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1996 DIGILAW 734 (MAD)

C. Dharmaraj Vellalar v. Ramachandra Vellalar

1996-07-19

S.S.SUBRAMANI

body1996
Judgment :- 1. Defendant in O.S. No. 5 of 1960, on the file of the Sub Court, Pattukkottai, is the revision petitioner. 2. Suit filed by the plaintiff was one for partition and separate possession. In the plaint, there was also a relief for mesne profits. The suit was decreed on 8-2-1965 and a preliminary decree was passed. There was an appeal before this Court as A.S. No. 339 of 1965, which was also dismissed. An appeal before the Supreme Court also failed. A final decree was passed in I.A. No. 303 of 1971 on 24-1-1979. There were also several proceedings between the parties, and, in I.A. No. 423 of 1991, an application was made by the 1st respondent herein to appoint a Commissioner to ascertain the mesne profits. It is against the order passed in the said I.A., the present Civil Revision Petition is filed. 3. It will not be out of place to mention that in a proceeding for passing final decree, against the order of the court below, an appeal was filed before this Court, and the same is pending as A.S. No. 260 of 1993. 4. In this revision by the defendant, against the order of the court below, where by it appointed a Commissioner to ascertain the mesne profits, it is contended that once a final decree is passed in a partition suit, the court has no jurisdiction to appoint a Commissioner to ascertain the mesne profits. The Court has become functus officio and nothing more survives once a final decree is passed. 5. It is further contended that the ascertainment of mesne profits for a period exceeding three years is also without jurisdiction. 6. The said contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is disputed by respondents counsel. According to them, law does not prohibit the passing of more than one final decree. Question of mesne profits is also an item over which the parties are at issue, and so long as that matter has not been decided, legally the suit is deemed to have been pending, and final decree must set at rest all disputes between the parties, and so long as that is not done, plaintiff is entitled to move for ascertaining the profits and is also entitled to get his due share. Further, learned counsel also submitted that even now the dispute is pending adjudication especially in view of the tendency of A.S. No. 260 of 1993 before this Court. 7. Let us now consider which of the rival contentions has to be accepted. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in (1951) 2 M.L.J. 176 = 64 L.W. 669 (Full Bench) ( Babburu Basavayya and others v. Babburu Guruvayya and others ), wherein their Lordships held thus: “The claim of a plaintiff suing for partition and his share of the profits accruing from the lands pending suit is not, properly speaking, a claim for “mesne profits” and Order 20, Rule 12, Civil Procedure Code, has no application to such a case” Learned counsel also relied on the decision reported in 1972-1-M.L.J. 230 = 85 L.W. 95 ( B.N. Thyagarajan and others v. B.N. Sundaravelu ), wherein a learned Judge of this Court has held thus:— “Where a preliminary decree awarding possession contains direction for enquiry into the future mesne profits, that part of the suit relating to the mesne profits continues to be pending and the decree holder might move the Court to hold an enquiry and pass a final decree awarding such profits without the necessity of filing an application within the period under Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Where a decree awarding possession is silent with regard to enquiry into future mesne profits and th e decree has not completely disposed of the suit which, for one reason or another, continues to be pending, there is nothing in the Code prohibiting the decree-holder from applying to the Court for an enquiry into future mesne profits or the Court from ordering such enquiry; and where no relief for mesne profits is claimed in the plaint and the preliminary decree does not provide for such relief, the relief for mesne profits can be claimed even for the first time in an application for passing a final decree. “In all the above cases the enquiry must he concluded before the final decree is passed so that the result of the enquiry may be incorporated in the final decree itself”. (Emphasis supplied) All these have been explained in the subsequent decisions, according to learned counsel for the respondents. 9. “In all the above cases the enquiry must he concluded before the final decree is passed so that the result of the enquiry may be incorporated in the final decree itself”. (Emphasis supplied) All these have been explained in the subsequent decisions, according to learned counsel for the respondents. 9. In 92 L.W. 97 ( K.P. Nalla Gounder v. P. Ramaswamy and others ), their Lordships considered that a suit for partition is not a question of mesne profits, but it is only a question of accounting and, therefore, there cannot be any bar in appointing a Commissioner for the said purpose. In the said decision, Ismail, J. (as he then was), held thus:— “With regard to a suit for partition what is really the consequential relief will be a claim for accounting and not a claim for mesne profits. In a suit for partition the profits accruing from the different items of properties which are the subject matter of the claim for partition will also be properties to be divided among the different sharers. So long as that item of the property is not divided, the suit cannot be said to have been finally disposed of. Any decree that is passed prior to that can only be an interim final decree or one of the several final decrees which came to be passed in the suit.” Their Lordships further held that any final decree which is passed without settlement of accounts will be only an interim final decree. In the same volume, i.e., 92 L.W., at page 489 (D. Nataraja Achari v. Balambal Ammal) also, the same principles have been enunciated. In that case also, the Full Bench decision (cited supra) was considered. At page 490, it was held thus:— “Held , following the decisions in 85 