CHIDANANDA ULLAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment dated 21. 12. 1990 in S. C No. 115/88 passed by the xxii Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, whereby the appellants were convicted. The appellants were the accused before the Trial Court. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are as follows : Based on the charge-sheet filed by the COD, the learned XXII Additional City Civil and sessions Judge, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as 'sessions Judge' for convenience) had framed charges under Sections 3,4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Sections 304b, 498a and 306 read with Section 34 of IPC against the husband, father-in-law and the mother-in-law of the deceased, Kamalabai, who died on 23. 5. 1987 by committing suicide in the house of the appellants in Bangalore City. ( 3 ) THE prosecution case is that the deceased Kamalabai was the daughter of one Gundoji kupparao of Mulbagal, Kolar District (P. W. 3) and she was given in marriage to the first appellant/accused No. 1 working in a private factory in Peenya. The marriage was arranged by the brother-in-law of the deceased by name Krishnoji Rao, P. W. 6, of Bangalore. At the time of marriage talk a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was demanded in cash as dowry and it was settled at Rs. 5,000/- besides the said sum, gold ring, 'jumki' and watch were also decided to be given at the time of marriage. At the time of marriage invitation, a sum of Rs. 5,00 ()/- was given by the father of the deceased at Mahalakshmi Layout in Bangalore. The rest was agreed to be given at the time of marriage. ( 4 ) THAT after marriage, the deceased started living in the house of the appellants/accused situated at No. 6, 6th cross, Srikanteshwar Nagar, within the jurisdiction of Mahalakshmi Layout Police station, Bangalore. The deceased lived with the first appellant happily for about 4 months and thereafter the appellants/ accused started harassing the deceased demanding her to bring the balance sum of Rs. 5,000/- agreed to be given towards dowry. The deceased narrated the said demand to her father, P. W. 3, through her sister Chandrabai (P. W. . 4 ). The first appellant is stated to have written two letters to the father of the deceased in that connection. 5,000/- agreed to be given towards dowry. The deceased narrated the said demand to her father, P. W. 3, through her sister Chandrabai (P. W. . 4 ). The first appellant is stated to have written two letters to the father of the deceased in that connection. Thereafter, there was a 'panchayat' held in the house of the appellant/ accused persons, in which it was decided to pay the sum of Rs. 5,000/- within the next six months. It was so decided in the presence of Krishnoji rao, P. W. 6, and Venkoba Rao, P. W. 7; nevertheless the harassment to the deceased in the hands of the appellants/accused did not stop. The appellants/accused persons were ill-treating the deceased by not providing her with food. That on one occasion the appellants/accused had also been to the place of the father of the deceased to demand the said sum of Rs. 5,000/-, that the deceased was ill-treated, harassed for dowry demands and that the deceased doused her body with kerosene and Ft fire on herself and committed suicide on 23. 5. 1987 in the house of the appellants/ accused persons. The Mahalakshmi Layout Police had registered a case under sections 304b, 498a, 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. ( 5 ) THAT the Mahalakshmi Layout Police on filing the charge-sheet against the appellants/accused before the I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore City, they were committed to sessions to take trial before the Sessions Judge. The appellants/accused persons had admitted the marriage of the deceased Kamalabai with the appellant/accused No. 1 and further admitted the committal of suicide by the deceased in their house situated at Srikanteshwar Nagar, ( 6 ) THE Sessions Judge framed the charge as against the appellants/accused persons under sections 498a, 304b and 306 read with Section 34 of IPC and under Sections 3,4 and 6 of dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants/accused pleaded not guilty before the Sessions Judge, whereafter the Sessions Judge held the trial and passed the impugned judgment, whereby he held the appellants/accused guilty of the above offences. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing the accused on the sentence, sentenced the first appellant to 7 years rigorous imprisonment and sentenced the second and third appellants/accused each for 3 years rigorous imprisonment. