JUDGMENT 1. - In these petitions identical questions of law and facts are involved. I, therefore, propose to dispose them of together. 2. The petitioners viz. Ishwar Lai, Banshi Lal, and II, Balu Ram and Satyanarayan each filed a civil suit in the Court of Addl. Distt. Judge No. 1, Chittorgarh in respect of plots, the description of which is available in each suit. It is necessary to give numbers of the plots of each plaintiff. The plaintiff in each case filed a suit for permanent injunction and also moved an application for temporary injunction with the allegations that he was given a quarry license by the Mining Engineer in respect of the suit plot and which was renewed from year to year. When the plaintiff filed an application for renewal of the above for the period of 1-7-93 to 30-6-94 the same was refused on the ground that City Monitoring Committee constituted by the concerned Collector found that the plot in respect of which the renewal of the license was sought situated at a point within the distance of 45 mtrs. from the river. As such under sub-Rule (26) of Rule 18, the same could not be renewed. The plaintiff alleged that the order refusing the renewal at the behest of the City Monitoring Committee was erroneous factually as well as legally. The above plot does not come within the distance of 45 mtrs. from the river. The Commissioner appointed by this Court also submitted a report in which this factual error was pointed out. Before refusing the renewal, no opportunity was given to the plaintiff to represent his case. According to the Mines and Minerals Concessions Rules 1986, the license could have renewed from year to year for a maximum period of 30 years as per Rule 26 of the rules. Hence, the order rejecting the renewal dated 25-2-94 is illegal and against the rules. The plaintiff made heavy investment in order to operate the quarry and if the defendants are not restrained by temporary injunction the plaintiff may suffer irreparable loss. Since the ground on which the renewal was refused was baseless, the plaintiff has got a prima facie case. 3. The plaintiff made heavy investment in order to operate the quarry and if the defendants are not restrained by temporary injunction the plaintiff may suffer irreparable loss. Since the ground on which the renewal was refused was baseless, the plaintiff has got a prima facie case. 3. The defendant contested the application on the ground that the recommendations made by the City Monitoring Committee was correct and on account of geological imbalance and hazards, the legislature by enacting Rule 18(26) did not allow a licence to operate the quarry which is at a distance of 45 mtrs. from the river. It was also averred that the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction inasmuch as the plaintiff-petitioner could have filed an appeal under Rule 43 to the Director, Mines or revision under Rule 4 to the State Government. Since there are special provisions for filing revision or appeal against the order refusing renewal, the plaintiff ought to have pursued the above remedy. By enacting Rules 43 and 47 of the Rules, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been impliedly barred. 4. The learned trial Court did not find a prima facie case and dismissed the application. The learned trial Court also maintained the above order. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the non-petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has raised a preliminary objection that the revision petition is not maintainable inasmuch as according the finding of the Courts below the remedy available to the plaintiff was either to file an appeal under Rule 43 or revision under Rule 47. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred on account of the provisions made for an appeal or revision against the order of refusal. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Ms. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co., AIR 1990 SC 255 and Ambika Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat 1986 JT 1036 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1073 ). 7. I earned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order was passed on the basis of the recommendations made by the City Monitoring Committee on the ground that the licence of the plaintiff could not be granted as the quarry plot lies within the distance of 45 mtrs. from the river Hence, it cannot be said that the above order is passed under the above Rules. from the river Hence, it cannot be said that the above order is passed under the above Rules. The above recommendations are factually wrong and this fact was even varified by the Commissioner who inspected the site and measured the distance between the various plots and the river. Since the renewal was not refused under the Rules, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be ousted Learned counsel has placed reliance on Dev a Ram v. State 1979 WLN-1. 8. I have considered the rival contentions. The important question for determination in this case is whether the plaintiff has got a prima facie case. The finding of the Courts below is that the order refusing renewal was appealable and the plaintiff could have availed of the remedy of appeal as provided by Rule 43 of the rules. In case he felt aggrieved and he could have filed a revision as provided by Rule 47 of the Rules. The question of jurisdiction is, therefore, seriously involved in these petitions. 9. I may refer to Deva Ram v. State ( 1979 WLN 1 ) which is an important decision and has strongly been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this case Lodha, J. referred to S. 9, C.P.C. and then delt with the case law on the point. In Secretary of State v. Masks and Co. Al R1940 PC 105, the following observations were made:- "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial principles of judicial procedure." 10. In Firm of I.S. Chetty v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 322 ), the appex Court summed up the law relating to Sec. 9 of the C.P.C. as follows:- "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. The mere fact that a special statute provides for certain remedies may not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters covered by the said statute." 11. In the above case, the facts were that the plaintiff submitted an application for allotment of quarry No. 377 under Rule 29. His application was prior in time. The quarry was allotted to defendant No. 3. The plaintiff challenged the above allotment alleging that the Act of the Mining Department was ultra vires, mala fide and was a blatant act of favouritism It was held that the question of jurisdiction has to be determined with reference to the allegations or averments made in the plaint. In that case, the plaintiff further alleged that the Min ing Department did not act under the rules and no order was made on the application of the plaintiff. 12. In the instant case, the facts are entirely different. It is clear even from the statement made in the memo of petition that the Mining Engineer rejected the application for renewal in terms of sub-Rule 26 of Rule 18, though in this connection, the recommendations made by the City Monitoring Committee was taken into consideration. All the same in substance it can be said that the order was passed in terms of sub-Rule 26 of Rule 18 of the rules. Hence, I am unable to accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order was not passed under the rules. It was definitely passed with reference to sub-Rule 26 of Rule 18 of the rules. Hence, there was absolutely no impediment if the plaintiff filed an appeal under Rule 43 of the rules The only ground on which the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to invoke the Civil Court with the jurisdiction to try this matter was that the impugned order cannot be said to have been passed under the above rules. This contention is devoid of force. 13. In Ambika Quarry Works' case, (AIR 1937 SC 1073) (supra), the Supreme Court stated that renewal of a quarry lease cannot be claimed as a matter of right notwithstanding of the fact that the aggrieved party had invested large sum of money in mining of the quarry. This contention is devoid of force. 13. In Ambika Quarry Works' case, (AIR 1937 SC 1073) (supra), the Supreme Court stated that renewal of a quarry lease cannot be claimed as a matter of right notwithstanding of the fact that the aggrieved party had invested large sum of money in mining of the quarry. In Jitendra Nath's case, ( AIR 1990 SC 255 ) the appellant claimed relief of wages. It was held that the above relief could be granted under the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, the above reliefs did not fall within the preview of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. It was, therefore, held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was held to be impliedly excluded. In the instant cases also since the imugned order could have ben challenged under Rule 43 by way of an appeal, it may be inferred that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was impliedly excluded. Hence, in my opinion the Courts, below have not committed any jurisdictional error in not finding a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. 14. For the above reasons, I do not find any substance in the revision petitions and the same are hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******