Judgment Aftab Alam, J. 1. Whether gul (a powdry concoction, primarily of tobacco, consumed by rubbing against teeth)is covered by the definition of Cosmetic as contained in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940? A learned Single judge of this Court, answering this question in the affirmative, dismissed c. W. J. C. Nos.1257 and 1327 of 1987 (R) filed at the instance of the appellants in each of the two appeals by judgment and order dated March 23, 1989. 2. The sole appellant in L. P. A. No.48 of 1989 (R) [arising from C. W. J. C. No.1257/87 (R)] is engaged in the manufacture and sale of gul under the trade name gulab Marka Gul. Similarly the sole appellant in L. P. A. No.47/89 (R) [arising from C. W. J. C. No.1327/87 (R)] manufactures and sells gul under the trade name, a. R. Chand tara Marka Gul. By notices issued by the State Drug Controller, Bihar, Patna on 28-7-1987 each of the two appellants was intimated that the manufacture of gul/gudaku/dant Manjan (dentifrice)were required to obtain a cosmetic licence under the provisions of the drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (the Act hereinafter) and the Rules framed thereunder. The notices further asked them to make application for licence failing which legal action would be taken against them for being engaged in the manufacture of gul without licence. Both the appellants came to this Court in the aforesaid two writ petitions challenging the notices dated 28-7-1987 issued by the Drug Controller on the plea that gul was not cosmetic. A learned single Judge of this Court, however, found and held that gul was covered by the definition of cosmetic as provided in the Act and accordingly dismissed the writ petitions by judgment and order dated March 23, 1989. These two appeals are directed against this judgment. 3. The nature and composition of gul, the purpose of its use and the mode of its application have been described in the judgment and order coming under appeal in the following words: "the petitioners manufacture gul which has as its ingredients tobacco and tendu leaves ashes. It is not in dispute that the gul is applied by rubbing against the teeth. According to the petitioners, by so applying the gul, the consumer enjoys the narcotic effect of tobacco. It is not in dispute that the gul is applied by rubbing against the teeth. According to the petitioners, by so applying the gul, the consumer enjoys the narcotic effect of tobacco. It is also not dispute before me that incidentally the gul so rubbed has the effect of cleansing the teeth and protecting them. Annexure-A which is a certificate issued to the petitioner in CWJC No.1257/87 (R) by the assistant Registrar of trade marks under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 discloses that the manufacturers themselves claimed that the application of gul protects the teeth. This fact is mentioned in the registered trade mark itself learned Counsel for the petitioners did not dispute that the application of gul also cleanses the teeth and protects it, but submitted that the primary purpose for which gul is used is not for cleansing teeth or for use as dentifrice, but primarily it is used by persons who wish to quench their thirst for tobacco. According to the petitioners gul is used as tobacco or tobacco product, and can never be said to be cosmetic. On the other hand it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that gul manufactured by the petitioners is a cosmetic as defined in section 3 (aaa) of the Act. The main argument urged on behalf of the petitioners was that since gul was used only by those addicted to tobacco, not primarily for the purpose of cleansing teeth but primarily for the purpose of quenching their thirst for tobacco, it cannot be considered to be a cosmetic even if it had incidentally the effect of cleansing teeth and protecting them. It was submitted that in ordinary parlance gul was considered to be tobacco or a tobacco product and not a cosmetic or a dentifrice or a tooth powder. It was, therefore, submitted that even for the purpose of the act, it must be understood as in common parlance and must not be understood in a manner not ordinarily understood by those using the said product. " 4. At this stage it would be apposite to see what is meant by Cosmetic under the Act. It was, therefore, submitted that even for the purpose of the act, it must be understood as in common parlance and must not be understood in a manner not ordinarily understood by those using the said product. " 4. At this stage it would be apposite to see what is meant by Cosmetic under the Act. Sec.3 (aaa) of the act defines cosmetic as under: 3 (aaa) cosmetic means any article intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled or spread on or introduced into or otherwise applied to, the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance, and includes any article intended for use as a component of cosmetic. " (the italicised words indicate how the definition of cosmetic was broken down by the learned Judge for testing its applicability to gul) 5. Taking into consideration the definition of Cosmetic under Sec.3 (aaa) of the Act and relying upon a decision of the Orissa High Court in gopilal Agrawal V/s. State of Orissa and another, AIR 1973 Orissa 15 the learned judge held and observed as under: "it is not disputed that Gul is rubbed against the teeth, and it has the effect of cleansing the teeth, even though such effect is not primary but incidental effect. For the purpose of judging whether Gul is cosmetic within the meaning of the Act, the definition can be read after deleting unnecessary words as follows: cosmetic means any article intended to be rubbed or otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing or beautifying. . . . . "in the instant case, it is not