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing the accused on the sentence, sentenced the first appellant to 7 years rigorous imprisonment and sentenced the second and third appellants/accused each for 3 years rigorous imprisonment. By taking into account the social and economic conditions of the accused persons, the learned sessions Judge had not imposed any fine the appellants/accused. The appellants/accused have preferred the instant appeal before mis Court challenging the conviction as well as the sentence on several grounds. While urging the said grounds therein, the learned Counsel for the appellants/ accused argued that the Sessions Judge had recorded the conviction mainly on the evidence of the father of the deceased Gundoji Kupparao P. W. 3 and Padmabai P. W 5. the mother of the deceased. He further pointed out that P. W. 4, Chandrabai/ the sister ot the deceased, did not support the prosecution, whereas Krishnoji Rao P. W. 6. who arranged the marriage being me brother-in-law of the deceased (son-in-law of P. W. 3) and another Venkoba rao P. W. 7, had turned to be hostile witnesses. He had further pointed out that P. W. 8 M. M. Muddaiah, the Circle Inspector and the Investigation Officer who had registered the case, P. W. 10 M. N. Nagendra, the Tahsildar, who held the inquest were the other witnesses examined by the prosecution. He further submitted that P. W. 9 is the Doctor who had conducted post mortem on the body of the deceased and that his evidence was of no bearing on the case since death of the deceased was by suicide was no longer in dispute and that the evidence of P. W. 11 Jaikishan, was for the limited purpose of proving that P. W. 3 father of the deceased had purchased certain jewels from his shop at Malur for the marriage of the deceased. That the last witness the prosecution had examined was P. W. 12 T. C. M. Sheriff, the Circle Inspector and the investigation Officer. The other two witnesses the prosecution had examined are: V. Gurumurthy p. W. 1 and one M. B. Kandahalli P. W. 2, the mahazar witnesses for the spot mahazar drawn by the Police and the inquest held by P. W. 10. The other two witnesses the prosecution had examined are: V. Gurumurthy p. W. 1 and one M. B. Kandahalli P. W. 2, the mahazar witnesses for the spot mahazar drawn by the Police and the inquest held by P. W. 10. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants/accused had contended that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove that the appellants-accused persons were ill-treating and harassing me deceased in connection with and on account of the dowry demands. He challenged the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the appellants/accused had treated the deceased in such cruelty so as to drive a woman of ordinary prudence to commit suicide. He pointed out that the evidence tendered by P. Ws. 3 and 5, the father and the mother respectively was the self-interested testimony and not to be relied upon. He had also pointed out that the evidence of P. W. 5 is not in corroboration of me evidence of P. W. 3, for according to him when P. W. 3 spoke the demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000,/- and settling the sum at Rs. 5,000/ -. P. W. 5, Padmavathi, the mother had deposed that me accused demanded Rs. 10. 000/- for meeting the marriage expenses and that they paid a sum of Rs. 5/000 /- in cash and out of the remaining sum of Rs. 5,000 /- they got prepared jumki, ear-rings and other jewels and in addition to mat they had also given ring, wrist watch and clothes and part of me marriage expenses also was made good by them. The learned Counsel for the appellants/accused in this context also pointed out that in the cross-examination of P. W. 5, she had admitted that she did not tell the Police that die appellants/accused demanded Rs. 10,000/- from them. He had specifically drawn my attention to the admission of P. W. 4, Chandra bai, the sister of the deceased-Kamalabai, that ear-rings, jumki, watch and ring were given by the second appellant/accused. Next the learned Counsel for the appellants/accused argued is that the prosecution had failed to produce the letters stated to have been written by the appellant/accused No. 1 to P. W. 3, the father of the deceased, wherein as claimed by P. W. 3 and p. W. 5 that the appellants/accused demanded the balance of the dowry amount or" Rs. Next the learned Counsel for the appellants/accused argued is that the prosecution had failed to produce the letters stated to have been written by the appellant/accused No. 1 to P. W. 3, the father of the deceased, wherein as claimed by P. W. 3 and p. W. 5 that the appellants/accused demanded the balance of the dowry amount or" Rs. 5,000/from them and in this context he further argued that non-production of the said letters was fatal to the case of the prosecution. ( 8 ) SUMMING up his argument, the learned