JUDGMENT 1. - This petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. is directed against me order dated October 16, 1987 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Bharatpur confirmed the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharatpur taking cognizance of the offence u/s. 41 (2) of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1974) against the petitioner company and eight of the officers/Directors/employees.The relevant facts are these 2. The petitioner is an industrial unit manufacturing 5 tones of "Ghee" and 70 tones of "skimmed Milk-powder" per day at its factory located at Bharatpur. In the manufacturing process of its products the petitioner allegedly utilises 1000 tons of milk, 125 tons of steam coal and 60 tons of furnace oil per month. The manufacturing process allegedly results in such contamination of water or such alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of water or such discharge of sewage or trade effluent or other liquid, gaseous or solid substance into water as may, or is likely to, create a nuisance or render such water harmful or injurious to public health or safety, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other legitimate uses, or to the life and health of animals or plants or of acquit organism which activity amounts to "pollution" within the meaning of the term defined in Section 2 of the Act of 1974. 3. The non-petitioner is a "state Board" constituted u/s. 4 of the Act of 1974 for prevention and control of water pollution within the territories of the State of Rajasthan. Since in the opinion of the non-petitioner Board the manufacturing activities of the petitioner company created water pollution it filed an application u/s. 33 of the Act of 1974. In the Court of a Magistrate First Class at Bharatpur for restraining the petitioner from causing water pollution, and discharging the effluent in terms of the consent accorded to it by the Board on 20.1.76 u/ss. 25/26 of the Act 1974. The learned Magistrate is stated to have accepted the application of the non-petitioner on 17.12.84 and required the petitioner to act in accordance with the conditions imposed upon it while granting consent u/s. 25/26 aforesaid. 25/26 of the Act 1974. The learned Magistrate is stated to have accepted the application of the non-petitioner on 17.12.84 and required the petitioner to act in accordance with the conditions imposed upon it while granting consent u/s. 25/26 aforesaid. However, on an inspection made by the Executive Engineer (Environment), of the non-petitioner-Board on 10.1.85 the petitioner company and its officers/servants were found not to be following the conditions of the consent and acting in a way as caused "pollution". It may be mentioned that vide its order dated 5.1.82 the Board had refused to extend the validity of the consent granted to the petitioner u/s. 25/26 of Act of 1974 and had directed the petitioner to desist from discharging its trade effluent and while doing so the Board had imposed certain specific conditions u/s. 25(4) which conditions and the order of the Magistrate dated 17.12.84 were found to have been not followed and observed by the petitioner at the time of the inspection of the factory by the officer of the Board on 10.1.85. It was under such circumstances that in its 48th meeting held on 15.3.85 the Board resolved that the petitioner-company be prosecuted for violation of the provisions contained in section 33(2) read with Section 41 and 47 of the Act of 1974. The member Secretary of the Board in exercise of his powers conferred upon him by the Board in its meeting held on 15.6.82, authorised Sri. M.M. Goel the Environmental Engineer to file a complaint in the competent court against the petitioner company and its officers/servants and to do such other acts as were necessary for successful culmination of the complaint. Shri Goel accordingly filed the requisite complaint against the petitioner company and eight of its Director/Officers/Servants on 2.4.88. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence u/s. 41(2) of the Act of 1974 against the petitioner-company and eight of its Director/Officers/Servants on 10.4.88 and such order of the learned Magistrate was confirmed in revision by the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide his impugned order. Hence this petition. 4. Mr. G.C. Garg, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner Board raised a preliminary objection to the effect that since the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence has under gone the examination and judicial scrutiny by the learned Addl. Hence this petition. 4. Mr. G.C. Garg, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner Board raised a preliminary objection to the effect that since the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence has under gone the examination and judicial scrutiny by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge U/s. 397 Cr.P.C. same matter cannot again be examined by this Court in exercise of its powers u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. It was submitted by Mr. Garg that revisional powers u/s. 397 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised for the second time in the garb of powers of this Court U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. in the presence of specific bar u/s. 397(3). 5. It is true that the bar created by section 397(3) does not permit the maintainability of a second revision which may be presented in the garb of powers of the court u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. But that does not mean that the jurisdiction of this court u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. is totally excluded in respect of an order which has been once revised by the Sessions Judge or by this Court under Section 49 x 397 Cr.P.C. The controversy which was there on the point now stands set at rest by the pronouncement made by the Apex Court in cases of Raj Kapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration) A.I.R. 1980 SC 258 , Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi A.I.R. 1983 SC 67 and Ganesh Narain Hegde v. S. Bangrappa (1992) 1 SCC 41 wherein it was held that powers u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by this Court in such case also wherein the impugned order had been revised u/s. 397 Cr.P.C. provided that it is necessary to do so in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While exercising its powers in such matters this court has to keep in mind that not only that the powers under Section 482 have to be sparingly exercised by it in rarest of the rare cases (Rupen Deo Bajaj v. K.PS. Gill, 1995(6) SCC 194 and State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Singh Peeraji Kalpatri 1996(1) SCC 542 ) but also that the validity and legality of such order has already been examined by a competent court in exercise of the powers u/s. 397 Cr.P.C. In view of such authorities pronouncement from the Apex Court the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Gill, 1995(6) SCC 194 and State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Singh Peeraji Kalpatri 1996(1) SCC 542 ) but also that the validity and legality of such order has already been examined by a competent court in exercise of the powers u/s. 397 Cr.P.C. In view of such authorities pronouncement from the Apex Court the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Garg has to be over-ruled. 