ORDER T.S. Doabia, J. 1. The respondent a handicapped person-sought benefit of Chapter IIII-A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). His status as a handicapped person and that he does fall within the term landlord as defined in section 23-J of the Act is not in dispute. As a matter of fact, no serious argument with regard to physical handicapped condition of the landlord has been raised. 2. The Rent Controlling Authority (hereinafter referred to as Authority) came to the following conclusions: (i) that, there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties; and (ii) that, the premises are bona fide required by the landlord. 3. After recording the aforementioned conclusions an order of eviction was passed. It is this order which is being challenged in the present petition under section 23-E of the Act. 4. Before noticing the various contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be apt to note some of the pleadings. 5. In para 1 of the petition preferred under section 23-A the description of the property has been given. In para-2 it has been stated that the building whose descriptions has been given in para 1 of the petition, there is a shop in the ground floor. It is pleaded that it was given on rent to the present petitioner at the rate of Rs. 145/- per month. A rem note is said to have been executed in this regard. A site plan of the building was also appended. In para-3 of the the petition it is stated that the landlord wanted to start the business of sale of retail cloth. This was the purpose for which the premises were required by him. A notice is said to have been served on the respondents and as he failed to get the vacant possession, he had to resort to the remedy under Chapter III-A of the Act. In para-5, it was pleaded that earlier a civil suit was filed and this was withdrawn. 6. The present petitioner who figured as respondent sought leave to defend. Leave was granted. Thereafter, written statement was filed. In this, it was slated that the shop in question was taken from Motilal Maheshwari. This Motilal Maheshwari is the father of the respondent landlord. 6. The present petitioner who figured as respondent sought leave to defend. Leave was granted. Thereafter, written statement was filed. In this, it was slated that the shop in question was taken from Motilal Maheshwari. This Motilal Maheshwari is the father of the respondent landlord. The fact that there existed a rent note as adverted to in para 2 of the petition was not specifically denied. In para-9, by way of additional pleadings, it was sought to be pleaded that in fact Motilal Maheshwari father of the respondent landlord is the real owner and if this fact is given due recognition then this petition was not maintainable and the benefit of Chapter III-A of the Act was not available to the respondent. 7. Again by way of additional pleas, it has been restated that the respondent cannot be treated as owner of the house and in reality the ownership vests in the father. 8. Thus in para-1 of the petition preferred under 23-A of the Act, the description of the house has been given by the respondent. In para-2 of the petition, it has been averred that the premises was given on rent. It has also been mentioned that a rent note was duly executed in this regard. It was on the basis of this rent note, the tenancy rights were said to have been created in favour of respondent. It is pleaded that this rent note was signed by the parties to this petition. In para-3 of the petition it was stated that on account of his disablement the respondent has lost interest in his studies and therefore he wanted to start the business of retail sale of cloth. A notice is said to have been issued on 30th of March, 1981. The tenancy was said to have been terminated in pursuance of this notice. 9. After leave to defend was granted, the reply which was filed by the present petitioner be taken note of. The present petitioner stated that he had taken the premises from the father of the respondent namely Maheshwarilal. He did not specifically deny that he did not enter into or did not execute any rent note. All that he stated was that it is the father of the respondent who is the real owner. The present petitioner stated that he had taken the premises from the father of the respondent namely Maheshwarilal. He did not specifically deny that he did not enter into or did not execute any rent note. All that he stated was that it is the father of the respondent who is the real owner. In para-10, it was stated mat even if the respondent is treated as a landlord for the purposes of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 1961, even then, no relief can be granted to the respondent. 10. The respondent did place on the record photocopy of the rent note and also the copy of the gift deed. The rent note is dated 15th of August 1974. The gift deed is said to be of 24th March, 1972. 11. Evidence was led. The landlord stated that he is suffering from polio. He wanted to start cloth business in the premises in question. According to him he could conveniently sit at a place and conduct his business. 12. In the statement before the Court, the respondent landlord also stated that he had acquired the ownership of the property by virtue of a gift deed. The gift deed has been placed on the record. It has not been exhibited. This is dated 24th Match 1973. The rent note which is again not exhibited has been placed on the record. This is dated 15th August 1974. The above documents to which reference has been made are merely photocopies. These documents as indicated above were not exhibited. 13. The learned counsel appealing for the petitioner has submitted that the Rent Controlling Authority has gone wrong in recording a finding that the respondent is the landlord. He has argued that the statement of the present petitioner should be read as a whole. According to him, sentences has been picked up from here and there, and in doing so, the Authority has arrived at a wrong conclusion. It has been argued that in para 13 of the order, reference has been made to inadmissible evidence. It is accordingly argued that a mistake has crept in the order passed by the Authority and this Court under section 23-E of the Act has enough power to correct these errors. 