Counsel for the appellants/accused submitted that the whole case of the prosecution is based on the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 5 and they being interested witnesses, the Court should weigh their evidence with great care and caution particularly when mere is no corroboration in their evidence. He had pointed out that of the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 5 is discarded there is no evidence worth the name to hold that the appellants/accused were harassing, much less harassing for demand of dowry from the parents of the deceased. According to him, the deceased was not interested in marrying the appellant/ accused No. 1 and that she was forced to marry the appellant/accused No. 1 by P. Ws. 3 and 5 and because of the same she had gone out of the house once without informing the appellants and that in that connection there was a quarrel in the house of the appellants/accused and that the deceased therefore, was unhappy in the house of the appellants/accused and because of that and out of frustration she might have committed suicide by dousing her body with kerosene and further setting herself on fire. He further prayed that the impugned judgment be set aside and the innocent appellants/accused be acquitted by absolving of the charge. He further prayed that the impugned judgment be set aside and the innocent appellants/accused be acquitted by absolving of the charge. He cited before the following decisions in support of his argument: III (1996) CCR 39 (SC), on the point mat only the actual receiving of dowry and the demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage, the offence is made out under Section 4 (1) of the Dowry Prohibition act, 1961 and that voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the bride-groom as the case may be of a traditional nature would not fall within the mischief of the expression 'dowry' made punishable under the Act. AIR1975 SC 216 , 1975 Crilj262 , (1975 )3 SCC752 , on the point that when the witnesses were relations of the deceased by itself does not make their evidence unreliable and the same puts the Court on the guard to scrutinise their evidence with more than ordinary care. 1990 Cr. LJ 407, on the point that it is not every harassment or every type of cruelty that would attract Section 498a and that it must be established that beating and harassment was with a view to force the wife to commit suicide or to fulfil illegal demands of husband and in-laws. AIR1978 SC 1091 , 1978 Crilj766 , (1978 )4 SCC161 , [1978 ]3 scr393 , on the point that in all criminal cases the proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be adduced and it is not necessary that it should be perfect and that the proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline and not a fetish so that guilty man cannot get away in the process. II (1993) DMC 96, on the point that mere quarrels or mere cruelty would not be sufficient to level a charge of cruelty within the meaning of the explanations to Section 498a and that the decree of the conduct of the husband must be such mat it would reasonable be expected of a wife to commit suicide. ( 9 ) THE learned Government Pleader while supporting the judgment of the learned Sessions judge had counter argued that the evidence on record shows that me accused were ill-treating and harassing the deceased to bring the balance of sum of Rs. ( 9 ) THE learned Government Pleader while supporting the judgment of the learned Sessions judge had counter argued that the evidence on record shows that me accused were ill-treating and harassing the deceased to bring the balance of sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards dowry on the ground that the dowry what was given to them earlier was insufficient. That the deceased committed suicide due to die unbearable harassment meted out to her and she died within seven months after her marriage with the appellant/accused No. 1 and she was very young being aged hardly about 19 years. He had taken me through the evidence on record particularly of P. Ws. 3 to 5. He further submitted that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the appellants/accused under sections 498a, 304b read with Section 34 of IPC and under Sections 3,4 and 6 of Dowry prohibition Act. According to him, there was no error in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge. He had further submitted that the Court should not be liberal when the offenders before it are facing dowry related charges bearing in mind the social purpose of legislation in Dowry Prohibition Act and the provisions in Sections 304-D and 498a of IPC to check the menace of social evil of dowry. He had also argued that the appellants/accused persons had taken inconsistent stand before the learned Sessions Judge during the course of trial. He had also cited before me the following decisions in support of his argument: 1993 SCC (Cr.) 655, on the point that in a prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence, the deceased sustained 90% burn injuries resulting in her death in place of her in-laws' house, the onus is on the inmates of the house to explain the circumstances leading to her death. 