996 against the orders in Application No. 33 of 1994, Application No. 2421 of 1994 and Application No. 1030 of 1994 respectively. The plaintiffs in C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 have filed O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996 against the dismissal of the suit. The applicants in Application Nos. 215 of 1994 and 1901 of 1994 have respectively filed O.S.A. Nos. 128 and 129 of 1996. O.S.A. Nos. 62 to 64 of 1996: 16. In so far as these three appeals are concerned, the appellants have been non-suited mainly on the ground that the proceedings were frivolous and vexatious, instituted by persons who do not have real and subsisting interest in the Trust in pursuance of a personal vendetta against the first respondent. It is also held that the prior proceedings between the parties prove the want of bonafides on the part of the first plaintiff and it is not open to him to file the present proceeding after having withdrawn Application No. 3147 of 1978 without leave of Court. It is also held that the Plaintiffs are seeking to reagitate the very same questions which arose for consideration in the earlier proceedings and they are not entitled to do so. 17. It is also held that the Plaintiffs are seeking to reagitate the very same questions which arose for consideration in the earlier proceedings and they are not entitled to do so. 17. The main argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that at this stage of the proceedings, the Court can look into the averments in the plaint only, and before taking any evidence in the matter, the Court cannot hold that the claim of the plaintiffs is frivolous or vexatious. It is argued that the learned Judge has accepted the contentions raised by the respondents in their affidavits as Gospel truth without any evidence therefor and proceeded to hold against the appellants. Learned counsel argued that at this stage of the proceedings, neither Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. nor Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. will apply. According to him, the Court is concerned only with the question whether the appellants have made out, on the basis of their allegations in the proposed plaint, a case for grant of leave to institute the suit under Section 92, C.P.C. Alternatively, it is submitted by him that even if the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. can be invoked at this stage, the matter does not fall under any of the clauses of the Rule and the Court is in error in thinking that the Rule is not exhaustive and the clauses are only illustrative. It is submitted by learned counsel that admittedly new allegations have been made as against the respondents and the proposed plaint differs from the plaints filed in earlier proceedings and, therefore, the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. are not applicable. 18. Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that the present proceeding is intended only to harass the first respondent and it is nothing but vexatious. According to him, the history of the litigation would reveal the antecedent of the first appellant and the absence of bona fides on his part. It would also disclose, according to him, that the appellants have no real and subsisting interest in the trust and the present proceeding is not a true representative action. According to him, the history of the litigation would reveal the antecedent of the first appellant and the absence of bona fides on his part. It would also disclose, according to him, that the appellants have no real and subsisting interest in the trust and the present proceeding is not a true representative action. It is argued that though some of the allegations against the respondents are new and they were not made in the prior proceedings, the present proceedings cannot be sustained as it is not open to the first appellant to simply add some more allegations and some more persons and reagitate the same subject matter. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to the fact that the first appellant voluntarily resigned his office of Trustee and Director in 1959 and did not evince any interest in the Trust till 1978 and even after instituting a proceeding in Application No. 3147 of 1978, chose to withdraw the same without the leave of the Court, thus giving up his entire claim. Thereafter, he set up his son to institute proceedings, which went up to the Supreme Court and concluded in 1993 against them and then only in 1994 he has come forward with the present proceedings and at the same time instigated his sons to file a separate suit in C.S. No. 1509 for 1994. According to him, the common order passed by the learned Judge does not warrant any interference. 19. Before considering the validity of the respective contentions, it is necessary for us to advert to the general principles governing an application for leave under Section 92, C.P.C.:— A. (i)A proceeding under Section 92, C.P.C. is administrative in character and neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. An order granting leave does not affect the rights of any party, though an order refusing to grant leave may affect the rights of the persons who seek such leave. In any event, the nature of the proceedings is only administrative. In Mullas Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edition, Volume I, at pages 634 and 635, the following passage occurs:— “10. In any event, the nature of the proceedings is only administrative. In Mullas Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edition, Volume I, at pages 634 and 635, the following passage occurs:— “10. Nature of the order granting leave by the Court.-Under the section as it stood before its recent amendment and when what was required was the consent of the Advocate-General, there was some divergence of opinion on the question whether the proceedings for consent before the Advocate-General were quasi-judicial in character, and if they were, whether they were open to challenge in writ proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Abu Backer v. Advocate General (AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 331) the High Court of Travancore-Cochin held that such proceedings were quasi-judicial and that view was shared by the Pepsu High Court in Sadhu Singh v. Mongol Gir Mohatmin (AIR 1956 Pepsu 65). But a contrary view was taken by the High Court of Rajasthan in Srimali v. Advocate-General (AIR 1955 Raj. 166), Allahabad in Shanthanand v. Advocate-General (AIR 1955 Allahabad 372), Madras in Raju v. Advocate-General (AIR 1962 Madras 320 = 75 L.W. 240), and in Abdul Kasim v. Mohd. Dawood (AIR 1961 Madras 244 = (1960) 73 L.W. 649 ), and Jammu and Kashmir in Desraj v. Dy. Commissioner, Jammu and Kashmir ( AIR 1962 J.&K. 86 ). A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court later on reconsidered the position and held reversing Abu Backers case (supra) that the proceedings before the Advocate-General were only administrative ( A.K. Bhaskar v. Advocate-General (AIR 1962 Kerala 90 F.B.). Further, it has also been held that the function of the Advocate-General not being a judicial one, notice by him to the trust or its trustees was not obligatory and that the absence of such notice did not invalidate the consent given by him. All that was required of him at that stage was to satisfy himself that it was worth-while to institute the suit. (Shav v. Masood Hasain ( AIR 1965 A.P. 143 ). Notice to the defendants before granting leave is not mandatory. The Supreme Court now so held Although as a rule of caution, such notice should be given, leave granted without notice is not bad in law. The proposed defendants can always apply for revocation of leave already granted. (R.M. Narayan Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar ( AIR 1991 S.C. 221 = 1990-2-L.W. 468). The Supreme Court now so held Although as a rule of caution, such notice should be given, leave granted without notice is not bad in law. The proposed defendants can always apply for revocation of leave already granted. (R.M. Narayan Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar ( AIR 1991 S.C. 221 = 1990-2-L.W. 468). The mere fact that the amended section now requires leave of the Court in place of consent by the Advocate-General does not seem to change the nature of the order of leave made by the Court. In making such an order the Court, like the Advocate-General earlier, would no doubt have to apply its mind but that is only to satisfy itself whether the persons asking leave have interest in the trust, whether the trust is a public trust specified in the section and whether there are prima facie grounds for thinking that there has been a breach of the trust. At that stage the Court would not have before it all the parties to the proposed suit nor the evidence from which it would called upon to adjudicate any issue. All that it would have to see is whether it is in the interest of the trust to file the suit for which leave is sought.” We are entirely in agreement with the view expressed by the learned author that the amendment of the Code in 1976 requiring leave of the Court in place of consent by the Advocate-General does not change the nature of the order. (ii) In Abdul Kasim v. Md. Dawood (AIR 1961 Madras 244 (1960) 73 L.W. 649 ), a learned single Judge of this Court had to consider a similar provision in Section 55(1) and (2) of Muslim Wakfs Act (1954). After referring to the earlier ruling under Section 92, C.P.C., the learned Judge held that the decision of the Board to file or not to file a suit itself, or