14. The argument raised be serialised: (i) that, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is accordingly argued that a mistake has crept in the order passed by the Authority and this Court under section 23-E of the Act has enough power to correct these errors. 14. The argument raised be serialised: (i) that, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In fact, it is the father of the respondent who is real landlord; (ii) that, the present petition is mere camouflage for seeking benefit of Chapter III-A of the Act; (iii) that, the gift deed and rent note are totally inadmissible in evidence and these cannot be looked into; (iv) reference made to the pleadings in which some inference is sought to be drawn regarding some admission made by the present petitioner should not be read in isolation. Same is the argument vis-a-vis the statement recorded in the Court. (v) Summary procedure contemplated in the Act is the same as is followed by the Court deciding a litigation under the small Causes Act. According to him, if a question of title raised then the same should be referred to the Civil Court. It has been argued that, in this case, a question of title did arose and the Authority under the Act should not have decided the matter. It should have sought the opinion of the Civil Court and left the parties to seek remedies before the above forum. (vi) The reference made in the order by the Authority to some material is not apt. The documents were not taken on record. According to him, neither certified nor uncertified copies of Municipal records are available, and therefore, reference made to these documents has vitiated the order passed by the Authority. 15. With a view to point out the scope of revisional jurisdiction the learned counsel for the petitioners has made reference to Ram Das v. Ishwar Chander. AIR 1988 SC 1422 . He argued that stray sentences should not be read from here and there for arriving at a particular conclusion. Reliance has been placed on decisions reported as K.C. Dora v. Annamenaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 , & Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744 . It is also argued that if disputed question of title is involved then the Authority should not venture to decide the same. Reliance has been placed on decisions reported as K.C. Dora v. Annamenaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 , & Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744 . It is also argued that if disputed question of title is involved then the Authority should not venture to decide the same. Reliance has been placed on Jumma v. Birja, 1987 MPLJ 710 & Smt. Ramdularibai & Others v. Chatrapal Singh Punjabi, AIR 1993 MP 90 in support of this proposition with a view to contend that inadmissible evidence should not be looked into, reliance has been placed on the decision reported as Major Pakhar Singh v. State of Punjab & others in AIR 1995 SC 2185 . 16. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the revisional power of this Court under section 23-E of the Act is wider than the powers which have been conferred on this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. Revision as per Black's Law Dictionary means to re-examine or careful reading over for correction or improvement. See Sixth Edition Page 1321. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under the Rent Laws has been subject matter of several decisions. The broad view is that when the findings of facts arc recorded by the Court below and these are supportable on the evidence of record, the revisional Court must be slow to interfere with them and indeed be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassessment of evidence and the supplement a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted and supported the one reached by the Court below. Upsetting concurrent finding of facts recorded by Courts below by supplementing a different finding on an independent reassessment of evidence may invite criticism from superior Courts. 18. In M.V. Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, Kottayam, AIR 1970 SC 337 , while dealing with the revisional power under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 the Supreme Court held that the District Court is empowered to call upon and examine the record with regard to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such an order of proceeding and pass such order in reference there to as it thinks fit. It was observed that the language of the statute permits interference not only on question of jurisdiction but the revisional Court is also empowered to consider whether on the evidence the finding of the Court below was proper or not. It was further observed that in any event the power would be the same as it exercisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 19. In this regard it would be useful to refer to the decision given by the Supreme Court of India in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1956 SC 463 . In this case the power of the superior Court to disturb the decision of the inferior Court or the Tribunal was considered. The meaning of the word 'propriety' was also taken note of. Even though this case arose in writ jurisdiction but the observations made are pertinent. It was observed that there may be tribunals which by virtue of legislation constituting them have the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which further exercise of their jurisdiction depends with regard to these Tribunals. It was observed that their decisions even if wrong on facts cannot be corrected by a superior Court. It was further observed that in case where the fact in question is a part of the very issue which the inferior tribunal has to enquire into a Court will not interfere although the inferior tribunal may have arrived at erroneous conclusion with regard to it. The word 'Property' was also subject matter of consideration. With regard to the scope and amplitude of the term, it was pointed out, the word "propriety" has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. In the Oxford English Directory (Vol. VIII) it has been stated to mean fitness, appropriateness, aptitude, suitability appropriateness to the circumstances of conditions, conformity with requirement, rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 20. In K.A. Anthappai v. C. Ahammed, AIR 1992 SC 1696 the Supreme Court concluded that the question whether the building is required bonafide by the landlord for his own residence or not is primarily one of the fact and the finding recorded by the appellate Court after considering the evidence on record could not be interfered with by exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 21. 