Judgment :- Thomas, ag. C. J. This writ appeal is by Karunagappally Grama Panchayat. Appellant filed the original petition under Art.226 of the Constitution challenging an order passed by the Government containing a direction that the Panchayat should permit certain persons to carry on construction of a multistoreyed building. Learned Single Judge, while dismissing the original petition, has observed that "Panchayat has to obey the order-passed by the State Government, and the Panchayat cannot be the petitioner aggrieved". Learned single judge has referred to another judgment rendered by himself in which such a view has been taken. 2. Facts are the following: Construction of a multi-storeyed building on the side of National Highway was in progress. Appellant panchayat (within whose territorial limits the land concerned is situate) took the view that the construction is in violation of the rule insisting on providing a set back area as enjoined by S.220 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short'the Act'). The Panchayat Committee adopted a resolution empowering its Secretary to take necessary steps for stopping further construction of the building. The Secretary then ordered stoppage of further construction of the building and directed the respondents to demolish the already constructed portion. Affected respondents thereupon approached the Government with a petition (Ext. P1) requesting to lift the order passed by the Panchayat Secretary. Government passed Ext. P3 order withdrawing the interdict of the Panchayat and directed the Panchayat to give permission to the respondents to complete the construction in accordance with the suggestions made by the Chief Town Planner. It is Ext. P3 order which the Panchayat has challenged under Art.226 of the Constitution. 3. Learned single judge, after pointing out that Panchayat is incompetent to file the original petition under Art.226 as the Panchayat has to obey the orders passed by the Government, further observed that as the construction of the building is in progress, it is not just and proper to exercise the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court. 4. 3. Learned single judge, after pointing out that Panchayat is incompetent to file the original petition under Art.226 as the Panchayat has to obey the orders passed by the Government, further observed that as the construction of the building is in progress, it is not just and proper to exercise the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court. 4. In Karur Panchayat v. State 1996(1) KLT 112 = (1995(2) KLJ 742) learned single judge has held that so long as Panchayat has to function in accordance with the provisions of the Act, it has to decide as a quasi-judicial authority and hence "its role could not be one that can be understood to be a role of adversary in the system 'where there is a question of resin the sense of a normal litigation as is understood". It was based on the said decision that the original petition was held to be not maintainable at the instance of the Panchayat. 5. The basic question which we have to decide now is whether a Panchayat has a legal right to approach the court under Art.226 of the Constitution in respect of any action or order taken by the Government affecting the Panchayat. 6. If a Panchayat has a legal right to sue, then its corollary is that it can mention an action under Art.226 of the Constitution. The legal character of a Panchayat is very much analogous to that of a Municipality or such other local body. In the case of a municipality, the position seems to be settled that it can sue or be sued. (Vide Allahabad Municipality v. J.B. Works, AIR 1957 All. 244, Gauhati Municipal Board v. Stale AIR 1966 Assam 120). The right of a company registered under the Companies Act for suing another and also for moving under Art.226 has been recognised by the Apex Court in D. C. & G. M, Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1983 SCC 937). It may be that an officer of a Company or local body is incompetent to challenge an order passed by any authority superior to the local body through a suit or writ petition. He-has to abide by the order. But that principle cannot be imported to the situation where the juristic person itself becomes the aggrieved party. 7. It may be that an officer of a Company or local body is incompetent to challenge an order passed by any authority superior to the local body through a suit or writ petition. He-has to abide by the order. But that principle cannot be imported to the situation where the juristic person itself becomes the aggrieved party. 7. In this context, we refer to S.5 of the Act which says "every Panchayat shall be a body corporate by the name of the Panchayat". It shall have perpetual succession and a common seal. It shall, subject to any restriction or qualification imposed by or under the Act or any other law "be vested with the capacity of suing or being sued on its corporate name". The Section further says that Panchayat shall be vested with the capacity of acquiring, holding and transferring property, movable or immovable or entering into contracts, and of doing all tiling necessary, proper or expedient for the purpose for which it is constituted. 8. Legal concept envisaged in S.5 of the Act makes the position clear that Panchayat is a body corporate. If so it can sue or be sued. In that position Panchayat cannot be denuded of the right to move under Art.226 of the Constitution when any of its legal right is infringed by the authorities including the Government, 9. We, therefore, hold that appellant Panchayat is competent to file the original petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. 10. On merits we have to treat Ext. P3 as an order passed in exercise of the revisional powers vested in the Government under S.276 of their Act. Of course, an attempt was made by the learned counsel for appellant-panchayat to show that there was no petition invoking such revisional jurisdiction. True, Ext. PI petition filed by the building owners is not specifically worded as a revision petition. Nevertheless it cannot be treated as for any other purpose. 11. S: 276(3) of the Act confers revisional powers on the Government. True, Ext. PI petition filed by the building owners is not specifically worded as a revision petition. Nevertheless it cannot be treated as for any other purpose. 11. S: 276(3) of the Act confers revisional powers on the Government. It reads thus: "(3)(i) Government may, in their discretion at any time either suo motu or on application, call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceedings recorded under the provisions of this Act by - (a) the superior officer authorised by the Government under sub-section (1) of S.275; or (b) any other authority or office for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality of such order, or as to the regularity of such proceedings and pass such order in reference thereto, as they think fit. (ii) The powers of the nature referred to in clause (i) may also be exercised by such superior officer as may be empowered in this behalf of the Government". It is now well settled that the statutory powers conferred on any authority has to he exercised fairly and reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Reasons are to be stated by the statutory authority for the orders issued by it except, perhaps, orders relating to the day to day administration. An order unsupported by any reason while in exercise of statutory powers cannot stand scrutiny as it would infringe Art.14 of the Constitution (vide 5. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 and alj. Sivaiah v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770). 12. Ext. P3 order is bereft of any reason whatsoever. It simply says that the stay order passed by the Panchayat stands withdrawn. Why it was withdrawn has not even been mentioned, 13. The action of the Panchayat was purportedly under S.220 of the Act. The provision imposes a prohibition on a person'against construction of a building or structure in any land abutting any public road within a minimum distance of 3 M. from the boundary of his land. Here the case of the Panchayat is that the questioned construction would fall within the prohibited zone. Of course, the contesting respondents have put forward a case that the prohibition contained in S.220 is only prospective and a building which started construction before commencement of the Act can reach its completion de hors the prohibition contained in the Section. Here the case of the Panchayat is that the questioned construction would fall within the prohibited zone. Of course, the contesting respondents have put forward a case that the prohibition contained in S.220 is only prospective and a building which started construction before commencement of the Act can reach its completion de hors the prohibition contained in the Section. This seems to be a highly disputed question of fact because Panchayat contends that construction of the questioned building started only in May, 1995 whereas the Act came into force on 23.4.1994. We do not think it proper to resolve the said controversy in these proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. 14. We quash Ext. P3 order and direct the Government to dispose of Ext. P1 petition afresh by treating it as an application filed under S.276(3) invoking revisional powers of the Government. Fresh orders on Ext. P1 shall be passed after affording a reasonable opportunity to both sides within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. We direct both sides to maintain status quo as on today until Government would pass orders on Ext. P1 petition. Writ appeal is disposed of as above. Issue photo copy on usual terms.