Suleman v. Prescribed Authority/IVth Addl. Civil Judge, Lucknow
1996-06-18
S.P.SRIVASTAVA
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : S.P. Srivastava 1. HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner feels aggrieved by an order passed by the Prescribed Authority in the proceedings under section 23 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, where under the objections filed by the petitioner to his ejectment in execution of an order of release granted by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 (1) of the aforesaid Act which order was affirmed in appeal vide appellate order dated 10th January, 1996, have been rejected. 2. THE proceedings seeking release of the accommodation in dispute had been initiated by Ishtiaq All Siddiqul against Smt. Bismillah Begum. THE claim of the landlord was that Ahmad Hussain, the husband of Smt. Bismillah Begum was the sole tenant of the premises in dispute. Smt. Bismillah is the aunt of the present petitioner. A plea was raised by Smt. Bismillah Begum that the premises in dispute had been let out originally to Tasadduq Hussain, the father of the petitioner. THE Prescribed Authority, however, found that the premises in dispute had in fact been let out to Ahmad Hussain, husband of Smt. Bismillah Begum and he was the sole tenant of the premises in dispute. It was also found that after the death of Ahmad Hussain and Tassaduq Hussain, Smt. Bismillah Begum allowed the petitioner to occupy the premises in dispute. In the circumstances, therefore, the status of Suleman in the building in dispute was held to be only akin to a licensee of Smt. Bismillah Begum and permissive in nature. It may be noticed that although the application seeking release of the accommodation in dispute had been filed in the year 1989 and as observed by the Prescribed Authority, it was Suleman, the petitioner himself who was doing the pairvi of the case on behalf of Smt. Bismillah Begum who had executed a power of attorney in his favour, and was attending the case on various dates fixed therein, the application setting forth a claim of joint tenancy was filed by Suleman, at quite a late stage. As noticed by the Prescribed Authority, with a mala fide intention of delaying the proceedings of the case, Suleman moved an application seeking his impleadment in the case in the year 1993 asserting that Tassaduq Hussain and Ahmad Hussain were tenants who were running the business in the shop in question.
As noticed by the Prescribed Authority, with a mala fide intention of delaying the proceedings of the case, Suleman moved an application seeking his impleadment in the case in the year 1993 asserting that Tassaduq Hussain and Ahmad Hussain were tenants who were running the business in the shop in question. This application was dismissed on 15.2.1993, and this order ultimately became final. This obviously shows that he was found to be neither necessary nor proper party in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. 3. THE Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority in their judgment and orders in the proceedings under Section 21 (1) of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972 concurrently found that Tassaduq Hussain was never the tenant of the premises in dispute and Suleman could not be deemed to be a joint tenant as claimed. THE appellate authority in its judgment and order dated 10th January, 1996 also observed that considering the facts and circumstances brought on record, there was no justification for interfering in the order passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting the application filed by Suleman seeking impleadment in the case. THE Prescribed Authority in its impugned order dated 10.6.1996 has also found that Suleman could not be held to be a tenant of the premises in dispute and his possession was not in his independent right but with the consent and permission of Smt. Bismillah Begum. 4. CONSIDERING the findings recorded in the proceedings under Section 21 (1) of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 referred to above as well as in the order dated 10.6.96 passed by Prescribed Authority in the proceedings under Section 23 of the aforesaid Act which findings do not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify an interference therein while exercising the extraordinary Jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this writ petition is clearly devoid of merits. Learned counsel for petitioner has urged that Suleman has filed a suit in the Court of Munsif South Lucknow, which has been registered as O. S. No. 257 of 1994 in which the landlord as well as Smt. Bismillah Begum had been Impleaded as defendants besides other persons.
Learned counsel for petitioner has urged that Suleman has filed a suit in the Court of Munsif South Lucknow, which has been registered as O. S. No. 257 of 1994 in which the landlord as well as Smt. Bismillah Begum had been Impleaded as defendants besides other persons. This is a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in regard to the status of the petitioner which is claimed to be that of a tenant in respect of the premises in dispute, seeking to restrain the landlord from evicting the tenant without taking legal action through court of law. The trial court in that case has granted a temporary injunction indicating that the plaintiff should not be dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law. The Prescribed Authority in its impugned order has considered the implications arising under the aforesaid impugned order and has come to the conclusion that the said interim order could not be treated to be an impediment in the ejectment of the petitioner in the proceedings for executing its order of release in question. In the aforesaid connection, it may be observed that Section 37 of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972 clearly provides that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under that Act shall be called in question in any court and that where an order purports to have been made and signed by any authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under the said Act, a court shall unless the contrary is proved, presume that such order was so made by that authority. 5. PROVISIONS contained in Section 38 of the aforesaid Act further provide that provisions of the said Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 6. FROM the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the civil court in the matters in regard to the enforceability of the orders passed by the competent authority as provided for under the provisions of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 is of a very limited nature and in fact should be treated to be confined to only those cases where it can be established that the order is a nullity having been passed without jurisdiction or In excess of the jurisdiction.
However, once the order is passed by the competent authority in exercise of the jurisdiction contemplated under the provisions of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972 after taking into consideration, the evidence and the materials on the record in that case, the civil court could not be deemed to be competent to pass any such order, assuming any purported jurisdiction, which has the effect of interfering with the findings recorded by such an authority. It is not open to the civil court to go into the question of the correctness or the propriety of such findings which are recorded on an appraisal of evidence in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction secured in favour of the competent authority under the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Building and Eviction) Act, 1972. In any view of the matter on the facts and circumstances as brought on record, I do not find the present one to be a fit case for the intervention of equity. 7. IN view of my conclusions indicated hereinabove, no justifiable ground is made out for any interference in the Impugned order. Consequently this writ petition falls and is hereby dismissed. 8. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, sought for in indulgence of the court asserting that he will be forcibly evicted from the premises in dispute which is being utilised for business purposes and some reasonable time be allowed to vacate the premises and shift. M. A. Faridi, learned counsel for landlord respondent is present and he has been heard in this matter. 9. CONSIDERING the totality of the circumstances, it is directed that the petitioner shall not be evicted from the premises in dispute on the basis of the impugned order till 30th July, 1996 provided he deposits the entire arrears of rent due in respect of the accommodation In dispute and deposits in advance the rent for the months of June and July, 1996 within two weeks before Prescribed Authority, the respondent No. 1. In the event of default, the order of eviction shall become executable without any reference to this court.