21. In Masjid Kacha Tank v. Tuffail Mohammed, AIR 1991 SC 455 while dealing with the power of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence in revisional jurisdiction, it was held that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent findings of the Court below by taking a different view of the evidence. The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the Courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. 22. In Rukmini Amma v. Kallyani Sullochanna, AIR 1993 SC 1617 the Court took view that finding of fact should not be interfered with in revision. It was observed as under:- We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary. In our considered view, the High Court Mad travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word propriety it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional Court can come to a different conclusion to legality regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. In the above case, the Supreme Court took note of the earlier decisions dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and concluded that the Court cannot act as a Court of first or second appeal, "as otherwise the distinction between the revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated." 23. The Supreme Court in Shiv Lal v. Sat Prakash, AIR 1993 SC 275 observed that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction cannot act as a third appellate Court. (See also Union of India v. M/s. Chaman Lal & Co. AIR 1957 SC 652 at 655 and 656). 24. The Supreme Court in Shiv Lal v. Sat Prakash, AIR 1993 SC 275 observed that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction cannot act as a third appellate Court. (See also Union of India v. M/s. Chaman Lal & Co. AIR 1957 SC 652 at 655 and 656). 24. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was considered in the case of Ram Das v. Ishwar Chander, AIR 1988 SC 1422 . It was held that the Act enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of the order under revision which is quite obviously a much wider jurisdiction. That jurisdiction enable the Court of revision in appropriate cases to examine the correctness of the findings of facts though the revisional court is not a second Court of first appeal. On the exercise of revisional jurisdiction it has been held that if the finding of the Rent Controller are vitiated by inherent defect the High Court would be justified in tacking a view that these findings are not binding on the revisional Court. The same view was expressed in Vinod Kumar v. Smt. Surjit Kaur, AIR 1987 SC 2179 . It was held that the findings have no binding force on the revisional Court. It was further held that the High Court in exercising its power under Section 15 (6) of the said Act is within its jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact if the same were improper and also illegal. It was further held that the rule when the Courts of facts render considered concurrent findings of fact, the High Court would not be entitled to disregard those findings and come to a different conclusion of its own would apply where the findings have been rendered with reference to facts. See also Dattonpant Gopalrao Devekata Gopalrao Devekate v. Vithalrao Marutirao, AIR 1975 SC 1111 where similar view has been expressed. Similar observations have been made by the Supreme Court in the case of Faquir Chand v. R.R. Bhanot, AIR 1973 SC 921 . 25. In Rai Chand Jain v. Chandra Kant Khosla, AIR 1993 SC 745 it was observed that revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Similar observations have been made by the Supreme Court in the case of Faquir Chand v. R.R. Bhanot, AIR 1973 SC 921 . 25. In Rai Chand Jain v. Chandra Kant Khosla, AIR 1993 SC 745 it was observed that revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. 1949 is much wider than the jurisdiction provided under section 115 of C.P.C. and the High Court while exercising jurisdiction is competent not only to see the irregularity or illegality in exercise of jurisdiction but also to see the legality or propriety of the order in question. It was accordingly held that where the High Court comes to the conclusion that the findings of the appellate Court are not based on any evidence on the record then the High Court can interfere in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 26. Thus the question as to whether interference is to be made in revisional jurisdiction with the findings recorded by the Court below would ultimately depend upon facts of each case. Under Chapter III-A the decisions arc given by the Rent Controlling Authority. There is no intervening right to appeal. The matter comes to this Court straight away in revisional jurisdiction. As such the examination of the record and the findings recorded on its basis should be reexamined with seriousness. This is because this is the only forum available to the aggrieved parties to agitate against the original order. In face of the above legal position, I have gone through the entire pleadings and the evidence on the record. I am of the view that if the petition preferred by the landlord and written statement of the tenant is read along with the statement made by the parties in the Court, the conclusion is apparent that the relationship of landlord and tenant stands established between the respondent and the petitioner. It is precisely for this reason, the relevant portion of the pleadings have been noticed above. 