JUDGMENT A. R. TIWARI, J. - To tax or not to tax is the common question once again in these cases which are heard as connected matters and are being disposed of by this common order. And the question revolves round the interpretation of the Notification No. F-A-3-13/78(3)V.ST. dated October 1, 1978 (annexure "D" in Misc. Petition No. 277 of 1990), issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers under section 12 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (2 of 1959) (for short "the Act") exempting "handloom and powerloom weavers", as class of dealers from the operation of the provisions of sections 4 and 7 of the Act, for the period from October 1, 1978 to March 31, 1982 and as continued further. 2. Interpretative exercise demands proper appreciation as to whether letter and spirit of the notification are in any way different ? New Testament II Corinthians III, 6 conveys that "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life". The assessees pray that addition of words like "per se" on imaginary basis be disapproved so as to assess the life of the notification and to avoid its mortality. 3. Factual matrix is in a narrow compass. The State Government issued the notification under section 12(1)(ii) of the Act and granted immunity to specified weavers from payment of sales tax. Sales Tax Commissioner issued Letter No. VIK/EK/338/24(b)72/13 dated May 4, 1979 (annexure "F" in Misc. Petition No. 1453 of 1989) to authorities under him that in the face of notification dated October 1, 1978, as noted above, liability to pay entry tax, under the Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976 (52 of 1976) (for short, "the Adhiniyam") ceases ipso facto in terms of section 3 of the Adhiniyam on exemption from payment of sales tax and as such no separate notification under section 10 of the Adhiniyam was issued. The inbred question is whether entry tax is still leviable. 4. As regards Misc. Civil Case No. 373 of 1991, the Tribunal (Board of Revenue) held on December 12, 1988 in Appeal No. 382-PBR/85 that notification covered only a "weaver" per se and not the applicant-assessee which manufactured cloth on powerlooms on import of raw material like yarn from outside the local area of place of manufacture by engaging and employing weavers for that purpose. On application under section 44(1) of the Act, registered as Reference No. 4-1 of 1989 of the applicant, the Tribunal stated the case and referred the undernoted question on June 25, 1990 for our opinion : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Tribunal was right in law in holding that the expression 'weaver' in the Separate Revenue Department's Notification No. A-3-13-78(3)-V-ST dated October 1, 1978 is meant to cover a weaver per se only, etc. ?" 5. As regards Misc. Petition No. 1453 of 1989, the petitioner in Revision No. 127/89/Entry Tax before respondent No. 2 (Additional Deputy Commissioner) on July 29, 1989 (annexure "H") on interpretation failed and filed this writ petition under article 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari to quash the revisional order (annexure "H"). And as regards Misc. Petition No. 277 of 1990, the petitioner No. 1 litigating through petitioner No. 2 suffered adverse order in Revision No. 39/R/E/88/Entry Tax before respondent No. 2 (Additional Commissioner) on June 30, 1989 on the same basis (annexure "G-1"), and filed this writ petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari to quash the revisional order (annexure "G-1"), the order of assessment dated November 25, 1988 for the period July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986, in terms of Notification No. A-3-13-1985(17)ST-V, dated April 8, 1985 (annexure "E") for the period April 1, 1985 to March 31, 1988, and for issuance of direction declaring that the petitioner No. 1 was still a weaver eligible and entitled to receive the benefit of exemption under notification annexure "E". 6. Respondents have filed returns in these two writ petitions in oppugnation and contended that the applicant and petitioners, being not weavers per se and being imprimis manufacturers of cloth, were not covered by the aforesaid notifications (annexures "D" and "E" as noted above). 7. We have heard Shri G. M. Chaphekar, Senior Counsel for the applicant in Misc. Civil Case No. 373 of 1991 and for the petitioner in Misc. Petition No. 1453 of 1989. We have also heard Shri Choudhary for the petitioners in Misc. Petition No. 277 of 1990. We have heard Shri Bhargava, Additional Advocate General for the non-applicant and respondents in these cases. Shri Chaphekar has placed reliance on AIR 1970 SC 755 (Hansraj Gordhandas v. H. H. Dave. Petition No. 1453 of 1989. We have also heard Shri Choudhary for the petitioners in Misc. Petition No. 277 of 1990. We have heard Shri Bhargava, Additional Advocate General for the non-applicant and respondents in these cases. Shri Chaphekar has placed reliance on AIR 1970 SC 755 (Hansraj Gordhandas v. H. H. Dave. Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Surat), [1991] 80 STC 138 (SC) (State of Madhya Pradesh v. G. S. Dall and Flour Mills), [1980] 46 STC 429 (MP) (Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Phoolchand Onkarlal), [1989] 73 STC 252 (Raj) (Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, Ajmer v. Shanker Namkin Bhandar), [1978] 41 STC 409 (SC) (Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax) and statute part of [1979] 43 STC at page 58 in support of his contentions that (i) object is to be seen, (ii) notification is to be looked into, (iii) it is not necessary to do the act personally i.e., by themselves, and (iv) assessees do fall in the "class" of dealers exempted under the notifications, Shri Choudhary has adopted the arguments. These contentions are dubbed as non-meritorious and submission is that object is to give relief to those who "weave" themselves and are such dealers, i.e., small dealers so as to enable them to compete with big dealers and to be able to earn their livelihood. 