disputed that Gul is rubbed against the teeth. Teeth is a part of the human body and rubbing such Gul against the teeth has the effect of cleansing it and thereby beautifying it. Obviously Gul satisfies the definition of cosmetic under the Act. It is, therefore, cosmetic within the meaning of the Act the fact that Gul may be classified as tobacco or tobacco product under any act such as the Sales Tax Act or the central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 is of no relevance while determining whether the manufacturer of Gul should take out a licence under the provisions of the Act. In the licensing provisions of the Act, there is no contextual compulsion to give it a different meaning. In the licensing provisions of the Act, there is no contextual compulsion to give it a different meaning. I am in respectful agreement with the decision of the Orissa High court reported in A. I. R.1973 Orissa 15 and hold that Gulab Marka Gul manufactured by petitioner C. WJ. C. No.1327/87 (R) and A. R. Chand Tara Marka Gul manufactured by petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.1257/87 (R) are "cosmetic" within the meaning of the Act. " 6. Referring, at this stage, to the orissa decision it may be noted that in gopilal Agarwals case (supra) a division Bench of the Orissa High court, dealing with the question whether Gudakhu (same article as gul though under a different regional name)was covered by the definition of cosmetic found that the Act provided a statutory definition for cosmetic and the article Gudaku satisfied all the elements of the definition and hence came within the meaning of cosmetic. The decision held and observed as under: "it is not disputed that Gudakhu is an article intended to be rubbed against human teeth. It is contended that it is not used for cleansing teeth but is used for its narcotic effect. The undisputed fact that it has narcotic effect does not detract from its being used for cleansing teeth. It is further contended that the word cleansing shall be construed ejusdem generis with the words succeeding such as beautifying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance. "different expressions have been used to convey different meanings. Gudakhu is used for cleansing teeth and the word cleansing need not carry the same meaning as the succeeding expressions. It may not whiten the teeth to the same extent as tooth paste and tooth powder do but all the same it cleanses the teeth. All the elements of the definitions are thus fulfilled. The language used by the Legislature is the true depository of the legislative intent. The plain meaning cannot be whittled down by taking into consideration the meaning of cosmetic, as used in common parlance. If there had been no statutory definition, the position might have been otherwise. " 7. All the elements of the definitions are thus fulfilled. The language used by the Legislature is the true depository of the legislative intent. The plain meaning cannot be whittled down by taking into consideration the meaning of cosmetic, as used in common parlance. If there had been no statutory definition, the position might have been otherwise. " 7. The Orissa decision, however, went on to notice that the Act and the rules framed thereunder did not prescribe any standard quality for gudaku and consequently held that those provisions of the Act and the rules which imposed penalty for infringement of standard quality could not be enforced against the manufacturers of Gudakhu, as long as standard quality for Gudakhu was not prescribed. The decision summed up the conclusions as under: " (i) Gudakhu is a cosmetic within the meaning of Sec.3 (aaa) of the Act. (ii) The petitioner cannot manufacture for sale or sell Gudakhu without taking a licence as required under the Act and the Rules, (iii) The provisions of the Act and the Rules prescribing penalty for infringement of standard quality of Gudakhu cannot be enforced against the petitioner until the standard quality is prescribed. " 8. From the passages quoted above (one from the judgment and order coming under appeal and the other from the Orissa decision) it is plain and clear that both the decisions are based on a literal interpretation of the definition clause. It is true that normally,the cardinal rule of construction of statute is to read statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning [jugal Kishore saraf V/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. , A. I. R.1955 SC 376]. It is, however, equally true that the rule of literal construction, like all other rules, has some excepions. In this case it needs to be examined where do the words used in the definition clause lead one if they are read and understood in their broad literal meaning. Do the conclusions to which one arrives by giving to those words their ordinary, natural and gramatical meaning truely reflect the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Act. 9. In this case it needs to be examined where do the words used in the definition clause lead one if they are read and understood in their broad literal meaning. Do the conclusions to which one arrives by giving to those words their ordinary, natural and gramatical meaning truely reflect the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Act. 9. However, before undertaking such an examination it may be pointed out that in the case of Gul another legitimate argument can be advanced to show that it is not covered by the definition of Cosmetic as provided under Sec.3 (aaa) of the Act. It can be contcnded that what was really meant by the word intended in the definition was not the intention regarding the mere application of the article to the human body but the intention to achieve cleansing, beautifying etc. as a result of such application. In other words, in order to qualify as cosmetic the article must be such which is applied to the human body for (that is to say, with the object of) cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness. In the case of gul though it is admittedly applied to teeth, the object of its application is not cleasing the teeth but to satisfy the urge for tobacco. Gul, therefore, does not qualify as cosmetic. If the contention is accepted well and good. In case, however, the contention is not accepted than as a consequence not only gul but tobacco, tendu leaves ashes and molasses (ingredients which are used for producing gul) would all fall within the definition of cosmetic by virtue of the inclusive clause at the end of the definition, and includes any article intended for use as a component of cosmetic; a rather incredible consequence. 