27. Oral evidence which has come on the record be again adverted to: The respondent landlord in his statement stated that he owns the premises and they were given to the present petitioner on rent. He stated that he wants their premises with a view to carry on the business of retail sale of cloth. He stated that the rent note was got written by his father. He stated that he wants their premises with a view to carry on the business of retail sale of cloth. He stated that the rent note was got written by his father. He also stated that he had given a notice to the present petitioner in the year 1988 requesting him to vacate the premises. In his cross-examination, he did submit that he has been assisting his father in the business of sale of cloth. He stated that the rent was got written by his father. A perusal of his statement indicates that no question was put to him regarding the execution or otherwise of the rent note. 28. The statement of the present petitioner be also taken note of. He has staled that he has been in possession of the shop as a tenant for about 20 years back. Initially the rental was Rs. 90/-. The rental was enhanced and was fixed at Rs. 145/-. In his cross examination, he stated that it was father of the respondent who used to issue the receipts pertaining to receipt of rent. First he stated that he had brought the requisite receipts which were being issued by Motilal. These receipts were however not produced. He stated that he never entered the name of the respondent or his father vis-a-vis the payments in his account books. He denied knowledge regarding the existence of the gift deed. 29. From the perusal of the record it becomes apparent that it is a case of oral evidence against oral evidence. The respondent landlord has stated that these premises are required by him for starting his own business. He placed reliance on a rent note. This was however not exhibited. He also placed reliance on a gift deed. This was also never got exhibited. So far as the respondent is concerned, he never denied the existence of a rent-note. All that he, stated was that Motilal, the father of the respondent is the owner of the premises. A specific plea was taken in para 2 of the petition under section 23 A that a rent note was executed. There is no specific reply given to this para. Again, he has stated in his written statement that even if the respondent is treated as a landlord for the purposes of this Act, even then, no decree of eviction could he passed. There is no specific reply given to this para. Again, he has stated in his written statement that even if the respondent is treated as a landlord for the purposes of this Act, even then, no decree of eviction could he passed. He wanted to suggest that the receipts were issued by the father of respondent. These were never placed on the record. 30. A perusal of the aforementioned evidence on the record would establish that the findings recorded by the Rent Controlling Authority cannot be said to be such which could not be arrived at or deduced from the evidence which has come on the record. Again the respondent landlord has come with a clear plea that he has a gift deed in his favour. 31. The statement of the petitioner in para one of his cross examination cannot be ignored. In the written statement the allegation made by the landlord that a rent note was executed was not specifically denied. No doubt the statement had been made that the father of respondent was collecting rent, but then this has come in evidence and it is also evident that a person who is afflicted by polio could not move from one place to another. In these circumstances if the respondent landlord was assisted by his father in the matter of arranging his affairs then no adverse interfeance can be drawn from this. 32. I am of the view that if totality of the circumstances arc taken into consideration and the stand taken by the petitioner in the written statement and again in the statement made in Court are read together a conclusion is inevitable that respondent is the landlord of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the Rent Controlling Authority appreciated the facts and reached a correct conclusion. The Authority had the advantage of recording the evidence and noticing the demeanour of the witnesses. In such a situation the view is that the superior Court should be slow to interfere with the findings recorded by the original authority. There is limitation on the power of the superior Court to dislodge findings of fact recorded by the trial Court on reappreciation of oral evidence. The elaboration of the principle is found in 'The Supreme Court Practice' (white book 1988 End. Vol II). This is relevant and may be noticed. There is limitation on the power of the superior Court to dislodge findings of fact recorded by the trial Court on reappreciation of oral evidence. The elaboration of the principle is found in 'The Supreme Court Practice' (white book 1988 End. Vol II). This is relevant and may be noticed. Great weight is due to the decision of a Judge of first instance whenever in a conflict of testimony the demeanour and manner of witnesses who have been seen and heard by him are material elements in the consideration of the truthfulness of these statements. It was further noticed that in case parties seek interference at the hands of Court of Appeal then the Court cannot excuse itself from the task of weighing conflicting evidence and drawing its own conclusions, though it should always bear in mind mat it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. The Higher Court ought not to take the responsibility of reversing conclusion so arrived at merely as the result of their own comparisons and criticisms of the witnesses and of their view of the probabilities of the ease... ......But while the Court of Appeal is always reluctant to reject a finding by a Judge of the specific or primary facts deposed to by the witnesses, especially when the findings is based on the credibility or hearing of a witness, it is willing to form an independent opinion upon the proper inference to be drawn from it.... 33. In Sarju Prasad v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 B.K. Mukherjee J., has staled the principle with regard to the appreciation of evidence as under at page 121: In such cases the appellate Court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the Trial Judge. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the Trial Judge. The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the findings of the trial Judge on a question of fact. 34. The speech of Lord Thankerton in Watt v. Thomas, 1947 AC 484 again brings out the principles on the subject and it is useful to quote the same. I do not find it necessary to review the many decisions of this House, for it seems to me that the principle embodied therein is a simple one, and may be stated thus : (1) Where a question of fact has been tried an appellate Court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial Judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial Judge's conclusion. (2) The appellate Court may take the view that without having seen or heard the witnesses, it is not in a position to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the printed evidence. (3) The appellate Court either because the reasons given by the trial Judge are not satisfactory, or because it unmistakably so appears from the evidence may be satisfied that he has not taken proper advantage of his having seen or heard the witnesses and the matter will then become at large for the appellate Court. 35. The position may however be different in cases where the credibility or reliability of a witness is not in question and what is required to be done is to draw a proper inference from proved facts. Lord Reid in Benimax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd. (1955) 2 WLR 418 at page 422. 35. The position may however be different in cases where the credibility or reliability of a witness is not in question and what is required to be done is to draw a proper inference from proved facts. Lord Reid in Benimax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd. (1955) 2 WLR 418 at page 422. It is observed as under:- But in cases where there is no question of the credibility or reliability of any witness and in cases where the point in dispute is the proper inference to be drawn from proved facts, an appeal Court in generally in as good a position to evaluate the evidence as the trial Court and ought not to shrink from that task though it ought to course, to give a weight to his opinion. 36. In the above case, Viscount Simonds pointed out the need to keep distinction between a finding on a specific fact on one hand and a finding which is an inference from the proved facts on other. According to him there is a distinction between what the term 'perception' and 'evaluation'. The limitation on the power of the Court to come to conclusion on its own after reappreciation of evidence is clearly confined to the former. It is observed as under:- A Judge without a jury would fall short of his duty if he did not first find the facts and then draw from them the inference of fact whether or not the defendant had been negligent. This is a simple illustration of a process in which it may often be difficult to say what is simple fact and what is inference from fact, or to repeat what I you actually perceive by the five senses. It is a datum of experience as distinct from a conclusion. It is obvious that in almost all cases tried by a Judge without a jury an appellate Court, which has not had an opportunity of seeing the witnesses must access his conclusions of fact because it cannot tell on what grounds he reached them and what impression the various witnesses made on him. This is a case of oral evidence against oral evidence. The appreciation of evidence by the Rent Controlling Authority does not suffer from any error which needs to be corrected in this Revision. This is a case of oral evidence against oral evidence. The appreciation of evidence by the Rent Controlling Authority does not suffer from any error which needs to be corrected in this Revision. In this view there can be no escape from the conclusion that the finding recorded by the Rent Controlling Authority in this regard calls for no interference. 37. If this be the situation then the other arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the question of title is required to be gone by the civil Court or that the procedure under the Small Causes Act should have been gone into becomes an academic issue and need not be decided in this petition. The law is well settled that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and he has a complete freedom in the matter. It is not the concern of the Court to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a standard of their own. These observations find place in the judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in Smt. Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishna, 1987 (2) RCR 580 (SC). See. Smt. Sakhi Bai v. Major Santosh Kumar (1996) 1 RCR 378. 