1994 SCC (Cr.) 107, on the point that in a criminal trial however intriguing may be the facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures and that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498a IPC and Section 113a of Indian Evidence Act. 1995 SCC (Cr.) 977, on the point that the defective investigation by the police cannot be a ground for acquitting the accused. 1979 Cr. LJ 1027, on the point that when there are omissions as to the vital facts, the same merit consideration, no matter that the statement given by the witnesses before the Police are meant to be brief statements. AIR1989 SC 378 , 1989 Crilj809 , 1989 (1 )Crimes173 (SC ), JT1988 (4 )SC 558 , 1988 (2 )SCALE1477 , (1989 )1 SCC244 , to the effect that the offence under sections 306 and 107 is made out if any person instigates any other person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation if the other person commits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished under Section 306 of the Penal Code for abetting the commission of suicide. 1995 SCC (Cr.) 36, on the point that the presumption of unnatural death of a married woman within 7 years of her marriage can be raised, if before her death she had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in connection with any demand of dowry. 1991 SCC (Cr.) 191, on the point that when the death had occurred within seven years of the marriage and that the deceased cremated hurriedly soon after the death without informing her father and brother, in the circumstances there arises a presumption under Section 113b of evidence Act and that essentials-of Section 304b is made out. ( 10 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the learned Government Pleader prayed that the impugned judgment of me learned Sessions Judge be confirmed by dismissing the appeal. ( 11 ) IN reply the learned Counsel for the appellants/accused submitted that the appellants/accused being the accused persons are entitled to take inconsistency stand or for that matter false stand and it is for the prosecution to prove every ingredient of the offences alleged against them and the burden is heavy on them to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, no matter the Dowry prohibition Act is a social piece of legislation. He had also pointed out that P. W. 5, the mother had stated in her cross-examination that she was not at all examined by the police and that me only eye witness for the so-called dowry payment of Rs. 5,000/- was P. W. 3 when P. Ws. He had also pointed out that P. W. 5, the mother had stated in her cross-examination that she was not at all examined by the police and that me only eye witness for the so-called dowry payment of Rs. 5,000/- was P. W. 3 when P. Ws. 6 and 7 have not turned hostile before the Trial Court. He, therefore, submitted that there is no material evidence on record to prove the guilt of the appellants/accused persons and therefore, he prayed that they be acquitted of the charges. ( 12 ) NOW the points for my consideration are as follows : (i) Whether the prosecution had proved the guilt of the appellants/ accused for the offence under sections 3,4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act? (ii) Whether the appellants/accused are guilty of the above offence under Sections 304b, 498a read with Section 34 of IPC ? (iii) Whether the conviction of the appellants/accused for the abovesaid offences by the learned sessions Judge can sustain ? i answer the points as follows : reg. Point No. (i) : It is not in dispute that Kamalabai, the deceased doused her body with kerosene and set fire in the house of the appellants/accused and committed suicide and that the death was within seven months from the date of her marriage with the appellant/accused No. 1. Before taking up of the rival contention and the evidence on record it is better to refer the respective provisions of law under which the appellants/accused are charged with. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter called 'dowry Act') defines the dowry as any property or valuable sums given or agreed to be given either by directly or indirectly. Section 2 of the Dowry act defines 'dowry' as follows: "2. Definition of "dowry"-In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to tine marriage or to any other person, at or before (or any time after the marriage) (in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include) dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation I- (x x x x x) explanation II-The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the indian Penal Code (45 of I860 ). " section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with the penalty for giving and taking dowry whereas Section 4 of the Dowry Act deals with the penalty for demanding dowry. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Dowry Act provides that wherein the dowry was received by any person or woman in connection with whose marriage that person was transferred it to the woman. If the dowry is received before marriage within three months and after received at the time of marriage within three months from the date of receipt or if the dowry is received when woman is a minor within one year or she has attained the age of 18 and pending such transfer shall hold it for the benefit of the woman. Whereas Sub-section (2) of Section 6 deals with the punishment for the violation of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Dowry Act. Sections 6 (1) and (2) of the Dowry Act reads as follows : "6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs- (1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman (a) if me dowry was received before marriage, within (three months) after the date of marriage; or (b) if the dowry was received at die time of or after the marriage, within; (three months) after the date of its receipt; or (c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, within one year after she has attained the age of eighteen years, and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman. (2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by Sub-section (1) within the time limit specified therefor [or as required by Sub-section (3)] he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years or with fine (which shall not be less than five thousand rupees, but which may extend to ten thousand rupees) or with both. " ( 13 ) IN me instant case in hand, the evidence on record is that at the time of marriage negotiation a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was alleged to have been demanded by the appellants/accused, and krishnoji Rao, P. W. 6 and Venkobarao, P. W. 7 were the Panchayathdars who negotiated and settled the dowry to a sum of Rs. 5/000/- in cash. The same is the version according to P. W. 3 in his evidence. But P. Ws. 6 and 7 turned hostile and never supported the prosecution. The further evidence of P. W. 3 was to the effect that me said Rs. 5,000/- agreed to be paid as dowry was paid at Mahalakshmi Layout at the time of marriage invitation. But it is not clear as to why that was paid at Mahalakshmi Layout and in whose presence it was paid, even P. W. 4 does not speak thereto. As a matter of fact, the evidence of P. W. 5 is that the appellants/accused asked for Rs. 10. 000/- for marriage expenses and they have paid Rs. 5,000/- in cash for marriage expenses and out of the balance they got prepared jumki, ear-ring and other jewels for the deceased in connection with the marriage. P. W. 5 further deposed that they also paid for marriage expenses. Both P. Ws. 3 and 5 were suggested in their cross-examination that neither cash nor jewels were given by them to the appellants/accused, but they have denied the said suggestion. It is clear from the above evidence of P. W. 3, the father and P. W. 5, the mother of the deceased that they have given contradictory versions as to the payment of dowry. When P. W. 3 deposed that sum of rs. 5,000/- was paid in cash as dowry at Mahalakshmi Layout, P. W. 5 the mother deposed that the said sum was paid towards marriage expenses. It is to be noted here that P. W. 5 never deposed that sum was paid as dowry at any time. In their further evidence, P. Ws, 3 and 5 deposed that they got readied the gold jewels in connection with the marriage of the deceased. P. W. 5 further deposed mat same was got prepared by P. W. 11. It is to be noted here that P. W. 5 never deposed that sum was paid as dowry at any time. In their further evidence, P. Ws, 3 and 5 deposed that they got readied the gold jewels in connection with the marriage of the deceased. P. W. 5 further deposed mat same was got prepared by P. W. 11. But P. W. 11, the jeweller stated in his evidence that he sold the said items including silver chain and they were all pledged to him by pawners as he was doing pawn business. He also stated in his evidence that he had not issued any receipt for me said sale but interestingly enough in the evidence of P. W. 3, he had stated that he had given the above jewels together with receipts thereto issued by P. W. 11 to the appellants/accused. As against all the above evidence of P. Ws. 3,5 and 11, P. W. 4, Chandrabai, the elder sister of the deceased in her evidence had deposed that jumki, ear-rings, watch and ring were given by the appellant/accused No. 2, nailing all that what P. Ws. 3,5 and 11 stated in their respective evidence with regard to the said jewels. ( 14 ) IN this context, it is pertinent to mention here that F. W. 6 is none other than the brother-in-law of the deceased and son-in-law of P. Ws. 3 and 5 and P. W. 7 is none other than the nephew of P. W. 6. But P. W. 6 despite being closed related to P. Ws. 3 and 5 never supported the prosecution, inspite of the fact that he negotiated the marriage, settled the dowry amount to be rs. 5. 