to sanction or withhold sanction to another person to file a suit is not equivalent to a judicial or quasi-judicial decision affecting the rights of parties and the decision to permit another to file a suit is an administrative act and is outside the purview of correction by the issue of a writ of certiorari. (iii) Another learned Judge of this Court in Raju v. Advocate-General, H.C. Buildings (AIR 1962 Madras 320 = 75 L.W. 240) held that a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the Advocate-General on a sanction application is not maintainable. He dissented from the view expressed in Abu Backer v. Advocate-General (AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 331). The learned Judge held that the nature of the proceeding was only administrative. (iv) A Full Bench of Kerala High Court in A.K. Bhaskar v. Advocate-Gemeral (AIR 1962 Kerala 90) over-ruled the above decision of the Travancore Cochin High Court in Abu Backers core (AIR 1954 Travancore-Cochin 331) and held that when the Advocate-General acts under Section 92, C.P.C. it is neither judicial nor a quasi-judicial order as it does not decide anybodys right, though it may be proper for him to issue notice to the proposed defendants and hear their view-point also. It was held that the order passed by the Advocate General giving or refusing sanction cannot be judicially reviewed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (v) In Mayer Simon Parur v. Advocate-General (AIR 1975 Kerala 57), a larger Bench considered the question once again and overruled the decision of the earlier Full Bench in A.K. Bhaskars case (AIR 1962 Kerala 90), in so far as it negatived the maintainability of a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the Full Bench accepted the view that the proceeding before the Advocate-General was administrative in character. After considering all the relevant rulings on the question, the Full Bench negatived the contention that the Advocate-General was performing a judicial or quasi-judicial act. But, even as an administrative order, the Ful Bench held that it was liable to be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution, when it declined to grant leave. (vi) In New College v. Basheer Mohammed ((1979) I M.L.J. 145), a Division Bench of this Court held that an order granting leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. (vi) In New College v. Basheer Mohammed ((1979) I M.L.J. 145), a Division Bench of this Court held that an order granting leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Bench took the view that the order, though preliminary or interlocutory in nature, definitely determines some right or liability of the parties to the suit and once for all decides the right of the plaintiffs to get the leave under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code and negatives the contention of the opposite party that leave should not be granted and, therefore, it is a judgment. The Bench did not consider the question whether the order under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, is administrative in nature. In our view, the decision of the Bench runs counter to the dictum of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben ( AIR 1981 S.C. 1786 = 94 L.W. 91 S.N.), wherein the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, only those orders will be judgments which decides matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. If the test prescribed by the Supreme Court is applied, the ruling of the Division Bench in NewCollegev. Basheer Mohammed ((1979) I M.L.J. 145) cannot be considered to be good law. (vii) In Prithipal Singy v. Mah Singh (AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 137), a learned single Judge of that Court held that order granting leave is administrative in nature and reasons need not be given in that order. The same proposition was reiterated by a Division Bench of that Court in Lachman Doss v. Ranjit Singh (AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 108). The Division Bench also held that no notice was necessary to the defendants before graning leave. The same proposition was reiterated by a Division Bench of that Court in Lachman Doss v. Ranjit Singh (AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 108). The Division Bench also held that no notice was necessary to the defendants before graning leave. (viii) In T.M. Shanmugham v. Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution (AIR 1985 Madras 93 = (1984) 97 L.W. 480 ), a learned single Judge of this Court relying upon the judgment of the Divison Bench in New College case ((1979) I M.L.J. 145) held that if leave is granted under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, without ordering notice to the defendants, the same is void in law and further action in pursuance of such order, namely, entertaining and numbering of suit, is unsustainable in law. This judgment is considered to have been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in R.M. Naryana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar ( AIR 1991 S.C. 221 = 1990-2-L.W. 468), to which we are going to refer in detail a little later. (ix) In Ambrish Kumar Singh v. Raja Abhushan Bran Bramhishah (AIR 1989 Allahabad 194), it was held that giving notice to proposed defendants before granting leaver under Section 92, C.P.C. is not contemplated, as the Court is hot deciding the rights of parties but merely sees whether prima facie case for grating leave is made out. (x) While upholding the principle that notice to defendants before granting leave is not necessary as a rule of law, the Supreme Court held in S.R.M. Naryanan Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanna Chettiar ( AIR 1991 S.C. 221 = 1990-2-L.W. 468) that as a rule of caution, the Court should normally give notice to the defendants before granting leave under the said section to institute a suit. The Court observed that the defendants could bring to the notice of the Court, for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless and that in a given case, they could point out that the persons who are applying for leave are doing so merely with a view to harass the mist or have such antecedents that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons. The Court hastened to add that the desirability of the issue of such notice being given to the defendants cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under Section 92 can be granted, as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust. Thus, it is clear that the application under Section 92, C.P.C. for grant of leave is administrative in nature. B. (i) Section 141, C.P.C. is not applicable to a proceeding which is administrative. It applies only to matters which are to be considered judicially by a Court. (ii) In Ram Candra v. State of U.P ( AIR 1966 S.C. 1888 ), the Court said:— “Bearing in mind that the term “proceeding” indicates something in which business is conducted according to a prescribed mode it would be only right to give it, as used in the aforesaid provision, a comprehensive meaning so as to include within it all matters coming up for judicial adjudication and not to confine it to a civil proceeding alone.” (iii) The trial Judge has placed reliance on the judgment in Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath ( AIR 1987 S.C. 1926 = 100 L.W. 146 S.N.). That was a case of Election petition, which had to be judicially adjudicated. In fact the question before the Court was whether the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C., could be invoked at a stage subsequent to the framing of issues and it was answered in the affirmative. The ruling has no relevance in this case. (iv) As Section 141, C.P.C. will not apply to an application under Section 92, C.P.C., the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. or Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C cannot be invoked at this stage. They may be available after the suit is taken on file. If the contention of the respondents counsel is accepted, it will lead to a trial in a truncated manner before a suit is registered and such a course is not contemplated at all by the framers of the Code. Hence, Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. and Order 23, Rule 1 C.P.C. are not applicable to an application under Section 92, C.P.C. for leaver to institute a suit. Hence, Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. and Order 23, Rule 1 C.P.C. are not applicable to an application under Section 92, C.P.C. for leaver to institute a suit. C. It is well settled that to invoke Section 92, C.P.C., three conditions have to be satisfied, namely, (i) the trust is a public trust; (ii) there is a breach of trust or a direction of Court is necessary in the administration of such a trust; and (iii) the relief claimed is one or other of the reliefs enumerated in the Section (See: Bishwanath v. Radha Ballabhji ( AIR 1967 S.C. 1044 ). D. It has also been held that the suit must be in a representative character instituted in the interests of the public and not merely for vindication of individual or personal rights of the plaintiff. (See: Sugra Bibi v. Haji Kummu ( AIR 1969 S.C. 884 ). E. At the stage of granting of leave, the Court has to look into the allegations in the proposed plaint and the documents produced by the plaintiff only. (See: Paramatmanand Saraswtahi v. R. Tripaihi ( AIR 1974 S.C. 2141 ) and Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh ( AIR 1975 S.C. 371 ). F. (i) The main purpose of the provision under Section. 