A. S. TRIPATHI, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant had preferred this appeal against his conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence of imprisonment for life, awarded vide judgment and order dated 1-2-1991 passed by 1st Additional Sessions Judge of Gwalior. ( 2 ) FACTS of the case are that deceased Kamarunnisa was the legally wedded wife of the appellant. They were living together. The deceased was married to the appellant only one year before her death. The appellant was demanding dowry from the parents of the deceased and was pressurising the deceased and harassing her. They were living in the house of one Sarikhan, who was the maternal uncle of Kamarunnisa. This house was adjacent to the house of the parents of the deceased. The appellant was frequently assaulting her to fetch more dowry from her parents. In the night of 7th May, 1987 at about 11 p. m. , it is alleged that the appellant had sprinkled kerosene oil on the body of Kamarunnisa and set her to fire. The appellant ran outside the house in the lane. One Salim, brother-in-law of the appellant intercepted him and the appellant came back to house. They all reached there. Then it was found that Kamrunnisa was lying on the floor after receiving burn injuries. The appellant then disclosed that the deceased caught fire from the stove while preparing tea. Saleem informed the family members. Kamarunnisa was taken to hospital. She was treated there in the emergency. FIR was lodged at the Police Station, Madhoganj, Lashkar in the town of Gwalior. Dying declaration of Kamarunnisa was recorded by Dr. Ashok at 11. 30 p. m. in the same night. A case under Sections 307 and 498-A IPC was registered against the appellant. Later on Kamarunnisa died and the case was converted into Section 302 IPC. ( 3 ) DURING investigation, post mortem was conducted on the dead body of deceased Kamarunnisa. Ex. P/2 is the post mortem report, which was proved on record. The appellant was apprehended and after necessary investigation a challan was submitted against him. ( 4 ) THE appellant had denied the allegation. A charge u/s. 302 IPC was framed against him and he was tried. ( 5 ) THE prosecution had examined P. W. 1 Nirpat Singh, at police constable, who was a formal witness. P. W. 2 Dr. The appellant was apprehended and after necessary investigation a challan was submitted against him. ( 4 ) THE appellant had denied the allegation. A charge u/s. 302 IPC was framed against him and he was tried. ( 5 ) THE prosecution had examined P. W. 1 Nirpat Singh, at police constable, who was a formal witness. P. W. 2 Dr. R. C. Upadhyaya had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, and had proved the same. P. W. 3 Shareef, a maternal uncle of deceased was examined who narrated the facts and had witnessed the occurrence when deceased Kamarunnisa was crying for help after being set on fire. He had taken her to hospital, where she died. P. W. 4 Saleem brother of Kamrunnisa was also examined on facts. P. W. 5 Basheer Khan was also a witness of fact. They all stated that appellant was always demanding dowry and was harassing Kamarunnisa for the same. P. W. 6 D. R. Khurre is a Naib Tehsildar who had recorded the dyinng declaration of Kamarunnisa and proved the same as Ex. P/4. P. W. 7 Chhotelal Kulshreshtha is a Patwari, who had prepared the site plan. P. W. 8 Kurban Khan is a formal witness of the site plan. P. W. 9 Sakuramabai (sic) is the mother of deceased Kamarunnisa and, she also stated that the appellant was harassing the deceased and torturing her for more dowry. P. W. 10 Aazad Khan had taken the deceased to hospital. P. W. 11 Dr. P. S. Gupta had medically treated Kamarunnisa. P. W. 12 Rajendra Singh Tomar is the Investigating Officer, who gave out the details of investigation and submitted the challan. ( 6 ) IN defence Munna Khan D. W. 1 was examined. He simply stated that the appellant was not demanding any dowry. ( 7 ) THE trial Court niter assessing the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the charge under Section 302 IPC was proved. The appellant had set fire to his wife on account of the fact that more dowry could not be fetched from her parents. Repeated harassment and torture to Kamarunnisa was also established on record on account of demand of dowry by the appellant. The trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid. The appellant had set fire to his wife on account of the fact that more dowry could not be fetched from her parents. Repeated harassment and torture to Kamarunnisa was also established on record on account of demand of dowry by the appellant. The trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforesaid. ( 8 ) WE have heard Shri B. Raj Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Shri M. K. Jain, Deputy Government Advocate for the respondent/state and perused the record. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant/accused did not press this appeal on merits. He conceded that there was a clear dying declaration of the deceased Kamarunnisa implicating the appellant and cogent reason was there for setting fire to the deceased. He simply urged on the point of sentence that the charge should have been framed under Section 304-B IPC instead of Section 302 IPC. On that ground, he argued that the sentence of imprisonment for life was excessive in the circumstances of the case, and urged that the same be reduced to some extent, holding therein that proper charge under Section 304-B IPC is only established. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant pointed out that it was a case of dowry death, and not a case of murder. He referred to the statements of the prosecution witnesses as mentioned above. They all had categorically stated that the appellant was demanding dowry and was pressurising the deceased Kamarunnisa and torturing her to fetch more dowry from her parents. The death had occurred an account of torture for dowry, by the appellant. As such, it could be a case of dowry death and not a case of murder. He pointed to us that the insertion of Section 304-B IPC was with an object of holding such deaths as dowry deaths, and proper punishment has been proved (Sic) (provided) in that Section. As such, it could be a case of dowry death and not a case of murder. He pointed to us that the insertion of Section 304-B IPC was with an object of holding such deaths as dowry deaths, and proper punishment has been proved (Sic) (provided) in that Section. ( 11 ) SECTION 304-B of the Indian Penal Code is quoted below :-" (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation : For the purpose of this Sub-Section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. " ( 12 ) ALL the prosecution witnesses have deposed that the death of Kamarunnisa was caused by setting her to fire only for demand of dowry, and therefore, in such circumstances, it was a case of dowry death. Under Section 304-B IPC when a wife dies, for demand of dowry, otherwise than under normal circumstances, it will be said to be a dowry death. The punishment provided in that Section was that in a case of dowry death, the accused has to be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant/accused argued that under this Section, from the evidence on record and circumstances of the case, when it was found to be a dowry death, the conviction could be recorded under Section 304-B IPC and punishment could be awarded in that light. ( 14 ) AFTER a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are in agreement with the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. It was clearly a case of dowry death. ( 14 ) AFTER a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are in agreement with the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. It was clearly a case of dowry death. Every witness has stated that the appellant had set fire to his wife, when she could not fetch more dowry from her parents. In such a situation, it was a case of dowry death and the conviction could be justified under Section 304-B IPC, instead of Section 302 IPC. The ingredients of Section 302 IPC may not be cogently established, rather the circumstances of the case and the evidence on record clearly indicate that it was a case of dowry death. ( 15 ) THUS, eve alter the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC from Section 302 IPC. ( 16 ) ON the point of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant/accused pointed out that the appellant is in jail for more than six years. It has come in evidence of P. W. 4 Saleem that the appellant had also gone with his wife for her medical treatment in the hospital. He was also by her side while the deceased Kamarunnisa was being treated in the hospital. The appellant was a young boy of 20 years of age at the time of the incident. The trial Court itself had considered his young age and awarded the sentence of imprisonment for life, giving reasons. The sentence u/s. 304-B IPC should nest be less than seven years, and the same could be extended for imprisonment for life. ( 17 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances of the case and holding therein that it was a case of dowry death, and also considering the young age of the appellant and his poverty, we are of the view that the sentence of imprisonment for life may be reduced to ten years, rigorous imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of Section 304-B IPC. ( 18 ) WE, therefore, direct that the conviction of the appellant/accused is converted into Section 304-B IPC and his sentence of imprisonment for life is reduced to ten years rigorous imprisonment. Except in the modification of conviction and sentence, as aforesaid, we dismiss this appeal. ( 19 ) APPELLANT/accused is in jail. He shall remain there to serve out the remaining part of his sentence, as directed by this Court. Order accordingly. Except in the modification of conviction and sentence, as aforesaid, we dismiss this appeal. ( 19 ) APPELLANT/accused is in jail. He shall remain there to serve out the remaining part of his sentence, as directed by this Court. Order accordingly. .