000/- earlier to marriage and further settled the dispute regarding the dowry amount on 22. 5. 1987 by holding a panchayath in the house of the appellants/accused a day earlier to the death of the deceased Kamalabai, and further took P. W. 3 to Police Station to lodge complaint, ex. P. 4. It should not be forgotten that P. W. 6 was all through thick and thin right from the date of marriage negotiation of the deceased and till her death and the pursuant complaint, Ex. P. 4 by p. W. 3 before Police dated 23. 5. P. 4. It should not be forgotten that P. W. 6 was all through thick and thin right from the date of marriage negotiation of the deceased and till her death and the pursuant complaint, Ex. P. 4 by p. W. 3 before Police dated 23. 5. 1987 having accompanied P. W. 3 to the Police Station as deposed by P. W. 3 in his evidence. That being the relationship and the association between them, I do not find any good reason why such a man had not supported the prosecution. It appears to me that the same cannot be without any good reason. Another aspect of the case is that the P. W. 5, the mother of the deceased, in her evidence deposed that she never stated before the police that the appellants/accused persons demanded dowry for a sum of Rs. 10,000/-, obviously demand of dowry is not her version of the case at all, for according to her what was demanded was to meet the marriage expenses and on the negotiation the same was settled down at Rs. 5. 000/- from Rs. 10,000/- demanded. Therefore, I hold that the prosecution had failed to prove guilt of the appellant/accused that they demanded dowry and received the dowry and they were harassing the deceased on account of dowry demand and that they were guilty of the offence under Sections 3,4 and 6 of Dowry prohibition Act. Hence, my answer to the point No. (i) is in the negative. Reg. Point Nos. (ii) and (in) : The moot point is whether the appellants/ accused were guilty of the other offences under Sections 304b, 498a read with Section 34 of 1pc. Section 304b speaks of dowry death and punishment to the offence thereof and Section 498a speaks of the cruelty by husband and punishment for the said offence. Reg. Point Nos. (ii) and (in) : The moot point is whether the appellants/ accused were guilty of the other offences under Sections 304b, 498a read with Section 34 of 1pc. Section 304b speaks of dowry death and punishment to the offence thereof and Section 498a speaks of the cruelty by husband and punishment for the said offence. Sections 304b and 498a of IPC read as follows : "304-B. Dowry death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation-For the purposes of this sub-section "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. " "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty-Whoever, being the husband or die relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation-For the purposes of this Section, "cruelty" means (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing here or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is or on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. " when Section 304b defines as to what is the dowry death by a deeming provision, Section 498a refers the cruelty within the meaning of Explanations (a) and (b) thereunder. " when Section 304b defines as to what is the dowry death by a deeming provision, Section 498a refers the cruelty within the meaning of Explanations (a) and (b) thereunder. ( 15 ) TO prove the charge under Sections 304b and 498a of IPC the evidence on record in the instant case is evidence of P. Ws. 3,4 and 5. 1 have carefully gone through the evidence on record of these witnesses. The learned Sessions judge observed in the impugned judgment that the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 5 is supported by the evidence of P. W. 4,1 am not inclined to contribute to me said view of the learned Sessions Judge. The reason being that in the very inception in registering the case by the jurisdictional police at Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station, I do not find any straightforwardness and truthfulness of P. Ws. 3 and 4, probably the learned Sessions judge himself failed to take note of the same, for that matter even the learned Counsel for the appellants/accused missed to point out me same to Court. According to me there is total artificiality and suspicious circumstances in registering the very case as against the appellants/accused. The jurisdictional police is shown to have registered the case at about 3 p. m. on 23. 