8. The undisputed position is that the non-applicant and the respondents have not levied any sales tax from these assessees. 9. The core question, requiring answer, is whether the aforesaid notifications are restrictive in nature and are applicable only to handloom and powerloom weavers per se as class of dealers or are wide enough to confer exemption also on those who manufacture cloth by import of raw material, i.e., yarn from outside the place of manufacture via handlooms and powerlooms by engaging and employing weavers. To put it differently, can it be said that such manufacturers are not weavers within the contemplation of notifications in question ? 10. Section 12(1) of the Act, as substituted with effect from October 1, 1978 vide Act No. 25 of 1978, captioned as Saving, provides as under : "12. Saving. To put it differently, can it be said that such manufacturers are not weavers within the contemplation of notifications in question ? 10. Section 12(1) of the Act, as substituted with effect from October 1, 1978 vide Act No. 25 of 1978, captioned as Saving, provides as under : "12. Saving. - (1) The State Government may, by notification and subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified therein, exempt whether prospectively or retrospectively, in whole or in part - (i) any class of dealers or any goods or class of goods from the payment of tax under this Act for such period as may be specified in the notification; (ii) any dealer or class of dealers from any provisions of the Act for such period as may be specified in the notification." 11. Luculently, exemption is to "class of dealers" from stated (sections 4 and 7) provisions of the Act in terms of section 12(l)(ii) of the Act and not to "any goods" or "class of goods" in terms of section 12(l)(i) of the Act as extracted above. 12. It is not disputed before us that if assessees are held immune from the payment of sales tax under section 4 (Incidence of taxation) and section 7 (Levy of purchase tax) of the Act on the strength of notifications issued under section 12 of the Act, and thus, are held covered by these notifications, then they would not be liable to pay entry tax on raw material brought in the area despite non-issuance of separate notification under section 10 of Adhiniyam in view of clarificatory letter, annexure "F" and on the other hand, if they are held not covered by these notifications, then they cannot escape the liability of payment of entry tax under the Adhiniyam. 13. Power to grant exemption is inherent in all taxing legislations. But an exemption, being an exception and saving, has to be construed properly to exclude from its purview those who are not intended to be the beneficiaries. Justifiable and rational reasons should exist for differentiation and for avoidance of hostile discrimination. In [1990] 77 STC 82 (SC); AIR 1990 SC 820 (Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab) it is held that : "It has to be reiterated that sales tax laws in all the States provide for exemption. Justifiable and rational reasons should exist for differentiation and for avoidance of hostile discrimination. In [1990] 77 STC 82 (SC); AIR 1990 SC 820 (Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab) it is held that : "It has to be reiterated that sales tax laws in all the States provide for exemption. It is well-settled that the different entries in Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule deal with the fields of legislation, and these should be construed widely, liberally and harmoniously. And these entries have been construed to include ancillary or incidental power. Power to grant exemption is inherent in all taxing legislations. Economic unity is a desired goal, economic equilibrium and prosperity is also the goal. Development on parity is one of the commitments of the Constitution. Directive principles enshrined in articles 38 and 39 must be harmonised with economic unity as well as economic development of developed and under-developed areas. In that light on article 14 of the Constitution, it is necessary that the prohibitions in article 301 and the scope of article 304(a) and (b) should be understood and construed. Constitution is a living organism and the latent meaning of the expressions used can be given effect to only if a particular situation arises. It is not that with changing times the meaning changes but changing times illustrate and illuminate the meaning of the expressions used. The connotation of the expressions used takes its shape and colour in evolving dynamic situations. A backward State or a disturbed State cannot with parity engage in competition with advanced or developed States. Even within a State, there are often backward areas which can be developed only if some special incentives are granted. If the incentives in the form of subsidies or grant are given to any part or unit of a State so that it may come out of its limping or infancy to compete as equals with others, that, in our opinion, does not and cannot contravene the spirit and the letter of Part XIII of the Constitution. However, this is permissible only if there is a valid reason, that is to say, if there are justifiable and rational reasons for differentiation. If there is none, it will amount to hostile discrimination. Judged in this light, despite the submissions of Mr. Sanjay Parikh and Mr. However, this is permissible only if there is a valid reason, that is to say, if there are justifiable and rational reasons for differentiation. If there is none, it will amount to hostile discrimination. Judged in this light, despite the submissions of Mr. Sanjay Parikh and Mr. Vaidyanathan, we are unable to accept the contentions that the petitioners sought to urge in this application." 