92, Civil Procedure Code, is to give protection to public trust of a charitable or religious nature, from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them. That is why it provides that suits under that Section can only be filed by the Advocate-General or two or more persons having an interest in the Trust and having obtained leave of the Court. The object is that before the Advocate-General files the suit, he would satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case, either of breach of trust or of the necessity for obtaining directions of the Court on the basis of the allegations made in the proposed plaint and the documents produced along with the plaint. So also, the Court is expected to satisfy itself that there is a prima facie case either of breach of trust or of necessity for obtaining directions of Court on the basis of allegations made in the plaint and the documents played before it along with the plaint. Vide: Pitchayya v. Venktakrishnamacharlu (AIR 1930 Madras 129) and Madappa v. Mahanthadevaru ( AIR 1966 S.C. 878 ). Vide: Pitchayya v. Venktakrishnamacharlu (AIR 1930 Madras 129) and Madappa v. Mahanthadevaru ( AIR 1966 S.C. 878 ). (ii) It is in that view, the Section provides that the plaintiffs in a suit under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure, must be persons having an interest in the Trust. Before 1887 the corresponding provision of law prevailing at that time required a direct interest in the Trust. The word ‘direct’ was dropped in 1887 and thereafter the requirement was to have an interest. The words ‘having an interest’ have been subject matter of judicial consideration in several judgments. In T.R. Ramachadra Aiyar v. Parameswaran Unni (I.L.R. 42 Madras 360), a Full Bench of this Court held that ‘interest’ in Section 92, C.P.C. denotes an interest which is present and substantial and not sentimetnal or remote or fictitious or purely illusory interest. In that case, a Hindu residing in Madras and another residing in Tellicherry instituted a suit in the District Court of North Malabar under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, in respect of a Hindu temple situated in Tellicherry. It was found that the former had gone to worship in the temple on one or two occasions in the past and might go there to worship in the future if business took him to Tellicherry and he relied on his right as a Hindu to worship in the temple as entitling him to institute the suit. The majority held that though as a Hindu he might have the right to worship in the temple, he had not on that ground alone the ‘interest’ required by Section 92 of the Code to maintain the suit. (iii) In Vaithianatha Aiyar v. S. Tyagaraja Aiyar (1921) 41 M.L.J. 20 ), a Division Bench of this Court held that where the two plaintiffs instituting a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure are the descendants of the founder of the charity, they have an interest within the meaning of the said Section. The Bench observed that the fact that the plaintiffs belong to the family of the founder would naturally give them an interest in the family charity so as to enable them to bring a suit under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Bench distinguished the judgment of the Full Bench in T.R. Ramachandra Ayyyars case (I.L.R. 42 Madras 360 = (1919) 9 L.W. 492 ). The Bench distinguished the judgment of the Full Bench in T.R. Ramachandra Ayyyars case (I.L.R. 42 Madras 360 = (1919) 9 L.W. 492 ). The judgment of this Court was affirmed on appeal by the Privy Council in Vaidyanatha Ayar v. Swaminathvya Ayyar (AIR 1924 P.C. 221(2) = (1924) 20 L.W. 803). The Judicial Committee held that the descendants in the female line from the founder of the charity have an “interest” therein within the meaning of Section 92; Civil Procedure Code, although they may not directly obtain any benefit from it. (iv) In Ramaswami v. Karumuthu (AIR 1957 Madras 597), a learned single Judge of this Court held that a person who was a Hindu and was residing only three miles away, and had saved the trust properties from being sold away by a decree-holder and had got the attachment released, and was a lessee in respect of the trust to be by being the highest bider at an auction held by a Commissioner of Court, is a person vitally interested in the trust and its proper management. (v) In Hamam Singh v. Gurdial Singh ( AIR 1967 S.C. 1415 ), the residents of a village, where free food is served to visitors by an institution running a free kitchen, do not have any interest entitling them to file a suit under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. On the facts it was found by the Court that the institution was meant for Nirmala Sadhus and the plaintiffs as lambardars and followers of Sikh religion cannot be said to have an interest entitling them to file a suit as Nirmala Sadhus are not Sikhs. (vi) In C. Kalahasti v. R. Sukhantharaj (1975 T.L.N.J. 155 = (1975) 88 L.W. 57 ), a Division Bench of this Court held that old students of a College are persons having an interest in the trust which is in management of the College. (vi) In C. Kalahasti v. R. Sukhantharaj (1975 T.L.N.J. 155 = (1975) 88 L.W. 57 ), a Division Bench of this Court held that old students of a College are persons having an interest in the trust which is in management of the College. (vii) In Kumudavalli v. P.N. Purushotham (AIR 1978 Madras 205 = 91 L.W. 205), another Division Bench of this Court held that a resident of the locality, who has some nexus or connection with the trust in the sense that he has interest in its well-being and prosperity can under certain circumstances be taken to be a person having an interest in the trust and in the cause of a public School, such presumption could also be raised, if he is an old student of the school. The Bench said that if a fair inference could be drawn that a resident in the locality is subjectively interested in the well-being of the school and, therefore, the trust, then such an interest would come within the meaning of the expression ‘having an interest’ and cannot be held to be illusory or hypothetical. In that case, the Bench also held that a remote relationship through the female line by itself cannot be such an interest sufficient to lay an action under Section 92, C.P.C. G. (i) In Jugul Kishore v. Shiam lal (AIR 1944 Allahabad 231), a Division Bench of that Court held that in cases of alleged mismanagement of public trust, the Advocate-General should go into the question not only of the condition of the trust but also into the question of the bona fides of the would-be plaintiffs and of their capacity properly to represent the public on whose behalf they are purporting to sue. (ii) In Mayer Simon v. Advocate General, Kerala (AIR 1975 Kerala 57), to which we have made a reference earlier, the Court held that a consent under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure, could be refused by the Advocate-General for all or one of the following reasons:— (1) the persons approaching the Advocate-General may riot have sufficient interest; (2) their motives may not be pure; (3) they ma not be solvent; (4) there may be no breach of trust, and (5) direction of the Court may not be deemed necessary. With respect, we are unable to agree with the Full Bench as regards the third reason set out above. 20. With respect, we are unable to agree with the Full Bench as regards the third reason set out above. 20. Keeping the above principles in mind, we shall now advert to the facts of the case. There are four plaintiff in the suit. The first plaintiff is admittedly a son of the founder. It cannot by any stretch of imagination be said that he is not a person having interest in the trust. The argument that is advanced against him is that he voluntarily resigned his trusteeship in 1959 and did not evince any interest till 1978. It is also argued that even after initiating an action, he withdrew the same, thus giving up his claim to trusteeship. He has not done anything to show his interest in the trust, till he filed the present proceeding in 1994. None of the above arguments can hold good to defeat the claim of the first plaintiff that he is a person having an interest in the Trust. Just because he had reigned in 1959 and kept quiet till 1978, it does not preclude him from initiating proceeding to protect the interests of the Trust as and when he finds that they are in jeopardy and the Trust is not managed properly. When a person who is a descendant in the female line has been held by the Privy Council to be one having an interest (vide Vaidyanatha Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar (AIR 1924 P.C. 221(2) = 20 L.W. 803), there can be no doubt that the son of the founder is a person having an interest and for that mater, a direct interest in the Trust. In the deed of Trust, clause (d) provides that if and when additional trustees are appointed, and if and when a Court has to appoint trustees or additional trustees, the heirs of descendants of the Founder may be preferred to others. I That itself is sufficient to make him a person having an interest in the Trust. 21. The second plaintiff is a regular reader of Daily Thanthi and a person interested in education. The third plaintiff is a seller of newspapers and magazines and in that process has also sold Daily Thanthi. He is also a reader of Daily Thanthi from his boyhood and concerned about education. 