10. Let us now examine some other articles in case of which even the aforesaid argument is not available, that is to say, articles which are applied to the human body with the sole object of cleansing the body or any part of the body. 10. Let us now examine some other articles in case of which even the aforesaid argument is not available, that is to say, articles which are applied to the human body with the sole object of cleansing the body or any part of the body. In case the words used to define cosmetic are to be read in their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning and not in the context of the ordinary acceptation of the word cosmetic which is the subject of definition then the first cosmetic that comes to mind is plain water which is used by every one almost every day for cleansing the body or a part of the body. Water being plentifully available in nature there is hardly any need to manufacture it but in case it is held to be cosmetic, as it would be on a literal reading of the definition and for the same reasons for which gul can be said to be a cosmetic, than all the Water boards and Corporations supplying water in towns and cities may find it obligatory to obtain licence for distributing water in terms of Sec.18 (c) of the Act which, in its relevant portions, is reproduced below: section 18. Prohibition of manufacture and sale of certain drugs - From such date as may be fixed by the slate Government by notification in the official gazette in this behalf, no person shall himself or by any other person on his behalf - (c) manufacture for sale or for distribution or sell, or stock or exhibit or offer for sale, or distribute any drug or cosmetic except under, and in accordance with the conditions of, a licence issued for such purpose under this chapter. 11. Passing on to some other articles one would find that by giving the words used in the definition their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning such other articles as towel, napkin, handkerchief, tissue paper, bath sponge, tooth-brush, comb etc. would also fall within the meaning of cosmetic for all these articles are rubbed against or applied to the human body or a part of the body for cleansing, beautifying etc. Now, the question that must be answered is whether it was the intention of the legislature to regulate and control the distribution of water and the manufacture and sale of the aforementioned articles as cosmetic under the provisions of the drugs and Cosmetics Act. Now, the question that must be answered is whether it was the intention of the legislature to regulate and control the distribution of water and the manufacture and sale of the aforementioned articles as cosmetic under the provisions of the drugs and Cosmetics Act. I find it impossible to answer in the affirmative. It must be realised that what is being defined in Sec.3 (aaa) is cosmetic and that is the context of the definition. The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary (1978 edition, 1982 reprint) gives the meaning of Cosmetic as follows:- cosmetic: Adj; Designed to beautify hair, skin or complexion; (of surgery etc.)improving or modifying the appearance. Noun-Cosmetic preparation. 12 The New Lexicon Websters dictionary of the English Language, deluxe Encyclopedic Edition gives the meaning of Cosmetic as follows: adj; Designed to beautify the complexion, eyes, hair, lips, nails etc. Noun; a preparation to enhance beauty, cleanse and improve the skin etc. 13. I find no reason to assume that the legislative intent was to define cosmetic in such wide terms as to practically make the ordinary meaning of the word irrelevant and to include in it many articles which by no stretch of imagination fit into the ordinary meaning of the word. I am, therefore, firmly of the opinion that in order to discern the correct legislative intent one must read the words used in the definition clause not in their broader meaning but in the context of the ordinary meaning of the word (that is, cosmetic) which is the subject of definition. I may here usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme court in Reserve Bank of India V/s. Peerless G. F. and I Co. Ltd. [air 1987 S. C.1023} wherein in paragraph 33 of the judgment it was observed as follows: "interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by Section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by Section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in tne context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the Sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what oach Section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the court construed the expression prize chit in Srinivasa and we find no reason to depart from the Courts construction. " 14. Having thus outlined the mode of construction which would be appropriate to correctly construe the definition of cosmetic as provided under section 3 (aaa) of the Act, it may be noted that the Section uses the words cleansing, beautifying, promotion attractiveness or altering the appearance to describe the desired result which the article (cosmetic) may produce on application to the human body or any part thereof. It may further be noted that the words beautifying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance, more or less correspond to the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word Cosmetic and it is only the word cleansing which tends to so enlarge the ambit and scope of the definition as to lead to the anomalous consequences as seen above. 