TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) A short but interesting question of law falls for determination in these writ petitions. The question and so also the answer to the same turns on a true and correct interpretation of regulation 30. 05 of the Karnataka Electricity Supply regulations 1988, which empowers the Board to recover interest on belated payments. The Regulation reads thus:"levy of interest. In case of any belated payment, simple interest will be levied at the rate of 2% per month or part thereof from the expiry of due date, subject to a minimum of Rs. 1/- for L. T. installations and Rs. 100/- for h. T. installations". ( 2 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it is argued that the Regulation envisages payment of interest at the rate of 2% per month or 'part thereof, which words according to the petitioner imply that if the delay in the payment of the electricity charges is less than a month then interest at the prescribed rate is recoverable only for the period of actual delay and not for a completed month. Reliance in support is placed on Sakthi Sugars Limited v assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Central assessment Circle-1, Coimbatore and Others; (2) Brooke Bond india Limited v Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, lucknow and Another, (3) Lamina Suspension Products (P) limited v State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (4) State of tamil Nadu v P. T. C. Sanghvi and Company and Others. ( 3 ) MR. Narasimha Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-Board on the other hand argued that regulation 30. 05 framed by the respondent-Board in exercise of the powers vested in it under Section 79-J of the Electricity supply Act, 1948 only stipulates the conditions subject to which the Board would supply energy to the consumers. Supply of electricity, argued the learned Counsel, was tantamount to supply and sale of goods and any stipulation in the Regulations no matter statutory in flavour ought to be viewed only as one of the conditions subject to which such sale and supply is made. Supply of electricity, argued the learned Counsel, was tantamount to supply and sale of goods and any stipulation in the Regulations no matter statutory in flavour ought to be viewed only as one of the conditions subject to which such sale and supply is made. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in khazan Chand and Others v State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, in support of his submission that a party committing default in the payment of an amount which it was bound to pay whether on account of tax or otherwise was not entitled to complain of harshness in the provisions enacted to discourage such non-payment or to ensure prompt remittance. He contended that the provisions of Regulation 30. 05 have been in existence for a long time and have been understood not only by the Board but even by the consumers at large to be permitting recovery of interest on delayed payments at the prescribed rate of 2% p. m. not only for every completed month of default but also part of a month as a full month for purposes of such recovery. ( 4 ) I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made at the Bar. The crucial expression in the Regulation is "simple interest will be levied at the rate of 2% p. m. , or part thereof from the expiry of the due date". Regulation 30. 3 of the regulations provides that the Bill amount must be paid by the consumer within 15 days from the date of presentation thereof. The amount remaining unpaid would therefore attract the prescribed rate of interest from the date of expiry of the said period of 15 days. Now the expression "2% p. m. or part thereof can be broken into two namely "2% p. m. " and "part thereof. The words 2% p. m. , signify that for every 100 rupees remaining unpaid the Board would charge Rs. 2/- by way of interest for each month's delay. In other words for every thirty days of delay the Board would be entitled to charge Rs. 2/- on every hundred rupees remaining unpaid. It is thus obvious that "2% p. m. " provides a measure by reference to which the interest payable to the Board on the amount outstanding is calculable. In other words for every thirty days of delay the Board would be entitled to charge Rs. 2/- on every hundred rupees remaining unpaid. It is thus obvious that "2% p. m. " provides a measure by reference to which the interest payable to the Board on the amount outstanding is calculable. In the process of any such calculation the amount outstanding may be a precise multiple of hundred or it may be an odd figure. Similarly the period for which the amount has remained outstanding may be an exact multiple of a month or may be an odd figure. In either eventuality the interest payable to the Board at 2% p. m. , would be calculated for the exact amount outstanding and for the precise period for which the payment was delayed. Just because the delay in the payment of the amount is less than a complete month would not either justify exclusion of that part of the period nor would it justify charging of interest for the period beyond the actual delay only to make the charge equivalent to a month. Let us test this by taking a hypothetical case where the consumer has delayed an amount of Rs. 750/- for a period of six months and fifteen days. Now it is obvious that the amount due and the period for which it remained unpaid are