21. The second plaintiff is a regular reader of Daily Thanthi and a person interested in education. The third plaintiff is a seller of newspapers and magazines and in that process has also sold Daily Thanthi. He is also a reader of Daily Thanthi from his boyhood and concerned about education. The fourth plaintiff is employed as a reporter and has been a reader of Daily Thanthi for a very long time. He is also interested in education. The first object of the Trust is to establish “Dhina Thanthi” or Daily Th anthi as an organ of educated public opinion for the Tamil reading public. Thus, it is clear that the beneficiary of the trust is the Tamil reading public. Naturally, plaintiffs 2 to 4 are beneficiaries and thus, they have an interest in the trust. They do not belong to the family and they have no axe to grind against, the first defendant. We are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the plaintiffs have no substantial or subsisting interest in the trust. 22. He next argued that the suit is being instituted for a personal vendetta and not with bona fide motives. We are unable to appreciate this argument. It is not known how the Court will be in a position to decide before taking evidence that the plaintiffs have come to this Court only to achieve some personal gains or with mala fide motives. It was repeatedly argued that the history of the litigation would automatically prove the same. Reference is made again and again to the resignation of trusteeship in 1959 and withdrawal of the proceeding instituted in 1978 without leave Court as well as the institution of proceedings by the sons of the first plaintiff. We are unable to draw any inference from those circumstances that the plaintiffs are actuated by malice. The case set out in the plaint is cogent and it is possible for the plaintiffs to prove the same by adducing evidence. It is only if the plaintiffs fail to adduce acceptable evidence, the Court can hold that the plaintiffs have come forward with a frivolous and vexatious litigation with ulterior motives. The case set out in the plaint is cogent and it is possible for the plaintiffs to prove the same by adducing evidence. It is only if the plaintiffs fail to adduce acceptable evidence, the Court can hold that the plaintiffs have come forward with a frivolous and vexatious litigation with ulterior motives. While the respondents harp upon the conduct of the first plaintiff in having initiated similar proceedings earlier and not taking decisions from the Court, the plaintiffs are equally vehement in pointing out the conduct of the first respondent in making every attempt at his command to stifle the proceedings at the threshold not having the courage to face the same in the Court. It is necessary for the Court to bear in mind the fact that the first defendant did not on the earlier occasions allow the plaints to be registered as suits. We have already narrated the sequence of events. It was the first defendnat who started the first round of litigation questioning the power of the founder to appoint additional trustees in spite of the fact that there is an express provision in the trust deed empowering the founder to appoint additional trustees. When the Court passed a conditional order of injunction in that proceeding, the first defendant did not comply with the condition. Thus, he is also prima facie guilty of disobeying the order of the Court. 23. If is quite evident that the first defendant has been adopting the same tactics of cross-examining the plaintiffs in each case. In spite of the directions of the Supreme Court in S.L.P. 6040 of 1982 that the cross-examination should be confined only to questions applicable to sanction of leave, he chose to widen the scope of the same in such a manner that the Court could not take notice of it. If the conduct of the plaintiffs could be said to be bad, the conduct of the first defendant is equally bad, if not worse. We are still unable to appreciate the need for cross-examination of the plaintiffs at the initial stage before grant of leave, when the matter has to be decided on the basis of the allegations in the plaint and the documents produced by the plaintiffs only. We are still unable to appreciate the need for cross-examination of the plaintiffs at the initial stage before grant of leave, when the matter has to be decided on the basis of the allegations in the plaint and the documents produced by the plaintiffs only. Obviously, the attempt of the first defendant is only to bring in other materials in support of his undisclosed defence in the guise of cross-examination without adducing proper proof therefor. 24. Even when the present proceedings were instituted, the conduct of the first defendant in appointing three additional trustees in a hurry and getting a document registered after office hours of the Sub Registrar on the day on which Application No. 33 of 1994 was filed would show that there can be no denial that the first defendant was quite aware of every move on the part of the plaintiffs and notice was taken on 4.1.1994 when the application came before the Court for the first time. The contention of learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the appointment of additional trustees was itself only on 3.1.1994 after the filing of Application No. 33 of 1994 and the first defendant ante-dated the documents as if it was on 29.12.1993, is not one without substance Ofcourse, it is a matter for evidence. But, it should not be forgotten that it is this first defendant, who instituted C.S. Nos. 352 and 353 of 1978 questioning the power of the founder to appoint additional trustees in spite of the specific clause in the deed of trust. 25. We are not convinced that the antecedents of the first plaintiff or the other plaintiff are such that leave should not be granted to them to institute the proposed suit. Nor do we agree with the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the only object of the suit is to cause harassment to the first defendant and others 26. It is quite possible to draw an inference from the admitted facts and circumstances that there must have been an arrangement between the parties after the passing of the conditional order of injunction in the earlier proceedings, but for which, the first plaintiff would have continued his Application No. 3147 of 1978. There was no necessity for him to withdraw the same, when at that time, it was the first defendant who was the defaulter. There was no necessity for him to withdraw the same, when at that time, it was the first defendant who was the defaulter. We should not be mistaken to be giving a finding on that question. We are only pointing out that fact only to show that it is possible of proof and without giving an opportunity to the parties to prove their cases, the Court cannot hold at this stage that the present proceeding is frivolous or vexatious. 27. The proposed plaint contains several serious allegations against the management of the trust. They are matters to be established by evidence. If they are proved, there will be no doubt whatever that the first defendant is guilty of breach of trust. The prayer in the proposed plaint is to frame a scheme for the administration of the Trust, making provision for the number of trustees, the method of accounting, action to be taken for misconduct of trustees and such other matters as may be necessary for the proper administration of the Trust and also to consider whether or not the first defendant should continue as a trustee of the trust. Besides the above prayer, there is a prayer for directing the first defendant to render a true and proper account of the administration of the trust. The reliefs prayed for will fall within the scope of Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. 28. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the plaintiffs are only trying to reagitate the same matter again and again in order to harass the first defendant. The facts narrated earlier prove that on no prior occasion the Court considered the truth of the allegations. An attempt was made by counsel to convince us that the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions S.L.P. Nos. 3362 and 3363 of 1987 on 18.1.1993 only after it was convinced that there was no merit whatever in the allegations made against the first defendant. In support of the said argument reference is made to the direction given by the Supreme Court in that case to the first defendant to file an affidavit meeting the allegations made against him. According to learned counsel, the first defendant filed not only a counter affidavit but also typed copies of all relevant documents in as many as 18 volumes and that the Court dismissed the S.L.Ps. only after perusing the same. According to learned counsel, the first defendant filed not only a counter affidavit but also typed copies of all relevant documents in as many as 18 volumes and that the Court dismissed the S.L.Ps. only after perusing the same. We are somewhat surprised that such an argum ent is advanced by a senior counsel in this Court. The order of the Supreme Court dated 18.1.1993 consists of only one line reading, “The Special Leaver Petitions are dismissed.” It is absolutely impossible and improper for this Court draw an inference that the Supreme Court was convinced of the absence of merit in the case of plaintiffs and that was why the S.L.Ps. wee dismissed. We do not think it necessary to dilate any longer on this aspect. 29. Learned counsel invited our attention to some rulings of the English Courts dealing with vexatious proceedings. 