14. The dictionary meaning of the word "weave" is to interlace threads in a loom, to unite by intermixing, to insert, to practise weaving and of the word "weaver" is one who weaves. The notifications have employed the word "weavers" without saying further as "who weave personally, i.e., per se". The point is as to what is to be understood by the word "weavers" in the context of taxation and what is the significance of words "handloom and powerloom". 15. Lord Denning observed in Seaford Estates Asher (1949) 2 All ER 155 that a Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but can and should iron out the creases. Now when assessees claim that they too are handloom and powerloom weavers when they manufacture cloth on such looms through the labour of those who indisputably are weavers and sell the same as class of dealers, do they alter the material of which notifications are woven or simply iron out creases ? Similarly, when the revenue chooses to add words like "per se" after the word weavers, does it alter the material or only iron out creases ? 16. Before proceeding further, it is significant to notice that notifications do not employ the words "per se". Now on such addition, does one find alteration to say like New Testament that "The letter killeth". The spirit and on removal of these words, does one find the conferment of exemption on these assessees as well to state that "spirit giveth life" to the notifications ? What is the object or reason ? What is the significance of the words "weavers" and "class of dealers" as against "any goods" or "class of goods" ? Is there any case of ambiguity in the notifications and, if so, what is the surest guide to solve the conundrum ? Is there any real difference between the expressions "to do" and "to cause to be done" in the context of Incidence of taxation ? Is there any case of ambiguity in the notifications and, if so, what is the surest guide to solve the conundrum ? Is there any real difference between the expressions "to do" and "to cause to be done" in the context of Incidence of taxation ? Does such activity not give rise to "same class of dealers" in terms of business ? 17. It is in the area of legislative ambiguities, yet not receding, that courts have to fill gaps, clear doubts and mitigate hardships. In the words of Judge learned Hand, spoken in Cabell v. Markhan (1945) 148 F 2d 737, 739, we get enough light to locate correct path : "It is one of surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence....to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." 18. Section 3 of the Adhiniyam provides that : "3. Incidence of taxation. - (1) There shall be levied an entry tax - (a) on the entry in the course of business of a dealer of goods specified in Schedule II, into each local area for consumption, use or sale therein; and (b) on the entry in the course of business of a dealer of goods specified in Schedule III, into each local area for consumption or use of such goods as raw material or incidental goods or as packing material or in the execution of works contracts but not for sale therein; and such tax shall be paid by every dealer liable to tax under the Vanijyik Kar Adhiniyam who has effected entry of such goods :" 19. It is clear that entry tax, i.e., "such tax shall be paid by every dealer liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act". The words "Sales Tax Act" are now replaced by the words "Vanijyik Kar Adhiniyam" by M.P. Act 11 of 1995. It is an admitted position that no tax is imposed under the Sales Tax Act on these assessees. These are thus not shown to be the dealers liable to tax under the aforesaid Act. 20. The words "Sales Tax Act" are now replaced by the words "Vanijyik Kar Adhiniyam" by M.P. Act 11 of 1995. It is an admitted position that no tax is imposed under the Sales Tax Act on these assessees. These are thus not shown to be the dealers liable to tax under the aforesaid Act. 20. In the case of Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, Ajmer v. Shanker Namkin Bhandar [1989] 73 STC 252 (Raj), the undernoted question was also referred for opinion : "(1) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee is entitled for exemption under Notification No. F5(31)FD/CT/72-16 dated 28th July, 1972 although he has employed servants for preparation of namkins, etc." 21. The court after consideration answered the question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue (page 255). 