38. The view is consistent that if on appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence, a view can be formed by the Court that the need is bonafide then the Court is not to superimpose its opinion. The genuineness of the need is to be seen and this need is never static. It varies from person to person, place to place and from profession to profession. The meaning to be given to the term need or requirement should neither by artificially extended nor its language should be unduly restricted as such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act. At the same time the proposition that the landlord is the sole arbitrator of his need is not to be accepted as the only view on the matter. There is no doubt that the subjective choice exercised in a reasonable manner by the landlord should normally be respected by the Court. Where the need for additional accommodation is proved the Court is not to dictate the landlord to continue in the same business. The term bonafide represents something more than a desire or wish to occupy. There is no doubt that the subjective choice exercised in a reasonable manner by the landlord should normally be respected by the Court. Where the need for additional accommodation is proved the Court is not to dictate the landlord to continue in the same business. The term bonafide represents something more than a desire or wish to occupy. It quite clearly does not convey the idea of absolute necessity in the sense that there should be no other possible alternative for the landlord for meeting his requirement except by occupying his property. The Rent Control Legislation is primarily meant for protecting the tenants against the tactics of greedy and unscrupulous landlords who are taking advantage of the difficulties and helplessness of the tenants to extract exorbitant rents from them. It does not appear to be designed to penalise the owners by disabling them from occupying their own property when they bona fide require it. There is adequate provision in the Act safeguarding against a possible abuse of the privilege or the right of eviction on their part. In Mattu Lal v. Radhey Lal, 1974 RCR 441 it was pointed out that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show that he genuinely required the accommodation. When the need can be said to be only a desire and when it is genuinely required, cannot be tested on the criteria of the absolute necessity. The meaning of bona fide requirement was considered in S.N. Datta V. VIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1984 (1) ARC 113, as follows:- Mere desire or absolute need or necessity are both it has been held, erroneous approaches in this behalf, vide Janki Pd. v. IInd Additional District Judge and others, 1980 (UP) RCC 602. The word 'bona fide' mean genuinely, sincerely, i.e. in goodfaith in contradiction to mala fide. A Full Bench of this Court construed this to mean to genuinely or 'in good faith' and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive, vide Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge Varanasi, 1976 RCR 274 : AIR 1976 All. 328 : 1977 ARC 142 (FB). It will not be bona fide requirement of the landlord if release is sought for an ulterior purpose of fanciful whim, vide Dr. 328 : 1977 ARC 142 (FB). It will not be bona fide requirement of the landlord if release is sought for an ulterior purpose of fanciful whim, vide Dr. Dita Ram Gandhi v. District Judge, Meerut 1978 (2) All India TCJ, 326; Smt. Kamla Ahuja v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1981 ARC 371. 39. As such the Rent Controlling Authority has rightly come to the conclusion that the respondent who is a handicapped person wants to run his own business. This is a finding which has been recorded after due appreciation of evidence. This calls for no interference on the revisional side by this Court. It would be apt to refer to some other judicial precedents which are to the following effect:- Where the landlord is seeking ejectment for separate non-residential premises and if he is found to be having requisite financial capacity and is ready and willing to start his shop, then his need would be definitely bona fide. This view as expressed by the Supreme Court in A.K. Veeraraghaya Iyenger v. N.V. Prasad, 1996 1 RCR 268. Eviction was sought by the landlord for his son on the ground of bona fide requirement of shop. No other shop was available to the son except the shop in question. Bona fide requirement no doubt has to be considered to be objectively, but landlord is the best judge in this regard. Such was the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in the case reported as Alimuddin v. Chandrika Prasad and others, 1996 1 RCR 536. Landlady was running a shop. She required additional accommodation. It was held that the landlady is not required to prove that her income from existing business was not sufficient to maintain her family. See: Gopal Krishna Gupta v. IVth Addl. District Judge, 1995 1 RCR 365. In this case it has come on record: (i) that, landlord is a handicapped person; (ii) he can not move around and can do such business which would not require much movement; (iii) that, the landlord has no other premises available to him ; (iv) that, his need to start the business does exist; As such the order of eviction passed in this case can not be said to be illegal. 40. Another argument which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner may also be noticed. 40. Another argument which was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner may also be noticed. According to him the respondent has stated that with a view to raise money he would sell his agricultural property and start his business. He has also pointed out that the respondent is in service and before starting the business he will have to resign from the service. He submits that as soon as the landlord resigns or sells his agricultural property only then the order of eviction should be passed and the order now passed be kept in abeyance till the landlord-resigns or sell his agricultural lands. 41. There is no such provision in the Act. The only safeguard which is provided in the Act is in the shape of section 17 of the Act. This is a sufficient safeguard. The above suggestions made by the landlord would lead to introducing in the statute some thing which the legislature never contemplated. This argument is rejected. As the petitioner is carrying on commercial activity in the premises, he is granted two months lime to vacate the premises. This is however subject to the condition that he would deposit upto date rent and give an undertaking to the Authority that he would handover the vacant possession within the period stipulated in this order. The undertaking to be given within a period of 15 days from today. In view of the above, I am of the view that this petition is without merit and is dismissed with costs. Costs Rs. 500/-. Petition dismissed