30. In Re Vernazza ((1959) 1 All E.R. 200), the Queens Bench Division held that in determining whether proceedings were vexatious the Court must look at the whole history of the matter, not solely at the question whether the pleadings had throughout disclosed a cause of action. It is seen that in that case the first action was compromised on the basis of which a decree was passed. An appeal against it was dismissed. Leave to appeal to House of Lords was refused. All the subsequent proceedings in the years 1938, 1939, 1940, 1952, 1953, 1957, 1958 and 1959 to set aside the earlier judgment were dismissed or refused. The facts in the present case are entirely different. 31. That case went on appeal to the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of the Division Court by its judgment dated 2.12.1959 and refused to grant leave to appeal to the House of Lords. That judgment is reported in Re Vernazza ((1960)) 1 All E.R. 183). It is to be noted that Section 51 (1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 contained the expression “habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings”. On the facts of that case, the Court held that the appellant was a person convered by the Section. 32. In Re Langton ((1966) 3 All E.R. 576). On the facts of that case, the Court held that the appellant was a person convered by the Section. 32. In Re Langton ((1966) 3 All E.R. 576). the Queens Bench Division held that for the purpose of Section 51(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, the Court can and should consider proceedings brought by the litigant in a representative capacity as well as in his own personal capacity. On the facts, they held that the party concerned was a vexatious litigant. 33. None of the three cases referred to above can be compared with the present cane. There was no decision in any of the prior proceedings between the parties in this matter. There was neither a decree on merits nor on compromise. There is no possibility of branding the first plaintiff as a vexatious litigant even before giving an opportunity to him to adduce evidence in this case. If he is able to prove the allegations made by him in the plaint, there is no question of the proceeding being vexatious. 34. Our attention is drawn by both sides to the judgment in Arivanandam v. Satyapal ( AIR 1977 S.C. 2421 = 91 L.W. 21 S.N.). Each side had its own purpose therefor. In that case, the father of the petitioner suffered an order or eviction which was confirmed on appeal and on further revision. The Revisional Court, however, granted six months time to vacate. After enjoying the benefit thereof, the party sought for extension of time. Even when such a proceeding was pending, the petitioners father set up the petitioner to file a suit for a declaration that the order of eviction was obtained by fraud and collusion. When the factum of the institution of that suit was brought to the notice of the High Court at the hearing of the petition for extension of time, the Court persuaded the landlord to give more time for vacating the premises on the basis that the sons suit would be withdrawn. After gaining time by another five months, the son filed another suit before another District Munsif and got an interim order of injunction. The landlord entered appearance and got it vacated by disclosing the above facts. An appeal against the order and a further revision to the High Court failed. The Special Leave Petition was against the said order. After gaining time by another five months, the son filed another suit before another District Munsif and got an interim order of injunction. The landlord entered appearance and got it vacated by disclosing the above facts. An appeal against the order and a further revision to the High Court failed. The Special Leave Petition was against the said order. Holding that there was a gross abuse of process of Court, the Supreme Court condemned severely the petitioner and his father and dismissed the petition with the following observations:— “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsifs Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful, not formal reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexat ious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. 7, R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under O. 10, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing s o that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Ch. XI) and must be triggered against them.” 35. While the respondents counsel contends that the facts in the present case are similar and the proceedings must be held to be vexatious, counsel for the appellants submits that this case can in no way be equated to the above case. According to him, the above passage clearly shows that what the Court should look into at this stage is only the plaint which on a reading of it discloses that it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue. We are in agreement with the contention of appellants counsel. According to him, the above passage clearly shows that what the Court should look into at this stage is only the plaint which on a reading of it discloses that it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue. We are in agreement with the contention of appellants counsel. It should not be forgotten that in the case before the Supreme Court, there was an order of eviction on merits which was tested on appeal and revision and confirmed. In the present case, there was no judicial adjudication in any of the prior proceedings. 36. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in Naryana Chettiars case ( AIR 1991 S.C. 221 = 1990-2-L.W. 468) referred to by us earlier, it is argued that it is open to the defendants in a proceeding under Section 92, C.P.C. to bring to the notice of the Court that the allegations made by the plaintiff are frivolous or reckless and that the proceeding is initiated with a view to harass the trust and that the antecedents of the plaintiffs are such that it would be undesirable to grant leave. In our opinion, the Supreme Court has not, by such observations in that case, intended or meant that a preliminary or a summary trial should be held by the Court even before the grant of leave. The defendants could only rely upon the admitted facts and circumstances and the documents filed along with the plant. 37. There is no merit in the contention that the plaintiffs are only reagitating the same subject matter in the present proceeding. In the course of arguments, learned counsel for appellants placed before us statements containing separately the allegations made in the plaint filed along with (1) Application No. 3747 of 1978. (2) Application No. 165 of 1981 and (3) Application No. 33 of 1984. At our instance, he filed a separate statement setting out the new allegations made in the present proceeding, which were not made in the earlier proceedings. The statement reads as follows:— “The following are the new allegations contained in para 56 of the draft of the plaint filed along with Application No. 33 of 1994. Paragraph 56 (ii) About land at Trichy given to Malai Malar. (ii) About advancing monies from Trust out Malai Malar to construct building at Bangalore. (v) Some procedure at Pondicherry. The statement reads as follows:— “The following are the new allegations contained in para 56 of the draft of the plaint filed along with Application No. 33 of 1994. Paragraph 56 (ii) About land at Trichy given to Malai Malar. (ii) About advancing monies from Trust out Malai Malar to construct building at Bangalore. (v) Some procedure at Pondicherry. (vi) About using the sophisticated Machinery of the trust for multi colour printing for “Rani”. (vii) Malai Malar multi Colour weekly Supplement printed at Trust Press. (viii) Commission to News Agency for sale of Daily Thanthi-Sri Devi Agencies. (ix) Sponsoring Video Programme with the Funds of Trust for the benefit of Malai Malar. (xi) Advancing monies to Malai Malar (xii) Advertisement Revenue directed through Soverign Media Marketing Pvt. Ltd.,” It is seen that there are at least nine new allegations in the present proceedings. The correctness of the said statement has not been disputed before us, and on the other hand, it is admitted by counsel for the respondents that some of the allegations in the present proceedings are new. 38. It is well settled that mere identity of some of the issues do not bring about identity of subject-matter. The entire cause of action and the reliefs claimed must be the same to make the subject-matter identical. (See: Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madanlal ( AIR 1970 S.C. 987 ). 39. It is equally well settled that if a suit is maintainable for part of the reliefs claimed, the suit cannot be thrown out in limine as not maintainable. (See: Ishbar Singh v. National Fertilizers ( AIR 1991 S.C. 1546 )). Hence, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that addition of new allegations based on new facts will not help the plaintiffs to maintain the suit is not tenable. On the other hand, there is considerable force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that even with regard to the old allegations which are repeated now, it is a case of continuing cause of action and the suit is maintainable. 40. We have no hesitation to hold that the requirements of Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure have been fulfilled in this case and A. No. 33 of 1994 deserves to be allowed. Hence, O.S.A. No. 62 of 1996 has to be allowed. 41. 40. We have no hesitation to hold that the requirements of Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure have been fulfilled in this case and A. No. 33 of 1994 deserves to be allowed. Hence, O.S.A. No. 62 of 1996 has to be allowed. 