JUDGMENT 1. - On July 10, 1990, SHO Police Station Renwal, District Jaipur (Rural) submitted a report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Sambhar, Dist. Jaipur to the effect that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace had arisen between the parties hereto with regard to the possession of agricultural land comprising Khasra No. 46 admeasuring 29 Bighas 16 Biswas situate at village Kanwarpura. Having felt satisfied with the truth in the police report the learned Executive Magistrate initiated proceedings under Section 145(1) Cr.PC and passed preliminary order dated 10.7.90 requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court and put in written statements of their respective claims in respect of the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. 2. On July 24, 1991, on the basis of an affidavit filed by SHO, Police Station. Renwal on 17.7.1991. The learned Magistrate considered the case to be one of emergency and hence attached the subject of dispute under Section 146(1) Cr.PC and appointed the Tehsildar, Phulera, District Jaipur as receiver thereof. 3. Kana Ram petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the order of the learned Executive Magistrate by way of a revision petition under Section 397 Cr.PC. to the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur. Hence this petition under Section 482 Cr.PC. before this Court. 4. Mr. R.S.Rathore, the learned counsel for the Non- petitioner Nos.2 to 6 raised a preliminary objection to the effect that in view of the specific bar under Section 397(3)Cr.PC. this petition, which for all practical purposes is, in fact, a second revision petition in the garb of a petition under Section 482 Cr.PC., is not maintainable. In support of such contention Mr. Rathore heavily relied upon several decisions of this court including Rameshwar Lal v. State 1987 RLW 746 , Bhanwar khan v. State 1991 RCC 456 , and Neeraj Kumar v. State 1996(2) WLC 215 as also of the Supreme Court in Dhararnpal v. Ram Shiri AIR 1993 SC 1360 and Deepti @ Arti Ravi v. Akhil Rai & Co. 1995 JT (7) S.C. 175 . 5. The objection as raised by Mr. Rathore was considered by the Full Bench constituted in this case under Orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice dated 23.4.1992. 1995 JT (7) S.C. 175 . 5. The objection as raised by Mr. Rathore was considered by the Full Bench constituted in this case under Orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice dated 23.4.1992. The Full Bench decided the issue in the following manner "The provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 do not limit or effect the inherent power of this court under Section 482 of that Code. The said inherent power can be exercised for either of three purposes specifically mentioned in Section 482, but in exercising the aforesaid power the court should exercise self-restraint and the said power should be exercised very sparingly for the purposes mentioned in that Section. It can also exercise such power as and when in a given case the conscience of the court is shaken, but such cases will be far and few and the power should be exercised only sparingly." 6. In view of the above answer by he Full Bench the objection survives no more for consideration by me. However, suffice it to say that in view of the specific bar created in Section 397(3) Cr.PC against the maintainability of second revision petition, no second revision can be entertained in the garb of powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.PC. But it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that in all cases and under all circumstance the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.PC would stand ousted, once it is found that the legality & validity of an order and/or the regularity of a proceedings has been examined under Section 397 in a given case. If on examination of the facts of a case it is noticed by this Court that despite the exercise of the powers under Section 397 an order allowing the pendency of certain proceedings perpetuities abuse of the process of the Court or leads to injustice, this court would be justified in exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC to prevent such abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice. Each case shall have, therefore, to be examined on its own facts and no hard and fast rules applicable to all cases and in all circumstances, can be laid down in that behalf. Each case shall have, therefore, to be examined on its own facts and no hard and fast rules applicable to all cases and in all circumstances, can be laid down in that behalf. This view, I think, is fortified by the view expressed by this court in the cases of Kalu and Others v. Karnidar and others, 1990 Cr.LR (Raj.) 606 , Kana Ram v. State (Full Bench decision in this very case dated 16.12.92) and of the Supreme Court in Raj Kapoor & Others v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1980 SC 258 , Ganesh Narain Hegde v. S. Bangarappa & Ors. AIR 1995 S.C. 2364 . 7. In the above view of the matter the preliminary objection is over-ruledNow coming to the merits of the case it is the undisputed position that Kana Ram petitioner and Chitar Respondent No. 4 are the co-tenants of the subject matter of dispute with equal shares. By a sale-deed dated 29.6.89 registered on 3.7.89 Chitar Respondent sold his interest in the holding to Sanwar Mai & Madan Lal Respondent Nos. 5 & 6 for Rs. 72,000/-. This broke a dispute between the parties over the question of possession of the subject land. FIRs were lodged by both the parties against each other. Ultimately Kana Ram petitioner filed a Revenue suit being 47/89 (75/89) in the court of Sub-Divisional Officer Sambar and an application under Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for ad interim relief was filed on 27.6.89. Exparte injunction order was also passed on 29.6.89, but was vacated on 3.12.1990 and appeal/revision against the order vacating the injunction order was also dismissed on 23.12.94. It was during the course of the pendency of the Revenue suit that proceedings under Section 145(1) were instituted on 10.7.90 and attachment of the subject of dispute was made under Section 146(1) on 24.7.91. 