5. 1987 with a detailed report stated to have been filed by P. W. 3 but in the evidence of p. W. 3 he had stated that it was a Friday and that he was alone and that the appellant/accused no. 3 made him to stay on that day upto sunset but F. W. 4 took him to cinema and when he came out in the mid, the husband of P. W. 4, Manindra Rao came in an auto and told P. W. 3 that his daughter was done to death by throttling her neck and that he then went to see me dead body of his daughter. That it appeared to him that the deceased was throttled and done to death. That there was a kerosene tin present near the dead body, P. W. 6 Krishnoji Rao took him to police station and he gave Ex. P. 4 the complaint to the police. That it appeared to him that the deceased was throttled and done to death. That there was a kerosene tin present near the dead body, P. W. 6 Krishnoji Rao took him to police station and he gave Ex. P. 4 the complaint to the police. ( 16 ) THE evidence of P. W. 3 to the above effect reads as follows : xxx xxx xxx" ( 17 ) AS against the above evidence of P. W. 3, P. W. 4 had stated in her evidence that at about 8 p. m. P. Ws. 3 and 4 were returning to their house after witnessing the cinema. When they were so returning, her husband, Manindra Rao informed them that Kamala Bai (deceased) died, that she had been to see the dead body, that there was a kerosene tin near the dead body, that there was a mark in the neck and there was boils all over the body and that the reason for the death was not known. ( 18 ) THE evidence of P. W. 4 to the above reads as follows : "xxx xxx xxx" ( 19 ) THAT there is discrepancy as to the situation and point at which they both,. e. P. W. 3 and p. W. 4 came to know regarding the death of the deceased, for when P. W. 3 had deposed that manindra Rao told him about the death of Kamala Bai (deceased) when he came out of the cinema house in the middle, P. W. 4 stated that her husband Manindra Rao told her and P. W. 3 about the death of Kamala Bai when both of them were returning after witnessing the cinema at about 8 p. m. on that day but by this one thing is clear that they have come to know about the death of Kamalabai at about 8 p. m. on 23. 5. 1987, the day of death, of course was not a Friday as deposed by P. W. 3 but it was Saturday. If that was true, it is not at all possible to accept that p. W. 3 accompanied by Krishnoji Rao P. W. 6 had lodged the complaint at 3. 00 p. m. on that day. e. 23. 5. 1987 and further for P. Ws. If that was true, it is not at all possible to accept that p. W. 3 accompanied by Krishnoji Rao P. W. 6 had lodged the complaint at 3. 00 p. m. on that day. e. 23. 5. 1987 and further for P. Ws. 3 and 4 to see the dead body of the deceased, Kamalabai on that day after that hour because the dead body of the deceased Kamalabai, was removed to the victoria Hospital by P. W. 10, the Taluka Magistrate by holding the inquest, Ex. P. 2, between 3. 10 p. m. to 4. 00 p. m. on that day. e. 23. 5. 1987. Even in the evidence of P. W. 10 he had deposed that he had sent the body to the Victoria Hospital after the inquest as per Ex. P. 3. ( 20 ) FROM the above there is clear, firstly that there was no possibility for P. Ws. 3 and 4 to see the dead body of the deceased Kamala Bai, with throttling mark in the neck, boils all over the body and a kerosene tin near the dead body as deposed by them since the dead body of the deceased was removed to the Victoria Hospital by P. W. 10 in and around 4. 00 p. m. on that day after holding the inquest. Secondly and crucially that there was no possibility for P. W. 3 to lodge a complaint, Ex. P. 4 at about 3. 00 p. m. on 23. 5. 1987 roughly five hours earlier to his knowledge of the death of Kamalabai in and around 8. 