15. It may further be noted that the words beautifying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance, more or less correspond to the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word Cosmetic and it is only the word cleansing which tends to so enlarge the ambit and scope of the definition as to lead to the anomalous consequences as seen above. 15. The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary (1978 Edition, 1982 reprint) defines cleanse as follows:- Cleanse: V/s. t. make clean, to purify, cure (leper etc.) 16 The New Lexicon Websters dictionary of the English Language gives the meaning of cleans as follows: cleanse: to make thoroughly clean, to cleanse a wound. 17. Now it is well known that the won, clean has a very wide variety of meanings and usages. I may further state here that though the Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition does not contain the word cleanse it states the following about the word clean. Clean: It is a very flexible adjective, however and is particularly dependent upon context. 18. Applying the same principle to the word cleanse too it becomes clear that this word has not been used in the definition clause in the sense of mere washing or wiping or mere removal of dirt or other impurities. The word cleansing used in Sec.3 (aaa), therefore, must take its colour from the ordinary meaning of the word cosmetic for defining which it has been used and must further take its colour from the other words (beautifying, promoting atractiveness or altering the appearance)with which it has been grouped together. The word cleansing in the definition clause of cosmetic has not been used in the sense of mere washing, wiping or removal of dirt etc. but is meant to connote a process related and incidental to beautifying the human body or any part thereof and indicates a stage preparatory to or a part of the beautification process. 19. I may here note that in the orissa case a submission was advanced that the word cleansing should be construed following the rule of ejusdem generis. The Court, however, did not accept the submission. With utmost respect, I am unable to follow the Orissa decision and in my view the definition of cosmetic can be correctly construed only by reading the word cleansing following the context of the definition and by limiting its meaning to make it one with the other words in the group. 20. The Court, however, did not accept the submission. With utmost respect, I am unable to follow the Orissa decision and in my view the definition of cosmetic can be correctly construed only by reading the word cleansing following the context of the definition and by limiting its meaning to make it one with the other words in the group. 20. The question of gul being cosmetic can be viewed from yet another angle. Sec.16 of the Act deals with standards of quality and in relation to cosmetic the relevant portion of the Section is as under: 16. Standards of quality - (1) For the purposes of this chapter, the expression "standard quality" means:- (b) in relation to a cosmetic, that the cosmetic complies with such standard as may be prescribed. Sec.17 (c) deals with misbranded cosmetics and Sec.18 prohibits manufacture and sale of certain drugs and cosmetics. Sections 6 (2), 12 and 33 of the Act empower the central Government to make Rules for giving effect to the provisions of the respective chapters containing the aforesaid Sections. Sec.38 provides that every rule made under the Act should be laid, as soon as may be, after it is made before each House of Parliament and the Rules so placed could be modified or annulled as directed by the house. 21 Rule 150-A of the Drugs and cosmetics Rules, 1945 is as under:- 150a: Standards of Cosmetics - Subject to the provisions of these rules, the standards for cosmetics shall be such as may be prescribed under Schedule s 22 Schedule s as it stood in 1987 at the time of the issuance of the impugned notices was in the following terms and prescribed the standards of quality only in respect of cosmetics listed in that Schedule: schedule s standards for cosmetics. Standards for cosmetics in finished form: The following cosmetics in finished form shall conform to the Indian Standards Specifications laid down from time to time by the Indian Standards Institution. 22_891_PatLJR1_1997.htm 23. It may be noted here that by g. S. R.731 (E) dated 23-8-1990 the following articles have been added to the schedule w. e. f.23- 8-1990 : 23_891_PatLJR1_1997.htm 24. The list of articles enumerated in Schedule s is clearly indicative of how the authorities who are to enforce the provisions of the Act have understood and applied the provisions keeping in view the intention of the legislature. 25. The list of articles enumerated in Schedule s is clearly indicative of how the authorities who are to enforce the provisions of the Act have understood and applied the provisions keeping in view the intention of the legislature. 