both odd in the sense that the former is not an exact multiple of 100 and the latter not an exact multiple of a month. Calculation of simple interest at the rate of 2% p. m. on the above amount, would be possible not only for the exact amount but also for the exact period for which the delay has occurred; by applying the simple interest calculating formula i. e. , When so calculated vt the interest payable to the Board is It is thus obvious that the expression 2% p. m. is complete in itself to make calculation of interest for any amount for any period exact to the actual number of years, months and days possible. It is not as though it would be impossible or even difficult to calculate interest for any period less than a month so as to make the use of the expression "or part thereof necessary. It is not as though it would be impossible or even difficult to calculate interest for any period less than a month so as to make the use of the expression "or part thereof necessary. Even in the absence of the said expression, it is possible to calculate interest for the exact period for which the delay has taken place. ( 5 ) THE interpretation suggested by the petitioner that the use of the words "or part thereof only mean that if the delay is less than a month then the interest amount calculated should be only for the actual delay and not a complete month if accepted would render the said expression a total surplusage. That is so because, even in the absence of the said expression, interest would be chargeable for the exact period of delay and not the whole month. Any such interpretation has therefore to be eschew for it is an elementary rule of construction that the legislature and even a body exercising subordinate legislative functions does not waste words while enacting the laws. Each word and expression, it is presumed, is meant to serve a purpose and an interpretation which may render any word or expression redundant or superfluous must be avoided. When viewed thus the expression "or part thereof used in the Regulation can only mean that not only shall the Board, be entitled to interest at the rate of 2% for every completed month of delay but even for a delay of a part only of a month also the interest chargeable would be 2%. Stated differently the Board is entitled to claim Rs. 2/- for every one hundred rupees unpaid for each months delay and for a delay of a part only of a month also. This is how the Regulations appears to have been understood not only by the Board but even by the consumers at large for it is not in dispute that till the filing of the present petition none of the consumers has at any stage questioned the Board's right to recover interest for a full month even when the delay in making the payment of the charges was only for part only of a month. Even the petitioner has been over the years accepting that interpretation and making payments of interest for the full month even when the delay was less than a month. Even the petitioner has been over the years accepting that interpretation and making payments of interest for the full month even when the delay was less than a month. The Regulation it is apparent stipulated a condition governing the supply of goods to the consumers and is therefore different from the provision contained in a Taxing Statute where the Court may be required to take a view more indulgent towards the tax payer if two interpretations are possible. ( 6 ) THAT apart there is nothing unconscionable in the Regulation providing for payment of interest for the full month although the delay is only for a part thereof. Once the consumer fails to remit the amount within the time prescribed, it is open to him to withhold the payment till the end of the month and remit the same before the beginning of the next month. That is so because even if he makes the payment in the middle of the month his liability to pay interest for the whole month would remain unaffected. ( 7 ) RELIANCE upon the judgments referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not in my opinion, lend any assistance to his case. In all the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner the Court was considering the question of payment of interest and/or penalty under the provisions of the Sales Tax act, where the Courts are entitled to adopt an interpretation more beneficial to the subject, if two views are otherwise possible. I am conscious of the fact that the view taken in those decisions does not proceed on that logic, but, the only basis on which they can be distinguished is that the cases dealt with by them arose out of taxing Statutes. If that distinction be not sound enough as even I am inclined to believe I regret my inability to subscribe to the view taken in the same and that I do with utmost respect to the honourable Judges who decided those cases. ( 8 ) IN the result I hold that the respondent-Board is entitled to recover interest at the prescribed rate of 2% for not only every completed month of delay but also for every part thereof as though the part too was a complete month. ( 8 ) IN the result I hold that the respondent-Board is entitled to recover interest at the prescribed rate of 2% for not only every completed month of delay but also for every part thereof as though the part too was a complete month. There is no merit in this petition which fails and is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any orders as to costs. --- *** --- .