41. Now we turn to O.S.A. 64 of 1996 in which the question is whether the prayer for amendment of the proposed plaint can be granted. We have already referred to the fact that respondents 4 to 6 had no objection to be impleaded and they have been made parties to the proceeding. As the plaintiffs were not aware of the appointment of additional trustees when they presented A. No. 33 of 1994, they could not make any allegation against them in the proposed plaint. When the counter affidavit referred to the appointment of additional trustees, necessarily they have to be impleaded as parties. While doing so, the plaintiffs are desirous of making allegations against the new trustees for the purpose of proving that they are not fit to be trustees and their appointment as additional trustees is mala fide . In that view, they have made some allegations. The burden of proving the same is entirely on the plaintiffs. Without giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs to adduce evidence in support of the same, how on Earth any Court can come to the conclusion that they are frivolous or reckless or vexatious? Just because the defendants are holding high position in life or apparently having good reputation, can a litigant be prevented from making specific allegations and proving the same in a Court of law? We are somewhat surprised that even at this stage the trial Judge has characterised the allegations as frivolours and reckless. The plaintiffs will be taking the risk of facing an order for compensatory costs if they fail to prove their allegations by evidence. We will not be transgressing our limits if we point out that the recent happenings in this country bear ample proof that people who held high and powerful positions in this country are not exempt from the necessity to face charges and judicial proceedings against them. In our opinion the order rejecting the application for amendment of the proposed plaint is wholly erroneous and unsustainable. O.S.A. No. 64 of 1996 has to be allowed. 42. In our opinion the order rejecting the application for amendment of the proposed plaint is wholly erroneous and unsustainable. O.S.A. No. 64 of 1996 has to be allowed. 42. As regards O.S.A. No. 63 of 1996, which is against the order allowing A. No. 2421 of 1994 in which the prayer is to dismiss A. No. 33 of 1994 in limine , we have now held that Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, does not apply to A. No. 33 of 1994 as the proceeding is administrative in nature. We have also found the requirements of Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied and there is no ground for throwing out the plaint at the threshold by refusing leave. However, we would like to discuss the position in law even if Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure applies. 43. Before ding so, we must refer to one interesting if not intriguing aspect of the matter. The application A. No. 2421 of 1994 has been filed only under Section 151 read with Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. There is no reference in the petition to Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. But, an argument as to the applicability of the provision has been advanced before the learned trial Judge and considered by him at length. He has held that the provision can be invoked even at this stage because of the provision in Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure. Similarly, before us, arguments have been advanced by both sides as if the petition was under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. Unfortunately it was not noticed by anybody that the petition is only under Section 151 and Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, a plaint can be rejected only on the four grounds set out therein and the i Court cannot travel outside the Rule and reject the plaint on other grounds. The Rule reads as follows:— “11. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, a plaint can be rejected only on the four grounds set out therein and the i Court cannot travel outside the Rule and reject the plaint on other grounds. The Rule reads as follows:— “11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action: (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) Where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficient stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (High Court Amendment: (Madras) - For clause (c) the following clause shall be substituted:— (c) “Where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written on paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff does not make good the deficiency within the time, if any, granted by the Court,” (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the paint to be barred by any law. Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correction of the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” 44. The language of the Rule, the context in which it appears and the provisions in Rules 12 and 13 clearly show that the Rule is exhaustive and a plaint can be rejected only on any one of the four grounds set out in the Rule. The matter is not res integra. Our attention is drawn by both sides to some rulings which we will refer now. 45. The matter is not res integra. Our attention is drawn by both sides to some rulings which we will refer now. 45. In Thakur Harihar Bakhsh Singh v. Tahkur Jagannath Singh (A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 413), a Division Bench held that the grounds on which a Court is authorised to reject a plaint are not only those given in Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure and that the instances given in the Rule cannot be regarded as exhaustive or as limiting the powers of a court under Section 151 of the Code. In that case, the suit was filed by a minor through his mother, as his next friend on the allegation that a sale deed executed by her was invalid. There were already some other proceedings pending. The Subordinate Judge rejected the plaint on the ground that the suit had not been brought in good faith. It was contended before the Appellate Bench that the only grounds on which the Court was authorised to reject the plaint were those mentioned in Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. The Bench did not agree with that contention. By the time the appeal was heard by the Appellate Bench, the other proceedings ended in favour of the parties to the suit. The argument advance before the Bench was that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to reject the plaint except on grounds set out in Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. The Bench agreed with the said contention by placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in Lakshmana Chetty v. Lakshmanan Chettiar (1 L.W. 875). However, the Bench held that in view of the conclusion of other proceedings in favour of the parties to the suit, the same was maintainable and had to be considered on merits. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the order of the lower court was set aside in spite of the fact that the Bench expressed a particular opinion regarding the scope of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. Strictly speaking, the opinion of the Bench is obiter dictum. 46. The ruling of this Court referred to in the above case viz., Lakshmanan Chetty v. Lakshmanna Chettiar (1 L.W. 875) turned on the substantive law of infants and not on the language of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. Strictly speaking, the opinion of the Bench is obiter dictum. 46. The ruling of this Court referred to in the above case viz., Lakshmanan Chetty v. Lakshmanna Chettiar (1 L.W. 875) turned on the substantive law of infants and not on the language of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. The objection taken before the Bench was that the suit was not instituted in the interests of the minor, who was shown as the plaintiff. That objection was upheld and the paint was rejected. On appeal, a preliminary objection was raised questioning the maintainability of the appeal. The Court held that the order rejecting the plaint would amount to a decree, in view of the definit ion of ‘decree’ contained in Section 2(2), Code of Civil Procedure. Under that Section, a decree shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint. Hence, the preliminary objection was over-ruled. Reliance was placed on the decision in Beni Ram Bhatt v. Ram Lal dhukri (I.L.R. 13 Calcutta 189). But, nowhere in that Judgment the Bench considered the question whether the provisions under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure were exhaustive. The Bench dealt with only the provision under Order 32, Code of Civil Procedure and held that it was not exhaustive. Hence, the Division Bench of Oudh was not justified in treating the decision of this Court in Lakshmanan Chettys case (I L.W. 875) as an authority for the proposition that the grounds set out in Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive. 47. In Radhakishen v. Wall Mohammed (AIR 1956 Hyderabad 133), the plaint in the suit was signed by a person said to be the muktar of the plaintiff. An interim petition for stay filed by the plaintiff was signed by one Rameshwar. The Court found that the plaint and petition were signed by two different persons. Therefore, it directed the plaintiff to file the power of attorney of the person who signed the plaint. On a perusal of the power of attorney, the Court found that it did not give any power or authority to the person concerned to s ign the plaint and consequently rejected the plaint holding that the