L.W. 699 (D.B.) and 64 L.W. 669 (F.B.), O. 20, R. 12, C.P.C. will not be applicable to a case like the present case, because when an account of the income from the property pertaining to the share of the plaintiff is ordered upto the date of the final decree what actually happens is the division of an integral partition of the hotch pot comprising of not only the property but also the income and accretions thereto upto the date of the final decree, and to such a case, O. 20, R. 12 will be inapplicable. The question of the applicability of the provisions of O. 20, R. 12 to the instant case does not arise because in this case, though the application purports to be one under O. 20, R. 12, C.P.C., it would fall within the second and third categories enumerated by the Full Bench and to which the provisions of O. 20, R. 12 will not be applicable. O. 20, R. 18, C.P.C. would govern the present case and therefore, the objection of the appellant that the mesne profits cannot be given for more than three years f rom the date of the decree does not hold good.” 10. In a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1984-1-M.L.J. 200 = 97 L.W. 131 ( Hashumal v. Bombay Halwa House ), the provisions of Order 20, Rule 12 read with Rule 18, C.P.C. were again considered, and their Lordships said that the profits arising from the properties is also subject matter of the suit, and provision will have to be made for accounting regarding profits, and accounting will have to be provided even if there is no relief claimed in the plaint, nor any provision is made in the preliminary decree. It was further held that it is the duty of the Court to set at rest all disputes/issues, and the quest ion of profits arising from properties also has to be considered as a corpus to which the parties are entitled to. The relevant portion of the said decision reads thus:— “However the provisions of Order 20, Rule 12 and Order 20, Rule 18 of the Code are exceptions to such general rule. In the circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the plaint does not contain a prayer for future mesne profits, the Court will have jurisdiction to pass a decree for mesne profits Similarly it is equally well settled that in a suit for partition where there is no prayer for mesne profits and a preliminary decree also does not provide for mesne profits, an application can however be filed after the preliminary decree and before the final decree is passed. The reason is that profits arising from the properties which are eventually to be allowed to be plaintiff form part and parcel of the corpus itself and are as much in the hotchpot as the lands themselves. The reason is that profits arising from the properties which are eventually to be allowed to be plaintiff form part and parcel of the corpus itself and are as much in the hotchpot as the lands themselves. It may also be noted that a partition suit does not come to an end with the passing of the preliminary decree. On the other hand it is still a pending suit. Even after the passing of the preliminary decree it is open to the Court to give appropriate directions regarding the distribution of the profits of the properties realised pending the suit either suo motu or on the application of the parties. It is perfectly justified to order an enquiry into the compensation payable by each of the parties and passing a final decree for the same.” The same principle has been enunciated in 1988-II-M.L.J. 18 = 1988-2-L.W. 447 (P. Ponnammal v. Mrs. Kanakavalli Srinivasan). 11. Finally, in (1988) 2 L.W. 217 ( Krishnamurthi v. Gopal Gounder ), a similar question came for consideration. V. Ratnam, J. (as he then was), held thus:— “Applying the principle laid down by the Full Bench in 60 L.W. 933 to the facts of this case, the application filed by the petitioners cannot be stated to be barred by limitation. In a suit for partition, the mesne profits with reference to the properties forming the subject matter of the suit, and referable to the properties, eventually allotted to the share of the successful party form part and parcel of the corpus itself and are as much in the hotchpot as the lands themselves and it would be most inequitable and unjust that despite a preliminary decree directing the ascertainment of mesne profits, the successful party should be driven to institute another suit separately for the mesne profits, and it is certainly not the policy of the law to encourage multiplicity of proceedings. In other words, mesne profits form part of the very property that is to he divided and when under a preliminary decree, a direction is given not only for partition of the suit properties according to the shares declared thereunder, but also for the ascertainment of mesne profits in a separate enquiry, it is the duty of the Court not only to divide the several items of properties, but also the mesne profits derived therefrom, for, the profits derived are also in the nature of property liable to be divided between the sharers. “The circumstance that a final decree had been passed without reference to the relief of mesne profits granted under the preliminary decree, would not justify the refusal of the relief of ascertainment of mesne profits according to the terms of the preliminary decree. “It is thus seen that consistent view taken by this Court is that where the entitlement to mesne profits granted under the preliminary decree had not been ascertained and quantified, as a consequence of which no provision in that regard is made in the final decree, that matter should be considered as not having been disposed of earlier.” 12. In view of the above settled position of law, any final decree passed without taking note of the accounting between the parties can only be treated as an interim final decree. The question of limitation also will not arise, especially when the profits are sought to be ascertained from the date of suit, i.e., future profits, from the date of plaint. So long as the lis is continuing, the question of limitation will not apply, 13. I do not find that there is any merit in this Revision Petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed with costs.