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1996 DIGILAW 713 (PAT)

Raghunath Prasad Singh v. State Of Bihar

1996-10-17

N.PANDEY

body1996
Judgment 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the resolution of the Bihar State Electricity Board dated 21.10.1992. contained in Annexure 10 to the amendment petition whereby the petitioner has been punished with an order of dismissal from service of the Board and further he will not be paid any amount other than subsistence allowance for the period he was under suspension nor the period of suspension will be treated as on duty for the purpose of salary. 2. It would be relevant to mention, initially this writ petition was filed for quashing the order of suspension including the main departmental proceeding. 3. It appears, at the relevant time, the petitioner while serving the Board as Junior Engineer, Mithila Area Electricity Board, Darbhanga, was arrested by the Police in connection with Bengabad P.S. Case No. 84 dated 6.9.1981, registered under sections 379, 414 and 411 I.P.C. Therefore, the Board vide office order No. 285 dated 22.1.1992, placed the petitioner under suspension under the provisions of Rule 99 of the Bihar Service Code. 4. Subsequently, on 5.6.1992, basically two charges were framed (i) on the ground of initiation of the criminal case and other (ii) that the alleged offence was a misconduct on the part of the petitioner. During the pendency of the inquiry, criminal trial for the alleged offence under sections 379, 414 and 411 I.P.C. was carried out and ultimately by judgment dated 25.3.1994, passed by the Judicia Magistrate, 1st Class, Giridih, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges. Photostat copy of the judgment is annexure 4 to the writ petition. 5. The Conducting Officer, however, after close of the inquiry by his report dated 23.3.1995, held the petitioner guilty of the charges for which practically the petitioner had got acquittal from the criminal court. 6. The petitioner thereafter, was given second show cause notice by the Board vide its resolution dated 27.6.1995. But at that stage also it was not noticed that the petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charges by the Criminal court. Ultimately, by the impugned order, which I have already noticed, the petitioner was dismissed from service. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that Inquiring officer as well as Disciplinary authority have wrongly come to a conclusion that petitioner was involved in a criminal case, therefore, entitled for a severe punishment. Ultimately, by the impugned order, which I have already noticed, the petitioner was dismissed from service. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that Inquiring officer as well as Disciplinary authority have wrongly come to a conclusion that petitioner was involved in a criminal case, therefore, entitled for a severe punishment. He contended admittedly, by judgment of the competent criminal court the petitioner was granted clean acquittal on 25.3.1994 itself. The court had also held that the prosecution failed to prove the offence levelled against the petitioner. Therefore, it was not proper either for the Inquiring Officer or the respondent Board to take into account the alleged allegation on the basis of which the criminal case in question was started. 8. There cannot be any dispute that even with regard to the alleged offence for which a criminal case was started, the disciplinary authority can proceed against such a delinquent regarding his alleged misconduct in a departmental proceeding. This also cannot be denied that acquittal in a criminal case would not entitle a delinquent for automatic exoneration of the charges in a departmental poroceed-ing. But certainly, in a case where a delinquent is granted clean acquittal, the disciplinary authority will have to assign reasons while holding the delinquent guilty for the same charge in a departmental proceeding. In other words, suppose, the same set of witness and documents are examined by the criminal court as well as the Inquiring Officer making a different statement, naturally the disciplinary authority will have to be cautious and vigilant while holding a delinquent guilty on the basis of the evidence of such witnesses. 9. That apart, the Inquiring Officer as well as the disciplinary authority have completely failed to take notice of the findings of the criminal court granting acquittal to the petitioner, holding that prosecution failed to establish its charges. In that view of the matter, I will have no option but to remit the case back to the disciplinary authority to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made above. 10. Learned counsel further contended that since in relation to the same charges, after holding a detailed inquiry, the criminal court had acquitted the petitioner, therefore, it was essential for the Inquiring Officer to take into consideration all the relevant materials placed before him at the time of the inquiry. 10. Learned counsel further contended that since in relation to the same charges, after holding a detailed inquiry, the criminal court had acquitted the petitioner, therefore, it was essential for the Inquiring Officer to take into consideration all the relevant materials placed before him at the time of the inquiry. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another V/s. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 . 11. Apart from the aforesaid grievance it was also contended by the learned counsel that penalty of dismissal as imposed by the respondent Board is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. It is well known that penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct otherwise it may be violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. Reliance in this regard can be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhagat Ram V/s. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1983 SC 454 . Similar was the view taken by a learned single Judge of this court in the case of Surya Nath Singh V/s. Chairman & M D M/s B.B. U. Nigam Ltd. & others, 1995(2) PLJR 421. A reference can also be made yet to another decision of this court in the case of Ram Bilas Mandal V/s. The State of Bihar & others, 1995(2) PLJR 805. 12. Undisputedly, the legal position as to the power of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the penalty awarded in a disciplinary proceeding is well settled. The High Court generally should not interfere with the order of penalty where the same has been awarded after inquiry in accordance with law and on following the principles of natural justice, except on the ground of mala fide. But where the penalty in the background of the facts of the particular case, appears excessive, harsh or disproportionate to the misconduct, the court can direct the authorities to reconsider the quantum of punishment. However, since the present case is remanded back for reconsideration, on the points indicated above, therefore, in case on such consideration, if occasion arises to impose punishment, naturally the respondents would bear in mind that punishment imposed should not be excessive, harsh or disproportionate to the misconduct. 13. However, since the present case is remanded back for reconsideration, on the points indicated above, therefore, in case on such consideration, if occasion arises to impose punishment, naturally the respondents would bear in mind that punishment imposed should not be excessive, harsh or disproportionate to the misconduct. 13. For the reasons stated above, this writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above and the impugned order is hereby quashed. But the claim of the parties for payment of salary etc. will depend on the final decision of the Respondent Board in terms of the provisions of Section 97 of the Bihar Service Code.