6. Now coming to the merits of the petition Mr. Mahenara Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner company has stressed two points : In the first place it was vehemently urged by the learned counsel that the complaint was not presented by the authorised person and the same was not maintainable in view of the provisions of S. 49 of the Act of 1974, it was pointed out that though the complaint was signed by Sri. M.M. Goel, the Executive Engineer (Environment) but the same was filed in court by his counsel and, therefore, the complaint was not maintainable. I find no force in this contention. Sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Act of 1974, which is relevant for our purpose, read as under:- "49. Cognizance of offence-(1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act except on a complaint made by, or with the previous sanction in writing of the State Board and no court inferior to that of a (Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate) of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Act." 7. A bare reading of the above provisions informs that in order to enable a judicial Magistrate of the First Class to take cognizance of any offence under the Act of 1974, a complaint is required to be made or filed with the previous sanction in writing of the State Board. This provision does not require that the complaint has to be presented in person by the authority or authorised person before the Court of Judicial Magistrate. The State Board is statutory body having a legal personality and acting in through its officers. The requirements of this provision is that the Board may accord previous sanction in writing to any of its officer to make a complaint on its behalf in the competent court. In fact, it is not at all necessary that in each and every case a complaint should be made by the aggrieved person himself. The requirements of this provision is that the Board may accord previous sanction in writing to any of its officer to make a complaint on its behalf in the competent court. In fact, it is not at all necessary that in each and every case a complaint should be made by the aggrieved person himself. It is quite evident from a bare reading of the definition of term "complaint" as given in Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which reads as under:- "(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report." 8. The definition of the term complaint clearly shows that the complaint which in fact is bundle of certain allegations made by one person against others may be made orally or in writing to a Magistrate. Section 200 certainly requires the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint to examine upon oath, the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination to be reduced to writing and to be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate. The necessity of examining the complainant on oath may suggest that the complaint should be presented by the aggrieved person himself. But the proviso to Section 200 says that when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses in a case, interalia, where a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a court has made the complaint. It is true clear that the proviso carves out an exception to the ordinary rule that the complaint should be made to the Magistrate by the aggrieved person himself. In fact, the definition of the term complaint as given in Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. does not make it obligatory that the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only when the complaint has been made by the aggrieved person himself. What is required for taking congnizance by the Magistrate is that the complaint disclosing the commission of certain offence should be made to him. 9. What is required for taking congnizance by the Magistrate is that the complaint disclosing the commission of certain offence should be made to him. 9. The proviso to Section 200 Cr.P.C. in fact visualises the situation wherein the complainant himself cannot appear in person before the Magistrate. Such cases may involve commission of offences against State of statutory bodies. Therefore, in such cases if the complaint is made in writing by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, such complaint would be maintainable. 10. In the instant case, the complainant Board had conferred powers on its member Secretary in its 36th Meeting held on 15.6.1982 to authorise an officer to file complaint in a court of law. It was in exercise of such powers as conferred by the Board upon member Secretary that the member Secretary of the Board had directed Shri M.M. Goyal Environmental Engineer to file the complaint against the petitioner Company and its officials. It was on the basis of such authority that the Executive Engineer (Environment) of the Board had made a complaint in writing in the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharatpur. It may be noted that in the case title, the name of the complaint had been mentioned as "Rajasthan State Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution), Board, Jaipur". It is thus evidently clear that a complaint in writing had been made by the Board through its authorised officer in the court of the learned Magistrate. The complaint no doubt, appears to have been presented in the court by the counsel appointed by the authorised officer for the purose. The mere presentation of the complaint cannot be read as amounting to not making complaint in writing by the Board or by an officer duly sanctioned and authorised by it to make such complaint in the Court 11. Mr. Singh had placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case by Dev Krishan v. State of Rajasthan 1984 RLW 570 . In that case, the District Magistrate had accorded written sanction to the Food Inspector to launch prosecution against the accused but the complaint was not filed by the Food Inspector, but the same was filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor Shri S.K. Mathur. In that case, the District Magistrate had accorded written sanction to the Food Inspector to launch prosecution against the accused but the complaint was not filed by the Food Inspector, but the same was filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor Shri S.K. Mathur. The Court referred to Section 20 of the Act and pointed out that since the Assistant Public Prosecutor was not the person or authority to whom written consent to launch the complaint was given, he had no powers to present the complaint. This case is distinguishable for the reason that in the instant case, the complaint, as stated above was made in writing by the Executive Engineer (Environment) for and on behalf of the non-petitioner Board and that such Executive Engineer (Environment) was the person in whose favour the member Secretary of the Board had issued the required authority to file the complaint. As stated above, the complaint itself had been filed in the name of the non-petitioner Board itself. Under such circumstances, I find no violation of Section of Section 49 of the Act of 1974 in the present case and therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel Mr. Singh is rejected. 12. In the next place it was urged by Mr. Singh that the Director/Officer/Servants of the petitioner Company, numbering 8 in all, have been unnecessary arrayed as accused by the non-petitioner Board in the present litigation. It was submitted that in the complaint, non averment were made regarding the fact that any such Directors/Officers/Servants of the petitioner Company was in-charge of and/or responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business at the time of commission of the alleged offences. Mr. Singh referred to the provisions of Section 47(1) in this behalf and further made reference to the Allahabad High Court decision. In the case of K. Modi and Ors. v. State of U.P 1984 All. Law Journal 847 and Full Bench Decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Mehmood Ali v. State of Bihar and Anr., AIR 1986 (Patna) 133 . This contention too has no merit and has to be rejected. 13. In the case of K. Modi and Ors. v. State of U.P 1984 All. Law Journal 847 and Full Bench Decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Mehmood Ali v. State of Bihar and Anr., AIR 1986 (Patna) 133 . This contention too has no merit and has to be rejected. 13. The provisions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Act of 1974 clearly say that along with the Company every person who, at the time of the commission of offence, was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The proviso under this Section gives a right to such other person to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due delegence to prevent to such offence. Sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Act starts with a non-obstente clause and says that where an offence under this Act 1974 has been committed by the Company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance or is attributable to any person including any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the Company, such Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The reading of provision contained in Section 47, thus, clearly lays down that along with the offender Company, any person who at the time the offence was committed was in-charge of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and in case it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any person including any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the Company, such Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence. It is thus clear that in the commission of an offence against the Act of 1974 not only the company but also other persons and its Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer may also be legally made co-accused in the case. 14. It is thus clear that in the commission of an offence against the Act of 1974 not only the company but also other persons and its Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer may also be legally made co-accused in the case. 14. In the present case, in para 5 of the complaint it had specifically been stated that the co-accused Nos. 2 to 9 were responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. In view of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 47, the co-accused member No. 2 to 9 have a right to prove that the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they had exercised all due deligence to prevent the commission of such offence. That apart, a prosecutor has also a right to prove at the trial that the offence had been committed with the consent or connivance or is attributable to any person including the co-accused Nos. 2 to 9 which include the Director, Managers, Secretary or other officers of the petitioner-Company. It is thus, evident that it is an issue of fact which is required to be proved at the trial. Since the requisite averments in that behalf had been made by the complainant in Para No. 5 of the complaint, the order of the Magistrate taking congnizance of the offence against the co-accused Nos. 2 to 9 cannot be said to be amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 15. The case relied upon by Mr. Singh were decided on their own facts and view of the specific averments made against the co-accused Nos. 2 to 9, the ratio of the decisions in those case does not help the case of the petitioner Company. It may be stated that none of the co-accused Nos. 2 to 9 ever challenged the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance against them or any of them and this court had to examine this point from that angle only for the reason that specific arguments were made by the learned counsel for the petitioner Company in the trial. 16. No other point was agitated before me. In the result, it is held that the impugned orders as passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner and co-accused Nos. 16. No other point was agitated before me. In the result, it is held that the impugned orders as passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner and co-accused Nos. 2 to 9 as also that of the learned Additional Sessions Judge confirming the order of the learned Magistrate do not amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 17. No order from this Court to secure the ends of justice is required to be made in the facts and circumstance of this case. The petition, therefore, has no merits and is hereby dismissed accordingly. 18. The delay caused in the proceedings of this case is attributable to the accused petitioner.Petition dismissed. *******