power of attorney was defetive. Therefore, it directed the plaintiff to file the power of attorney of the person who signed the plaint. On a perusal of the power of attorney, the Court found that it did not give any power or authority to the person concerned to s ign the plaint and consequently rejected the plaint holding that the power of attorney was defetive. In the appeal, two contentions were urged:— The first was that the Court was in error in holding that the power of attorney did not authorise the said persion to sign the plaint and the second was that Order 7, Rulel 1, Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the case. The Bench held that the Court was not justified in rejecting the plaint without calling upon the plaintiff in the first instance to cure the defect therein. They allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the court below. The case was remanded to the trial Court with a direction that it should, after giving time to the plaintiff to sign the plaint, proceed with the case according to law. But, the question whether Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure was considered. Manohar Pershad, J. held that the judgment of that Court in an earlier case laid down that the rule was not exhaustive. The other learned judge, viz., Bilgrami, J. held that though the grounds for rejection of the plaint in Order 7, Rule 11, were not exhaustive, the defect for which the plaint could be rejected should not be such as is curable by amendment and nothing more than an error of procedure. The dictim in that case is also an obiter. 48. We hve already referred to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal ( AIR 1977 S.C. 2421 ) and extracted a passage therefrom. The dictim in that case is also an obiter. 48. We hve already referred to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal ( AIR 1977 S.C. 2421 ) and extracted a passage therefrom. The following sentence in that passage is relevant for the present purpose:— “The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sence of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. 7, R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentined therein is fulfilled .” (Underlining ours) The underlined portion clearly shows that the Supreme Court has settled the law by holding that the Court must take care to see that the grounds set out in Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. That shows that the Court should not travel outside the rule. In fact, in the earlier part of the judgment, the Court has referred to the circumstances in which the suit could be said to be vexatious and meritless by pointing out that the plaint is not one disclosing a clear right to sue. That will be a case falling squarely under clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7, Code of Civil Procedure. In our opinion, after the pronouncement of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the rulings to the contrary are no longer good law. 49. In British Airways v. Art Works Export Ltd. (AIR 1986 Calcutta 120), a Division Bench held that the Court shall dismiss the suit only if on the face of the plaint it appears to be barred by any law. The Bench said. “But where it does not so appear, but requires further consideration or, in other words, if there be any doubt or if the Court is not sure and certain that the suit is barred by some law, the Court cannot reject the plaint under Cl. (d) of O. 7. R. 11 of the C.P.C. Both the grounds as embodied in Cls. (a) and (b) of O. 7, R. 11 must appear on the face of the plaint.” 50. Thanikkachalam, J. had occasion to consider the scope of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure in Application No. 5379 of 1992 in C.S. No. 963 of 1992. R. 11 of the C.P.C. Both the grounds as embodied in Cls. (a) and (b) of O. 7, R. 11 must appear on the face of the plaint.” 50. Thanikkachalam, J. had occasion to consider the scope of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure in Application No. 5379 of 1992 in C.S. No. 963 of 1992. In fact, the order has been referred to before the trial Judge and the latter has expressed his dissent. Thanikkachalam, J. has observed that if the cause of action has been clearly disclosed in the plaint, there can be no manner of doubt that the application to reject the plaint is totally misconceived. The learned Judge has pointed out the differe nce between rejection of a plaint and dismissal of a suit. The learned Judge said:— “There is no reported case where the courts have used the provisions in Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procter Code to dismiss a suit/reject a plaint as being barred by law or for non-disclosure of cause of action by an argument based on locus standi or by holding that the suit is not maintainable by general principles of law.” Again the learned Judge said. “At this stage, it is not open to this Court to find out the merits or demerits, the truth or falsehood, legality or illegality of the cause of action disclosed by the plaintiffs in the plaint, because this Court is not at present disposing of the suit on merits. The point for consideration at this juncture is whether in terms of Order 7, Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs have disclosed a cause of action in the plaint. All that is required under this provision is that the plaintiff must disclose a cause of action which should be in the nature of an actionable claim and nothing else. If the plaint discloses a cause of action, the correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action is beyond the purview of Order 7, Rule 11(a) (See British Airways v. Arts Works Export Ltd. (1986 Cal. 120 at 123).” 51. If the plaint discloses a cause of action, the correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action is beyond the purview of Order 7, Rule 11(a) (See British Airways v. Arts Works Export Ltd. (1986 Cal. 120 at 123).” 51. After referring to the order of Thanikkachalam, J. and the reasoning therein, the learned trial Judge has observed as follows:— “With due respect to the learned Judge, I wish to state that there is no prohibition to dismiss an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the defendant is able to establish that the plaint suffers infirmities and shows that the application filed for leave to sue is a gross abuse of process of the Court or a vexatious proceeding brought by the applicant to pursue his personal vendetta.” We are unable to agree with the opinion expressed by the learned trial Judge. The reasons therefor have already been given by us in this Judgment. The learned Judge has also made a reference to the decision in Samar Singh v. Kedar nath ( AIR 1987 S.C. 1926 = 100 L.W. 141 S.N.), to which we have already made a reference in another connection, and observed that the Supreme Court having held that if the cause of action is not disclosed, the application can be dismissed at the threshold of the proceeding and, therefore, he is unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for the plaintiffs. It is needless to point out that as a mater of fact, the learned Judge has gone into the merits of the cases of both the parties without resting his conclusion on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint, as if he is disposing of the suit itself after the evidence. 52. One of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the respondents is that the present proceeding is barred by Order 23, Rule 1(4), Code of Civil Procedure and thus, the matter falls within the scope of clause (d) of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. We have already referred to the admitted fact that all the allegations made in the present proposed plaint are not the same as those made in the earlier proceedings and there are several new allegations. We have also referred to the circumstances that the cause of action is a continuing one. We have already referred to the admitted fact that all the allegations made in the present proposed plaint are not the same as those made in the earlier proceedings and there are several new allegations. We have also referred to the circumstances that the cause of action is a continuing one. Clause (d) of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure itself uses the expression “where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint”. Hence, on a reading of the allegations made in the plaint, the Court must be able to find that the proposed suit is barred by any law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the present proposed suit is barred by the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, we reject that contention. 