25. It may be noted that there are certain articles listed under Schedule s which, in the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word, can be more appropriately described as Toiletries rather then cosmetics. However, the line between cosmetics and toiletries is quite thin and may sometimes get blurred. Therefore, there may not be any objection to those articles being included as cosmetics for the purposes of the Act though in the accepted meaning of the word they are toiletries. What is however worth noting that there is no attempt to include in the list anything which is not cosmetics/toiletries in the accepted meaning of word though it may qualify as cosmetic on a literal construction of the definition. 26. If I may point out here, even after the Orissa decision rendered about a quarter century ago no standard of quality has been prescribed for Gul or gudaku under Schedule s. In this regard it may also be noted that the drugs Controller (India) by his letter dated 19-5-1982 addressed to the Commissioner, food and Drugs Control Administration, Ahmedabad intimated that creamy snuff could be considered neither as Drug nor as cosmetic and as such it was not possible to exercise control over this article under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 27. I may here refer to two supreme Court decisions in which the rules and the statutory Forms were referred to for the construction of the definition given in the Act. In P. Kashilingam and others V/s. PS. G. College of Technology and others, A. I. R.1995 SC 1395 it was held that though the definition of private College given in the Act did not exclude a technical educational institution, the definition of college provided in the rules framed under the act made it clear that : technical educational institutions were excluded from the ambit of the Act. In paragraph 20 of the decision it was observed and held as under: "20. The Rules have been made in exercise of the power conferred by Sec.53 of the Act. In paragraph 20 of the decision it was observed and held as under: "20. The Rules have been made in exercise of the power conferred by Sec.53 of the Act. Under Sec.54 (2) of the Act every rule made under the Act is required to be placed on the table of both houses of the Legislature as soon as possible after it is made. It is accepted principle of statutory construction that "rules made under a statute are a legitimate aid to construction of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio" (See: Craies on Statute law, 7th Edition pp.157-158; Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. V/s. Gram Panchayat Pimpri Waghere, (1977) 1 SCR 306 , at p.317: ( AIR 1976 sc 2463 at p.2467 ). Rule 2 (b) aad Rule 2 (d) defining the expression "college" and "director" can, therefore, be taken into consideration as contemporanea expositio for construing the expression "private college" in Sec.2 (8) of the Act. Moreover, the Act and the Rules form part of a composite scheme. Many of the provisions of the Act can be put into operation only after the relevant provision or form is prescribed in the Rules. In the absence of the Rules the Act cannot be enforced. If it is held that Rules do not apply to technical educational institutions the provisions of the Act cannot be enforced in respect of such institutions. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that professional and technical educational institutions are excluded from the ambit of the act and the High Court has rightly taken the said view. Since we agree with the view of the High Court that professional and technical educational institutions are not covered by tne Act and the Rules, we do not consider it necessary to go into the question whether the provisions of the act fall within the ambit of Entry 25 of List iii and do not relate to Entry 66 of List I. " 28. In Pali Devi and others V/s. Chairman, Managing Committee and others, (1996) 3 SCC 296 , it was held with reference to the language employed in the statutory forms that Sec.20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act also includes an ex-employee. In paragraph 8 of the judgment it was observed and held as under: ". . . In Pali Devi and others V/s. Chairman, Managing Committee and others, (1996) 3 SCC 296 , it was held with reference to the language employed in the statutory forms that Sec.20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act also includes an ex-employee. In paragraph 8 of the judgment it was observed and held as under: ". . . Thus on account of the preponderance of authority, Sections 20 (2) and 2 (i) had to be read along with the rules and Form VI to lean in favour of the view that both past and present employees were entitled to move in the matter. Such would be a purposive approach, which would carry out the necessary intendment of the statute, for which the Rules and the Form lend a hand to carry out the objectives of the Act. The language employed therein, even though executive voiced, is more often than not, demonstrative of the legislative purpose. So viewed, the intendment of the statute is furthered if an ex-employee too is held entitled to seek relief under Sec.20 (2)of the Act. " 29. There is yet another reason to hold that gul is not a cosmetic. I feel that describing Gul as cosmetic would be strongly opposed to public policy. After all Gul is another form for the consumption of Tobacco, a highly toxic and addictive substance, and gravely injurious to human health. I think, it should be left for what it is an undesirable and unhealthy concoction of tobacco rather than give it the fency name of cosmetic and add to its advertisement potential. 30. For the reasons aforesaid. I am firmly of the view that Gul is not cosmetic within the meaning of Sec.3 (aaa) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. I would, therefore, set aside the judgment and order coming under appeal, allow the writ petitions and quash the impugned notices dated 28-7-1987 issued by the State Drugs Controller, Bihar, Patna. In the result, the two appeals are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal Allowed.