8. It is in the above background that it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that institution and continuation of a parallel proceedings under Section 145(1) and 146(1) amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. 8. It is in the above background that it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that institution and continuation of a parallel proceedings under Section 145(1) and 146(1) amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. Reliance in this behalf was placed on the decision of this Court in Kalu and Others v. Karnidar & Others, 1990 Cr.LR (Raj.) 606 , Kanhyya Lal v. State of Rajasthan 1991(1) RLW 73 , Udmi Ram v. Dharam Singh 1988(2) RLW 269 and Supreme Court decisions in Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1985 S.C. 472 ) and Dharam Pal and Ors. v. Ram Siri & Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 435 . 9. Mr. Rathore, however, submitted that the mere fact of the pendency of the Civil/Revenue proceedings in respect to the same subject of dispute does not oust the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate to initiate and continue proceedings under Section 145(1) and to attach the subject of dispute and appoint a receiver thereof under Section 146(1) Cr.PC. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on (1) Shankar Lal v. State 1977 RLW, 454 , (2) Madan Lal v. State, 1983 RLW 201 , (3) Rameshwar Lal v. State 1987 RLW 746 and Surajmal v. Ram Narain 1989(1) RLW 593 . 10. In the case of Mangal Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B Criminal Misc. Petition No. 721 of 1994) decided on 14.6.1996 , I had an occasion to examine the merits of the very same argument as has been advanced by Mr. Rathore. After considering the ratio of the decisions in the cases of Ram Sumer Rai (Supra), Dharampal (supra), Tikuda v. State 1961 RLW 469 , Udmi Ram (supra), Ali Mohd. v. State of Rajasthan 1986 RCC 166 , Shubh Karan v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. Rathore. After considering the ratio of the decisions in the cases of Ram Sumer Rai (Supra), Dharampal (supra), Tikuda v. State 1961 RLW 469 , Udmi Ram (supra), Ali Mohd. v. State of Rajasthan 1986 RCC 166 , Shubh Karan v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1987 WLC (UC) 147 , Surajmal (supra) and Rameshwar Lal Verma (supra), I expressed myself in the following mannerIt is well settled by the decisions of the Apex Court and of this court that hereit is noticed in a given case that a dispute concerning immovable property has arisen between certain parties and such dispute has created the likelihood of breach of peace and the parties concerned have approached the civil or the revenue court to get their titles to the immovable property determined finally and the revenue or the civil court is seized of the matter and is in a position to make appropriate interim orders for the protection of the property and safeguarding the interests of the parties concerned, proceedings under sections 145/.146 Cr.PC cannot be initiated as that would result in multiplicity of litigation consuming public time in meaning less litigation. The proper course in cases of persistence or subsistence of the likelihood of breach of peace despite the seizure of the matter by the revenue or the civil court would be to initiate proceedings under section 107 read with Section 116 of the Code and not under Section 145/146 Cr.PC. As held by this court in Ali Mohd. v. State of Rajasthan (1986 RCC 166) and reiterated in Kanhiya Lal's case initiation of parallel and dual proceedings regarding the same subject matter would amount to misuse and abuse of the process of court which shall have to be prevented. 11. In the cases of Shubh Karan v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 1987 WLN (UC) 147 , Suraj Mal v. Ram Narayan 1989 RLW (1) 593 and Rameshwar Lal v. State of Rajasthan (supra) a view contrary to that of the Full Bench in Tikuda's case (supra) and Supreme Court decisions in Ram Sumer Puri's case and Dharam Pal's case (supra) seems to have been expressed. In none of these cases the Full Bench decision in Tikuda's case was referred to. In none of these cases the Full Bench decision in Tikuda's case was referred to. In the case of Shubh Karan only the Supreme Court decision in Ram Sumer Puri's case was referred to but the same was distinguished on the ground that in that case there had already been a determination in relation to the title to the property by the trial court. I have reproduced above the view of the Apex Court as expressed in Dharam Pal's case which negatives the view expressed in Shubh Karan's case. With utmost respect to the learned Judges deciding the above mentioned three cases. I may observe that the view expressed by them is not correct in the presence of the view expressed by this Court in Tikuda's case and the Supreme Court decisions in Ram Sumer Puri's case and Dharam Pal's case."The above observations apply on all fours to the facts obtaining in the present case. Therefore, in view of the fact that the Revenue case. Therefore, in view of the fact that the Revenue Court already stood seized of the subject matter involved in the present proceedings and was in a position to pass appropriate orders including ad-interim injunction, appointment of Receiver etc. the institution of the proceedings under Section 145/146 subsequently amounts to plurality of the proceedings and continuation of such criminal proceedings simply lead to wastage of public time in meaningless litigation and thus amount to abuse of the process of Court. In order to prevent the abuse of the process of Court, it is expedient to quash such proceedings and bring the meaningless criminal litigation to an end. In case the parties are found bent upon causing breach of peace they may be dealt with under relevant provisions of the Cr.PC like 107/116, 151 etc. and/or be punished for disobeying the orders of the Revenue Court. 12. In the result, the criminal proceedings under Section 145/146 Cr.PC in this case are quashed and the petition allowed.Petition allowed. *******