22. In the notification, which fell for consideration in the aforesaid case, the words used were "prepared by themselves". The exemption was thus granted to the dealers who prepared deshi-sweet and namkins themselves. The court held that these words cannot be construed to mean "cooked or prepared personally" and that the words as used would cover within their ambit the articles prepared by the assessee with the help of the employees. The court held as under : "..........This shows that whenever it was intended to confine the preparation by the assessee himself and to exclude preparations made with the help of employees specific words to that effect have been used. The absence of such specific words in the notification dated 28th July, 1972 indicates that the said notification does not exclude from its ambit deshi-sweet and namkins prepared by the assessee with the assistance of persons employed by him. The first question, therefore, must be decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee." 23. In the instant cases, the notifications contain the words "Handloom and powerloom weavers". Firstly, it does not further say "who weave themselves" and secondly, even then it would not be construed as restrictive to personal activity only. However, absence of these specific words in the notifications further indicate that there is no scope for confusion and that the notifications do not exclude from their ambit the dealers who manufactured the cloth with the assistance of the persons employed by them. However, absence of these specific words in the notifications further indicate that there is no scope for confusion and that the notifications do not exclude from their ambit the dealers who manufactured the cloth with the assistance of the persons employed by them. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that the applicant and the petitioners do fall in the category of "class of dealers" as "Handloom and powerloom weavers" covered by the notifications in question. Any other meaning would introduce incongruity and would lead to hostile discrimination. The emphasis is on "class" and not on a class in a class. It is trite law that "like should be treated alike". We see no justification to give restrictive meaning to the notifications as was done by the Tribunal and revisional authorities. It is not permissible to create a class in class. In view of the aforesaid position, we are satisfied that the assessees herein are entitled to the benefit of the exemption conferred by the notifications and they do not stand excluded from their ambit. 24. We hold about entitlement because notifications (annexures "D" and "E") have exempted "Handloom and powerloom weavers" as class of dealers from operation of specified sections. In other words, the exemption pertains to the dealers who sell cloth woven on these looms. Notifications do not use expression like "per se" which is a Latin word meaning "by itself. It is legitimate to say that Ne obliviscaris that notifications, born on the fulcrum of statutory power, like a statute must be construed according to its plain language and neither should anything be added nor should anything be subtracted. More than eight decades ago Lord Mersey in Thompson v. Goold & Co. [1910] AC 409 that "It is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there and in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do". Lord Loreburn, LC also observed in Vickers, Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans [1910] AC 444 that "we are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself'. We are not shown any reason, much less clear, or necessity, again muchless clear, to justify addition of words like "per se". We are not shown any reason, much less clear, or necessity, again muchless clear, to justify addition of words like "per se". Luculently, it is the class of dealers, different from other classes, involved in the business of weaved cloth on looms. Contrary view of the Tribunal and authorities seems to be recorded impromptu or without appreciation of purpose or object. 25. The clear purpose and object are to benefit weavers, irrespective of the situation whether they weave for themselves or for others like the assessees. If they do for others, then their employers, on exemption of tax, can ameliorate their position. By putting a different meaning, Revenue is not entitled to blur the distinction between tax avoidance which is legitimate and tax evasion which is not. The former carries no ignominy. 26. In the light of purpose and object, as flows from the notifications, we have thus found it fit to hold that these assessees are handloom and powerloom weavers and appropriately give at least the gleam that they belong to the category of exempted class of dealers in terms of the notifications. The incentive by way of exemption can help weavers, weaving for themselves or as employees for others, to come out of the limping to compete as equals with others manufacturing and selling cloth spun on machines. We, thus, see justifiable and rational reasons to provide relief in this manner and hold that, in the absence of restrictive words, notifications remain applicable. Revenue has not imposed liability of sales tax on these assessees. If there is comfort on exit, why should there be discomfort on entry of raw material ? 