53. In the result, we hold that even if Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure is applicable at this stage of the proceedings, Application No. 33 of 1994 cannot be dismissed and no ground has been made out in Application No. 2421 of 1994 for dismissing the proceeding in limine. Hence, O.S.A. No.63of 1996 deserves to be allowed. O.S.A. Nos. 128 and 129 of 1996:— 54. O.S.A. No. 128 of 1996 is against the order in Application No. 215 of 1994 and O.S.A. No. 129 of 1996 is against the order in Application No. 1901 of 1994. The earlier application was filed by two persons by name P. Arivudai nambi and A. Fathimanathan, both being advocates practicing at Madras. The appeal is filed only by P. Arivudai Nambi. The other applicant has not chosen to prefer an appeal against the order of the learned Judge. Hence, we are concerned only with P. Arivudai Nambi. The later application, i.e., O.A. No. 1901 of 1994 is filed by one S.N. Krubanandam, who is also an advocate practising in Madras. Both the applications have been filed for impleading the applicants as parties to the proceedings in Application No. 33 of 1994. It is alleged in the affidavit that the applicants are regular readers of Daily Thanthi and have great concern for the welfare of the newspaper and interested in the development of education. Both the applications have been filed for impleading the applicants as parties to the proceedings in Application No. 33 of 1994. It is alleged in the affidavit that the applicants are regular readers of Daily Thanthi and have great concern for the welfare of the newspaper and interested in the development of education. We have already pointed out while discussing the position regarding plaintiffs 2 to 4 in Application No. 33 of 1994 that the Tamil reading public is the beneficiary of the Trust and as such the persons who are regular readers of the newspaper are persons having an interest in the trust. The same reasoning will apply in so far as these two appellants are concerned. It is argued on behalf of the respondents that one of them alleged that he wants to come on record in view of his apprehension that the original plaintiffs may withdraw the proceedings without prosecuting the same. It is argued, therefore, that the applicants have no bona fides and in any event, they cannot get impleaded themselves as parties to a proceeding which, according to the respondents, is not itself maintainable. It is the contention of the respondents that the only remedy of the appellants is to file a separate suit, if they are so interested, and establish their claims. 55. We are unable to accept any of the contentions of the respondents. The reasoning given by us regarding plaintiffs 2 to 4 in the proposed suit will hold good for these two appellants. We hold that they are persons having interest in the trust and just because an aprehenson was expressed in the affidavit that the original plaintiffs may withdraw the proceedings, they do not cease to be persons having an interest in the trust. We must point out that the plaintiffs have no objection whatever to the appellants being impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the suit. 56. No doubt, in view of our finding that the proceeding under Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure is administrative in character, the provisions of Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure may not be applicable as such. The appellants cannot as a mater of right insist upon maintaining an application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure. But as already pointed out, the plaintiffs on record have no objection whatever to the appellants being impleaded as co-plaintiffs. The appellants cannot as a mater of right insist upon maintaining an application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure. But as already pointed out, the plaintiffs on record have no objection whatever to the appellants being impleaded as co-plaintiffs. In view of the said consent of the plaintiffs on record, we permit the appellants to get impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the proceedings. The appeals have, therefore, got to be allowed. O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996 : 57. We have already narrated the facts leading to the filing of this appeal, which is against the order dismissing the suit C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 in limine under Section 151 and Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. The suit has been filed by the sons of the first plaintiff in Application No. 33 of 1994. The prayer in the suit is for declaring that the order of dismissal passed in Application No. 165 of 1981 filed by the plaintiffs is vitiated by fraud, without jurisdiction and non-est in law and void. There is a consequential prayer to set aside all the orders made in the said application. The main allegation in the plaint is that the first defendant had suppressed a material document and certain essential facts in the earlier proceedings, thereby playing a fraud on the Court and obtained favourable orders even without allowing the Court to go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations made against him in Application No. 165 of 1981. In particular, the case of the plaintiffs is that a memorandum evidencing the terms of certain understanding between the father of the plaintiffs and the first defendant was suppressed by the first defendant. It is not necessary for us to set out in detail the allegations made in the present plaint. According to learned counsel for the respondents, the plaint does not give the particulars of fraud. It is also contended that even if the memorandum referred to in the plaint had been suppressed by the first defendant as alleged by the plaintiffs, that would not be sufficient to give a cause of action to the plaintiff to institute the present suit for the reliefs prayed for by them. Thirdly it is argued that the memorandum does not represent any agreement between the parties and it has not been suppressed by the first defendant as alleged. Thirdly it is argued that the memorandum does not represent any agreement between the parties and it has not been suppressed by the first defendant as alleged. It is contended by learned counsel that the memorandum was written by the father of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs cannot deny any knowledge of the same. It is also argued that the case of an agreement between the parties is put forward for the first time by the plaintiffs. 58. In so far as the contentions of the counsel for the respondents regarding the memorandum and the terms thereof are concerned, they cannot be considered at this stage. They are matters to be decided at the trial after evidence. We must consider only the contention that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs. For that purpose, we have to read only the allegatins made in the plaint. If the allegations are such that the plaintiffs will be entitled to get reliefs if they prove the same, then there can be no doubt whatever that the plaint discloses cause of action. The plaintiffs have come forward with a definite case of fraud on the part of the first defendant by suppressing a material document. The argument that the plaintiffs would have been and ought to have been aware of the document as the author of the document was their father, cannot be considered at this stage. It is a matter for evidence. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs in the plaint that they were not aware of the said document. That is a matter to be proved by them. If the plaint allegations are proved, there can be no doubt whatever that the prior proceedings were vitiated by fraud. It is arged that the earlier proceeding was dismissed because of the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to obey the order of the Court in the matter of inspection of documents. But the reason given by the plaintiffs is that if they had been aware of the memorandum referred to in the plaint, there would have been no occasion for the Court to pass an order of inspection of documents as has been done. But the reason given by the plaintiffs is that if they had been aware of the memorandum referred to in the plaint, there would have been no occasion for the Court to pass an order of inspection of documents as has been done. Thus, the basis of the entire plaint is the non-disclosure of the memorandum referred to therein by the first defendant and the absence of knowledge on the part of the plaintiffs of the existence of the memorandum. They are matters which can be established by the plaintiffs in the evidence. Hence, it cannot be said that on the face of the plaint, it does not disclose a cause of action. 59. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Chengalavaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994-1-L.W. 21) that fraud vitiates all proceedings. The law is laid down in the following terms:— “5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the ill egal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial tantamounts to playing fraud on the Court. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial tantamounts to playing fraud on the Court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Exhibit B15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigatioa If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other si de then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.” 60. If as alleged by the plaintiffs a fraud has been played by the first defendant, they will be undoubtedly entitled to get the reliefs prayed for by them in the suit. Hence, it is not possible for the Court to dismiss the suit in limine under Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of non-disclosure of cause of action in the plaint. Consequently, the Appeal O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996 has to be allowed 61. O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996 is allowed. Application No. 6571 of 1994 is dismissed. No costs. 62. (i) O.S.A. No. 62 of 1996 is allowed with costs. Application No. 33 of 1994 is allowed. Counsel fee Rs. 5000/-. (ii) O.S.A. 63 of 1996 is allowed. Application No. 2421 of 1994 is dismissed. No costs. (iii) O.S.A. No. 64 of 1996 is allowed. Application No. 1030 of 1994 is allowed. No. costs. 63. O.S.A. Nos. 128 and 129 of 1996 are allowed. Application Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994 are allowed in so far as the appellants are concerned. No costs.