00 p. m. on that day. The evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 that there were marks of throttling of the neck of the deceased is also belied by the evidence of p. W. 9, the doctor, who had stated in his evidence that there was no signs of the injuries on the neck and the neck bone was not fractured. ( 21 ) FROM the above, I am not left with any doubt that there is totally artificiality in the very registration of the case by Ex. P. 4, written complaint, as the same came into existence in the hand s of P. W. 3 five hours earlier to his coming to know the very incident of the death of the deceased Kamalaba. P. 4, written complaint, as the same came into existence in the hand s of P. W. 3 five hours earlier to his coming to know the very incident of the death of the deceased Kamalaba. ( 22 ) YET another situation that has to be mentioned here is that why the police had not produced the two crucial inland letters made over by P. W. 3 to the police wherein it is stated that the appellant/accused No. 1 demanded the remaining sum of the dowry amount of Rs. 5,000/ -. The non-production of the said two crucial inland letters by the prosecution, more so, when they were possessing the same, according to me, creats doubt in the prosecution case that the appellants/accused were harassing the deceased for dowry. ( 23 ) YET another aspect of me case is that if it was true that the day earlier to the death of the deceased Kamalabai, panchayath was held with regard to the settlement of dowry amount and everything thereto was settled with a happy note, in token of which all the accused persons, the deceased and P. W. 3 had witnessed the cinema as deposed by P. W. 3 in his evidence, it appears to me that there could not be dowry demand and harassment on that count for the deceased to commit suicide on very next day morning in the absence of the appellant/accused Nos. 1 and 2 and further when P. W. 3, father, was away at the house of P. W. 4. Here we have to remember what P. W. 3 had deposed in his evidence with regard to settlement of dispute on 22. 3. 1987 over a panchayath. He had deposed that P. W. 6 next day. e. 22. 5. 1987 brought 4 persons and held a panchayath, that the appellants/accused persons assured not to do anything, that on that day all have gone to cinema, that it was a Friday, that appellant/accused No. 3 told P. W. 3 to wait till her husband-appellant/accused No. 2 to return home and appellant/accused No. 3 retained P. W. 3 till evening To the above effect the evidence of P. W. 3 reads as follows: "xxx xxx xxx" ( 24 ) FROM me above it is clear that the dispute was once and for all settled between them and the relationship between the parties were quite cordial. If that is so why {lie deceased had taken one extreme step to put an end to her life by committing suicide on the very next day morning, is the intrigueing question unanswered. Under the said fact and circumstances, it appears to me, definitely not for demand of dowry or dowry harassment, but it should be something other than that. In almost similar situation in a reported case in 1993 Cr. LJ 134, the Division Bench of the calcutta High Court by applying me 'proximity test' under Section 113a of Evidence Act held that when harassment of wife for dowry demand was met and settled and when there is no evidence of any further demand and torture, suicide committed by wife thereafter within \vi months after the demand was met and settled, the probability of existence of nexus between cruelty and suicide suffered a set back and it is unsafe and unjust to invoke presumption of guilty against the accused under Section 306 of IPC. In the case in hand the time gap is less than 24 hours. ( 25 ) IN my considered view, the above decision applies in full force to the instant case. ( 26 ) THEREFORE, I am but to hold that the prosecution had failed to prove that die appellants/accused persons were guilty of me offences under Sections 304b and 498a read with section 34 of IPC. Hence I am further to hold that the impugned judgment and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge is liable to set aside. ( 27 ) HENCE, I answer the above Points (ii) and (iii) also in the negative. ( 28 ) NO doubt the deceased died unnatural death but that itself cannot be a ground to hold that the appellants/accused persons were guilty of the offences charged against them. I find missing links in good number in the case of the prosecution as it had been put up by them before the learned sessions Judge. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the benefit of doubt should always go to the accused persons, probably in the instant case in hand the appellants/accused deserve for the said benefit of doubt in full measure in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the benefit of doubt should always go to the accused persons, probably in the instant case in hand the appellants/accused deserve for the said benefit of doubt in full measure in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 29 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the instant appeal filed by the appellants/accused persons merit consideration and the same is liable to be allowed. ( 30 ) THEREFORE, the impugned judgment and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge dated 21. 12. 1990 in S. C-No. 115/1988 is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed.