Judgment :- 1. The second defendant is the appellant in this appeal. One Arunachalam Pillai, who was previously the owner of the suit properties, executed a Will on 25.9.1929. Under the said will he gave the properties described in A schedule thereto to one Vadivel who was his fathers brothers grandson and to one Sivagurunathan, who was a great grandson of his fathers brother. The said property was to be taken by them absolutely. B schedule properties were given to some persons as trustees for utilising the income therefrom for performing certain charities. C schedule properties were given by him to his wife to be taken by her absolutely. In this appeal we are not concerned with either A or C schedule properties. The only property in dispute is the B schedule properties which are described in the first schedule to the plaint. 2. Arunachalam died in 1930 and his wife Parvathi died in 1940, Vadivel died in 1935 and Sivagurunathan died in 1943. After the death of Sivagurunathan, his wife Pattu Achi was in enjoyment and management of one portion of the properties and the other portion was in the management and enjoyment of two sons of Vadivel by name Sadasivam and Thiagarajan who are the plaintiffs in the present suit out of which the Second Appeal arises. 3. According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Sivagurunathan the entirety of the B schedule properties were to be taken over by them and managed as trustees. But with their permission a portion of the properties was being managed by Pattu Achi during her life time. It is the plaintiffs contention that Pattu Achi had no right whatever to bequeathe the properties to anybody as she was only a permissive occupant on their behalf. For the purpose of claiming exclusive right of trusteeship to the properti es, the plaintiffs contend that the terms of the Will executed by Arunachalam which is marked as Exhibit A-1 provided that after the death of Vadivel and Sivagurunathan, their respective Santhathis were to take over the properties, manage the same and perform the trust. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the expression “santhathi” used in Exhibit A-1 would only mean the “descendants” or the children of the person concerned and will not by any sense of the term refer to the heirs of the said per son. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the expression “santhathi” used in Exhibit A-1 would only mean the “descendants” or the children of the person concerned and will not by any sense of the term refer to the heirs of the said per son. On that footing the plaintiffs prayed for a decree for possession. At the time when they filed the suit, Pattu Achi was alive and she was made the first defendant in the suit. The second defendant in the suit was Sivaprakasam who is the appellant herein. He was impleaded as a party to the suit since Pattu Achi claimed that she had already executed a will whereby the properties had been given to Sivaprakasam for management as trustee. Defendants 4 and 5 are the tenants in the suit property and the third defendant has been impleaded as a person who had entered into contract for purchasing sugarcane grown on the suit properties. We are not really concerned with defendants 3 to 5 in this appeal. 4. Pattu Achi died within a few days after the filing of the suit. In the written-statement the second defendant contended that under the Will of Arunachalam, the properties devolved on the respective heirs of Vadivel and Sivagurunathan and as such heir, Pattu Achi had a right to nominate her successor trustee which she did by executing a Will giving the properties to him and appointing him as a trustee. The second defendant also pleaded that Pattu Achi had perfected title to trusteeship by adverse possession and therefore, the suit was not sustainable. Another contention was raised that the suit was bad for non-joinder of other parties who would be entitled to trusteeship. 5. The trial court dismissed the suit accepting the contention of the defendants that the expression “Santhathi” would only mean the legal heirs. The trial court has also held that the plaintiffs could not claim right of trusteeship to the properties described in second schedule to the plaint as there was an arrangement between Vadivel and Sivagurunathan under which each had taken possession of certain specific properties and had been in management of the same. The trial court further held that the defend ants 1 and 2 had perfected title to trusteeship by adverse possession. 6. The trial court further held that the defend ants 1 and 2 had perfected title to trusteeship by adverse possession. 6. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Subordinate Judge, Virudhachalam held that the expression ‘Santhathi’ could only refer to the issues of the persons concerned. Neither the appellant nor Patttu Achi could be considered to be the santhathi of Sivagurunathan. The learned Subordinate Judge also negatived the plea of adverse possession. In view of his finding that the plaintiffs were the only persons entitled to be the trustees and defendants 1 and 2 were trespassers, the Subordinate Judge granted a decree for possession as prayed for by the plaintiffs. 7. The first question that arises for consideration turns on the construction of the Will Exhibit A-1. I have to decide whether the expression ‘santhathi’ used in the said Will would mean the issues or children or heirs of Vadivel and Sivagurunathan. In the beginning of the Will the testator has said that he has made arrangements set out in the Will as he had no faith that he would live for long and as he did not have either male or female santhathi, his uncles grandson Vadivel and great grandson Sivaigu runathan Pillai should maintain and protect himself and his wife Parvathi Ammal and after their life time, they should perform the obsequies. While referring to Sivagurunathan, the Testator has mentioned his age as 15 and pointed out that he was a minor. The Testator proceeds to say that for the purpose of performing the obsequies and carrying out certain trust, the properties set out in the A Schedule were to be taken by the said two persons absolutely, with powers of alienation. Then he referred to the B schedule property. It is stated that the income from the B schedule property and the income from the outstandings due to the Testator should be utilised for certain purposes set out therein expressly. Thereafter, the Will also says that after the lifetime of the said two persons, their respective santhathi should enjoy the property and perform the trust. The relevant sentence reads as follows:— Tamil “Then the Testator bequeathed the C schedule properties to his wife and provides that whatever properties were acquired by him after the execution of the Will should be taken by the said Vadivel and Sivagurunnathan absolutely. The relevant sentence reads as follows:— Tamil “Then the Testator bequeathed the C schedule properties to his wife and provides that whatever properties were acquired by him after the execution of the Will should be taken by the said Vadivel and Sivagurunnathan absolutely. He refers to a decree obtained by him in the Court of District Munsif, Chidambaram against one Karuppa Padayachi and also some other outstandings. It is provided that after the said amounts were collected the two legatees should enjoy the same and perform the trust. The said Vadiv el Pillai is nominated as guardian till Sivagurunathan attained majority. In the last sentence of the operative portion of the Will, before describing the schedule it is stated that the B schedule property should not be divided at any time by the said two persons. 8. It is in evidence that some years back there was an arrangement by which some properties were put in the possession of Pattu Achi and some properties in the possession of the plaintiffs. They were managing the properties in their respective possession and performing the trust. The question is whether the expression ‘santhathi’ in Exhibit A-1 would refer only to the issues of Vadivel and Sivagarunathan and not their legal heirs. It has been repeatedly held that for construction of documents, rulings in earlier cases will not be of much help and in each case the facts and circumstances shall be considered. It is a rule of construction that the entire document should be read and the expression used therein should be construed primarily on the basis of the language contained in the document and if necessary on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. Bearing the said principles in mind, I would refer to the rulings cited on both sides which dealt with documents containing similar expressions. 9. In Rajah of Ramnad v. Soundarapandiaswami Thevar (27 M.L.J. 694), word ‘santhathi’ was dealt with in the following manner: “The words santhathi paramparayamayi used in the Tamil version are of Sanskrit origin signifying literally from generation to generation. The same word santhathi used in an earlier portion of the document which provides that neither the plaintiff Sivasami nor his heir shall have any claim to the zamindari, as pointed out more than once in the judgment. The same word santhathi used in an earlier portion of the document which provides that neither the plaintiff Sivasami nor his heir shall have any claim to the zamindari, as pointed out more than once in the judgment. It is absurd to suppose that it was the intention that the settlement should be binding only on the lineal heirs of Sivasami and might be disputed by collaterals. Further the District Judge stated in his judgment of 1869 that these words were often used loosely among the Tamil people to signify heirs general and the same construction has often been placed on similar words by the Privy Council. It is, I think, clearly shown that under the terms of the compromise the annuity is descendible to the heirs of Sivasami generally and is not limited only to his lineal descendants.” Again it was observed as follows:— “Those words convey a heritable estate from generation to generation. They are even stronger than the words Puthura Pouthra Paramparya. No authority has been quoted for the proposition that the word “santhathi” is to be restricted to the lineal descendants. It means the heirs in general and as Poolar Thevar is undoubtedly in the line of heirs to Sivasami he is entitled to recover the allowance” 10. In Angurbala v. Debabrata (AIR. 1951, SC. 293)=64 L.W. 960 (SC), the Court said that the word ‘heirs’ cannot normally be limited to issue only and must mean of persons who are entitled to the property of another under the law of inheritance. The relevant portion of the document has been extracted in the judgment only in English and the expression used is ‘heirs’. Therefore, the ruling may not be of much help in this case. 11. In Kota Pullaiah v. Grandhi Veeraraghavamma and another (1954 (2) MLJ, 30 (A.P.) = 67 L.W. 1205 (A.P.) Justice Umamesheswaran has held that the etymological meaning of “Santhathi” is “issue of body”. The expression “Santhathi Paramparai” used as a word of limitation to define the estate taken by a person has however come to acquire the larger significance of heirs. “Santhathi” should not be construed in its narrow or etymological sense but should be construed as meaning heirs. 12. In G. Appaswami v. R. Sarangapani . ( AIR 1978 S.C. 1051 = 91 L.W. 141 (SC) (SN) the Court held that the expression “santhathi” could include an adopted son. “Santhathi” should not be construed in its narrow or etymological sense but should be construed as meaning heirs. 12. In G. Appaswami v. R. Sarangapani . ( AIR 1978 S.C. 1051 = 91 L.W. 141 (SC) (SN) the Court held that the expression “santhathi” could include an adopted son. In Sundaramier v. Sarojini . (1994-I-MLJ 255) a Division Bench of this Court considered the expression “jesta varasu” and ‘santhathi paramparaya’ at some length. The relevant part of the discussion is as follows:— “Another term used in the trust deed which requires to be considered is the word ‘santati’. In Tamil Lexicon, published under the authority of the University of Madras, Vol. III, Part I, 1928 edition, at page 1262 the word ‘santati’ is given the following meaning: “santati” descendant, heir, son, lineage, pedigree.” It is in the background of the meaning to be attached to the expression ‘Varish’ and ‘santati’ that we have to interpret the trust deed executed by Lakshmana Iyer and Krishnaswami Iyer. Prior to the introduction of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Mitakshara system of law prevailed in Madras. The rules of inheritance under the Mitakshara Law were based on the text of Manu: “sons take the property; to the nearest sapinda, the inheritance next belongs. Mitakshara recognises two modes of succession-succession by surivorship and succession by inheritance. If a Hindu male died and at the time of his death he was a member of a Hindu undivided family, technically called coparcenary, property devolved on his coparceners by survivorship. On the other hand, his separare property would devolve on his son, his grandson whose father and grandfather are both dead, the grandson representing his father and the great grandson representing his grandfather. The female heirs would come in only a limited estate. It was only in 1937, by the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, that a widow of a deceased Hindu was brought in as an heir entitling her to succeed to the interest of her husband in the Hindu Joint family property. However, the provisions of the Act made it clear that the interest which would devolve on a Hindu widow under the provisions of the Act would only be a limited interest known as Hindu Womans estate. Thereafter, only in 1956, the Hindu Succession Act came to be enacted conferring absolute rights on female members of the Hindu Family. However, the provisions of the Act made it clear that the interest which would devolve on a Hindu widow under the provisions of the Act would only be a limited interest known as Hindu Womans estate. Thereafter, only in 1956, the Hindu Succession Act came to be enacted conferring absolute rights on female members of the Hindu Family. Consequently, when in 1919, a Hindu governed by Mitaksbara law spoke of ‘varish’ and ‘santati’ one can naturally infer that he would have had in his mind only such persons who would be entitled in law to succeed to his property and who would be in a position to transmit the interest in the property to his heirs. When such a person stated that the trusteeship should devolve, on his (Tamil) it could be presumed that the words ‘Jestha Varish’ and ‘santhathi’ were used in a restricted sense meaning only male heirs.” 13. In Rajalinga Raja S.S.S v. Thiruvengadathammal (100 L.W. 393) I had an occasion to consider the expression male santhathi or santhathis born to them. The question was whether the expression ‘santhathi born to them’ would include female children also or would be confined to male issues. The question was not whether the expression santhathi would mean the heirs or only the issues, in the decision, entirely apart from the language used in the said document I had no occasion to consider the question which arises for consideration in the present case. 14. Keeping in mind the principles laid down in the above decision, if the document in question viz. , Exhibit A-1, is looked into, it will be seen that Arunachalam wanted to make an arrangement for his properties and also for the protection of his wife in case he predeceased her. On the date of the Will Sivagurunathan was a minor and the age of the other legatee Vadivel does not appear from the Will. Hence it cannot be said that the testator intended the properties to be taken only by the issues of Vadivel and Sivagurunathan, after their death for the purpose of performing the trust. In the context in which the expression “santhathi” is used in the Will Exhibit A-1, would only indicate that the testator intended to refer only to the legal heirs of the two legatees. In the context in which the expression “santhathi” is used in the Will Exhibit A-1, would only indicate that the testator intended to refer only to the legal heirs of the two legatees. In fact be has provided that the respective ‘santhathis’ of the two persons Vadivel and Sivagurunathan should only perform the trust. 15. On a perusal of the entire Will and taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the expression ‘santhathi’ is used in the larger sense and there is no question of restricting it to its etymological sense. Consequently, it follows that the contention of the plaintiffs that on the death of Sivagurunethan, his wife Pattu Achi was not entitled to claim any interests as trustee in the properties and that entire trusteeship vested only in the plaintiffs as by then Vadivel had passed away. Once the conclusion is reached, the suit for possession filed by the plaintiffs as if they are exclusively entitled has to fail and as such the relief cannot be granted to them. It is not necessary for me to decide whether there are trustees other than the plaintiffs once it is found that the plaintiffs are not the only trustees under the document. 16. It is then contended that the appellant being a trespasser the plaintiffs could recover possession on the basis of trusteeship from him even if there are other trustees. Answering to this it is pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant that whatever right Pattu Achi had as a trustee was passed on to Sivaprakasam Pillai under her Will dated 20.11.1981, marked as Exhibit B.23. It is in this connection, reference is made by learned counsel to the judgment of this court in Jayarama Naidu v. Tirupatthi (1972 I M.L.J. 162 = 85 L.W. 49) and Venkataraman v. Thangappa (1972 1 M.L.J. 325 = 84 L.W. 695). It has been held in these cases that it is open to the heir of the founder in whom the trusteeship is vested owing to the failure of the line of the original trustee, to create a new line of trustees and that the remedy is actually based on the presumed intention of the founder that the heirs could be at liberty to make fresh arrangements for the devolution of the trust instead of leaving it to devolve in the family. I have no doubt that the principles laid down in the said decisions would apply in this case. I have already held that Pattu Achi being one of the heirs of Sivagurunathan was entitled to succeed Sivagurunathan as a trustee. She has in turn nominated one Sivaprakasam, the appellant herein, as a trustee, which she was entitled to do. Consequently, the appellant cannot be considered to be a trespasser and it is not open to the plaintiffs to recover possession from the appellant on such basis. 17. I have already referred to the contention of defendants 1 and 2 that they have perfected title by adverse possession to the office of trusteeship. The Appellate Court has negatived the contention because of its finding on the first question that the word ‘santhathi’ in Exhibit A-1 did not mean the heirs but only issues. Even on that basis that ‘Santhathi’ meant only issues, the question of adverse possession had to be considered on the finding of the appellate Judge that Pattu Achi was not entitled to trusteeship and she was only a trespasser and Sivaprakasam was also a similar trespasser, the Appellate Court ought to have held that they have perfected title to the trusteeship by adverse possession. Though the Appellate Court has found that the arrangement pleaded by the plaintiffs was not proved by evidence the Appellate Court has erroneously considered that it is open to the plaintiffs to recover possession from the defendants as they are only trespassers. The Appellate Court has failed to consider the question whether they could prescribe title to the office of the trusteeship as they were in uninterrupted possession for the requisite period. It is well settled proposition that trusteeship could be acquired by adverse possession vide Venkataramanujan v. Parthasarathi (1976-I-M.L.J. 141 = 89 L.W. 12 (SN). But in this case I have now held that Pattu Achi as well as Sivagurunathan were rightfully entitled to the office of the trusteeship and there is no need for them to rely upon the prescription of title to trusteeship. 18. In view of the aforesaid findings, it follows that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of the suit properties from the defendants. Hence, the judgment and decree in the appeal are unsustainable and they are hereby set aside and the judgment and decree made in the original suit are restored. The Second Appeal is allowed. 18. In view of the aforesaid findings, it follows that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of the suit properties from the defendants. Hence, the judgment and decree in the appeal are unsustainable and they are hereby set aside and the judgment and decree made in the original suit are restored. The Second Appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.