27. Our country has 15 per cent of the world's population but has meagre 1.5 per cent of the world's income. Soon the country would usher in 21st century but still it is 21st poorest nation on the earth. The Revenue should search proper avenues. The State Government are expected, nay required, to issue notifications, whenever held proper and prudent, free from ambiguity. Why should these be left to guess work or interpretation ? Why should these be not associated with "objects and reasons" spelling out as to which assessees are covered and which ones are left out on justifiable and rational basis ? The State Government are expected, nay required, to issue notifications, whenever held proper and prudent, free from ambiguity. Why should these be left to guess work or interpretation ? Why should these be not associated with "objects and reasons" spelling out as to which assessees are covered and which ones are left out on justifiable and rational basis ? Or was Lord Keynes right when he observed that "Men will do the rational thing, but only after exploring all other alternatives ?" We do not subscribe to this view and hold that men should do the rational thing straightway. So we revert to the notifications and find that handloom and powerloom weavers, constituting class of dealers required to compete with others as equals are undoubtedly exempted as the assessees herein spin cloth on handloom and powerloom with the assistance of workers to weave and are thus nothing but such weavers as class of dealers. Let's then preserve the "spirit" of the notifications and need not go by the "letter" alone, if that is seen as creating confusion. And on experiencing any confusion. State Government could have been approached to know the intent and extent to end the exercise. 28. What is thus clear is that - (i) Assessees are manufacturing cloth on handlooms and powerlooms and selling this product as dealers. (ii) They have workmen who weave as hired labour or as regular employees. (iii) They have to compete with others as equals and have to ensure livelihood for such workmen as such. (iv) They are thus handloom and powerloom weavers constituting a "class of dealers". They are manufacturers in terms of section 2(j) and dealers in terms of section 2(d) of the Act. (v) They are "class of dealers" as envisaged by the notifications. The exemption is to weaving and not to weaver per se. 29. The expression, "class of dealers", employed in the notifications, thus, in our view, serves as a surest guide to spell out the purpose and object sought to be accomplished. It is not intended to benefit "any dealer" but "class of dealers" in terms of section 12(1)(ii) of the Act. In our view, weaver per se would be "any dealer" and not "class of dealers". This provides the key to the solution and unlocks the problem. It is not intended to benefit "any dealer" but "class of dealers" in terms of section 12(1)(ii) of the Act. In our view, weaver per se would be "any dealer" and not "class of dealers". This provides the key to the solution and unlocks the problem. The distinction between "any dealer" and "class of dealers", as used in section 12(1)(ii) of the Act gives the clue. The difference between "any" and "every" can thus be easily understood as legislative intent. Any and every confusion is thus laid to rest. 30. The result is that the assessees are not liable to suffer entry tax, more so when they were not made to suffer sales tax. This is clarified by the letter of Commissioner of Sales Tax issued on May 4, 1979 (annexure "F" in Misc. Petition No. 1453 of 1989). 31. It needs to be stated that these two miscellaneous petitions were single bench matters but were linked with this reference matter required to be heard by divisional bench. So on request of counsel for the-parties, we heard these three cases as connected matters. 32. Ex consequenti, we decide these three cases as under : (a) Misc. Civil Case No. 373 of 1991 : The question, in view of the aforesaid conclusion, is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee as we find that the notification itself does not employ the word "per se". (b) Misc. Petition No. 1453 of 1989 : We allow this writ petition and quash the revisional order dated July 29, 1989 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, in Revision No. 127/89/Entry Tax and hold that the petitioner-assessee is not liable to pay entry tax in view of the interpretation given by us to the notifications in question. (c) Misc. Petition No. 277 of 1990 : We allow this writ petition and quash the revisional order dated June 30, 1989 (annexure "G/1") passed by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore in Revision No. 39/R/E/88 and hold that the petitioner No. 1 is covered by the notifications dated October 1, 1978 as extended up to March 31, 1988 vide Notification No. A-3-13-1985(17)ST-V, dated April 8, 1985 (annexure "E"). We also quash the order of assessment dated November 25, 1988 for the period from July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986 imposing the liability of payment of entry tax. 33. Misc. We also quash the order of assessment dated November 25, 1988 for the period from July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986 imposing the liability of payment of entry tax. 33. Misc. Civil Case No. 373 of 1991 is, thus, disposed of with answer as noted above but without any orders as to costs. A copy of this order shall be transmitted to the Tribunal for further action as may be necessary. Misc. Petitions Nos. 1453 of 1989 and 277 of 1990 are allowed in terms indicated above. Appropriate writs be issued in conformity with this order. We, however, make no orders as to costs in these writ petitions and leave the parties to bear their own costs as incurred. Security cost, if deposited, shall be refunded after verification. 34. Misc. Civil Case No. 373 of 1991 is thus disposed of and Misc. Petitions Nos. 1453 of 1989 and 277 of 1990 are allowed. 35. Retain this order in the record of Misc. Civil Case No. 373 of 1991 and place its copy each in the records of Misc. Petitions, as particularised above, for ready reference.